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Since its independence 25 years ago, Macedonia has been besieged by 
considerable inter-ethnic tensions and sporadic violence. In addition, a short 
armed conflict took place in 2001. The conflict between its majority Orthodox 
Christian Macedonians and minority Sunni Muslim Albanians in many ways 
dates back to at least the late 19th century. Over time, the nature and intensity of 
this conflict has shifted from peaceful, yet strained, coexistence to open warfare. 
This thesis focuses on Macedonian-Albanian relations since independence in 
1991 and contends that conflict is the result of three overarching factors: 
incompatible worldviews; competing constitutional rights claims; and an 
anocratic state that lacks democratic institutions to manage conflict. 
 
The thesis analyses the worldviews, informed largely by nationalist doctrines and 
religious belief systems, of the two communities. While these worldviews are not 
universal across both ethnic groups, they do form the basis from which many 
currently perceive reality. These worldviews shape the way in which individuals 
from both groups understand themselves and their collective interests, and how 
they perceive ethno-religious ‘others’. Because of their worldviews, the two 
groups understand contemporary problems differently and their opposing visions 
for the future result in widely conflicting solutions.  
 
Competing rights claims between the two groups are a struggle to assert 
dominance over the state by the Macedonians, and exercise greater self-
governance by the Albanians. These competing rights claims – constitutional 
status of ethnic Albanians, local self-government, proportional public 
employment, parliamentary veto powers, and the use of minority languages – 
principally stem from the incompatible worldviews of the two communities and 
their respective visions for the state. 
 
Macedonia’s anocratic state and weak institutions are unable to provide an 
effective bargaining mechanism to negotiate conflicting rights claims. Nor is 
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either community able to provide credible guarantees that it is committed to a 
peaceful resolution of the issues or a long-term rapprochement. In addition, a 
culture of ethnic outbidding by political elites, within both communities, has 
grown over the past two and a half decades resulting in the ethnicisation of many 
political issues. 
 
The larger political parties, under international auspices, attempted to resolve 
some of these issues through significant constitutional and legislative 
amendments agreed to under the Framework Agreement. Rather than addressing 
these issues the Framework Agreement has exacerbated the causes of conflict, 
while becoming a contentious matter in and of itself. The thesis contends that 
there cannot be peaceful cohabitation or successful national integration between 
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Since its independence 25 years ago, Macedonia has been besieged by 
considerable inter-ethnic tensions and sporadic violence. In addition, a short 
armed conflict took place in 2001. The conflict between its majority Orthodox 
Christian Macedonians and minority Sunni Muslim Albanians in many ways 
dates back to at least the late 19th century. Over time, the nature and intensity of 
this conflict has shifted from peaceful, yet strained, coexistence to open warfare. 
This thesis focuses on Macedonian-Albanian relations since independence in 
1991 and contends that conflict is the result of three overarching factors: 
incompatible worldviews; competing constitutional rights claims; and an 
anocratic state that lacks democratic institutions to manage conflict. 
 
Macedonia is located in the central Balkans and shares common borders with 
Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, Kosovo. The country covers an area of 25,713 
square kilometres and its terrain is mostly mountainous and traversed by the 
Vardar River (Appendix One). It has a population of two million.1 
 
Table 1. Ethnic Composition of Macedonia (percentage), 1948-2002 
Ethnicity 1948 1953 1961 1971 1981 1991 1994 2002 
Macedonians 68.5 66.0 71.2 69.3 67.0 65.3 66.6 64.2 
Albanians 17.1 12.5 13.0 17.0 19.8 21.7 22.7 25.2 
Turks 8.3 15.6 9.4 6.6 4.5 3.8 4.0 3.9 
Romani 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 2.3 2.6 2.2 2.7 
Serbs 2.6 2.7 3.0 2.8 2.3 2.1 2.1 1.8 
Others 1.8 1.7 1.9 2.7 3.9 4.4 2.3 2.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia, Censuses of Population 1948-
2002, www.stat.gov.mk (accessed 15 July 2010). 
 
Macedonians constitute the majority (64 per cent) of the population with 
Albanians comprising a further 25 per cent. Albanians are concentrated in the 
                                              
1 State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia, Census of Population, Households and Dwellings 
in the Republic of Macedonia, Book XIII, 2002, www.stat.gov.mk (accessed 20 July 2016). 
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northern and western regions of Macedonia, and represent the majority of 
inhabitants in thirteen municipalities and a significant proportion in a number of 
others. Officially, 57.1 per cent of the population lives in urban areas;2 however, 
many of Macedonia’s cities are small towns by international standards. Only one, 
Skopje, has more than 100,000 inhabitants and only four others have more than 
50,000 inhabitants. In the largest 10 cities Macedonians are a majority in eight 
and Christianity is the dominant religion in these cities. Albanians and followers 
of Islam are in the majority in only two of the 10 largest cities. 
 












Skopje 467,257 Macedonians 71.2 Christianity 73.4 
Bitola 74,550 Macedonians 88.5 Christianity 89.1 
Kumanovo 70,842 Macedonians 60.4 Christianity 66.0 
Prilep 66,246 Macedonians 92.5 Christianity 91.5 
Tetovo 52,915 Albanians 54.6 Islam 63.3 
Veles 43,716 Macedonians 92.1 Christianity 91.8 
Štip 43,652 Macedonians 87.7 Christianity 89.6 
Ohrid 42,033 Macedonians 80.3 Christianity 80.8 
Gostivar 35,847 Albanians 47.1 Islam 66.0 
Strumica 35,311 Macedonians 90.8 Christianity 85.6 
Source: State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia, Census of Population, 
Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia, Book XIII, 2002, www.stat.gov.mk 
(accessed 20 July 2016). 
Note: Figures are for the towns themselves and not the larger municipalities that are named after 
the towns. 
 
Macedonia’s earliest inhabitants arrived in the early Neolithic era (6,000 BC).3 
By the late Neolithic period (4,000-2,800 BC) central and western Macedonia 
had sizable populations.4 The ancient Macedonian clans most probably have their 
origins in the early Iron Age (1,050 BC).5 By the end of the 9th century BC the 
Macedonians had established a kingdom with Caranus (808-778 BC) ruling over 
it. Philip II (359-336 BC) and his son Alexander the Great (336-323 BC), whose 
empire extended from the Balkans to Egypt and India, are ancient Macedonia’s 
most notable figures. In the second century BC Macedonia was annexed by the 
                                              
2 State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia, Census of Population, 2002. 
3 A. Rossos, Macedonia and the Macedonians: A History, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 2008, p. 11. 
4 ibid., p. 11. 
5 E. Borza, In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1990, p. 73. 
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Roman Empire. Following the East-West split in 395 AD, Macedonia became a 
territory within the Eastern Roman Empire and the Byzantine Empire. During the 
Middle Ages it was intermittently under the control of Serb and Bulgarian 
kingdoms, with short periods of self-rule. 
 
Subsequently, Macedonian territory fell under Ottoman rule which lasted until 
the early 20th century. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the 
two Balkan Wars (1912-1913) Macedonia was partitioned between Greece, 
Bulgaria, Serbia, and Albania under the terms of the Treaty of Bucharest (1913). 
Under the Treaty of Versailles (1919) the portion of Macedonia under Serb 
occupation became a part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which 
in turn became the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. During the Second World War 
Yugoslavia was partitioned by the Axis powers, resulting in the occupation of 
Macedonia by the German, Italian, and Bulgarian armies. The Macedonian 
Partisan Army, allied with the All-Yugoslav Partisan Army led by Josip Broz 
Tito, fought occupying forces from 1941 to 1944. By 1944 the Macedonian 
partisans had liberated Macedonia from foreign occupying forces without the 
direct assistance of Tito’s Yugoslav partisans. 
 
The first session of the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the National Liberation of 
Macedonia (ASNOM) was held in August 1944. It was attended by elected 
delegates from across the country and proclaimed the liberation and 
establishment of the People’s Republic of Macedonia.6 ASNOM declared itself 
the constituent assembly of the republic and assumed full legislative and 
executive powers.7 However, the government was divided between those who 
sought independence for Macedonia and those that supported unification with 
Yugoslavia. By the end of the war Macedonian independence was subverted by 
Yugoslav intervention and it became a republic within the People’s Republic of 
Yugoslavia, later the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Its key pro-
independence leaders, including ASNOM President Metodija Andonov Čento, 
                                              
6 J. Shea, Macedonia and Greece: The Struggle to Define a New Balkan Nation, McFarland & Company, 
Jefferson, 1997, p. 176. 
7 Rossos, Macedonia and the Macedonians, pp. 195-197. 
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were imprisoned or executed. Under Yugoslav rule, Macedonia underwent large-
scale economic development and industrialisation. Large parts of society moved 
from traditional subsistence agriculture to working in factories and the state 
administration. Many Macedonians and Albanians also left the country to escape 
economic hardship and Tito’s totalitarian regime. 
 
After a referendum on its sovereignty Macedonia declared independence on 
8 September 1991. The wars of independence and the subsequent economic 
sanctions, due to the break-up of Yugoslavia, devastated the region. Greece 
refused (and continues to do so) to accept the terms Macedonia and Macedonian 
in an attempt to deny the existence of a large Macedonian minority within its 
current borders, Bulgaria claims that Macedonians and their language are 
actually Bulgarian (a position with clear territorial pretensions), and the Serbian 
Orthodox Church (SOC) refuses to recognise the independence of the 
Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC). These factors inevitably affected the 
Macedonian economy, Macedonia’s internal inter-ethnic relations, and its 
political stability. The war in Kosovo (1999) contributed to an influx of an 
estimated 350,000 Albanian refugees into Macedonia, which further weakened 
the Macedonian economy and put more pressure on its volatile inter-ethnic 
relations. The refugee crisis breached the limits of Macedonia’s capacity and the 
country spiralled into its own political crisis. 
 
Long-standing ethnic tensions exploded when war erupted in February 2001, led 
by the National Liberation Army (NLA) in predominately Albanian-populated 
areas. The war was short but brutal and resulted in the deaths of up to 250 
combatants and 70 civilians. A further 1,000 were wounded and up to 186,000 
people were displaced internally, mostly Macedonians who fled Albanian-
populated areas in the war zone. The war also caused considerable damage to 
both private property and public infrastructure. On 13 August 2001 the United 
States and the European Union pressured Macedonian and Albanian 
representatives to sign a peace accord known as the Framework Agreement. In 
November 2001 the Macedonian Parliament approved a series of constitutional 
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amendments based on this agreement. Implementation of the Framework 
Agreement through legislative amendments and policy initiatives has been 
ongoing. 
 
Constitutionally, Macedonia is a republic with three branches of government: 
executive; legislative; and judicial. In theory, the principle of the separation of 
powers exists and each branch is independent of the other. Executive power is 
vested in the government, headed by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is 
generally the leader of the ruling political party or the largest political party in a 
ruling coalition. Ministers cannot be Members of Parliament or hold any other 
public office, and are elected by majority vote in the Parliament.8 The parliament, 
known as the Sobranie, is unicameral with 123 members elected for four-year 
terms by proportional representation from six electoral districts, each 
contributing 20 members and three reserved seats for the Macedonian diaspora. 
Judicial power is exercised by the courts, with the court system headed by the 
Judicial Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, and the Republican Judicial 
Council. 
 
In practice, Macedonian politics and government are mired in corruption, 
clientelism, and authoritarian governance. Georgievski has argued that in a 
transitionary state like Macedonia the constitutionally inaugurated model of 
governance largely depends on the behaviour of the country’s political actors.9 In 
Macedonia the transition process created a “distorted model of practicing 
democracy by the local political elite…[where there is a] strong tendency of the 
leaders of the affiliated parties to dictate the functioning of state institutions and 
overall social and political life”.10 Macedonia has been governed through 
anocratic means with the narrow interests of political elites in mind. In practice, 
there is little separation of powers. The ruling party controls the executive, the 
                                              
8 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia 1991, art. 89, 90. 
9 S. Georgievski, “Separation of Powers in the Republic of Macedonia: A Case of a Multi-Ethnic Country 
Acceding to the European Union”, Duquesne Law Review, Vol. 47, 2009, p. 923. Macedonia is a 
transitionary state in that if is still officially working towards transitioning from a totalitarian regime 
under Tito to a liberal democracy.  
10 Georgievski, “Separation of Powers in the Republic of Macedonia”, p. 923. 
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parliament (through its majority), and the judiciary (through corruption and the 
threat of its security services). Media freedom is low and civil society is virtually 
non-existent. To the extent that it has reach, the ruling party controls almost 
absolutely. However, the state itself is weak and the reach of its institutions and 
security services are limited, particularly in rural areas. Clientelism, corruption, 
and a lack of commitment among public personnel, in combination with close 
clan ties at the local level, creates weak state structures and an absence of the rule 
of law. In some instances, there is a complete absence of the state. While a 
semblance of democracy exists, such as regular elections, these are generally 
tainted with vote buying, ballot stuffing, and pressure on citizens to vote for a 
particular candidate. For example, a 2015 International Republican Institute (IRI) 
survey found that 29 per cent of respondents were either personally subjected to 
pressure to vote a particular way or knew of somebody else that was.11 
 
Macedonians and Albanians (for the most part) live in ethnically segregated 
areas. Villages are generally mono-ethnic and the two communities generally live 
in separate neighbourhoods within cities and towns. Where there are ethnically 
mixed towns and villages the two groups generally live in parallel worlds. There 
are few social or business contacts between them. They patronise businesses 
owned by their ethnic kin, frequent beaches and parks visited by their own 
community, and rarely socialise with the ‘other’ beyond casual conversation in 
the street. Intermarriage between the two communities is rare and strongly 
discouraged. However, it is not uncommon for Albanians to intermarry with 
other Muslim groups (such as Turks and Roma) or for Macedonians to 
intermarry with other Christian groups (such as Vlachs). There are deep ethnic, 
social, and religious divisions between the two communities. Both are highly 
suspicious of each other and are quick to lay blame on the other when incidents 
arise. Koppa has noted that: 
In multi-ethnic states and in Macedonia in particular, the citizen tends to 
identify with members of his own nation, since ethnic identity dominates 
                                              
11 International Republican Institute, Survey of Macedonian Public Opinion, [website], 6-15 June 2015, 
www.iri.org (accessed 3 September 2016). 
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all other. Under these circumstances, all social problems are expressed as 
interethnic. We have been witnessing a gradual but persistent 
ethnicisation of every aspect of everyday life in the country, which was at 
the expense of democratization and the creation of a civic state.12 
The Framework Agreement: A Summary 
The Framework Agreement was signed on 13 August 2001. It was a peace 
accord that ended the 2001 war between Macedonian Government forces 
(supported by Macedonian paramilitaries) and an Albanian paramilitary group 
calling itself the National Liberation Army (NLA). The signatories of the 
Framework Agreement were President Boris Trajkovski, Prime Minister Ljubčo 
Georgievski, leader of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) 
Branko Crvenkovski, leader of the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) Arben 
Xhaferi, and leader of the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) Imer Imeri. 
European Union (EU) and United States (US) envoys also signed the agreement 
as witnesses. While it was not a party to the agreement, the NLA pledged its 
support. 
 
The authors of the Framework Agreement assumed two underlying 
presuppositions; firstly, that the conflict was the result of a denial of group 
political and cultural rights for the Albanian community; and secondly, that 
enshrining these rights in the Macedonian Constitution and legislative framework 
would resolve ongoing conflict between the two groups. The stated overriding 
objective was to ensure the territorial integrity of the Macedonian state, while 
integrating the Albanians into the Macedonian political community and 
guaranteeing the minority rights enumerated in the accord. 
 
The Framework Agreement covers five issues, all pertaining to group rights for 
minority communities that account for 20 per cent or more of the total national 
population or the municipal population. In practice, only the Albanian 
community meets this threshold nationally and in a number of municipalities, 
                                              
12 M. Koppa, “Ethnic Albanians in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Between nationality and 
citizenship”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 7, Iss. 4, 2001, p. 45. 
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while the Turkish community does so only in two municipalities.13 The 
Framework Agreement includes agreement on the following contentious issues: 
 Local self-government and the revision of municipal boundaries; 
 Proportional employment of minority communities in all central and 
local public entities and at all levels of employment within such 
entities; 
 Parliamentary veto powers, whereby minority communities were 
provided with veto powers in relation to specified constitutional 
provisions and legislative acts. This veto power, known as the Badinter 
Principle, is effected through a double majority system: 
a) At the central level specified constitutional amendments cannot be 
approved without a qualified majority of two-thirds of all votes, 
within which there must be a majority of the votes of 
representatives from minority communities.14 This also applies to 
legislation with regard to local self-government and national 
symbols.15 
b) At the central and municipal levels legislation affecting culture, 
language, education, personal documents, the use of minority 
symbols, local finances, local elections, the City of Skopje, and the 
boundaries of municipalities must receive a majority of votes,16 
within which there must be a majority of the votes of 
representatives from minority groups.17 
 Minority group languages are official in addition to the Macedonian 
language at both national and municipal level if they are spoken by 
                                              
13 Centar Župa and Plasnica in western Macedonia. 
14 The Badinter Principle in this case applies to constitutional provisions dealing with the Preamble, 
language, religion, use of minority symbols, ethnonational identity, culture, the Public Attorney, the 
Committee for Inter-Community Relations, the Security Council, the Republican Judicial Council, the 
Constitutional Court, local self-government, and the provisions dealing with constitutional amendments 
themselves, see Framework Agreement, s5.1 and annex A. 
15 Law on the Committee for Inter-Community Relations, Služben Vesnik na Republika Makedonija, 
No. 150/2007, c11(1) and (2). 
16 Framework Agreement, s5.  The Law on the Committee for Inter-Community Relations identifies 44 
legislative acts to which the Badinter Principle applies, see Law on the Committee for Inter-Community 
Relations, Služben Vesnik na Republika Makedonija, No. 150/2007, c11 (1), (2), and (3). These were 
agreed by the ruling Macedonian and Albanian parties at the time. 
17 Framework Agreement, s5.2. 
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20 per cent of residents at their respective levels of government.18 In 
addition, local authorities may decide to make a minority language 
official even if the 20 per cent threshold is not met. The Framework 
Agreement also stipulates that primary and secondary education will 
be provided in the students’ own language, while state funding will be 
provided for tertiary education in the languages spoken by at least 20 
per cent of the national population.  
 Expression of ethnonational identity by the various communities, 
particularly the display of symbols that represent the community in the 
majority within the municipality. 
Notes 
Terminology 
This section briefly defines some of the concepts and principles used in this 
thesis. While many of the concepts and principles included here are contested, 
they have been selected and developed on the basis that they best apply to the 
specific circumstances under examination. 
 
In Smith’s analysis nationalism as a doctrine can be broadly summarised in a 
number of key principles: 
 
 the world is divided into nations, each possessing a distinctive identity, 
history, and destiny; 
 the nation is the sole source of political power; 
 loyalty to the nation overrides all other loyalties; 
 real freedom for individuals can only be realised in and through the 
nation; and 
 global peace and justice can only be based on free nations.19 
 
                                              
18 Macedonian remains the only official language for international relations and use in the armed forces, 
see Framework Agreement, s6. 
19 A. Smith, The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism, 
University Press of New England, Hanover, 2000, pp. 72-73 and A. Heywood, Political Ideologies: An 
Introduction, 2nd edn, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1998,  pp. 156-167. 
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Smith argues that these principles (or ‘propositions’ as he refers to them) form 
the “core doctrine of nationalism everywhere, at all times” and that other 
nationalist ideas and motifs are specific to particular movements and 
communities, and are secondary to the central propositions of the nationalist 
doctrine.20 
 
Ethnonationalism, or ethnic nationalism, is a form of nationalism that is fuelled 
primarily by a keen sense of ethnic distinctiveness and the desire to preserve it.21 
Connor made a distinction between the state and the nation, and between what he 
defined as patriotism (the love of the territorial state) and nationalism (the love of 
the ethnic nation). The nation itself is a heavily contested concept and has no 
universally accepted definition. Many scholars and commentators refer to 
‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ conceptions of the nation. The ethnic conception of a nation 
can be understood as a group of people sharing a common descent, language, 
religion, and culture. On the other hand, a civic nation is understood as one 
where individuals are bound by rights and obligations to the state, along with 
other members of the nation, and are identified as members of a nation by their 
legal citizenship, regardless of their ethnicity, language, religion, or culture. 
Within the Macedonian and Albanian contexts, Connor’s definition of the nation 
as “a group of people who believe they are ancestrally related [emphasis in 
original]” is most suitable.22 For Connor, ethnonationalism underlines the ethnic 
and kinship basis of the nation (real or imagined), which is (in the minds of its 
members) one large extended family.23 Further, Connor argues that to identify 
with the nation means not only to identify with that particular group of people of 
today, but with that people and its saga throughout time.24 
 
                                              
20 A. Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p. 102. 
21 A. Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction, 5th Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 
2012,  p. 172. 
22 W. Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
1994, p. 212. 
23 A. Smith, “Dating the Nation” in D. Conversi (ed.), Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World: 
Walker Connor and the Study of Nationalism, Routledge, London, 2004, p. 56. 
24 W. Connor, “The Nation and its Myth”, International Journal of comparative Sociology, Vol. 33, No. 
1-2, 1992, p. 49. 
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The idea of anocracy attempts to conceptualise political systems that span from 
those in which elements of democratic institutions exist but are too weak to 
accommodate an effective democracy, to countries with primarily autocratic 
characteristics, albeit with some institutional openness (anocracy will be further 
defined below).25 However, very few substantive definitions of anocracy exist. 
Fearon and Laitin describe it as a “regime that mixes democratic and autocratic 
features”.26 Others define it as a regime that permits some participation through 
opposition groups, but that has undeveloped mechanisms to redress grievances.27 
Marshall and Gurr define anocracies as regimes with institutions and political 
elites that are unable to maintain central authority, control the policy agenda, or 
manage political dynamics.28 
 
Regan and Bell have argued that anocracies encompass many variants of possible 
institutional arrangements; however, at their core they have the institutional 
capacity for some broader participation in the governing process, are able to 
facilitate candidate recruitment beyond the selection of a small cadre of anointed 
leaders, and exhibit some political behaviour consistent with a budding civil 
society.29 They argue that an anocracy should meet three critical conditions: 
weak institutions for moderating political debate; a modicum of opportunity to 
make demands on these weak institutions; and politics that gravitate toward zero 
sum outcomes.30 
 
                                              
25 P. Regan and S. Bell, “Changing Lanes or Stuck in the Middle: Why are anocracies more prone to civil 
wars?”, Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 4, 2010, p. 748. 
26 J. Fearon and D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 97, 2003, p. 81. 
27 For example, see M. Benson and J. Kugler, “Power Parity, Democracy, and the Severity of Internal 
Violence”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, Iss.  2, 1998, pp. 196-209. 
28 M. Marshall and T. Gurr, Peace and Conflict 2005: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-
Determination Movements, and Democracy, Centre for International Development and Conflict 
Management, University of Maryland, College Park, 2005, p. 18. 
29 Regan and Bell, “Changing Lanes or Stuck in the Middle”, p. 748. 
30 ibid., p. 749. 
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Ilievski and Wolff define consociationalism as “government by elite cartel 
designed to turn democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable 
democracy” and provide Lijphart’s four key characteristics crucial to 
consociationalist democracy: 
 
a) grand coalition; 
b) segmental autonomy; 
c) proportionality; and 
d) mutual veto.31 
 
The central argument of consociationalists is that elite cooperation can overcome 
conflict that arises when minorities are sidelined through majoritarian political 
systems by compromise or amicable agreement. The literature on 
consociationalism distinguishes between corporate and liberal consociationalist 
power sharing. Ilievski and Wolff identify the main difference between the two 
as “corporate consociationalism [accommodating] groups according to ascriptive 
criteria, and [resting] on the assumption that group identities are fixed, and that 
groups are both internally homogeneous and externally bounded, while 
liberal…consociation… rewards whatever salient political identities emerge in 
democratic elections, whether these are based on ethnic groups, or on sub-group 
or trans-group identities”.32 
 
National self-determination is the idea that a nation has an inherent and 
inalienable right to govern itself. This principle can, and usually is, advocated on 
the basis of natural law where all individuals are equal and possess both a 
conscious and free will. As free individuals governing themselves they can 
legitimately join a group, which in turn governs itself and is free from 
domination by non-members and other groups. Appeals to the United Nations 
(UN) Charter are also made with regard to national self-determination. In 
addition, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
                                              
31 Z. Ilievski and S. Wolff, “Consociationalism, Centripetalism and Macedonia”, Crossroads, Vol. 11, 
No. 4, January-August 2011, p. 35. 
32 ibid., p. 36. 
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are also viewed 
as sources of legitimacy for the idea of national self-determination. 
 
Nation-building refers to a process, through conscious effort, of constructing a 
‘national’ identity by instilling a sense of solidarity and loyalty amongst citizens 
of a given state through the use of a variety of means, including ‘national’ 
mythology (or an official history), ‘national’ symbols, a standardised language 
etc., with the aim of creating a socially, economically, and politically stable 
state.33 It is envisioned that through nation-building, national identity will come 
to override other local, tribal, or religious identities as the primary focus of an 
individual’s allegiance. Once this project is achieved, or is perceived to have 
been achieved, some states continue to use similar strategies to ensure the 
‘maintenance’ of the nation and its continual reproduction with every 
consecutive generation so that its members do not fall back to pre-national 
cleavages or identities, i.e. nation-maintenance.34 
 
Macedonism (Makedonizam) is a term that generally encompasses the 
Macedonian nationalist ideal. This includes securing Macedonia as an 
independent and democratically-governed state in which sovereignty lies with the 
ethnic Macedonian people. As the nation-state of the Macedonian people it 
should protect their culture, language, and identity. It generally conceptualises 
Macedonia within its ethno-historic borders, prior to its partition during the 
Balkan Wars (1912-13). Largely in response to the attack on its right to exist by 
neighbouring states, some adherents seek international acknowledgement of the 
existence of the following as self-evident and irrefutable: 
 the indigenous ethnic Macedonian people, language, and identity; 
 Macedonia as the homeland and nation-state of the Macedonian people; 
 Macedonian culture, symbols, and folklore; 
                                              
33 For an in-depth discussion on nation-building, see P. Kolstø, Political Construction Sites: Nation-
building in Russia and the Post-Soviet States, Westview Press, Boulder, 2000, pp. 16-29. 
34 A good discussion of the concept of nation-maintenance is provided by P. Kolstø, “National Symbols 
and Signs of Unity and Division”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 29, Iss. 4, 2006, pp. 676-701 and 
A. Smith, “National Images and National Maintenance: The Ascendancy of the Ethnic Idea in North 
America”, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 14, No. 2, June 1981, pp. 227-257. 
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 the Macedonian heritage and history in its entirety; and 
 the Macedonian Orthodox Church. 
 
Ethnic or ethnonational groups will be referred to by their self-identified 
ethnonyms without the use of any further descriptive terminology such as 
‘ethnic’, unless it is necessary for clarity. For example, ethnic Macedonians will 
be referred to as Macedonians, ethnic Albanians as Albanians and so on. When 
referring to all citizens of the republic, the terms Macedonian citizens or citizens 




Notes on Transliteration  
ISO 9:1995 has been used to transliterate Macedonian Cyrillic characters into 
Latin characters. This system is univocal – one character is represented by one 
equivalent character (by the use of diacritics), which represents the original 
spelling and allows for reverse transliteration.  
 
The Albanian language uses the Latin alphabet (with the addition of the 
letters ë, ç, and nine digraphs – Dh, Gj, Ll, Nj, Rr, Sh, Th, Xh, and Zh ) and does 
not require transliteration. Where the names of Albanian individuals, 
organisations or places are well recognised in English without the use of the 
letter ë and ç, these will be used to avoid confusion. 
 
Table 3. ISO 9:1995 Macedonian Cyrillic Transliteration System 




А а A a Н н N n 
Б б B b Њ њ N̂ n̂ 
В в V v О о O o 
Г г G g П п P p 
Д д D d Р р R r 
Ѓ ѓ Ǵ ǵ С с S s 
Е е E e Т т T t 
Ж ж Ž ž Ќ ќ Ḱ ḱ 
З з Z z У у U u 
Ѕ ѕ Ẑ ẑ Ф ф F f 
И и I i Х х H h 
Ј ј J̌ ǰ Ц ц C c 
К к K k Ч ч Č č 
Л л L l Џ џ D̂ d̂ 
Љ љ L̂ l̂ Ш ш Š š 






The acronyms used in this thesis are generally those used in the Macedonian 
language as these are also used and recognised in the vast majority of English 
language media and scholarly works.  
 
VMRO-DPMNE (Vnatrešna Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija–
Demokratska Partija za Makedonsko Nacionalno Edinstvo) 
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation–Democratic 
Party for Macedonian National Unity 
 
SDSM (Socijaldemokratski Sojuz na Makedonija) Social Democratic 
Union of Macedonia 
 
DUI (Bashkimi Demokratik për Integrim) Democratic Union for 
Integration 
 
NDR (Rilindja Demokratike Kombëtare) National Democratic 
Revival 
 
ARM (Armija na Republika Makedonija) Army of the Republic of 
Macedonia 
 
NLA (Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombëtare) National Liberation Army 
 
DPA (Partia Demokratike Shqiptare) Democratic Party of 
Albanians 
 
MOC (Makedonska Pravoslavna Crkva) Macedonian Orthodox 
Church 
 
IRC (Bashkësia Fetare Islame e Maqedonisë) Islamic Religious 
Community 
 









This thesis contends that: 
1. Violent and non-violent conflict between Orthodox Christian 
Macedonians and Sunni Muslim Albanians in Macedonia are the result of: 
a) incompatible worldviews (ethnonationalist and religious); b) competing 
rights claims, namely self-determination (Albanians) and state sovereignty 
(Macedonians); and c) an anocratic regime that lacks democratic 
institutions to manage conflict, coupled with a dysfunctional political 
culture; 
2. There was an attempt to resolve some of these issues through significant 
constitutional and legislative amendments agreed under the Framework 
Agreement. However, rather than addressing these issues the Framework 
Agreement has exacerbated the causes of conflict noted above, while 
becoming a contentious issue in and of itself; and 
3. There cannot be peaceful cohabitation or successful national integration 
between the two communities under the status quo. 
Scope of the Research 
The period under investigation focuses on relations between the Macedonian 
community and the Albanian community in the Republic of Macedonia between 
1991 and 2016. Conflict between these two groups has existed at least since the 
beginnings of their respective nationalist movements in the late 19th century. The 
period since Macedonian independence in 1991 has been selected for 
investigation because during this time the conflict has been isolated within a 
local context without direct influence or interference from external actors such as 
the Serb or Yugoslav authorities. This enables the exclusion of arbitrary 
influences on relations between the two groups and clearer focus on the issues 
directly affecting them. 
 
Secondly, this thesis excludes any detailed consideration of Kosovo and Albania 
except for where it is directly related to the conflict between the Macedonians 
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and the Albanians in Macedonia. For example, while Kosovo’s independence has 
an indirect influence on Albanian political thinking in Macedonia (and where 
appropriate this is evaluated), the situation in Kosovo alone does not constitute a 
primary cause of conflict and over the past eight years since its independence 
Kosovo has not produced any significant impact on Macedonian-Albanian 
relations. Similarly, neighbouring states such as Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece 
(which have historically played a significant role in Macedonian wars and 
internal Macedonian politics) have been excluded from this study (except where 
their policies or actions explain some Macedonian reactions to Albanian rights 
demands) as their influence on the Macedonian-Albanian conflict has become 
minimal. 
 
Finally, the thesis focuses solely on Macedonians and Albanians and excludes all 
other ethnic groups except for a few examples which are directly relevant to the 
main research hypothesis. While Macedonia has a large number of ethnic groups 
residing within its territory, Macedonians and Albanians jointly constitute 
approximately 90 per cent of the total population. The remainder of the 
population is distributed among dozens of small ethnic minorities that are largely 
ignored and incapable of influencing Macedonian-Albanian relations or politics 
more broadly. 
Document Research and Interviews 
The vast majority of the research was obtained through published sources such as 
books, academic journals, academic papers, conference proceedings, government 
and non-government reports, statistical collections, news reports, and comments 
publicly available from relevant actors. 
 
Interviews were also conducted across Macedonia during July and August 2013. 
These included interviews with stakeholders and participants involved in 
Macedonian politics (officials from key political parties), relevant state 
institutions (such as the police, military, and educational institutions), religious 
organisations (Orthodox Christian and Sunni Islam), and civil society 
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organisations (pro-democracy movements, think tanks, research centres, and 
community associations). Interviews took place in both ethnically homogenous 
and heterogeneous towns across Macedonia. These included Skopje, Tetovo, 
Gostivar, Struga, Ohrid, and Bitola. 
 
The aim of the interviews was to use interviewee experiences and knowledge to 
test the findings of the published research and to put the hypotheses of the thesis 
under direct scrutiny from those who play, or have played, a role in the area 
under investigation. 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical literature on ethnonational and religious conflict is quite cluttered 
and contradictory, crossing over a number of disciplines including anthropology, 
sociology, history, philosophy, and political science. As Atanasova has noted, it 
may well be the case that no ‘single-factor’ approach is capable of presenting an 
accurate explanation of the whole problem for all conflicts.35 This thesis will take 
a multi-disciplinary approach, to the extent that it is relevant, in examining the 
complex political, institutional, social, religious, and economic circumstances 
contributing to conflict in Macedonia.  
 
Specifically, this thesis will argue that there are three primary sources of conflict 
in Macedonia. These include incompatible worldviews, claims to competing 
rights, and a weak state with a dysfunctional political culture as primary 
contributory factors. It should be noted, however, that because many of these 
issues are so entangled it is sometimes difficult to clearly delineate them as 
incompatible worldviews, competing rights, or those related to weak states and 
political culture. 
Conflict as Incompatible Worldviews 
A worldview refers to the framework of ideas, values and beliefs through which 
individuals and groups understand, interpret, and interact with the world. 
                                              
35 I. Atanasova, “Transborder ethnic minorities and their impact on the security of Southeastern Europe”, 
Nationalities Papers, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2004, p. 374. 
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Worldviews are influenced by various factors, including political ideologies and 
religious belief systems. Incompatible worldviews, informed by nationalist 
doctrines and religious belief systems, are a primary source of conflict in 
Macedonia. Although some of the incompatibilities may be imagined, all have 
the potential to translate into real conflict. For example, Macedonians and 
Albanians have incompatible ‘original peoples’ myths in relation to the 
Albanian-majority populated region of northwest Macedonia. These myths are 
intricately tied to the notion of ‘national territory’ (i.e., which of the two groups 
own this ‘homeland’) and, by extension, claims to the competing rights of 
national self-determination (Albanians) and state sovereignty over territory 
(Macedonians). 
Ethnonationalism 
Cordell and Wolff have concurred that such incompatibility is a central theme in 
nationalist conflict. “Often, incompatible nationalist doctrines are at the centre of 
the relationship between minority and host state”,36 and it is within this context 
that threats and opportunities are assessed and interpreted as either being 
positively or negatively related to the preservation, expression and development 
of the group’s ethnic identity and the ability of the host state/nation to maintain 
the integrity of the state.37 
 
Smith has made a crucial point about the power of nationalism to influence the 
worldview of countless individuals. He has argued that national identity is 
pervasive, in that it permeates the “lives of individuals and communities in most 
spheres of activity”.38 
In the cultural sphere national identity is revealed in a whole range of 
assumptions and myths, values and memories, as well as in language, law, 
institutions and ceremonies. Socially, the national bond provides the most 
inclusive community, the generally accepted boundary within which 
                                              
36 K. Cordell and S. Wolff, Ethnic Conflict: Cause, Consequences, and  Responses, Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 2010, p. 84. 
37 ibid. 
38 A. Smith, National Identity, Penguin, London, 1991, p. 143. 
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social intercourse normally takes place, and the limit for distinguishing 
the ‘outsider’.39 
 
Similarly, Keating has discussed national culture and its impact on the 
worldviews of individuals. He has provided a definition of culture as the 
“customs, habits, traditions, values, beliefs, ways of life, manner of thinking and 
behaviour in a community”.40 Keating has argued that national culture provides a 
framework for the interpretation of social reality and sustains a set of “social 
values which may promote consensus and set the limits of debate and political 
division and serve as a mechanism of social integration”.41 Keating has also 
contended that although cultural activities may or may not be explicitly political 
or make reference to identity and nationalism, they continue to shape national 
identity by framing the issues and interpreting daily life.42 
 
Connor’s assertion that “it is not what is but what people perceive as is which 
influences attitudes and behaviour”,43 is important to understanding the ability of 
incompatibilities in worldviews to mobilise groups into conflict. Even 
democratic political systems and the public policies they produce are not immune 
to the influence of individual and collective worldviews: 
In some multicultural societies the differences in worldview between 
cultural groups may be so great that it is highly improbable that mutual 
understanding can be reached. In such situations, ethno-cultural minorities 
are likely to be constantly on the losing end of democratic deliberations. 
When this occurs, ethno-cultural minorities will suffer serious political 
inequalities and lose the capacity to effectively influence political 
decision making.44 
 
                                              
39 ibid, pp. 143-144. 
40 M. Keating, Nations against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and 
Scotland, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001, p. 10. 
41 ibid. 
42 ibid, p. 11. 
43 Connor, Ethnonationalism, p. 197. 
44 J. Valadez, Deliberative Democracy, Political Legitimacy, and Self-Determination in Multicultural 
Societies, Westview Press, Boulder, 2001, pp. 215-216. 
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On a related issue, Azzi has discussed what he refers to as goal incompatibility as 
a source of inter-group conflict. His work considers the achievement of 
incompatible goals a zero-sum game in which the goals of one group can only be 
achieved at the expense of the others.45 Azzi has argued that the psychological 
effects of goal incompatibility manifest themselves in the form of an increase in: 
 the perception of threat to the in-group; 
 the feelings of hostility toward the out-group which is perceived to be 
the source of threat; 
 in-group solidarity; 
 the salience of in-group identity; 
 the tightening of group boundaries; 
 negative stereotyping of the out-group; and 
 ethno-centric behaviour.46 
 
Territoriality is also a component of incompatible worldviews. “Territory is very 
often a crucial component of the identity of ethnic groups...[and can be] 
conceptualised more appropriately as [a] place bearing significance in relation to 
the group’s history, collective memories and character”, or in other words, a 
central component of a nation’s ‘national historiography’.47 Cordell and Wolff 
believe that the deep emotional attachment to territory that ethnic groups can 
develop and maintain often leads to intense conflict when it is challenged by 
others.48 Further, control of territory provides a power base from which 
minorities can challenge the status quo and can determine whether a group feels 
it is in a position to do so.49 
 
Smith has argued that within a given territory certain areas of land come to 
possess a special symbolic and mythical meaning, and that some ‘ethnoscapes’ 
                                              
45 A. Azzi, “From Competitive Interests, Perceived Injustice, and Identity Needs to Collective Action: 
Psychological Mechanisms in Ethnic Nationalism” in C. Dandeker (ed.), Nationalism and Violence, 
Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1998, pp. 76-77. 
46 ibid, p. 77. Azzi notes that the definition of group goals does not automatically ensure the cooperation 
of every individual. 





are endowed with sacred and extraordinary qualities that generate powerful 
feelings of reverence and belonging.50 Smith has argued that because these lands 
are considered sacred to the nation large numbers of people can and have been 
“mobilised and martyred in the defence or annexation of lands” deemed to 
belong to the nation by ‘right’:51 
Where these lands are by tradition sanctified, the site of sacred acts and 
memories, even greater fervour and attachments can be evoked, and even 
larger numbers of people can be mobilised for battle and death. The 
fraternity of the nation is then lived in and through the sacrifice of its 
citizens in defence of the fatherland or motherland, seen as the permanent 
and unchanging bedrock of the nation, and the sacred soil which 
nourishes its historic culture.52 
 
Cordell and Wolff have provided a more utilitarian explanation and reason why 
territory possesses certain values in and of itself for both states and minority 
groups. These include national resources, goods and services produced by the 
population, the tax revenue generated from residents, and possibly military or 
strategic advantages resulting from natural boundaries, access to the open sea, 
and control over transport routes and waterways.53 Beyond the emotional 
attachments and the resources available to the group, territory affects individuals 
very personally. Territory includes the homes, businesses, livelihoods and 
families of the individuals that live there and few would be prepared to abandon 
them to anyone. 
 
Another important component of incompatible nationalist doctrines is the 
national myth. This is essentially an ‘official’ or ‘national’ historiography, 
supported by an assortment of traditions, rituals, and symbols that are deemed to 
have originated with, belong to, or epitomise a particular nation. It can include 
myths of origin, development, and destiny, which define, legitimise, and inspire 
                                              
50 According to Anthony Smith, an ethnoscape is territory that, over time, has provided a unique and 
indispensable setting for the events that shaped the group in question. This land becomes eternally linked 
to the national psychology of the group, see A. Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation, pp. 150-152. 
51 ibid, p. 156. 
52 ibid. 
53 Cordell and Wolff, Ethnic Conflict, p. 82. 
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the nation.54 Coakley has argued that this nationalist historiography serves one or 
more of the following five functions: 
 definition of conceptual boundaries of the nation; 
 reinforcement of a sense of pride in national achievements; 
 commiseration over unjust suffering that justifies compensation; 
 legitimisation of the current national struggle by reference to its roots 
in the past; and 
 inspiration regarding the bright future of the nation.55 
 
This nationalist historiography is further compounded by a number of key 
features that help reinforce its message. According to Coakley, these features 
typically consist of: 
 national culture: literature, theatre, music and folklore; 
 rituals: processions, parades, marches, commemorations, 
inaugurations and ceremonies; and 
 symbols: flags, anthems, emblems, public monuments and buildings, 
national currency, postage stamps, passports, place names, and military 
uniforms.56 
 
“National history exists in a symbiotic relationship with other national 
symbols…all which serve to bolster the image of the nation rooted in a deep 
history”,57 culturally and politically separated from ‘others’. These myths and 
symbols are able to act as mechanisms for mobilising individuals to defend 
collective interests.  
Religious Belief Systems 
Religion can have a significant impact on conflict (violent and non-violent). This 
results from the values that different belief systems hold, which in turn inform 
public policy and decision-making. Religious belief systems influence many 
                                              
54 J. Coakley, “Mobilising the Past: Nationalist Images of History”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 
Vol. 10, 2004, p. 541. 
55 ibid. 
56 ibid, pp. 534-535. 
57 ibid, p. 536. 
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diverse issues in the public domain, and conflict can occur when these belief 
systems are incompatible on given issues. 
 
Some scholars have made the claim that Albanians are a secular nation and a 
number of points need to be made in relation to this.58 Firstly, this may or may 
not be the case among Albanians in Albania; however, Albanians in Macedonia 
differ markedly in this respect (Chapter Two). Secondly, it is important to note 
the point made by Marsh: 
Even those who think they are unaffected by religion do not realise how 
much a particular religious tradition is part of their culture until a different 
religious tradition begins to make inroads into their societies.59 
 
This is particularly evident in much of Europe, North America and Australia 
where large numbers of nominal Christians that generally regard themselves as 
secular have suddenly found themselves opposed to Islam and the Muslim 
community due to large-scale refugee movements resulting from the Syrian war 
and a number of tragic terrorist attacks in the West. Iveković has argued that 
religious activists and church officials (Christian and Islamic) in Southeast 
Europe, including Macedonia, are engaged in a battle for the de-secularisation of 
society in an attempt to regain the social space that was denied to them by the 
previous atheist regime.60 
 
It is useful to consider the theory put forward by Fox who has argued that 
religious belief systems can significantly contribute to conflict even if they were 
not the initial cause of that conflict.61 Fox has put forward six largely sequential 
hypotheses, which he maintains can explain the role of religion in conflict: 
 
                                              
58 For example, see G. Duijzings, “Religion and the Politics of ‘Albanianism’: Naim Frashëri’s Bektashi 
Writings”, in S. Schwandner-Sievers and B. Fischer (eds.), Albanian Identities: Myth and History, 
Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2002, pp. 60-69. 
59 C. Marsh, “The Religious Dimension of Post-Communist ‘Ethnic’ Conflict”, Nationalities Papers, 
Vol. 35, No. 5, November 2007, p. 824. 
60 I. Iveković, “Nationalism and the Political Use and Abuse of Religion: The Politicisation of Orthodoxy, 
Catholicism and Islam in Yugoslav Successor States”, Social Compass, Vol. 49, Iss. 4, 2002, p. 534. 
61 J. Fox, “Towards a Dynamic Theory of Ethno-Religious Conflict”, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 5, 
Iss. 4, 1999, pp. 456-458. 
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Hypothesis 1: Religious discrimination, whatever its cause, is likely to result in 
the formation of religious grievances within the ethnic group suffering from this 
religious discrimination; 
 
Hypothesis 2: Religious grievances are likely to result in the mobilisation for 
protest and rebellion as well as directly causing protest and rebellion among the 
ethnic group which has formed these grievances; 
 
Hypothesis 3: Provocative actions by a minority religious ethnic group are likely 
to provoke a negative reaction from the dominant ethnic group. This negative 
action can include religious, social, political and/or economic discrimination as 
well as other forms of oppression; 
 
Hypothesis 4: The presence of established religious institutions in some 
circumstances can facilitate mobilisation for protest and rebellion regardless of 
the more basic causes of that mobilisation unless the elites in control of these 
institutions have an interest in supporting the status quo; 
 
Hypothesis 5: The use of religious legitimacy can facilitate the growth of 
economic, political and social grievances as well as mobilisation, regardless of 
the basic causes of that mobilisation; and 
 
Hypothesis 6: The presence of religious discrimination and disadvantages is 
likely to cause an increase in the levels of group identity and cohesion among the 
group which suffers from these disadvantages and discrimination.62 
 
Considering that individual and collective worldviews are in part informed by 
religious belief systems and that these worldviews in turn inform public policy, it 
is conceivable that titular nations with a different religion to the minority group 
can create the conditions that would set Fox’s theory into effect. Even if the 
titular nation consciously undertook not to discriminate against the minority 




group in any official capacity, it is quite possible that a minority can perceive 
itself as being discriminated against through the actions of non-state actors who 
belong to the titular nation. It is also possible that in its attempts not to be 
perceived as discriminating against a minority a government can create a 
negative outcome among the majority community, which may consider itself as 
being unfairly treated. 
Conflict as Competing Rights 
The next primary source of conflict in Macedonia is claims to competing rights, 
which broadly translate into the right to national self-determination (claimed by 
the Albanians as a minority) versus the right for a state to maintain sovereignty 
over its existing territory (claimed by Macedonians as a titular nation). These 
particular rights claims are strongly influenced by the fundamentally opposing 
worldviews of the two communities. 
 
Connor’s theory of relative political deprivation offers a good foundation for 
explaining this hypothesis and how it relates to Macedonia.63 Connor argues that 
the idea of national self-determination – that the “destiny of the nation must be in 
the hands of the members of the nation” – is the main driver behind nationalist 
conflict.64 He argues that nations seek self-determination, or the freedom to 
determine their own affairs, because this is perceived to be the method through 
which they can achieve various political, economic, and/or social goals, which 
are of themselves vital interests to the particular group.65 These goals are 
“ultimately a matter of political control...protection of the nation’s culture, the 
homeland’s resources, the ethnic purity of the homeland, the physical safety of 
the nation and the like all rest upon political power”,66 effectively, self-
determination.  
 
                                              
63 W. Connor, “From a Theory of Relative Economic Deprivation towards a Theory of Relative Political 
Deprivation”, in M. Keating and J. McGarry (eds.), Minority Nationalism and the Changing International 
Order, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001. 





Connor, however, has noted that self-determination does not necessarily mean 
independent statehood; rather, he argues that the essence of national self-
determination is choice, not result.67 For example, Connor has claimed that 
meaningful autonomy within an existing state may satisfy the desire for national 
self-determination: 
Decentralisation of political decision-making has the potential for 
elevating a national group to the status of masters in their own home. And 
this may be quite enough. Ethno-national aspirations, by their very nature, 
are more obsessed by the dream of freedom from domination by outsiders 
than by freedom to conduct relations with states. Ethnocracy need not 
presume independence, but it must presume meaningful autonomy at the 
minimum [emphasis in original].68 
 
Connor’s theory that nationalist conflict stems from the desire for self-
determination of a minority group (and resistance from the host state and/or 
nation) has been supported by Cordell and Wolff. They have provided an 
examination of ethnic conflict and conclude that at its core it is driven by the 
desire to “establish or preserve conditions that are conducive to the preservation, 
expression and development of individual and group identities”,69 which can only 
be achieved through “secession, autonomy, power sharing, more extensive 
cultural rights, etc”.70 Cordell and Wolff have maintained that: 
Any ethnic group that is conscious of its uniqueness, and wishes to 
preserve it, is involved in a struggle for political power. It seeks either to 
retain a measure of political power it already possesses, or it strives to 
acquire the amount of power that it deems necessary in order to preserve 
its identity as a distinct ethnic group.71 
 
Like Connor, Cordell and Wolff have also maintained that self-determination (or 
self-government as they refer to it) need not translate into independent statehood; 
                                              
67 ibid. 
68 ibid, p. 124. 
69 Cordell and Wolff, Ethnic Conflict, p. 81. 
70 ibid, p. 82. 
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rather, it could be meaningfully obtained through local, regional or federal 
frameworks within the host state.72 
 
Valadez has contended that the “core rationale underlying autonomist and 
secessionist claims is that they constitute a distinctive people or nation with a 
right to autonomously determine their sociocultural, political, and economic 
affairs” [emphasis added].73 Valadez adds that perceived injustices towards 
minority groups can best be avoided in future by obtaining powers of self-
governance, as this would be the most effective method to prevent discrimination 
and empower the members of the group to determine their own affairs.74 
Conversely, majority groups or host nations will seek to “preserve the state in its 
existing form, with its territorial boundaries intact”.75 The rationale is that “this is 
their land, the land they have cultivated and defended...[and that] living in this 
land should be done on their terms and in a way that respects their cultural 
traditions and way of life. Any group living within the territorial boundaries of 
their country should take whatever steps are necessary for them to adapt to living 
in their political community”.76 
 
Berg and Ben-Porat have also noted that the conflicting rights of self-
determination and state sovereignty are the “material from which protracted 
ethnic conflicts are made”, particularly when the demands of the weaker group 
are perceived as threatening or illegitimate by the dominant group.77 In addition, 
Berg and Ben-Porat have argued that conflicts between two groups within the 
same state are often triggered and sustained by a disputed territory (in terms of 
rights over territory and the implications that stem from this) and/or an 
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“asymmetrical relation within it, where one ethnic group dominates over the 
other” thus denying the minority group a meaningful level of autonomy.78 
Anocratic State and a Dysfunctional Political Culture 
Many researchers have suggested that anocratic regimes are more prone to 
internal conflicts and civil war compared with democratic or autocratic regimes. 
Regan and Bell have argued that because of their weak institutions anocracies are 
unable to meet the expectations of their citizens and when challenged they lack 
the ability to effectively suppress civil conflict either through the use of 
repression (as in the case of autocracies) or by engaging in peaceful 
accommodation (as in the case of democracies).79 Fearon and Laitin have also 
asserted that anocracies cannot control challenges to their authority because of 
state incapacity,80 while others maintain that anocracies combine the possibility 
of demands being made without the ability to meet those demands – breeding 
expectations that cannot be met and generating greater levels of protest.81 
 
Hegre has examined the transitional phases of regimes from autocracies, through 
anocracies, to democracies and vice versa. He has argued that changes in 
political institutions are accompanied by heightened risks of civil war.82 Hegre 
has contended that changes in a democratic direction are likely to be 
accompanied by reduced repression (allowing for group mobilisation); however, 
it takes time to construct new institutions that can accommodate deep social 
conflicts.83 Groups which increase their political influence through the process of 
liberalisation may raise their expectations of improvement but these can be slow 
to materialise, inciting frustration and conflict.84 
 
In his analysis of what he termed ‘illiberal democracies’, Zakaria made a further 
distinction between democracy and liberalism, arguing that they are theoretically 
                                              
78 ibid. 
79 Regan and Bell, Political Research Quarterly, p. 748. See also H. Hegre, “Democracy and armed 
conflict”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 51, Iss. 2, 2014, p. 163. 
80 Fearon and Laitin, American Political Science Review, p. 85. 
81 Regan and Bell, “Changing Lanes or Stuck in the Middle”, p. 749. 





different and historically distinct. He noted that a liberal democracy is a “political 
system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also the rule of law, a 
separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties such as speech, 
assembly, religion and property”85 Zakaria has argued that open, free and fair 
elections are essential for democracy, but they will not necessarily produce 
governments that are committed to liberalism and the limitations on state power 
that it provide – this, however, does not make them undemocratic.86 He has noted 
that liberalism may have coincided with the rise of democracy, but it has never 
been immutably or unambiguously linked to its practice.87 Zakaria has 
maintained that many post-Cold War states are in fact democracies that provide 
legitimacy to autocratic rulers.88 He has also argued that far from being a 
transitional stage, illiberal democracy (or anocracy) may prove to be a form of 
government for which many countries choose to settle.89 
 
The theory of credible commitments (or a lack thereof) suggests that nationalist 
conflict can be a result a national minority not trusting the host state to honour its 
rights.90 The problems of credible commitments arise in newly independent states 
that contain one dominant group and at least one powerful minority group. The 
state (controlled by the dominant group) is unable to credibly commit (i.e., 
provide convincing guarantees) to the protection of the rights and property of the 
minority group(s). As a result, it is argued, minority groups have an incentive to 
establish their own self-governing state rather than rely on the dominant group to 
honour their commitments. Further, settlement of any violent conflict which may 
have taken place is also difficult as neither side trusts the other to disarm or 
comply with peace agreements. Weingast maintains that armed conflict can 
emerge from commitment problems even if only vague suggestions of repression 
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exist, as individuals who are convinced by their group leaders that they are 
targets of repression, extermination or forced removal would rationally take up 
arms even if their leaders’ assessment is not credible.91 
 
In addition, Hegre has contended that the lack of effective democratic institutions 
in anocratic states further facilitates conflict because they are unable to provide 
mechanisms for effective bargaining to produce credible commitments.92 He 
maintains that while groups may have some de facto power and are able to obtain 
policy concessions from governing elites, it is uncertain that this power or the 
concessions they acquired will be maintained in the longer term.93 Therefore, 
groups may demand that de facto power be transformed into de jure power and 
back this with the threat of war.94 
 
Ethnic outbidding theories posit that “politicians create platforms and programs 
to ‘outbid’ their opponents on the anti-minority stance adopted”.95 The key 
motivation of politicians outbidding their rivals, according to this theory, is to 
gain and/or maintain power. It is argued that ethnic outbidding marginalises 
minority communities and exacerbates tensions leading to minorities losing 
confidence in state institutions and the majority and that this would promote 
reactive nationalism leading to ethnic rivalry and conflict.96 DeVotta has argued 
that the political structure of a state is the most important factor in encouraging, 
or discouraging, ethnic outbidding. He has held the view that multi-ethnic 
political coalitions elicit ethnic coexistence, while encouraged competition 
between ethnic parties engenders ethnic outbidding.97 This is not necessarily the 
case in Macedonia where the ruling Macedonian party has always formed a 
coalition government with an Albanian party. In the Macedonian context, ethnic 
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outbidding not only occurs among Macedonian politicians but Albanian ones as 
well, and is a common feature of the political landscape. 
Thesis Outline 
This thesis consists of three parts covering the three broad areas under 
examination – incompatible worldviews, competing rights claims, and the 
anocratic state coupled with a dysfunctional political culture. Each part is divided 
into chapters that consider the specific issues within those broader areas of 
research.  
 
Part I (Chapters One to Three) of this thesis analyses the worldviews, informed 
largely by nationalist doctrines and religious belief systems, of the two 
communities. While these worldviews are not universal across both ethnic 
groups, they do form the basis from which many currently perceive reality. These 
worldviews shape the way in which individuals from both groups understand 
themselves and their collective interests and how they perceive ethno-religious 
‘others’. Because of their worldviews, the two groups understand contemporary 
problems differently and their opposing visions for the future result in widely 
conflicting solutions.  
 
Chapter One examines how ethnonational identity among Macedonians and 
Albanians impacts on their worldview. Since the establishment of a Macedonian 
republic 1944 (under Yugoslav rule), and even more so since Macedonian 
independence in 1991, successive Macedonian Governments have (either through 
apathy or neglect) created the conditions for an absent state and ignored most 
minorities outright (Romani, Vlachs, Turks, Serbs), while providing passive 
approval for others (Albanians) to undertake their own processes of identity 
formation and nation-building. No effort, beyond lip-service, has been exerted to 
integrate ethnic and religious minorities into a wider national community. Rather, 
their focus has been on consolidating the ethnonational identity of the 
Macedonians and securing Macedonia as their nation-state. This has led to 
minority groups, particularly the Albanians, pursuing their own nation-building 
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exercise in competition with the Macedonian ethnonational conception of both 
nationhood and the state. The result has been the solidification of competing 
ethnonationalist identities based on rival historiographies, claims to territory, and 
loyalty. 
 
Chapter Two investigates the religious differences between Orthodox Christian 
Macedonians and Sunni Muslim Albanians. These differences have created more 
spheres of difference and potential for conflict than cooperation. While there are 
similarities in the moral teachings contained in the Bible and the Qur’an, there 
are also fundamental theological differences. These differences are reflected in 
the worldviews of Christians and Muslims in general, and among Macedonians 
and Albanians in particular. Religion has also become politicised and both 
communities have incorporated their respective faiths into their ethnonational 
identities, using them to mobilise their communities for political action and 
violence. While it is sometimes difficult to ascertain whether religion is simply 
used to mobilise members of the two communities and advance ethnonationalist 
objectives (or vice versa), it is clear that religion itself has become embedded 
into the Macedonian-Albanian conflict as a cause, a means and an end in and of 
itself. Radical Islamism is not widespread across Macedonia but its adherents 
have demonstrated that they are persistent and patient. It remains to be seen how 
influential they will ultimately become within the Muslim community but their 
presence is dangerous. Their influence has already caused conflict within the 
Muslim community and between the Macedonian and Albanian communities. 
 
Chapter Three assesses the results of these incompatible worldviews and details 
examples of how they have impacted and influenced violent conflict between the 
two groups. Since the collapse of Yugoslavia and Macedonian independence, 
sporadic violence has been persistent. While much of this violence has been 
insignificant and generally remains unreported in western media, it is a daily 
reality for Macedonian citizens and from time to time escalates into violent 
actions and reactions. The two communities live parallel lives with interaction 
being rare and tense. While segregation has been culturally and socially 
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embedded over the past six to seven decades, in many cases it has now moved 
into the political sphere and become institutionalised through the implementation 
of the Framework Agreement. 
 
Part II (Chapters Four to eight) contends that competing rights claims between 
the two groups are a struggle to assert dominance over the state by the 
Macedonians and exercise greater self-governance by the Albanians. These 
competing rights claims – constitutional status of ethnic Albanians, local self-
government, proportional public employment, parliamentary veto powers, and 
the use of minority languages – principally stem from the incompatible 
worldviews of the two communities and their respective visions for the state. 
 
Chapter Four examines the constitutional status of the two communities within 
the Preamble of the Constitution. While largely symbolic, constitutive status 
within the Preamble is used by the Albanian community to further its claims for 
political power, meaningful decision-making, access to state resources, and 
cultural rights. On the other hand, Macedonians seek to minimise Albanian 
claims to ensure the dominance of the Macedonian community and the re-
establishment of the country as a Macedonian nation-state. The Preamble has 
been very contentious since its first iteration under the 1946 Constitution (within 
the framework of Yugoslavia) but particularly so since independence and the 
promulgation of its first independent constitution in 1991. The inclusion of 
provisions from the Framework Agreement into the Constitution has seen the 
Preamble amended to accommodate Albanian demands. As a result, Macedonia 
is de jure a state of the various nations (as each ethnonational group is defined) 
that live within its borders, while in practice it has become a de facto bi-national 
state of the Macedonians and Albanians. The thesis finds that the resolutions 
from the Framework Agreement are unlikely create a lasting settlement because 





Chapter Five analyses the results of decentralisation and the revision of 
municipal boundaries over the past 12 years. Broadly, decentralisation and local 
self-government are seen as positive in principle. However, the circumstances in 
which the reforms undertaken (as part of the Framework Agreement) and the 
ethnicisation of most of the issues relating to the devolution of powers has 
resulted in largely negative outcomes and perceptions. Macedonians generally 
view decentralisation and the corresponding exercise in revising municipal 
boundaries as an exercise in carving out territory where Albanians would 
comprise a majority. Macedonians fear that this will eventually lead to a Kosovo-
style scenario where Albanians will have a defined territorial unit with 
administrative and institutional structures that they can use to effect secession 
from the Macedonian state. On the other hand, some Albanians hold the view 
that the decentralisation process did not go far enough and that further power 
needs to be devolved to the local level. Under the Framework Agreement, 
decentralisation has become a zero-sum game on two levels. Firstly, over local 
political power and public resources and secondly, over the ethno-religious 
character of the municipalities – are they Macedonian or Albanian? Christian or 
Islamic? 
 
Chapter Six will assesses the Framework Agreements requirement for 
proportional employment within public entities. The issues surrounding 
proportional employment in the public sector are threefold: firstly, they act as a 
mechanism to control state institutions and influence decision-making, thereby 
creating conflict between the two communities; secondly, they act as an arena 
through which both ethnic groups compete over limited public resources; and 
thirdly, political elites misuse state employment as patronage for their support 
base in order to consolidate their own political power. In implementing 
proportional employment in public entities through a non-transparent and fiscally 
unsustainable manner both Macedonian and Albanian political elites have 




Chapter Seven considers the special parliamentary veto powers (Badinter 
Principle) that have been mandated under the Framework Agreement and the 
effect they have had on Macedonian-Albanian relations, particularly at the elite 
level. The Badinter Principle seeks to provide a veto over a range of laws at both 
the national and local levels so that minorities are able to protect their cultural 
and religious interests, along with other issues of importance to them. In practice, 
it mostly applies to the Albanian community as they vastly outnumber other 
minorities that do not have enough representatives at the national level and most 
municipalities to utilise it. Albanians see it as a partial equaliser to the 
Macedonian majority, not only helping to ensure that their interests are protected 
but increasing their power and influence over the state. However, disagreement 
over the scope of the Badinter Principle continues to plague political debates 
among the Macedonian and Albanian elites and the misuse of the veto power has 
also caused intra-Albanian conflict between the supporters of the major Albanian 
parties, the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) and the Democratic Party of 
Albanians (DPA). The power struggle over which of the two is the legitimate 
representative of the Albanian community often turns violent. 
 
On the other side, Macedonians see the Badinter Principle as an undemocratic 
mechanism designed to undermine the Macedonian nation and its natural 
position as the owner of the state. The fact that it has not only been used to block 
legislation related to fundamental cultural issues for Macedonians but also to 
force through legislation which is largely seen as anti-Macedonian has many 
Macedonians claiming that it is fundamentally undemocratic. At the local level, 
the Macedonian experience has been mixed. There are cases in which 
Macedonians (as a municipal minority) have successfully used the veto power to 
protect their interests. However, there are many more instances where the 
Badinter Principle has been ignored by Albanian-dominated municipal councils. 
 
Chapter Eight explores language conflict in Macedonia. Macedonians have 
broadly argued that Albanians should be able to maintain their language as part 
of their cultural rights so long as it is consigned to the private domain. They 
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maintain that minorities should accept Macedonian as the national language that 
unifies all citizens and acts as the language of administration. On the other hand, 
Albanians maintain that the Albanian language needs to be a second official 
language, alongside Macedonian. To them, Macedonian and Albanian should be 
equal working languages of the state. Language has become highly politicised 
with many refusing to learn the language of the ‘other’. Language is also being 
used as a political tool to dominate or demonstrate power. Macedonians see 
Albanian demands surrounding language as an attempt to ‘Albanianise’ the state. 
Albanians, given their co-constitutive nation status since the Framework 
Agreement, consider it a natural extension of their position and status within the 
state. With the establishment of two Albanian-language universities and the 
segregation within primary and secondary schools, it is now becoming possible 
for Macedonians and Albanians to mature into adulthood without ever having 
spent any considerable amount of time with members of the other community. 
These trends will have serious negative effects for Albanian integration and their 
social, economic and political participation in wider Macedonian society. 
 
Part III (Chapters Nine and Ten) contends that Macedonia’s anocratic regime and 
weak state institutions are unable to provide an effective bargaining mechanism 
to negotiate conflicting rights claims. Nor is either community able to provide 
credible guarantees that it is committed to a peaceful resolution of the issues or a 
long-term rapprochement. In addition, a culture of ethnic outbidding by political 
elites, within both communities, has grown over the past two and a half decades 
resulting in the ethnicisation of many political issues. 
 
Chapter Nine analyses the lack of credible commitments in Macedonia. These 
are evident through three ongoing issues: political elites who incite violence and 
seek the revision of international borders; widespread grassroots opposition to 
the Framework Agreement; and the existence of armed paramilitary groups and 
militias within both communities. These factors are chiefly present because of 
Macedonia’s weak institutions and anocratic rule by both Macedonian and 
Albanian political elites. Over the past two and a half decades prominent 
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individuals from both communities have expressed the desire (and promoted 
specific proposals) to partition the country along ethnic lines. While it is difficult 
to ascertain support for such proposals among the general public, it is clear that 
there is widespread opposition to the Framework Agreement. In addition, the 
existence of local militias in both communities, particularly in rural areas, has 
been a permanent feature of Macedonian and Albanian kinship networks for at 
least a century and a half, and demonstrates that the two communities neither 
trust each other nor the state to negotiate a long-term rapprochement or provide 
security. More recently, since the independence of Macedonia and the tense 
security environment internally and across the region, numerous ethnically based 
paramilitary groups have also been established, particularly during the 2001 war. 
 
Chapter Ten examines the ethnic party political system in Macedonia and its 
tendency to resort to radical rhetoric against other ethnic groups in order to win 
votes from within their own ethnic constituency. Political parties in Macedonia 
have been highly ethnicised since independence in 1991. The largest Macedonian 
parties are generally made up of Macedonian members, with some coming from 
other ethnic communities such as Turks, Roma, and Vlachs. This is the same for 
the main Albanian political parties and those of the Turkish, Serb, and Roma 
communities. Albanian and Macedonian political parties compete over the votes 
of their respective ethnic groups and cases of cross-community voting in both the 
municipal and national legislative elections are extremely rare. Generally, the 
two largest Macedonian political parties, VMRO-DPMNE and SDSM, have 
followed a strategy of attempting to ethnically outbid each other, while at the 
same time co-opting Albanian political elites by inviting them into coalition 
governments and providing them with ministerial posts. Albanian elites, on the 
other hand, have tried to work within government as this is the easiest way to 
obtain resources for their own goals but disrupt it when in opposition. Albanian 





There have been some academic studies on the ‘Albanian Question’ in 
Macedonia and the conflict between the Macedonians and Albanians. These have 
been limited in scope and primarily focused on two or three specific issues 
related to the conflict. However, there has been no monograph, to the author’s 
knowledge, that has provided a complete and detailed study of the sources of 
conflict between the two communities, an analysis of the efforts to remedy these 
issues and whether the status quo is a sustainable option.  
 
Risteska and Daskalovski have edited a monograph from various experts in the 
field that examines the Framework Agreement on its 10th anniversary.98 The 
authors covered various challenges in implementing the Framework Agreement 
and how the 2001 war affected inter-ethnic relations. Key exclusions include the 
anocratic state and the role of religion in the Macedonian-Albanian conflict. 
 
Ramet, Listhaug, and Simkus have edited a very good volume that analyses 
culture and values (including religious values), nationalism, the political system, 
and education and language use.99 The work does not cover all aspects of 
competing rights claims or the anocratic regime. 
 
Vankovska has produced a large body of work on specific issues related to the 
Macedonian-Albanian conflict.100 In particular, her papers on constitutional and 
security matters have contributed a great deal to the understanding of inter-ethnic 
relations in Macedonia. 
 
Liotta and Jebb have provided an examination of post-independence Macedonia 
and, in particular, the competing nationalisms of Macedonians and Albanians, 
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along with the competing factions and visions within them.101 Liotta and Jebb 
have also analysed the armed conflict of 2001 and its aftermath, and provided 
two interesting interviews with the first two presidents of independent 
Macedonia – Kiro Gligorov and Boris Trajkovski. The key omissions in this 
study are in-depth examinations of the weak state and the political culture of 
Macedonia, which have led to commitment problems and ethnic outbidding. In 
addition, the contribution of religion to the conflict is not covered. 
 
Tasevska Remenski has provided a fairly in-depth study of inter-ethnic relations 
in Macedonia.102 She focused on the post-independence period and specifically 
on the 2001 armed conflict. In doing so she put forward a number of theories to 
explain inter-ethnic tensions generally and the 2001 armed conflict specifically. 
Some omissions include the anocratic regime and credible commitments. 
 
Ripiloski has examined some of the factors that led to the 2001 war and draws on 
those to provide recommendations on conflict prevention.103 He focused on 
economic and structural factors and the war itself. The broader longer-term non-
violent conflict and its causes were outside of his scope. 
 
Shea has provided a wealth of information on inter-ethnic relations in 
Macedonia, which he had pieced together from a range of primary and secondary 
sources.104 Shea, however, treated his work as a book of facts and did not 
necessarily identify causes of conflict or provide analyses of the questions of 
how and why the troubled inter-ethnic relations led to violent and non-violent 
conflict in Macedonia. 
 
Roudometof, while writing on Macedonian nationalism and its conflicting 
aspects with Bulgarian and Greek nationalisms, did dedicate some space to the 
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Macedonian-Albanian conflict.105 Roudometof touched on some constitutional 
and demographic issues and provided a short discussion of Macedonian and 
Albanian political parties and their influence on inter-ethnic relations. He also 
briefly discussed education and language use. Roudometof did not provide any 
interpretation or analysis of the causes he listed and did not have a discussion on 
the effects of the Framework Agreement, economic competition, or weak state 
institutions. 
 
Poulton provided some discussion of what he called the ‘Albanian Question’ in 
his book.106 Poulton provided some general observations about Macedonian-
Albanian inter-ethnic relations, particularly around demographic, constitutional, 
language, religious, and educational issues. He also briefly discussed Albanian 
irredentism. Although Poulton provided some good information, it is brief and 
descriptive, and does not provide much analysis. 
 
Pettifer included a chapter in his book, The New Macedonian Question, on inter-
ethnic relations.107 He provided a brief analysis on foreign interference, cultural 
and educational issues, minority symbols as part of Albanian nationalism, the 
Kosovo war, Islamic life in the Albanian context, and some limited constitutional 
issues. His analysis was based mainly on the post-independence period, though 
he did provide some insights into the roots of these issues in the Yugoslav era. 
 
Letschert undertook a systematic analysis of three minority rights mechanisms 
(the Copenhagen Document, the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging 
to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, and the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities) and examined to what 
extent they have been able to influence the implementation of minority rights 
provisions in related legislation or policies in two case studies, including 
Macedonia. In doing so Letschert examined a number of areas (from a minority 
                                              
105 V. Roudometof, Collective Memory, National Identity and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria and the 
Macedonian Question, Praeger, Westport, 2002. 
106 H. Poulton, Who are the Macedonians?, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1995. 
107 J. Pettifer, The New Macedonian Question, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1999. 
43 
 
rights perspective) including education, political participation, the census, and 
national symbols. 
 
Arsovski, Kuzev and Damjanovski have written one of the most detailed 
accounts of the 2001 war to date.108 However, it only discussed the causes of the 
conflict in less than 10 pages. This is similar to the work of Petrovski, a serving 
general of the Macedonian army during the war.109 In his book, Petrovski 
included copies of numerous government letters, memorandums, and emails that 
shed much light on the Macedonian Government’s political strategies during the 
conflict. 
 
Mitevski examined the immediate causes of the 2001 war, such as regional 
events in Kosovo and the general lack of law and order in Macedonia.110 
Mitevski also provided some insight to the constitutional issues facing the 
country and an analysis of the Framework Agreement and its impact on 
Macedonian-Albanian relations. 
 
Gaber, the former Macedonian Ambassador to Australia, has published a book 
titled Kolateralna šteta (Collateral Damage), which amongst other side issues 
investigates the role of the international community in the 2001 armed conflict 
and how he claims the conflict was influenced by global geopolitics.111 
 
Phillips attempted to explain how and why armed conflict broke out in 2001.112 
He provided a brief historical overview before beginning his examination of the 
war in Kosovo and its linkages to the Macedonian conflict. Although Phillips 
touched on some longer-term causes of the 2001 armed conflict, such as the 
status of the Albanians within the Macedonian constitution, he mainly focused on 
the immediate causes of the war, the war itself, and its aftermath. Phillips 
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underpinned his research on discussions with various politicians, observers 
(some more relevant than others), and local eyewitnesses in the war zone. 
Although his monograph contains some good research, it largely lacks an in-
depth discussion of the sources of conflict and some of the immediate catalysts 
for the 2001 armed conflict itself. 
 
Koppa provided an overview of inter-ethnic relations primarily focusing on the 
dilemmas of identity, political participation and representation, and education.113 
Her analysis is limited and excludes other important factors such as opposing 
nationalist aims and economic competition. 
 
Koinova, having examined a number of case studies in south-eastern Europe 
(including Macedonia), concluded that relative changes in minority rights 
compared to the communist period rather than the absolute scope of minority 
rights granted by the new constitutions created political thresholds in the early 
period of transition that led to different degrees of ethno-national/ethno-religious 
conflict. She argued that this change in status, combined with state strategies of 
co-optation/coercion, prompted minorities in the region to pursue their demands 
either through the institutions of the state, clandestine activities, or a combination 
of both.114 
 
Adamson and Jović examined what they referred to as the rearticulation of 
national identity in Macedonia.115 They claimed that both Macedonian and 
Albanian identities had been influenced by the Marxist paradigm as officially 
interpreted by the Yugoslav state. Adamson and Jović argued that since 
independence new liberal-democratic concepts have been introduced into 
national identity transforming the Macedonians from a ‘constitutive nation’ 
status to a ‘majority’ status and the Albanians from a ‘nationality’ to a 
                                              
113 Koppa, “Ethnic Albanians in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia”, pp. 37-65. 
114 Koinova argues that Macedonia is an example of both, see M. Koinova, “Why Ethnonational Conflicts 
Reach Different Degrees of Violence? Insights from Kosovo, Macedonia and Bulgaria during the 1990s”, 
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Vol. 15, Iss. 1, 2009, pp. 84-108. 
115 K. Adamson and D. Jović, “The Macedonian-Albanian political frontier: the re-articulation of post-
Yugoslav political identities”, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2004, pp. 293-311. 
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‘minority’. Adamson and Jović maintained that this has been a key cause of the 
tension between the two communities. 
 
Karajkov attempted to analyse some of the causes leading specifically to the 
2001 armed conflict in a broader study looking at the implementation of the 
Framework Agreement, which ended the fighting.116 Karajkov provided some 
basic analysis on issues such as education, the use of national symbols, language, 
state employment, and the constitution. 
 
Brunnbauer has written numerous important articles on this topic. He has 
analysed the Framework Agreement and is one of the few scholars to provide a 
critical examination of its implications for both Macedonians and Albanians, and 
the stability of the state.117 However, Brunnbauer has not provided (to the 
author’s knowledge) a detailed study of the causes of conflict, either long-term or 
those immediately leading up to the 2001 war. Brunnbauer has also looked at 
demographic and economic differences between Macedonians and Albanians, 
arguing that the Macedonian state’s lack of understanding and insensitivity to 
those differences politicised them and made them contentious.118 Ragaru has also 
analysed the Framework Agreement, though mainly assessed its post-conflict 
implementation.119 
 
Engström has investigated inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia from a threat 
perception vis-à-vis the Macedonian identity.120 In other words, she examined 
how the Greek, Bulgarian, and Serb challenges to the existence of Macedonian 
identity influence relations between Macedonians and Albanians in Macedonia. 
For example, she has claimed that the more pressure Macedonians face from 
                                              
116 R. Karajkov, “Macedonia’s 2001 ethnic war: Offsetting conflict. What could have been done but was 
not?”, Conflict, Security and Development, Vol. 8, Iss. 4, 2008, pp. 451-490. 
117 U. Brunnbauer, The Implementation of the Ohrid Agreement: Ethnic Macedonian Resentments, Centre 
for the Study of Balkan Societies and Cultures, University of Graz, Graz, 2002. 
118 U. Brunnbauer, “Fertility, families and ethnic conflict: Macedonians and Albanians in the Republic of 
Macedonia, 1944-2002”, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 32, No. 3, September 2004, pp. 565-598. 
119 N. Ragaru, “Macedonia: Between Ohrid and Brussels”, Centre d’etudes et de recherché 
internationales, September 2008, www.ceri-sciences-po.org (accessed 1 May 2010). 
120 J. Engström, “The Power of Perception: The Impact of the Macedonian Question on Inter-Ethnic 




external enemies negating their identity, the less likely they are to accommodate 
Albanian demands internally. 
 
Daskalovski has analysed the potential dangers emanating from an independent 
Kosovo towards ethnic relations in Macedonia.121 He has investigated some of 
the factors that contributed to the 2001 armed conflict and concluded that they 
have largely been ameliorated and that the situation in Kosovo should not present 
any strong challenges for Macedonia. 
 
The literature on the issues in focus is sparse and no one work covers the 
completeness or complexity of Macedonian-Albanian relations. In particular, 
painstaking research and fieldwork was required to carefully examine the 
questions related to the weak state and political culture, many elements 
surrounding the incompatible worldviews and the largely under-analysed 
competing rights claims. 
 
                                              
121 Z. Daskalovski, “The Independence of Kosovo and the Consolidation of Macedonia – A Reason to 









A worldview refers to a comprehensive conception of the world from a specific 
standpoint. It is the framework of ideas, values and beliefs through which 
individuals and groups understand, interpret, and interact with the world. It 
affects every area of life, from money to morality, from politics to art. 
Incompatible worldviews informed by nationalist doctrines and religious belief 
systems are a primary source of conflict in Macedonia. Although some of the 
incompatibilities may be imagined, all have the potential to translate into real 
conflict. Smith has made a crucial point about the power of nationalism to 
influence the worldview of countless individuals. He argues that national identity 
is pervasive, in that it permeates the “lives of individuals and communities in 
most spheres of activity”.1 He also argues that in the “cultural sphere national 
identity is revealed in a whole range of assumptions and myths, values and 
memories, as well as in language, law, institutions and ceremonies.2 
 
Similarly, Keating has discussed national culture and its impact on the 
worldviews of individuals. Keating has argued that national culture provides a 
framework for the interpretation of social reality and sustains a set of “social 
values which may promote consensus and set the limits of debate and political 
division and serve as a mechanism of social integration”.3 Keating has also 
contended that cultural activities shape national identity by framing the issues 
and interpreting daily life.4 Azzi’s theory on goal incompatibility as a source of 
inter-group conflict is also relevant. He considers the achievement of 
incompatible goals a zero-sum game in which the goals of one group can only be 
achieved at the expense of the other’s goals.5  
 
Religion can have a significant impact on conflict (violent and non-violent). This 
results from the values that different belief systems hold, which in turn inform 
public policy and decision-making. Religious belief systems influence many 
                                              
1 Smith, National Identity, p. 143. 
2 ibid, pp. 143-144. 
3 ibid. 
4 ibid, p. 11. 




diverse issues in the public domain, and conflict can occur when these belief 
systems are incompatible on given issues. Considering that individual and 
collective worldviews are in part informed by religious belief systems, and these 
worldviews in turn inform public policy, it is conceivable that titular nations with 
a different religion to the minority group can create the conditions for conflict 
between the two. 
 
Religious differences between Orthodox Christian Macedonians and Sunni 
Muslim Albanians have created more spheres of difference and potential for 
conflict rather than cooperation. While there are similarities in the moral 
teachings contained in the Bible and the Qur’an, there are also fundamental 
theological differences. These differences are reflected in the worldviews of 
Macedonians and Albanians. In addition, religion has become politicised and 
both communities have incorporated their respective faiths into their 
ethnonational identities and used them to mobilise their communities for political 
action and violence. Religion has become a cause of conflict, a means through 
which to mobilise followers for ethnonational goals (and vice versa) and an end 
in and of itself.  
 
All of these underlying beliefs form the basis of incompatible worldviews. Since 
the collapse of Yugoslavia and Macedonian independence sporadic violence has 
been persistent. The competing rights claims (Part II) of the Macedonians and 
Albanians that the Framework Agreement attempted to accommodate principally 





The concept of a civic Macedonian identity, for all practical purposes, is virtually 
non-existent in Macedonia. The idea does not even receive lip-service among 
political elites. The ethnic conception of nationhood is deeply entrenched in 
society and the idea that an Albanian could be a ‘Macedonian’ (even in the civic 
sense) seems foreign to Macedonians and appears offensive to Albanians. 
Connor’s definition of the nation and his concept of ethnonationalism are 
important in understanding the Macedonian and Albanian conceptualisation of 
identity and the nation. Connor has made a distinction between the state and the 
nation and between what he defined as patriotism (the love of the territorial state) 
and nationalism (the love of the ethnic nation). Within the Macedonian and 
Albanian contexts Connor’s definition of the nation as “a group of people who 
believe they are ancestrally related [emphasis in original]” is most suitable.1 For 
Connor, ethnonationalism underlines the ethnic and kinship basis of the nation 
(real or imagined), which is (in the minds of its members) one large extended 
family.2 Further, Connor argues that to identify with the nation means not only to 
identify with that particular group of people of today but with that people and its 
saga throughout time.3 
 
It is clear that the processes of nation-building and nation-maintenance in 
Macedonia have been inconsistent and incoherent since their beginnings in 1944 
and more importantly since independence in 1991.4 Rather than attempting to 
integrate ethno-religious minorities into a wider national community, nation-
building efforts focused on Macedonian ethnonationalism. Political elites may 
have believed that this was a necessary strategy due to a weak Macedonian 
                                              
1 Connor, Ethnonationalism, p. 212. 
2 Smith, Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World, p. 56. 
3 Connor, “The Nation and its Myth”, p. 49. 
4 A concise discussion of the concepts of nation-building and nation-maintenance is provided by 
Kolstø, “National Symbols and Signs of Unity and Division”, pp. 676-701 and Smith, “National Images 
and National Maintenance”, pp. 227-257. 
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identity in the early 1990s among a significant proportion of the Macedonian 
people. Clearly there were many whose primary national identity could only be 
described as ‘Yugoslav’, along with some obvious examples of Serbophilia and 
Bulgarophilia. Even today some of these tendencies continue to exist among 
some sections of the Macedonian community, although perhaps to a lesser 
degree. 
 
The failure of Macedonian Governments since 1944 to integrate its minority 
communities, particularly Albanians, into a wider national community and 
encourage them to accept a Macedonian civic identity (i.e., primary loyalty to the 
Macedonian state based on their Macedonian citizenship, while retaining their 
cultural and linguistic heritage) has led to innumerable problems at present. In 
any case, the persistent nationalism of the Albanian community certainly would 
not have made integration an easy task. Since the Albanian community had 
remained largely segregated, extremists within the community were able to 
promote the idea that the Albanians are not a part of Macedonian society and that 
the political structures of the state and its institutions should reflect that reality. 
Ordinary Albanians identified with such views because they felt excluded from 
both the national community and the state-building process. Nor should it be 
ignored that the same logic has enabled Macedonian extremists to promote the 
idea of an ethnically pure Macedonian state that could involve exchanges of 
population and territory with Albania, or worse, genocide (Chapter Nine). 
 
While the Macedonian Government focused on an ethnonational Macedonian 
nation-building project, it left the Albanian community to undertake its own 
nation-building exercise. Albanian political and cultural elites did this informally 
until 2001 when their efforts were institutionalised through the Framework 
Agreement and the subsequent constitutional amendments. These overriding 
legal documents have fundamentally changed the character of the Macedonian 
state from a nation-state of the Macedonian people to a multi-national state in 
which separate, co-equal nations (Macedonian, Albanian, and ‘others’) are 
regarded as co-founders and provided with the right to foster their own 
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ethnonational identity regardless of how much it competes with the idea of 
Macedonia as a unitary state or all Macedonian citizens belonging to the one 
national community. In practice, the smaller ethnic minorities do not have the 
political power or financial resources to exercise their status as a co-constitutive 
nations and Macedonia has become a de facto bi-national state of the 
Macedonians and Albanians. The outcome for nation-building in Macedonia has 
become schizophrenic, with the two communities promoting opposing 
ethnonational ideologies and worldviews that have resulted in sustained 
segregation and conflict. 
Ethnonationalist Identity 
It is not possible to conclusively answer questions such as ‘what is a Macedonian 
(or an Albanian)’ and ‘who can be a Macedonian (or an Albanian)’. 
Nevertheless, they require some discussion. Responses to these questions are 
necessarily vague and inconsistent. A Macedonian might answer that one needs 
to be of Macedonian blood, but will concede there is no such thing as a 
Macedonian gene. An Albanian may assert that one needs to be born on Albanian 
land but accepts his kinsmen born in the diaspora. A Macedonian may note that 
one needs to speak Macedonian, but he will include kinsmen from the diaspora 
who cannot understand the language as part of the nation. An Albanian may 
claim that culture defines them, but will accept a fellow Muslim as his own 
regardless of the latter’s Macedonian ethnicity. As noted in the introductory 
chapter, Connor argues that when it comes to ethnonational identity, what is real 
is not as important as what people perceive to be real.5 
 
Exact definitions aside, some key identity markers of Macedonian and Albanian 
identity can be ascertained.6 Firstly, Macedonians believe they are blood-related 
and that they belong to one large extended family that is made up of inter-related 
familial clans who have a shared ancestry.7 Secondly, language and culture are 
                                              
5 Connor, Ethnonationalism, p. 197. 
6 These key identity markers have been developed through literature research and fieldwork. 
7 Considering the very small population and the complex clan networks, the notion is not as far-fetched as 
it sounds for either community. One need only look at the example of the Macedonian Mijaci clan, who 
number approximately 30,000. 
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important markers of identity. The fact that the Macedonian language and culture 
are disputed as ‘artificial’ by hostile neighbours makes these markers of identity 
much more sensitive than would be usual among other groups. For example, the 
use of Serb or Bulgarian words or listening to Serb or Bulgarian music can be 
met with hostility and accusations of treason in some quarters. Thirdly, shared 
history is a common marker of Macedonian identity. Fourthly, Orthodox 
Christianity is inextricably tied to Macedonian identity. Even the late President 
Boris Trajkovski could not escape this fact. Trajkovski was a Methodist, from a 
small community near Strumica in south-eastern Macedonia that was 
proselytised at the turn of the 20th century. The Macedonian view of President 
Trajkovski was a paradox: he was both accepted as a Macedonian and criticised 
for not being fully Macedonian because of his faith. Finally, the state – which is 
perceived as an ethnic Macedonian nation-state – is almost synonymous with 
Macedonian ethnic identity.8 
 
Like Macedonians, Albanians also believe their nation is one large extended 
family that spans Albania, Kosovo, western Macedonia, south-eastern 
Montenegro and Epirus in Greece. Their kinship networks are perhaps even 
stronger than their equivalent within the Macedonian community. Language and 
traditions are also key markers of Albanian identity. Language in particular has 
been used to differentiate Albanians from their neighbours and has become a 
highly politicised issue ever since the end of the Second World War and a key 
component of the Framework Agreement. Contrary to the general experience in 
Albania itself and to a lesser degree Kosovo, religion among the Albanian 
community in Macedonia is a key marker of identity. The conflict between the 
Albanian and Macedonian communities has largely been shaped as one between 
Christian Macedonians and Muslim Albanians, and religion has played a 
significant role (Chapter Two). It should be noted that, unlike Macedonians, the 
state does not play a key role in the identification or loyalty of Albanians in 
                                              
8 Research conducted by Petar Atanasov found that most Macedonians see the state as an inseparable part 
of their identity, see P. Atanasov, Macedonian National Identity: Quantitative Differences Between 
Unitary and Subaltern National Myths and Narratives, The Centre for the Study of Global Governance, 
London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 2004. 
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general. Rufi Osmani, leader of the National Democratic Revival (NDR) and 
former Mayor of Gostivar, notes that “given their bad experience with the 
Macedonian Government since 1945, Albanians are primarily loyal to their 
nation and only partially loyal to the state”.9 He makes it clear that Albanians 
will continue to identify themselves as Albanians, and because of their co-
constitutive status within the Constitution, can now identify as Albanians from 
Macedonia but never as Macedonians (in either an ethnonationalist or civic 
sense).10 The term Albanian Macedonians also seems unacceptable within the 
Albanian community. In fact, any terminology that could be perceived as 
implying a connection between Albanians and a Macedonian identity is 
controversial. 
 
It is important to note that both Macedonians and Albanians generally consider 
ethnonational identity as determined at birth by one’s ancestral lineage, as would 
be expected from groups that consider ‘blood’ as a key marker of identity. While 
there are exceptions to this within other ethnic groups in Macedonia, the ability 
to exit from one identity and enter into another is virtually impossible, 
particularly between the Macedonian and Albanian communities. Exceptions that 
do exist include the relatively fluid identity of (Orthodox Christian) Vlachs for 
whom it is not uncommon to weave between identifying themselves as Vlachs, 
Macedonians, Macedonian citizens, or various combinations of the three. 
However, Macedonians generally consider them outsiders and they are not 
accepted as part of the Macedonian ethnonational family.11 Other examples of 
exit and entry include the Macedonian-speaking Muslims and the Turks,12 many 
of whom have readily assimilated into the Albanian community (and have been 
encouraged to do so by Albanian elites) through their common Islamic faith. 
 
                                              
9 Rufi Osmani, Leader of the NDR, Interview with Author, 10 August 2013. 
10 ibid. 
11 Conversations with Macedonians during fieldwork revealed a common perception among them that no 
matter how much a Vlach identifies as a Macedonian or proclaims loyalty to Macedonia they [Vlachs] 
could never love Macedonia or the Macedonian people as much as a Macedonian does. 
12 Macedonian-speaking Muslims are generally considered to be ethnic Macedonians who follow Islam 
but have largely been ostracised from the Macedonian nation due to their ancestors’ conversion to Islam 




Ethnonationalist Doctrine and Historiography 
Within the context of the Macedonian-Albanian conflict, the respective 
ethnonationalist doctrines of both communities have competing claims to 
territory and indigenous status on those territories, particularly north-west and 
western Macedonia. The narratives of their respective ethnonational 
historiographies seek to demonstrate these claims and establish the moral 
authority to govern these territories. 
 
Macedonian and Albanian ethnonationalist historiographies are a complex and 
tortuous subject, not only because of their incompatibility, but also because they 
have: a) variations within their own broader national narratives; and b) alternate 
versions of the other community’s national narratives. For example, not only 
does the Albanian community have varying narratives for the origins of the 
Albanian people, their victories and defeats, and their future goals, but they have 
developed alternate versions of Macedonian national narratives that allow them 
to make better sense of their own. The same is true for the Macedonian 
community. In addition, the dominant ethnonational narratives do not necessarily 
align with the officially sponsored narratives that tend to change depending on 
the government of the day. Rather, they are popular narratives driven both at the 
grassroots level and by ethnonationalist academics. 
 
The dominant ethnonational historiographic narrative within the Macedonian 
community (with some variations) generally maintains that the history of the 
Macedonian people stretches from the ancient past up to the present.13 This 
narrative does not necessarily align with the official narratives promoted by 
VMRO-DPMNE and (even less so) by the Social Democratic Union of 
                                              
13 For example, see A. Donski, The Descendants of Alexander the Great of Macedon: The Arguments and 
Evidence that today’s Macedonians are Descendants of the Ancient Macedonians, Macedonian Literary 
Association, Sydney, 2004,  J. Gandeto, Ancient Macedonians: Differences between the Ancient 
Macedonians and the Ancient Greeks, IUniverse, Lincoln, 2002, J. Gandeto, The Theft of a King: Who 
Stole Alexander, Outskirts Press, Parker, 2011,  A. Markus and R. Popovski, Filip II – Makedonecot, 
Kniga 19, Skopje, 2005, S. Pandovski, Makedonija: za četoci na prvata nacija vo evropa, Invest-Trajd, 




Macedonia (SDSM) but it commands popular support among the general public 
and many Macedonian historians.  
 
The narrative sees Macedonian history and identity beginning in the ancient past, 
arguing that Macedonians are a unique ethnic group with their own culture, 
language, and identity that is indigenous to ethno-historic Macedonia.14 Further, 
they were one of the first people to establish a state, the ancient Macedonian 
kingdom, culminating in Alexander the Great’s conquest of the known world. It 
rejects the Slavic migration theory and questions this theory’s academic rigour, 
suggesting that it was a political idea of the 19th century pan-Slavic movement. 
The narrative includes the medieval states of Czar Samoil and King Marko as 
Macedonian states,15 and the Macedonian dynasty of the Byzantine Empire as a 
line of ethnic Macedonian emperors. Centuries of oppressive Ottoman rule are 
portrayed in terms of the Macedonian people resisting Islamic invaders and 
protecting Christendom on its eastern frontiers. 
 
Nineteenth- and 20th- century revolutionaries from the legendary Macedonian 
revolutionary organisation (VMRO) are an important aspect of the modern 
narrative, particularly the 1903 Ilinden rebellion against the Ottomans that 
resulted in the liberation of vast amounts of territory populated by Macedonians 
across ethno-historic Macedonia. While this rebellion was quashed within a few 
months, it is celebrated as a ‘glorious defeat’ and was used by the Macedonian 
partisans in 1944 who claimed to have initiated a second Ilinden as a basis on 
which to establish their legitimacy.16 In contrast, the Treaty of Bucharest (1913), 
which ended the Second Balkan War, is considered a national catastrophe in 
modern Macedonian history responsible for the partition of ethno-historic 
Macedonia among its four neighbours, the genocide of Macedonians that fell 
under Greek occupation, and (to this day) the continued human rights abuses and 
forced assimilatory policies towards Macedonians who find themselves within 
the new borders of Greece and Bulgaria. 
                                              
14 For example, see Gandeto, Ancient Macedonians. 
15 For example, see Rossos, Macedonia and the Macedonians, pp. 28-32. 




By and large, this narrative tends to gloss over the period of Yugoslav rule, 
which its adherents perceive to be tainted by socialism and pro-Yugoslav 
attitudes, save the occasional pro-Macedonian partisans and activists such as 
Metodija Andonov Čento who resisted Tito and attempted to persuade the 
Macedonian partisan authorities to split from Yugoslavia and liberate what was 
lost to Greece in 1913.17 Macedonian independence in 1991 is seen as a historic 
event. 
 
Albanian historiography in Macedonia disputes the Macedonian narrative on a 
number of counts. Albanians disparagingly refer to Macedonians as ‘Slavs’, with 
the implication that they are really Serbs and/or Bulgarians and hence an 
artificial nation. The purpose is primarily to bolster their claims to territory by 
portraying Macedonians as newcomers who settled on indigenous Albanian 
territory. But it is also related to the wider Albanian perception of being 
surrounded and threatened by their neighbours whom they see as 
indistinguishable ‘Slavic hordes’. Iso Rusi puts these views bluntly, stating that 
“the unfortunate but truthful fact is that Albanophobia is what unites the Slavs, 
the Orthodox people”.18 Balalovska argues that these perceptions began with 
Serbian expansionist policies into Macedonia and Kosovo during the 1840’s.19 
According to her, these perceptions escalated after the Serbian occupation of 
Macedonia and Kosovo during the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, which resulted in 
legally sanctioned persecution, resettlements, colonisation, and deportation 
(though this was also true for Macedonians under Serbian occupation). These 
policies continued up to the end of the Second World War and to a lesser extent 
during the Yugoslav period. However, by the end of the Second World War, and 
                                              
17 For example, Pavlovski and Pavlovski begin their history of Macedonia in 800 BC and end it in 1944, 
dedicating a mere four and a half pages to the Macedonian partisan movement, see Pavlovski and 
Pavlovski, Macedonia. Another example is Pandovski who begins his history of Macedonia from around 
7,000 BC to 6,000 BC and ends it prior to the beginning of the Second World War, see Pandovski, 
Makedonija. 
18 I. Rusi, “Skopje between Prishtina and Belgrade”, Refugees in Macedonia, Makedonija Denes, Skopje, 
1999, cited in K. Balalovska, “A Historical Background to the Macedonian-Albanian Inter-Ethnic 
Conflict”, New Balkan Politics, No. 3/4, 2002, www.newbalkanpolitics.org.mk (accessed 
21 September 2014). 
19 Balalovska, “A Historical Background to the Macedonian-Albanian Inter-Ethnic Conflict”. 
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the establishment of a Macedonian republic within the framework of Yugoslavia, 
Macedonians took on the role of oppressors within Macedonia. As the Albanians 
see it, “although this [chauvinism] is a Serbian product, its best consumers were 
among the Macedonian political elites”.20 Albanians also see themselves as an 
Islamic bulwark against a sea of Orthodox Christians. They use the religious slur 
Kauri, meaning ‘non-believers’ but specifically aimed at Christians, to refer to 
Macedonians.21 
 
While the Albanian narrative has many similarities with those of Albania and 
Kosovo, there are also key differences, particularly in modern history. The 
narrative identifies the ancient Illyrians as their ancestors and there are some who 
claim that Alexander the Great was an Albanian.22 The Illyrians (and therefore 
the Albanians) are claimed to be the oldest indigenous peoples in the western 
Balkans (including the territories in which modern Albanians live).23 Bideleux 
and Jeffries note that: 
[Albanians have] been brought up to believe that their nation is the oldest 
in the Balkans, directly descended from the ancient Dardanians 
(Dardanae), a branch of the ‘Illyrian peoples’ who had allegedly inhabited 
most of the western Balkans (including Kosovo) for many centuries 
before the arrival of the Slavic ‘interlopers’.24 
 
The narrative claims that the Albanians take their national name from an Illyrian 
tribe, the Albanoi,25 and that the Albanian language is directly descended from 
the ancient Illyrian language.26 Albanian historiography asserts that during the 
                                              
20 K. Mehmeti, “Parade of Democracy Leads Nowhere”, Refugees in Macedonia, Makedonija Denes, 
Skopje, 1999, cited in Balalovska, A Historical Background to the Macedonian-Albanian Inter-Ethnic 
Conflict”.  
21 This is similar to the Arabic term Kafir. 
22 N. Malcolm, “Myths of Albanian National Identity: Some Key Elements, as Expressed in the Works of 
Albanian Writers in America in the Early Twentieth Century”, in S. Schwandner-Sievers and B. Fischer 
(eds.), Albanian Identities: Myth and History, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2002, pp. 70-87 
and K. Ad̂ievski et al, Istorija za VI oddelenie od devetgodišnoto osnovno obrazovanie, Ministry of 
Education and Science of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, 2011, pp. 50-55. 
23 R. Bideleux and I. Jeffries, The Balkans: A Post-Communist History, Routledge, Abingdon, 2007, p. 
23. 
24 ibid, p. 513. 
25 A. Ramat and P. Ramat (eds.), The Indo-European Languages, Routledge, London, 1998, p. 481. 
26 Bideleux and Jeffries, The Balkans, p. 26. 
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middle ages the Illyrians were forced to withdraw from large sections of the 
Balkans because of various migrations into the region. The Koman Culture and 
Skanderbeg are also considered Albanian.27 The narrative celebrates Albanian 
revolutionaries from the 19th century Rilindja movement that sought to create an 
independent Albanian state (and the various congresses it held, including the 
Prizren Leagues, the Pejë League, and the Greater Albanian Kosovo 
Committee).28 Albanian historiography also sees the Balkan Wars as a national 
disaster in which the Albanian people were divided among various Balkan 
states.29 The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the National Liberation Army 
(NLA) in Macedonia are seen as modern-day revolutionaries who liberated their 
kinsmen from oppression. In fact, the vast majority of contemporary nation-
building projects within the Albanian community relate to the 2001 war and the 
‘heroes’ of the NLA, while largely ignoring most other periods of history (though 
this is in part driven by intra-ethnic competition among the key Albanian 
political parties, see Chapter Ten). 
 
In Macedonian historiography Albanians are generally seen as enemies even 
though both communities have experienced the same oppressive conditions under 
both Serbian and Yugoslav occupation for nearly a century. While Albanian 
historiography is not disputed in official textbooks, it is vigorously challenged in 
Macedonian academic circles and popular historiography.30 In particular, the 
theory that Albanians are descended from the Illyrians is ridiculed. Macedonian 
historiography generally supports theories that the ancestors of the modern 
Albanians settled in Albania much later and probably originated in northern 
Serbia or Romania. Albanians are seen as traitors to Christendom for converting 
to Islam during Ottoman rule, which Macedonian historiography claims was 
                                              
27 J. Rrapaj and K. Kolasi, “The Curious Case of Albanian Nationalism: the Crooked Line from a 
Scattered Array of Clans to a Nation-State”, The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, Vol. 44, 
2013, pp. 211-212 and K. Kaser and F. Kressing, Albania – A country in transition, Nomos, Baden-
Baden, 2002, p. 17. 
28 D. Hupchick, The Balkans: From Constantinople to Communism, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 
2004, pp. 302-308. 
29 A. Ersoy, M. Gorny and V. Kechriotis (eds.), Modernism: the creation of nation-states, Central 
European University Press, Budapest, 2010, p. 237. 
30 For an extensive discussion of Albanian history by a Macedonian historian see P. Popovski, Krvavo 
Dosie: Arnautskiot Gego-Mirditski Razbojnički Terorizam vo Makedonskite Zemji (od 1700 do 2002 
godina), Vol. 1 and 2, Makedonsko Sonce, Skopje, 2006. 
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solely for financial gain and social status. They are considered by Macedonians 
to be a nation of janissaries who colluded with the Ottomans in oppressing 
Christians. Even in contemporary Macedonian society, Albanians are regularly 
referred to as ‘Janissaries’ and ‘Turks’ in a derogatory fashion, signifying a 
betrayal of Christianity and Europe in general. While Macedonian historians 
accept there has been an Albanian minority in western Macedonia for centuries, 
they generally argue that most Albanians settled in the region during the 18th and 
19th centuries and are relative newcomers. 
 
In modern history, Albanians are portrayed as fascists (for collaborating with the 
Axis powers in World War Two through the Balli i Kombëtar movement) and 
extremists (for the National Liberation Army’s ideology and use of violence to 
achieve political aims). The idea of the Albanians as fascists and extremists 
serves to portray the average Albanian as largely unreasonable and uncivilised, 
and is related to the Macedonian fear of a greater Albanian state that would 
inevitably result in a loss of Macedonian territory – compounding the catastrophe 
of 1913. Like the Albanian perceptions of Macedonians being oppressors, 
Balalovska argues that Macedonian perceptions of Albanians in this regard can 
also be explained by history.31 She argues that Macedonian fears surrounding an 
Albanian desire (real or imagined) to create a greater Albanian state can be traced 
back to the Prizren League of 1878 and continual reference by Albanians to the 
ideas promoted by the League.32 She also contends that the creation of a greater 
Albanian state during the Second World War under German and Italian tutelage 
(which included western Macedonia and Kosovo) along with continued activism 
during the Yugoslav period and resistance to the Macedonian state (including the 
declaration of an autonomous ‘Republic of Ilirida’ in 1992 and the 2001 war) has 
“firmly imprinted in the Macedonian consciousness…the image of an Albanian 
ambition to create such an entity as a ‘Greater Albania’.33 
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The radically different views of each other are further evident in their 
understanding of recent history, particularly the 2001 war. To a great extent, 
Macedonians see the conflict as a combination of Albanian criminal gangs 
provoking violence for their own illicit interests, the influence of Kosovo 
Albanian fighters, foreign interests including the United States and Albanians 
outside of Macedonia,34 and terrorists who sought to achieve extremist political 
goals through the use of violence. Albanians, on the other hand, are much more 
likely to see the NLA leaders as local and national heroes fighting for equality, 
fair treatment for Albanians, and local autonomy and representation.35 Albanians 
see the NLA as a liberation movement that struggled against Macedonian 
oppression. A 2011 survey found that 53 per cent of Albanian respondents 
believed that the 2001 war was a justified war for human rights, while only 2.5 
per cent of Macedonian respondents agreed with that view.36 Macedonian 
respondents (37 per cent) believed that the same concessions could have been 
made through peaceful means, while a further 20 per cent believed that the 2001 
war was an international conspiracy against Macedonia.37 A large proportion of 
Macedonian respondents (31 per cent) and Albanian respondents (36 per cent) 
believed that forgiveness for what happened in 2001 was not possible and that 
revenge should be sought.38 
 
The two communities also clash in their respective visions for the future. 
Although both share a desire to obtain membership of the European Union (EU) 
and NATO, unlike the Albanian community, Macedonian support for these 
organisations is not unconditional. Ali Ahmeti, President of the Democratic 
Union for Integration (DUI) and leader of the National Liberation Army (NLA) 
summaries the Albanian vision as follows: 
I believe that one day Albanians will unite. Not only Kosovo with Albania, 
but us too, Albanians from Macedonia, we will unite with our brothers by 
                                              
34 K. Ringdal, A. Simkus, and O. Listhaug, “Disaggregating Public Opinion on the Ethnic Conflict in 
Macedonia”, International Journal of Sociology, Vol. 37, Iss. 3, 2007, p. 93. 
35 ibid. 
36 S. Klekovski, “Meǵuetnički odnosi vo Makedonija”, Macedonian Centre for International 
Cooperation, 2011, p. 13, www.mcms.org.mk (accessed 15 November 2014). 
37 ibid. 
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blood and language… One day, not too far away, all three of [our] countries, 
Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia will be part of NATO and [the] EU. I think 
this will be the fulfilment of the dream of all those who served the idea for 
unification.39 
 
While evidence suggests that many within the Albanian community support the 
idea of a ‘greater Albanian state’ or some form of pan-Albanian political unity,40 
it seems possible that this political idea could be fulfilled through: a) the 
provision of co-constitutive nation status for the Albanian community in the 
Macedonian Constitution; and b) membership of the EU and NATO, which 
would provide them with de-facto ‘unification’ with other Albanians in the 
region (assuming Albania and Kosovo also obtain membership of these 
institutions). Albanian political elites certainly view EU and NATO membership, 
and the perceived nationalist benefits, as a priority. The Macedonian community, 
however, see EU and NATO membership through the prism of Greece’s attacks 
on its identity. Membership of these organisations would mean violating their 
inalienable rights by forcing them to change their name. Macedonians view their 
historic national identity and their inalienable rights as more important than 
membership in multilateral organisations, which they generally consider are 
unable to deliver the economic and security benefits that they promise. For 
example, a 2015 survey found that 60 per cent of respondents that did not support 
EU membership believed that it would have no economic benefit.41 In another 
survey from 2014, 33 percent of respondents noted that they believed EU 
membership would worsen the standard of living, while only 29 per cent believed 
it would improve the standard of living in Macedonia.42 
 
                                              
39 A. Ahmeti, Shqip, 2000, cited in C. Koneska, “Between the Internal and External Other: Discourse 
Study of Macedonian National Identity”, Analytica, 2011, p. 20, www.analyticamk.org (accessed 15 
November 2013). 
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In terms of EU membership and Macedonian identity, a 2014 study of public 
opinion revealed that 78 per cent of Macedonian respondents would only accept 
EU membership if it did not affect Macedonia’s name or the ethnonational 
identity of the Macedonian people.43 Conversely, 75 per cent of Albanian 
respondents viewed EU membership as more important than the name of the 
country and would accept membership even if it were conditional on changing 
Macedonia’s name and the identity of their Macedonian neighbours.44 
Reconciling these two opposing objectives would be virtually impossible and is 
likely to lead to more direct conflict in the future. 
Ethnonationalism in the Public Domain 
The Framework Agreement provides for the expression of ethnonational identity 
by the various communities, particularly the display of symbols that represent the 
community in the majority at the local level. This has had a significant impact on 
nation-building and nation-maintenance, which are almost exclusively 
undertaken at the local level where the various communities control municipal 
councils and their budgets. The exception to this norm is the education system (to 
the extent that the national government controls the curriculum) and what is 
known as Skopje 2014, a project to redevelop the city centre of the capital. These 
are the features identified by Coakley (national culture, rituals and symbols) that 
complement and consolidate national historiography. 
 
In Macedonia, the national curriculum is used to promote competing 
ethnonationalist narratives of the ruling parties from both communities. While 
Macedonian school children learn about Macedonian ethnonational history, 
Albanian school children learn about the history of Albania and the Albanian 
people living in Kosovo and Macedonia as a version of their own ethnonational 
historiography. The latest curriculum provides two disconnected versions of 
ancient history in separate chapters of the same textbook.45 Ancient Macedonian 
history is explored through a chapter on the Ancient Macedonians, culminating 
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45 K. Adžievski et al, Istorija za VI oddelenie od devetgodišnoto osnovo obrazovanie, Ministerstvo za 
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in the conquests of Alexander the Great. Ancient Albanian history is explored in 
another chapter on the Illyrians, who are claimed to be closely related to the 
Dardanians, with the implication that both are ancestors of the modern 
Albanians. Both the ancient Macedonians and the Illyrians/Dardanians are 
defined as indigenous to the same territory within Macedonia. Neither chapter 
attempts to address or reconcile the inconsistencies between them. The one 
textbook offers both communities a historical narrative that is used as a basis for 
their competing claims to indigenous status, which is a core element in the 
argument over the ownership of territory, and a necessary element in 
demonstrating that the other community is a settler nation whose claims are 
illegitimate. 
 
Another example includes Macedonian-language textbooks that teach the history 
and dispersion of the Macedonian language, while Albanian-language textbooks 
do the same for the Albanian language. Here we see competing accounts as to the 
geographical dispersion of their respective speakers and in the Albanian language 
textbook a map showing the supposed geographic dispersion of Albanian dialects 
that virtually coincides with what Albanians consider to be ‘Greater Albania’ 
(Appendix Two).46 In addition to containing a survey of Albanian literature and 
the history of famous Albanian writers, this textbook also provides information 
about important historical Albanian heroes and events, and includes (as a 
learning exercise) the national anthem of Albania.47 
 
Successive Macedonian governments (which have always included a 
Macedonian and an Albanian party) have viewed the national curriculum as too 
politically difficult to confront. One attempt to reverse this trend was undertaken 
by the VMRO-DPMNE Government with a strategy known as Steps towards 
Integrated Education. The initiative sought to revise all existing history, 
geography, and language textbooks and allow Albanian students to choose when 
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they would begin learning Macedonian (if at all).48 The strategy itself aims to 
bridge the ethno-religious and linguistic divide between students in primary and 
secondary schools but such an exercise will be difficult as there are too many 
laws and government policies that fundamentally contradict the purpose of this 
project. Nor is either community committed to the idea. It is also difficult to see 
how linguistic divides would be bridged if Albanian students never obtain 
fluency in the national language. Conversely, few Macedonians are prepared to 
learn Albanian and no progress has been achieved on this initiative to date. 
 
Outside of the education system various grandiose building projects are 
underway, including two competing city squares within the capital Skopje. The 
first is a complete redesign of the city centre, known as Macedonia Square, by 
providing it with a baroque facelift and erecting a large number of statues of 
historical Macedonians such as revolutionaries from the 19th and 20th 
centuries.49 Various ‘triumphal arches’ named after historical battles and places 
have also been built and it is envisaged that a large Orthodox cathedral will be 
constructed. To rival this project, the Albanian populated municipality of Čair, 
located within the City of Skopje, has embarked on its own reconstruction 
project. The Čair authorities plan to extend Skanderbeg Square,50 making it the 
largest in the capital. The inclusion of a statue of Skanderbeg on horseback, 
which travelled through Albanian populated towns in Macedonia on its way from 
Tirana to Skopje, has become a centrepiece of the square. Ragaru has noted the 
symbolism in the statue, located a few dozen metres from the banks of the Vardar 
River, which itself has become a symbolic demarcation between the mostly 
Albanian-inhabited northern Skopje suburbs and the Macedonian suburbs in the 
south. The seven-metre-high bronze Skanderbeg is depicted as sitting on his 
horse with his sword sheathed and his right hand raised. In Macedonian culture 
                                              
48 The government undertook significant consultations with civil society groups and gained the support of 
the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, see International Crisis Group, Macedonia: Ten 
Years After the Conflict, 2011, p. 17, www.crisisgroup.org (accessed 7 June 2012). 
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this gesture could be interpreted as a salute or a greeting.51 “Among common 
Albanian people, ‘Stop’ is the message read into it. Your territory ends here”.52 
 
Nevertheless, the Macedonian narrative in the city’s centre is timid and many 
have opposed it. Opponents have claimed that it is too costly, that its mono-
ethnic narrative will exacerbate ethnic tensions, that it is unnecessarily 
antagonising Greece, that there was no public consultation and that it will 
compromise the unique character of the city.53 It has also been opposed because 
of some of the oddities surrounding it. For example, while wanting to appear to 
lay claim to the ancient Macedonian past for domestic political purposes, 
VMRO-DPMNE clearly seeks to avoid controversy with Greece. A case in point 
is the comically named statues – Warrior and Warrior on Horse. The implication 
is that these are Philip II and Alexander the Great, but the reality is a juvenile 
attempt to appear to be protecting Macedonia’s ancient heritage from a 
chauvinistic Greece, when in reality Macedonian elites have done everything to 
avoid insult. Macedonian nationalists have labelled it as an example of plastic 
patriotism. In addition, there are some questionable personalities and events that 
have been included in the VMRO-DPMNE narrative. One example is a statue of 
Tsar Dušan. The Serbian Tsar was crowned in Skopje in 1346. Skopje was 
chosen for Dušan’s coronation, in part, so he could claim Macedonia as an 
integral part of the Serbian Kingdom. Serb extremists still lay claim to 
Macedonia based on the boundaries of Dušan’s kingdom. Why the ruling party 
chose to include a statue of Tsar Dušan remains a mystery and no official 
explanation has been provided. The Albanian community has been particularly 
incensed by the presence of his statue. The statue has already been damaged and 
legal action against the state threatened. Given Dušan’s symbolism, it remains an 
enigma why the Macedonian community has not joined its Albanian neighbours 
in this instance, though perhaps it is yet another example of Balkan complexities 
where groups can be both friends and enemies. 
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Both the Macedonian and Albanian communities are undertaking nation-building 
projects based on contested national historiographies with the aim of 
consolidating ethnonational identity. However, it needs to be noted that a section 
of scholarship, particularly in the west, has misunderstood and misrepresented 
these undertakings. Some scholars and commentators have seen these endeavours 
from a purely constructivist perspective, led by manipulating political elites with 
malevolent agendas. However, the elites cannot be separated from the societies 
that produce them or the people who support them at the grassroots. Nor is the 
public an amorphous and mindless mass that awoke one morning to find itself 
with no memory of the past and an uncritical acceptance of the newest 
government directive.  
 
For example, some claim that the construction of Skopje 2014 is explained by 
Greece’s xenophobic stance towards Macedonia in denying the existence of 
Macedonian ethnicity and identity and that this is a way to anchor the 
Macedonian identity and national distinctiveness to the ancient past.54 However, 
these analyses miss the point. They fail to understand that popular Macedonian 
nationalist historiography has, at least within living memory, typically anchored 
its identity in the ancient past.55 In the 19th century the Song of Alexander was 
popular with peasants in Macedonia who saw it as part of their history.56 This is 
not to say that it was or is universally accepted by all Macedonians, but that its 
existence is much older than acknowledged. Countless testimonies from the 
generation born prior to the Second World War attest to the longevity of the view 
that the Macedonians have an ancient past. Testimonies from these people 
demonstrate their belief that the Macedonians are descended from the ancient 
Macedonians, and that their parents and grandparents held those same views, 
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which were taught to them through oral histories and tradition.57 These people 
have also attested to the fact that this version of Macedonian history was strongly 
discouraged under communist Yugoslavia, but now that Macedonia is 
independent they argue that they have the right and the ability to express their 
version of history as they understand it. Whether their interpretation of 
Macedonian history is accurate or not is irrelevant. The claim of some 
constructivist scholars who seek theoretical constructivist purity that this 
narrative is a new invention (post-1991) or a response to Greek chauvinism both 
misrepresents the longevity of this understanding of Macedonian historiography 
and dismisses those that subscribe to it as  mindless masses uncritically following 
the latest tendencies of their political (and supposedly intellectual) masters. The 
nation-building projects of both communities are not simply elite-inspired 
projects to mould ethnonational identity in their own image (though they are 
partly that) – they also represent a genuine effort (with wider community 
support) at expressing a version of their history and identity that they believe in 
and subscribe to.  
 
A survey of public opinion conducted in September 2013 by the Institute of 
Social Sciences and Humanities (Skopje) revealed that among Macedonian 
respondents 30 per cent viewed ancient and medieval Macedonian history as the 
most important periods for the formation of the Macedonian identity, while 38 
per cent chose people from the ancient and medieval period as the most 
important historic personalities.58 This is supported by research conducted by 
Atanasov who found that 37 per cent of those surveyed believed that either 
ancient Macedonia or Tsar Samoil’s medieval kingdom was the historical root of 
the modern Macedonian state.59 For those with a tertiary education, support for 
that view rose to 43 per cent of respondents.60 Atanasov asserted that that “in the 
case of Macedonian identity there are competing differences between unitary and 
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subaltern national myths and narratives [and that] the governing myth coexists 
with and is constantly contested by subaltern myths, which are capable of 
generating their own traditions and stories”.61 
 
Further evidence of this is the fact that these nation-building projects are not 
limited to the capital, they extend across the country where they are mostly local 
initiatives funded through private donations, diaspora funds, and local 
government grants. Bitola, Prilep, Ohrid, Tetovo, Gostivar, and Struga all have 
notable undertakings. In these areas, nation-building and maintenance are also 
accompanied by the practice of marking out ‘national territory’. The use of flags, 
monuments, and religious buildings and objects, along with the use of 
ethnonationalist nomenclature for public spaces such as streets, squares, and 
villages are a key mechanism for both. Some, examples include the statue of 
Alexander the Great in Prilep and Philip II in Bitola. These monuments have 
been built without fear of foreign objections and in line with popular 
ethnonationalist historiography, but have not been very controversial due to the 
fact that very few Albanians live in these towns. 
 
While erected in a predominantly Albanian-populated region in the village of 
Radušа, near the Kosovo border between Tetovo and Skopje, one highly 
controversial monument has been a statue of Adem Jashari, a KLA fighter killed 
in Kosovo. While Jashari never fought in the Macedonian war of 2001, 
Macedonians find the monument particularly unpleasant because they consider 
Jashari a terrorist and the insult is further compounded by the statue having been 
placed on the turret of a tank that once belonged to the Macedonian Army but 
was captured by the NLA during the 2001 war (Appendix Three). Construction 
has also begun on a vast memorial complex, near the village of Zajas, dedicated 
to about 500 Albanians allegedly executed by Serbian troops in 1913.62 The 
complex will cover over 3,000 square metres and incorporate an Albanian flag on 
                                              
61 ibid. 
62 S. Marušić, “Macedonia Albanians Build Huge Balkan War Memorial”, Balkan Insight, 16 July 2013, 
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a 30-metre-tall pole, a five-metre-tall bronze monument called the ‘Albanian 
Mother’ and some 500 surrounding cylindrical tombstones.63 
 
Names of various public spaces across the country have not been spared the 
process of ethnonationalisation. The proliferation of renaming streets, schools, 
parks, and other public spaces has taken on bizarre proportions. In Skopje alone, 
it has been reported that nearly 1,000 streets have either been renamed or are in 
the process of being renamed.64 The most popular choices for Macedonian 
neighbourhoods have been notable figures from antiquity, and 19th- and 20th- 
century revolutionaries. The primary aim of the community’s elites has been to 
replace names associated with Tito’s partisans and the Yugoslav era. Within 
Albanian neighbourhoods the trend has been to replace Macedonian names with 
those of much more modern Albanian heroes from the Balli i Kombëtar 
movement, the KLA from Kosovo, and their very own NLA. 
 
One final matter in relation to this subject is that of flags. Flags adorn 
Macedonian streets, public buildings, private homes, and village and town 
entrances. For all practical purposes, flags mark out territory. It is virtually 
impossible not to come across some sort of flag in any given location. A visitor 
to Macedonia would be at no pains to ascertain which community dominates any 
given neighbourhood simply by taking note of which flag is on display. Within 
Macedonian communities, it is even possible to determine which particular 
ideological outlook a given neighbourhood identifies with. For example, it is 
common for those who adhere to socially progressive political ideologies to fly 
the current flag used by the Macedonian Government. As background, this flag 
was forced on to Macedonia by Greece in 1995 through the Interim Accord as 
part of the ongoing name negotiations. On the other hand, those who see that flag 
as a violation of their national sovereignty and fundamental human rights relating 
to freedom of expression will typically fly the original Macedonian flag adopted 
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after independence in 1991 and used throughout the diaspora for a number of 
decades prior to that. 
 
Regardless of their own intra-community disagreements on Macedonian 
symbols, Macedonians generally oppose the use of the flag of Albania 
(Skanderbeg’s double-headed black eagle on a red background) by the Albanian 
community. They see it as further evidence of disloyalty to the state and a desire 
to secede and establish a ‘greater Albanian state’. Statements by Albanian leaders 
such as Ali Ahmeti have not helped dispel those perceptions. In 2012, for 
example, he commented at a flag-raising ceremony that “this is Albanian 
territory…these flags will fly throughout the ages”.65 Albanians argue that the 
flag is not the flag of the Albanian state, but rather a national flag of the Albanian 
people that belongs to all Albanians and reserve the right to use it as their 
community symbol. 
 
Albanian Flag Day, celebrated annually on 28 November, reignites the same 
tensions every year. As part of these celebrations Albanian communities saturate 
the streets (even more so than usual) with enormous Albanian flags that cover 
entire buildings and flag poles reaching heights of up to 35 meters. Albanians 
have continued attempts to have this celebration legislated as a national public 
holiday, alongside the Day of the Albanian Alphabet, which is available as a 
public holiday for those that identify as Albanians. Macedonian-led governments 
have resisted these proposals as they are too controversial with their own 
constituents. 
Demographics and Citizenship 
Demographics 
The issue of demographics is especially important because it affects most 
political discussions and disagreements between Macedonians and Albanians.66 
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Many Albanians argue that if they constitute a large minority then they should be 
provided with constitutional recognition as a state-forming nation (Part II). 
Further, many Albanians like to demonstrate that they are a majority in what they 
consider to be traditionally Albanian territory. Macedonians, while maintaining 
that the size of each ethnic community is irrelevant in a civic society, continue to 
dispute both the exaggerated Albanian claims with regard to their proportion of 
the total population and the official census results.67 In essence, demographics in 
the Macedonian context are about political rights and ownership of territory. 
 
During the 1980s the Macedonian leadership identified Albanian ‘demographic 
expansion’ as a key threat that needed attention and the government implemented 
increasingly harsh measures to curb Albanian population growth, which was seen 
as intrinsically linked to Albanian nationalist demands.68 Population policies 
targeting the high Albanian birth rate were developed both at the Yugoslav 
federal level and the Macedonian republican level. They hoped to curb Albanian 
birth rates in Kosovo and Macedonia, while stimulating Serb and Macedonian 
birth rates respectively.69 Macedonian authorities also implemented policies such 
as prohibiting the sale of properties in Albanian-dominated areas in order to 
prevent a further concentration of Albanians in the region.70 Ultimately, 
Macedonian authorities feared that the Albanian population would continue to 
grow faster than the majority and demand more political power. The 1987 
Macedonian Parliamentary Resolution on Population Policy promoted the four-
member family as ideal and announced fundamental changes in a wide range of 
socio-economic and religious policies.71 In addition, Macedonian authorities 
established Republican Centres for Human Reproduction to carry out family 
planning activities, including the provision of education, counselling and 
information, collecting medical information, carrying out research, and testing 
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new methods of contraception.72 
 
In 1988, alongside propaganda efforts that claimed lower birth rates were needed 
to secure economic development and social services, Macedonian authorities 
attempted to reduce birth rates by abolishing welfare benefits to families with 
many children. This measure affected mostly Albanians and relatively few 
Macedonians due to their smaller families, resulting in reproduction becoming 
politicised and turning it into yet another ethnic battleground.73 After 
independence Macedonian population policies had collapsed, but the fear that the 
majority would be out-grown by the Albanian community persists. These are not 
necessarily baseless either. Projections by the Pew Research Centre, for example, 
suggest that the Muslim population in Macedonia will increase to 40.3 per cent 
of the total by 2030.74 Many Macedonians see Albanian population growth as a 
deliberate political strategy. Albanians consider this form of criticism as an 
attack on one of the most salient features of their social and cultural 
reproduction,75 and is in fact an attack on their fundamental human right to 
procreate. 
 
These issues inevitably politicised what are normally mundane administrative 
activities such as the national census. During the 1990s Albanian leaders claimed 
that their community constituted approximately 40 per cent of the total 
population. This figure was highly exaggerated and was used to pursue co-
constitutive nation status.76 Consequently, census results have been highly 
contested in part because of exaggerated claims but also because of large 
irregularities during census counts. One of the key reasons that the 1994 census 
became controversial was because Albanians claimed that long-term residents 
with long-standing connections to Macedonia were not counted as they did not 
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hold Macedonian citizenship. It is claimed that they did not hold citizenship 
because the requirements that needed to be met were too stringent. However, 
these accusations fail on closer inspection. The Law on Census of Population, 
Households and Dwellings (1994) prescribed that a broad category of people 
could be counted.77 At a minimum, if an individual was legally residing in 
Macedonia or had an officially registered place of residence in the country at the 
time of the census there was nothing to preclude them from being counted simply 
because they did not hold Macedonian citizenship. 
 
The 2002 census was also highly controversial, though in this instance members 
of the Macedonian community claimed that the Albanian community was 
purposely over-counted in order for the provisions of the Framework Agreement 
to take effect. The 2002 census found that the Albanian community numbered 25 
per cent of the total population, surpassing the 20 per cent threshold required 
under the Framework Agreement. The census was completed a year after the 
signing of the accord and its completion was mandated by the Agreement itself.78 
 
Much speculation, political game-playing, and rumour preceded the 
announcement of the 2002 census results on 1 December 2003, over one year 
after its completion.79 Gaber and Joveska note that the “process of conducting the 
census was not sufficiently transparent so as to remove any possible doubts about 
its objectivity” and that “publishing the final data was unnecessarily prolonged, 
again provoking doubt as to the final results and adding even more speculation 
                                              
77 This included: Individuals who had an official place of residence in Macedonia and were present in 
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[from] various political sides from both the Macedonian and Albanian ethnic 
communities”.80 
 
Additionally, almost all opposition parties publicly cast doubt on the census 
results. The then Macedonian opposition (VMRO-DPMNE) claimed that the 
census counted 500,000 people (mainly Albanians) without personal 
identification numbers.81 The implication was that many of these people may not 
have existed. These claims may not have been entirely unfounded. A number of 
examples have been cited, including the case of an 87-year-old Albanian man 
living alone who reportedly listed 17 members of his extended family living in 
Switzerland and Austria.82 Some argued that many Albanians who had migrated 
to Macedonia as refugees after the Kosovo war should not have been included.83 
There were even disagreements between statisticians, with a number of 
Macedonian statisticians claiming that the Albanian community could not have 
numbered more than 19 per cent of the total population and may have been even 
lower.84 On the other hand, some Albanian statisticians claimed that the real size 
of the Albanian community was closer to 28 per cent.85 
 
Most recently, the 2011 census was cancelled indefinitely because of government 
fears relating to widespread fraud in Albanian-populated municipalities. Initially, 
Macedonian representatives argued that the census should be conducted during 
the autumn (October) of 2011. This would have excluded significant numbers of 
Albanians seasonal workers in Western Europe. Albanian opposition parties led 
by DPA (excluding DUI, which was part of the ruling coalition) wanted the 
census conducted during the summer (July) of 2011 when most Albanian 
workers return to Macedonia to ensure a maximal count for the Albanian 
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community.86 Additionally, DPA claimed to have conducted its own statistical 
analysis that would be used to confirm the accuracy of the final results.87 
However, throughout the process of seeking a postponement of the census DPA 
focussed its attacks on DUI, providing the impression that their opposition to an 
autumn census was more about intra-Albanian political posturing than any real 
concern for the implications for the result. Nevertheless, the DPA initiative failed 
and the census began in October 2011. 
 
Disputes over methodological issues and evidentiary regulations arose 
immediately. These became more controversial than necessary because of the 
implications that the final results would have in relation to the Framework 
Agreement and the wider conflict between the two communities. The first issue 
revolved around whether Macedonian citizens who had been living in other 
countries for more than 12 months should be counted. Albanian and Turkish 
members of the census commission argued that they should. The head of the 
census commission, Vesna Janevska (Macedonian), disagreed citing the rules of 
the European Statistical Agency (EUROSTAT) which state that these people 
should be counted in their countries of residence.88 There was also disagreement 
on census workers. Albanians wanted Albanian census workers in Albanian-
dominated municipalities, while Macedonians were concerned that they would be 
unaccountable and artificially inflate their numbers.89 
 
After several days of talks the commission failed to resolve the issue and the 
deputy head, Abdulmenaf Bexheti (Albanian), resigned without stating his 
reasons.90 Others that resigned from the Commission complained that the 
Macedonian mentality reflected their distrust towards the Albanians, referring to 
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Macedonian refusals to have Albanian-only census workers in Albanian-
dominated municipalities.91 The following day Janevska resigned citing 
suspicions that a “big census forgery is being prepared”.92 Janevska also raised 
concerns that Albanian census workers were accepting photocopies of 
identification,93 further implying that mass census fraud was being undertaken. 
Within a week the Prime Minister announced that the census would be cancelled 
citing widespread fraud.94 The Census Commission announced that it had 
undertaken inspections in Albanian-populated towns, which revealed that over 
18,000 residents had been counted whose existence could not be verified and that 
these residents had been registered within the first five days of the census 
count.95 The Census Commission estimated that over 100,000 non-existent 
people could have been registered if the trend continued for the entire census 
period, significantly distorting already controversial demographic data.96 
 
Further evidence later emerged that census workers in Albanian-populated 
regions were pressured, and in some cases threatened, to record residents even if 
they could not verify their identity or their very existence. Turkish and Roma 
census workers in these regions complained that eight days after the census had 
begun their Albanian superiors would not allow them to begin work, sending out 
only all-Albanian census teams into the field.97 The ruling VMRO-DPMNE 
reiterated their accusations from 2002 when they claimed that the then 
government of Branko Crvenkovski (SDSM) had falsified the census by adding 
120,000 non-existent Albanians solely so that they could meet the 20 per cent 
threshold required by the Framework Agreement and take advantage of its 
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provisions. They claimed that they would not allow the same to happen under 
their charge. 
 
Two events followed that are somewhat perplexing and create doubts as to the 
accuracy of the Government’s version of events. The first is in relation to the 
community response to Gruevski’s decision to cancel the census. Macedonian 
commentary around the cancellation was highly supportive of the Prime 
Minister’s decision, while Albanian politicians and political analysts largely 
remained silent. For a very proactive community it is highly unusual that 
virtually nothing was heard from Albanian leaders. The second was in relation to 
a dispute that erupted a week after the cancellation regarding the destruction of 
collected data. The governing coalition announced that all data would be 
destroyed, but a number of non-government organisations (mainly Macedonian) 
argued that doing so was simply an exercise in destroying evidence that would 
make it impossible to prosecute those guilty of fraud (if fraud had indeed 
occurred).98 Since the government cancelled the census on the basis of fraud, the 
question remains why no investigation was conducted and the data destroyed. 
 
There has been little public discussion on the census and it is unclear when a new 
one will be held. Even after a further census is conducted it is highly likely that 
the results will be disputed and that some level of fraud will have occurred. It 
may be some time yet before the ethno-religious composition of Macedonia is 
more accurately determined. The demographic structure of society will continue 
to divide the Macedonian and Albanian communities as they both attempt to use 
numbers to advance their respective nationalist causes. 
Citizenship 
During the 1990s Albanians protested against the stringent citizenship laws in 
Macedonia. Under the Law on Citizenship (1992), citizenship could be acquired 
through one of four methods: ethnic origin, birth within Macedonian territory, 
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naturalisation or international agreement.99 The vast majority of Albanians that 
did not hold citizenship needed to go through the process of naturalisation 
because they had immigrated from Kosovo or other parts of the former 
Yugoslavia, and in many cases illegally. 
 
Under the 1992 Law, naturalisation was difficult to obtain, particularly due to the 
requirement to have resided in Macedonia continuously for at least 15 years.100 
On the other hand, Macedonians were considered as ‘Macedonian by origin’ and 
eligible for automatic citizenship regardless of where they were born or lived.101 
 
Albanians argued that the 1992 Law did not adequately take into account the 
rights they previously enjoyed under Yugoslav law. They argued that as 
Yugoslav citizens prior to independence (regardless of which republic they were 
born in or maintained residency) they enjoyed the rights of citizenship in 
Macedonia. However, since independence they had been arbitrarily deprived of 
rights previously held because they were not ethnic Macedonians and were not 
born in Macedonia.102 In addition, Albanians (along with other minorities) argued 
that it was unfair that an ethnic Macedonian born and raised in a foreign country 
and with no ties to Macedonia could automatically obtain Macedonian 
citizenship whereas Albanians, Turks, Serbs or other minority group members 
who had lived in Macedonia for years needed to go through a stringent process of 
naturalisation.103 
 
In 1994 Arben Xhaferi, then leader of DPA, claimed that there were 
approximately 125,000 Albanians in Macedonia without citizenship.104  The 
Macedonian Ministry of Interior confirmed this by stating that 143,000 residents 
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did not have citizenship.105 In a 1995 interview with Human Rights Watch the 
then Minister of the Interior, Ljubomir Frčkovski (SDSM), argued that people 
needed to adjust to the new political realities: 
This is not just a problem for the Albanians. It is a problem for everyone. 
They must accept the new international borders...we cannot absorb 
everyone, especially from Kosovo.106 
 
Frčkovski made a reasonable point. The Macedonian republic needed to control 
who entered the state and could not simply provide citizenship to an unlimited 
number of people, many who had arrived illegally. The porous Macedonian-
Kosovo border is virtually impossible to control and it is still unknown how 
many Kosovo Albanians crossed into Macedonia during the reign of Serbian 
President Slobodan Milošević. Even to this day Macedonian police are unable to 
control the border zone, which acts as a transit for drugs, weapons, and illegal 
immigrants.107 
 
The problems surrounding citizenship remained largely unresolved until 2004 
when amendments were made including extending citizenship to children of 
existing citizens (regardless of where these children were born or the ethnicity of 
their parents),108 and reducing the residency requirement from 15 years to eight 
years for the purposes of naturalisation.109 While these changes brought about 
some criticism from diaspora Macedonians that they would lose access to 
citizenship and that it should have been extended to the grandchildren of existing 
citizens (based on the Irish model), relatively few were affected. In the light of 
the demographic debate, many within the Macedonian community felt that this 
provided citizenship to Albanians that should not have been eligible and is 
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perceived as dangerous for the survival of the state as a Macedonian state. For 
Albanians this has been a positive move and a satisfactory outcome to a core 




Religious Conflict  
Christianity and Islam: Similarities and Differences 
The overwhelming majority of Macedonians (97 per cent) identify as Christians, 
while a similar majority (98 per cent) of Albanians identify as Muslims. There is 
also a small Macedonian-speaking Muslim community. The vast majority of 
Muslims in Macedonia are Sunnis with small pockets of Bektashis and Sufis.1 
The Sunni Muslims in Macedonia generally belong to the Hanafi School of 
jurisprudence. Recent years, however, have seen the rise of radical Salafi and 
Wahhabi groups. The vast majority of Christians are Orthodox with small 
communities of Catholics, Protestants, and Evangelical Christians. There is also a 
small Jewish community.  
 












Macedonians 1,261,476  97.3 15,139  1.2 1,295,964  
Albanians 1,876  0.4 425,376  98.2 433,013  
Source: State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia, The 1994 Census of Population, 
Dwellings and Agricultural Holdings in the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, 1996. 
 
The two largest religious organisations in Macedonia are the Macedonian 
Orthodox Church (MOC) and the Islamic Religious Community (IRC). The 
MOC administers approximately 1,950 churches across 12 dioceses (including 
four in the diaspora).2 The MOC is presently headed by the Archbishop of Ohrid 
and Macedonia, Stefan. Due to a dispute with the Serbian Orthodox Church 
(SOC), the MOC’s autocephaly remains unrecognised by other Orthodox 
Churches. The IRC administers approximately 580 mosques across 13 
muftiships. It is headed by the Reis-ul-ulema, Suleyman Rexhepi. The Reis-ul-
ulema is the Chief of the Islamic Scholars or the Grand Mufti of the Muslims in 
                                              
1 M. Koinova, “Muslims of Macedonia”, Centre for Documentation and Information on Minorities in 
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2 Macedonian Orthodox Church, [website], 2016, www.mpc.org.mk (accessed 5 September 2016). 
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Macedonia.3 Prior to Macedonian independence the Muslims of Macedonia fell 
under the jurisdiction of the Islamic Community of the Yugoslav Federation 
(Rijaset) with headquarters in Sarajevo. 
 
Christianity and Islam have many similarities, though these are fairly superficial. 
Both the Bible and the Qur’an provide similar accounts of creation, the prophets, 
and heavenly beings. They also include similar moral teachings on which 
Christians and Muslims can agree and uphold as universal moral values. For 
example, both teach that one is to serve no other gods, to refrain from making 
idols and worshipping them, not to covet, not to murder, and to honour one’s 
father and mother. 
 
However, there are significant theological differences that affect the worldviews 
of Christians and Muslims. Muslims regard the Bible as corrupted and the Qur'an 
as the final authority and the last revelation of Allah. However, the Qur’an 
affirms that Allah sent revelation in the Torah and the Gospels.4 Furthermore, the 
Qur’an says that Jesus’ words should be believed,5 and even commands the 
Muslims to listen to those who had the Torah/Gospels before the Qur’an calling 
it a ‘Truth come to thee from Thy Lord”.6 As far as Christians are concerned the 
Bible was completed in the first century with the Book of Revelation and with it 
God’s message. The Bible warns against anyone adding to or subtracting from 
God’s Word.7 Christians also refute Muslim claims that the Bible has been 
corrupted and the vast amount of Biblical research and scroll findings certainly 
attest to the reliability of its transmission.8 
 
Christians believe in the triune God (the Trinity) – God the Father, God the Son 
(Jesus) and God the Holy Spirit – one God in three persons. Muslims reject the 
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Trinity and the divinity of Christ. Islam teaches the doctrine of tawhid, which is 
the oneness of God. With regards to Jesus Muslims believe that He was a prophet 
heralding the way for the coming of Muhammad. Many commentators make 
claims that Christians and Muslims worship the same God; however, this claim 
fails because Jesus either is God (the Bible) or is not God (the Qur’an) and both 
claims cannot be true. This is a key point of disagreement between the two, 
which has ramifications for other essential theological points such as salvation. 
 
As Muslims do not accept the Christian doctrine of original sin or of a 
subsequent sinful nature, there is no need for redemption. Many Muslims 
maintain that whoever believes in the oneness of Allah and the prophethood of 
Muhammad will be saved from the fire of judgement and enter Paradise. Other 
Muslims insist on the submission to Allah through adherence to the five pillars of 
Islam. The Bible, on the other hand, teaches that Adam and Eve rebelled against 
God and because of this all people died spiritually and the entire world was 
affected. In addition, the Bible teaches that all people sin individually against 
God in their own lives. The Bible teaches that people are born morally fallen and 
are naturally turned away from God and towards sin in every area of life – people 
may not be as bad as they could be, but they will never meet the holy and 
righteous standards of God. Therefore, people are under just condemnation to 
eternity in hell, and that is what they need to be saved from. The Bible teaches 
that salvation is only through faith in Jesus Christ, who is God and who died a 
substitutionary death on the cross to pay for our sins.  Those who repent of their 
sin, and believe and trust Jesus with their salvation will be forgiven and spend 
eternity with God. 
 
Unlike Protestantism, Orthodox Christian theology strays from the Bible as the 
sole source of God’s teaching, and uses extra-Biblical sources in shaping its 
doctrine. These additional sources include what is referred to as sacred tradition 
(claimed to be the faith which Jesus Christ taught to the apostles and which they 
gave to their disciples without any development or deepening in understanding of 
the faith), the writings of the early church fathers, decisions of the canonical 
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synods, and the discourses written at the time of disputes and schisms. In 
addition to the Qur’an, the Hanafi School also derives Islamic law from the 
hadiths (containing the words, actions, and customs of the Muhammad, narrated 
in six hadith collections), the consensus of the companions of Muhammad, the 
individual's opinion from the companions, Qiyas (analogy), Istihsan (juristic 
preference), and local Urf (local custom of the people).  
 
Islamic Scholars are divided over the extent to which the Qur’an permits or even 
advocates violence. The concept of jihad is important to understand within its 
correct context as it has often been used to endorse violence, both justifiably and 
unjustifiably. Jihad literally means struggle, effort, and exertion.9 There are two 
basic types of jihad: the greater jihad (personal spiritual struggle) and the lesser 
jihad (warfare).10 The Qur’an repeatedly reminds Muslims of the former, while 
also providing for the use of the latter under various circumstances. Most 
moderate Muslims conceive the lesser jihad as a form of defensive warfare or 
just war to defend their religion or way of life and independence when they are 
threatened or under attack.11 
 
Joel Hayward contends that like Christianity, Islam has a similar concept to just 
war and that three conditions need to be met: just cause; proportionality; and last 
resort.12 Hayward uses Sura 22:38-40 to argue that self-defence would be a just 
cause asserting that it provides “permission to undertake armed combat not for 
offensive war, but for self-defence and self-preservation when attacked or 
oppressed”.13 Further he notes that Muhammad acknowledged that “warfare was 
something that seemed very wrong, indeed a ‘disliked’ activity, yet it was 
morally necessary and thus morally right and obligatory under some 
                                              
9 A. Saikal, Islam and the West: Conflict or Cooperation?, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2003, p. 26. 
10 ibid. 
11 ibid. 
12 J. Hayward, Warfare in the Qur’an, The Roal Aal Al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, Amman, 
2012, p. 39. 
13 ibid, p. 30. Qur’an 22:38-40 states “Verily Allah will defend (from ill) those who believe: verily, Allah 
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circumstances”.14 Hayward argues that proportionality is a fundamental principle 
in the Qur’anic guidance on war, contending that the concept of ‘not 
transgressing limits’ is repeatedly stressed in the Qur’an.15 Finally, Hayward 
argues that the Qur’an teaches that war should be a last resort. He contends that 
the Qur’an teaches Muslims to respond to provocations with patience and efforts 
to facilitate conciliation.16 
 
Historically, various Islamic caliphates have afforded protection to the adherents 
of other monotheistic religions and prohibited violence against them as long as 
they paid a special tax (jizya). The Qur’an clearly states that “there is no 
compulsion in religion”,17 and contains passages that encourage Muslims to 
engage unbelievers with grace and persuasion.18 However, we also read the 
Qur’an stating: 
fight those who believe not in God nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden 
which hath been forbidden by God and His Apostle, nor acknowledge the 
religion of Truth, [even if they are] of the People of the Book, until they pay 
the jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued.19  
 
In addition to the Qur’an, Muslims refer to hadith, which are a collection of 
statements or actions of Muhammad or of his tacit approval or criticism of 
something said or done in his presence.20 A hadith from Sahih Muslim explains 
how Muhammad instructed his commander when sent out on an expedition: 
When you meet your enemies who are polytheists, invite them to three 
courses of action. If they respond to any one of these, you also accept it and 
withhold yourself from doing them any harm. Invite them to [accept] Islam; 
if they respond to you, accept it from them and desist from fighting against 
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them…If they refuse to accept Islam, demand from them the jizya. If they 
agree to pay, accept it from them and hold off your hands. If they refuse to 
pay the tax, seek Allah’s help and fight them”.21  
 
While the Qur’an generally instructs Muslims to extend the Islamic community 
peacefully through preaching, education, example, and writing,22 the above cited 
verses certainly raise questions (whether valid or not) among many Christians 
about the use of violence for the purpose of forced conversions and enforcing 
what would amount to a discriminatory tax (jizya) on non-Muslims, infringing 
their religious freedom.  
 
The Bible generally condones violence in two instances – self-defence 
(individual and collective) and by the state for the purpose of protecting citizens 
and punishing evil (for example, murder). The Bible teaches that war, and 
therefore violence, is necessary at times.23 While war is terrible, in a fallen world 
it is inevitable.24 However, the Bible does not condone war indiscriminately. The 
Bible makes a clear distinction between a holy war and a just war. According to 
the Bible a true holy war is one specifically commanded by God to Old 
Testament Israel. The commands to do battle in the Old Testament were for a 
specific group of people, for a specific time, and for a specific purpose.25 That 
purpose has been accomplished and no one can claim a holy war today, nor could 
the crusades be justified as a holy war. 
 
Like the Muslim, the Christian’s battle is spiritual,26 meaning (among other 
things) that God’s people do not use physical means to coerce people into God’s 
Kingdom, nor is it possible to truly change one’s inner-most beliefs by force (as 
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opposed to one’s outward profession of faith).27 However, the Bible does allow 
for just (or justified) wars, which are wars that are waged on behalf of justice. 
The goal of a just war is peace. The Bible outlines the God-ordained role of 
government in society to: 
 govern with authority from God; 
 praise the good in society; 
 punish the evildoer in society; and 
 bear the sword and execute wrath against wrongdoers.28 
 
Christians generally agree that a just war must adhere to the following 
guidelines: 
1) There must be a just cause (Revelation 19:11); 
2) War must be declared by a competent authority (Romans 13:1); 
3) The motives for war must be just (Romans 13:3); 
4) The purpose of war must be just (Proverbs 21:2); 
5) War must be a last resort (Matthew 5:9; Romans 12:18); 
6) There should be a reasonable expectation that the war can be won (Luke 
14:31); 
7) The outcomes of war should be greater than the cost of going to war 
(Romans 12:21, 13:4); and 
8) The war should be undertaken with great reluctance and sorrow at the 
harm that will come from war (Psalms 68:30).29 
 
In addition, some moral restrictions on how a just war should be fought should 
also be considered. These include the proportional use of force (Deuteronomy 
20:10-12), discrimination between combatants and non-combatants 
(Deuteronomy 20:13-14, 19:20), avoidance of evil means (Psalms 34:14), and 
good faith – the desire to restore peace and live in harmony (Matthew 5:43-44; 
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Romans 12:18).30 Obviously, the Christian understanding of a just war is rarely 
met by governments that claim to represent Christians, though it is also rare that 
those governing nominally Christian nations are Christians themselves (as 
opposed to nominal or ‘cultural’ Christians).  
 
While there are significant differences between Christians and Muslims within 
the Macedonian context and more broadly, there are also considerable 
misunderstandings between the followers of the two faiths and much can be 
learned about each other that will contribute to a deeper appreciation for the 
views of the other.  
Religiosity and Religious Values and Attitudes 
Social values and norms are considerably different between the two 
communities, and influenced by their respective religious beliefs. While care 
should be taken when analysing surveys on religiosity, particularly given that 
respondents may not necessarily hold religious beliefs but still identify with 
particular faiths because they are a marker of ethnic identity, there is 
considerable evidence that religiosity is high and influential on moral values and 
societal attitudes. 
 
A study on social distance by Jashari and Simkus concluded that Macedonians 
and Albanians are separated by very significant social distances involving most 
spheres of life.31 In particular, they found that Albanians “report much higher 
frequencies of prayer, more conservative religious beliefs, and higher self-
evaluated religiosity than do Macedonians…indeed, by most measures they are 
perhaps the most religious ethnic group in the Western Balkans” and that value 
differences between Macedonians and Albanians “involve serious differences in 
moral issues, in addition to less emotional norms of behaviour and preferred 
economic policies”.32 
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Work undertaken by Bianchini agrees with these findings. He goes further and 
concludes that inter-ethnic relations are strongly influenced by the official 
positions of the two respective religious organisations, the MOC and the IRC, 
which dramatically contribute to the strengthening of Macedonia’s socially 
conservative attitudes.33 Bianchini also notes that: 
the social profile of the individual who feels closest to religious values and 
prescriptions is represented by an Albanian female, Muslim by religion, 
with a primary education, living in the countryside and voting for the DUI. 
At the opposite end, the more secular individual can be symbolised by a 
male, Macedonian, Christian Orthodox by belief, with a high level of 
education, living in Skopje and voting for the Social Democrats.34 
 
Other studies conducted on religion and religiosity in Macedonia also confirm 
the findings by Bianchini, and Jashari and Simkus. For example, an Institute for 
Democracy: Societas Civilis report collected some interesting data in relation to 
religiosity, and religious values and attitudes among Muslim Albanians and 
Christian Macedonians. According to this research, Albanian respondents (91 per 
cent) more readily identify themselves as ‘believers’ than Macedonian 
respondents (67 per cent).35 More Albanians (92 per cent) considered religion to 
be of great importance to their lives than Macedonians (54 per cent).36 Albanians 
(63 per cent) were more likely to practise their religion than Macedonians (53 per 
cent),37 and do so more often (once per week for Albanians compared to a few 
times per year or for the major holidays for Macedonians).38 The vast majority of 
Albanians (96 per cent) and Macedonians (94 per cent) noted that they had never 
changed their religion.39 This is very similar to the virtual impossibility of exit 
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34 ibid. 
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and entry from one ethnic group to another as discussed above. A lack of 
proselytization between the two is partially linked to the fact that Islam and 
Christianity have become embedded into ethnonational identity. 
 
A plurality in both communities (45 per cent of Macedonians and 48 per cent of 
Albanians) identified very strongly with their faith.40 Although the Albanian 
respondents were mixed on the question of the separation of religion from the 
state, a plurality of them (33 per cent) considered it as bad, while a majority of 
Macedonians (64 per cent) considered it as good.41 On a related issue, Bianchini 
found that 84 per cent of Albanians support the idea of religious values being 
instilled in public schools, while Macedonians (39 per cent) appeared more 
reluctant about the idea.42 The vast majority of Albanian (95 per cent) and 
Macedonian (92 per cent) respondents claimed to know someone from another 
religion.43 
 
Research conducted by Taševska Remenski found that there was a significant 
perception among Macedonians (59 per cent) and Albanians (46 per cent) that 
the core interests of Christians and Muslims were diametrically opposed.44 
However, a considerable number of Albanians (40 per cent) believed that while 
the core interests of Christians and Muslims were different, they were not 
diametrically opposed.45 Her data suggests that Muslim Albanians were more 
tolerant of Christianity than Macedonians were of Islam.46 One more important 
attitude to note is that relating to the use of violence in political matters. The 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has found that 43 per cent of 
Albanians do not consider violence as justifiable in any case, compared to 78 per 
cent of Macedonians and 82 per cent of other ethnicities in the country.47 While 
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the UNDP found that Albanian attitudes towards the use of violence have been 
high historically, the percentage of those that justify it has declined since 2001.48 
 
Another study on political, social, and religious views in Macedonia found that 
43 per cent of all participants supported revolutionary means for social changes.49 
The same study found that 60 per cent of Albanian respondents supported 
revolutionary methods, while support for the same was at 38 per cent among 
Macedonians. Additionally, 42 per cent of all participants were of the view that it 
is acceptable to protest violently when there was dissatisfaction with the political 
situation.50 
Politicisation of Religion 
The demise of Tito’s regime led to an immense political, social, and cultural 
transformation in Macedonia where religion re-emerged as a valuable instrument 
in restructuring society. Since ethnicity and religion coincide in Macedonia, 
religion has become highly politicised and a very effective method of 
mobilisation in both communities. For example, Koppa has argued that: 
Nationalism uses religion as a criterion of cultural differentiation…religion 
becomes politicized, being used for the identification of a new cultural and 
political entity: the nation. In this context, religion loses its autonomous 
role, as it is manipulated by nationalism. In Macedonia we have witnessed 
the identification of Macedonians with Christianity and of Albanians with 
Islam. Ethnic conflict has thus been translated in terms of a continuous fight 
between Christianity and Islam, as a struggle between Good and Evil.51 
 
Fox’s hypotheses on the role of religion on ethnic conflict cast some light on the 
situation in Macedonia and the way in which the two communities have 
consolidated religion into their respective identities. Particularly relevant to the 
Albanians are arguments that religious discrimination is likely to result in the 
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formation of religious grievances (hypothesis one) and that the presence of 
religious discrimination and disadvantages is likely to cause an increase in the 
levels of group identity and cohesion among the group which suffers from these 
disadvantages (hypothesis six).52 
 
During the late 19th and early 20th centuries Albanian ethnonationalism was 
relatively secular and its elites traditionally avoided politicising religion because 
of the need to prevent internal divisions in the process of nation-building among 
Muslim, Catholic, and Orthodox Albanians.53 However, after the Albanians of 
Kosovo and Macedonia fell under Serbian (and then Yugoslav) rule, authorities 
in Belgrade began to encourage its Albanian population to emphasise Islam over 
their ethnicity in order to eradicate Albanian nationalism,54 which was 
incompatible with their own vision of Serb dominance across the Balkan 
peninsula. In addition, Serb and Yugoslav authorities promoted the imams and 
religious schools from Sarajevo (dominated by Muslim Serbs and Croats) over 
Albanian religious authorities, particularly the Sufi orders, missionaries, and 
lodges (tekkes), which were widespread in Kosovo and Macedonia and served as 
hubs of Albanian nationalism.55 Many of these groups were banned and 
persecuted. Yugoslav and Macedonian (after the Second World War) policy 
toward Albanians and their attempt to eradicate religious groups that served as 
conduits for nationalist claims had a detrimental impact on their religious 
diversity. By the late 20th century Albanians in Macedonia were religiously 
homogenised and Sunni Muslims accounted for the vast majority of the Albanian 
community. Catholic Albanians largely emigrated and Orthodox Albanians were 
assimilated into the Macedonian community.56 This homogenisation among 
Albanians opened the way for religion to become a marker of identity, 
particularly in opposition to the majority Christian Macedonians. Some scholars 
have also suggested that because Macedonian authorities (under Yugoslavia) 
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suppressed Albanian ethnic identity Albanians used Islam as a way of preserving 
their cultural identity and that has been an additional factor in merging religion 
into the Albanian ethnonational identity.57 
 
The Reis-ul-ulema of Muslims in Macedonia, Suleyman Rexhepi, has discussed 
considerable persecution of Muslims by the Macedonian authorities under 
Yugoslav rule, which further consolidated religion as part of the Albanian 
identity. For example, he notes that mosques and other religious structures were 
destroyed and permission for constructing new ones withheld, the walls 
surrounding Albanian homes were pulled down, setting up courses to study the 
Qur’an in small schools attached to the mosques was hindered, the Islamic call to 
prayer from speakers in the minarets was not permitted, and religious officials 
were routinely interrogated by State Security.58 
 
Orthodox Christianity is intertwined with Macedonian ethnonational identity, and 
within the Macedonian ethnonationalist narrative there is little conceptual 
separation between the nation, the state, and the church. The MOC is seen in 
many regards as a national institution rather than simply a religious one. Many 
Macedonians view the church, or at least the Macedonian priests and laity prior 
to the establishment of an independent church organisation, as an informal 
structure that functioned to cultivate and promote Macedonism (the Macedonian 
national idea) among the people and functioned as a state within a state. The 
church and the state are considered to be (to borrow President Lincolns famous 
phrase) of the people, by the people, and for the people and, therefore, 
inseparable from the people. While Macedonia does not have an official state 
religion (the Constitution does formally acknowledge the MOC and the IRC, 
among other religious institutions), in practice Macedonian political elites and 
MOC Bishops (along with lower ranking priests) are very closely aligned.  
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The MOC is to Macedonians the same as the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) is 
to Serbs, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BOC) is to Bulgarians, and the Greek 
Orthodox Church (GOC) is to Greeks – it is used to establish Macedonian 
uniqueness. As part of their negation of Macedonian identity, neighbouring 
Orthodox Churches (in collaboration with their respective governments) refuse to 
recognise the independence of the MOC. Among Macedonians, protecting the 
MOC from hostile neighbours is seen as equivalent to protecting Macedonian 
identity itself. Due to this, Orthodox Christianity and the MOC have been 
frontline instruments in the Macedonian nation-building process since the 1950s 
and even more so since 1991. The Macedonian Government, for example, has 
taken significant measures to defend the interests of the MOC in its disputes with 
other Orthodox Churches, viewing it as integral to the Macedonian identity, and 
the Church has worked closely with political elites in promoting nationalist 
discourse.  
 
Macedonians view both Albanian identity and Islam as incompatible with the 
idea of an Orthodox Christian Macedonian state and this in turn has frustrated the 
Albanian community.59 It is within this context that Islam has become a marker 
of identity for the Albanians of Macedonia; a reaction of the Muslim Albanian 
minority against the Christian Macedonian majority.60 
 
Within this context, one of the key grievances of the Albanian community was 
that the Constitution (1991) did not explicitly mention Islam and the IRC. 
Albanians claimed that this was further evidence of their ‘second-class’ status 
and continued religious discrimination from the Yugoslav era. Article 19 of the 
Constitution (1991) explicitly referred to only the MOC, though it guaranteed 
equality under the law for all ‘other religious communities’. As per the 
amendments agreed to in the Framework Agreement, Article 19 of the 
Constitution now explicitly names the Macedonian Orthodox Church, the Islamic 
Religious Community, the Catholic Church, the Methodist Church, the Jewish 
                                              




Community, and ‘other religious communities and groups’. The MOC was 
outraged at the constitutional amendments and the late President Boris 
Trajkovski bore the brunt of its frustration, many believe, because of his 
Protestant faith. Bishop Agatangel directly attacked Trajkovski in an article for 
Nova Makedonija claiming that the late President had allowed the position of the 
Orthodox Church to be weakened by the constitutional changes.61 Bishop 
Agatangel went further and accused Trajkovski of being involved in a Protestant 
conspiracy to undermine Macedonia and Macedonian Orthodox believers.62 
Religious Extremism 
While the vast majority of Albanians in Macedonia follow traditional Sunni 
teachings, radical Islamists from Salafi and Wahhabi backgrounds are making 
slow but steady inroads into both the Albanian and the Macedonian-speaking 
Muslim communities. This trend has accelerated since the 2001 war. In 
particular, radical Wahhabis from Saudi Arabia have infiltrated the Albanian 
community both at the grassroots level and within the official hierarchy of the 
IRC. The IRC, as the officially registered organisation representing Muslims in 
Macedonia, holds the title deeds to the vast majority of Islamic religious 
buildings and property. Wahhabis and other Salafi groups have set up small but 
committed networks of followers, particularly among younger Albanians and 
Macedonian-speaking Muslims across western Macedonia and the capital 
Skopje. They have also taken control of up to five key mosques in Skopje (some 
by force) and possibly control others in rural areas of the country, particularly 
those built with Saudi funds.63 Some have claimed that rather than destroying the 
existing Islamic institutions their strategy has been to take control of the IRC and 
redirect its official activities and teachings in a more radical direction.64 
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Suleyman Rexhepi and his followers have resisted what they see as illegitimate 
foreign influence in the past (becoming victims of physical attacks and 
anonymous death threats). However, reports indicate that Rexhepi has made 
peace with them and allowed them to maintain their positions within the official 
hierarchy of the IRC.65 Nevertheless, tensions continue and have erupted into 
violent confrontations between the traditional Balkan Sunnis on the one hand, 
and Salafis and Wahhabis on the other. Many of the IRC’s imams continue to 
call on Rexhepi to confront key Wahhabi leaders such as Zenun Berisha and 
Ramadan Ramadani and remove them from the mosques they have taken. 
Rexhepi, seemingly powerless, has at various stages appealed to the Macedonian 
Government, the Albanian political parties, and foreign diplomats to assist the 
IRC against the Islamists; however, none have provided any assistance. 
 
Islamists have readily undertaken violent action in the country. In May 2015 the 
Skopje Mufti Ibrahim Shabani ordered an armed group of 50 followers to capture 
IRC headquarters in Skopje in an attempt to take the leadership from Suleyman 
Rexhepi.66 A small gun battle took place but Shabani’s group quickly took 
control of the building.67 Shabani had previously been removed by Rexhepi as 
Mufti of Skopje a month prior due to earlier conflicts, which had allegedly led to 
a fist fight between the two in the parking lot of the Macedonian Opera and 
Ballet.68 Shabani claimed that Rexhepi had misappropriated IRC funds and acted 
unconstitutionally and that his key objective in taking control of the IRC through 
the occupation of its headquarters was to restore order to the IRC.69 Shabani’s 
followers left the IRC headquarters two weeks later when Rexhepi had secured 
the support of the 13 other Muftis in the country.70 Shabani left peacefully citing 
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the beginning of the month of Ramadan and is yet to answer for the violent 
occupation of the IRC building.71 Nevertheless, there have been numerous 
accusations of corruption, sultanistic rule, and indecent behaviour directed at 
Rexhepi. 
 
Macedonian-speaking Muslims have also been targeted by extremist groups for 
recruitment. Historically, this small community has identified itself as ethnically 
Macedonian and supported the Macedonian majority over their co-religionists in 
the Albanian community. However, since the early 1970’s, and particularly after 
Macedonian independence in 1991, the community has come under increasing 
assimilatory pressures from the Albanians. Albanian political, cultural, and 
religious leaders have promoted the idea that this community is really Albanian, 
which was ‘Macedonianised’ under Yugoslavia. As evidence they offer their 
shared Islamic faith claiming that if one is a Muslim one cannot be a Macedonian 
and, therefore, must be Albanian – a form of ethnic proselytising through 
religious affiliation. 
 
Since the decentralisation of various political and budgetary responsibilities in 
2004, Albanian elites (who control local governments) have been able to offer 
political and financial incentives to ethnic ‘converts’. The assimilatory pressure 
may be working as those identifying as Macedonian-speaking Muslims have 
dropped from 39,500 in the 1981 census to only 2,500 in the 2002 census.72 Of 
those that have resisted ‘Albanianisation’, many are beginning to shed their 
Macedonian identity and identify simply as ‘Muslims’. It is among this group, 
particularly in the villages of Labuništa, Podgorci, and Oktisi (all within the 
Struga municipality), that young men are being targeted by a number of groups, 
including Wahhabis and the Tablighi Jamaat (which some believe is now being 
used wittingly or unwittingly by extremists to attract new recruits).73  
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There are also increasing reports of young Macedonian-speaking Muslims from 
these villages receiving scholarships to study in madrassas in Pakistan and Saudi 
Arabia and identify new recruits from among their family and friends. Locals 
report that these men are then funded to act and dress in accordance with 
Wahhabi tradition and to ensure their wives do the same.74 Indeed, long beards 
and Wahhabi-style dress were unknown in Macedonia prior to 2001 but are 
becoming increasingly visible not only among the Macedonian-speaking Muslim 
community in Struga, but also among Albanians in Gostivar, Tetovo, and 
Skopje.75 Reports claim that these men receive between €200 and €500 per 
month, with those involved in distributing Islamist literature, DVD’s, and other 
promotional material receiving up to three times that amount.76 It should be noted 
that the average net monthly salary in Macedonia is approximately €360.77 It is 
quite common to find Islamist material promoting violent jihad, suicide 
bombings, and the killing of ‘non-believers’ openly sold at market stalls in the 
streets of Struga, Gostivar, Tetovo, and Skopje. Much of the material appears to 
have been translated and published in Albanian, with some literature on offer in 
Arabic and Macedonian.78 One observer notes that it is becoming more and more 
common to see: 
Physical attacks against clerics deemed to be in the way of Islamists and 
their goals; pressure for females to wear conservative religious dress; 
orders for moderate Muslims not to associate with Christians; injunctions 
against shopkeepers selling alcohol; perpetuation of the archaic custom of 
arranging marriages for teenage girls; threats against young Muslims seen 
to be engaging in Western ‘hedonism’; violence against Muslim 
journalists seeking to report on any such issues, and so on.79 
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There have also been frequent reports of Islamic terrorist cells in Macedonia, 
though many of them are difficult to corroborate. For example, in 2005 a 
PROXIMA (EU police mission to Macedonia) officer revealed that an Islamist 
cell with approximately 100 foreigners was taking refuge in the remote Jablanica 
mountain range on the Macedonian-Albanian border, near the mainly 
Macedonian-speaking Muslim villages of Oktisi and Labuništa.80 The officer 
noted that they were being assisted by the local villagers.81 Macedonian security 
officials have also claimed that jihadist training camps once operated near the 
villages of Lešnica (Kičevo), Šipkovica (Tetovo), and Tri Vodi (Strumica).82 The 
same sources claim that there is an existing camp that acts as a staging post for 
recruits off to Syria located between Jažnice (on the border with Kosovo) and 
Kačanik in Kosovo. Other reports have alleged that a militarised faction known 
as ‘the Protectors of Islam’ has been formed to protect extremist elements within 
the country,83 however it is difficult to determine the accuracy of these. 
Nevertheless, given the large number of small arms readily available across the 
country and the militarised nature of both Christian and Muslim communities it 
is highly likely that some armed units exist (Chapter Nine). 
 
The Macedonian Government has certainly taken advantage of these reports in an 
attempt to link such extremists with local Albanian radicals in order to portray 
the Macedonian-Albanian conflict as a struggle against international terrorism to 
which the Albanian community is supposedly connected. At least in one instance 
the Macedonian Government has orchestrated such a scenario. In March 2002 
seven illegal Pakistani immigrants were lured to Macedonia with promises that 
they would be taken to western Europe.84 Once there police arrested them, 
transported them to Raštanski Lozja about 5km north of Skopje, and executed 
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them.85 The then Interior Minister, Ljube Boškovski (VMRO-DPMNE), claimed 
that the men had been killed after opening fire on a police patrol with machine 
guns and that the Pakistani immigrants had been planning attacks on “vital 
installations and embassies”. 86 In 2004 the new Government led by the Social 
Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) revealed that it was a staged murder to 
impress on the international community that Macedonia was serious about 
participating in the war on terror,87 and another attempt to link the local Albanian 
community to radical Islamism. 
 
There is enough evidence, however, to demonstrate that radical Islamists have 
made inroads into the country without staging false incidents. Recruitment of 
fighters among the Albanian and Macedonian-speaking Muslim communities for 
foreign conflicts is an ongoing issue. In 2010 Macedonian security officials 
claimed that up to 50 volunteers had been recruited to fight in Afghanistan over 
the previous decade.88 This trend appears to be increasing. While it is difficult to 
ascertain accurate numbers and diverging estimates have been presented, reports 
suggest that up to 300 Albanians and Macedonian-speaking Muslims from 
Macedonia have joined opposition groups in Syria, mainly the Islamic State and 
the al-Nusra Front,89 with up to 20 having been killed.90 The most concerning 
case is perhaps that of Sami Abdulahu who died in the summer of 2013 
participating in an attempt to seize the prison in Aleppo, Syria.91 Abdulahu was 
an imam who received his degree from the madrassa in Kondovo near Skopje. 
There have long being suspicions that the Kondovo madrassa is linked to radical 
Islamists. This raises questions as to whether his training at the Kondovo 
madrassa influenced his radicalisation. Interestingly, Kondovo has twice been 
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occupied by the Krasniqi Group, a small Albanian paramilitary group whose ties 
with the madrassa are unclear (Chapter Nine).  
 
Fighters returning from the Syrian conflict are also of particular concern for 
Macedonian authorities. It has been reported that up to 80 radical Islamists are 
now under surveillance across the country.92 In August 2015 Macedonian police 
raided 24 houses, the Yaya Pasha and Tutunsuz mosques in Skopje, and two 
Islamist NGOs in search of 36 suspected ISIS fighters (nine were found and 
detained).93 This included a self-proclaimed Imam, Rexhep Memishi (who is also 
in conflict with the IRC), who was sentenced to five and a half years in prison in 
March 2016 for organising and preparing volunteers for the Syrian war.94 The 
others were charged with taking part in the fighting in Syria and Iraq through 
participation in foreign armed forces, police, paramilitary, or para-police 
formations.95  
 
Reported motives for entering the Syrian conflict vary and it is difficult to 
determine their accuracy. According to Serbian police sources not all fighters are 
motivated by jihadist beliefs. Some appear to be motivated by simple 
adventurism or purely financial reasons.96 Albanians that have been arrested and 
questioned by Kosovo police claimed their agreed salaries were $65 per day, 
while some suggested that jihadists receive up to €5,000 per month.97 Many of 
these jihadists were also involved in the Balkan wars, particularly with the KLA 
in Kosovo and the NLA in Macedonia. Ivan Babamovski, former chief of the 
Macedonian State Security Agency, claims that “foreign militants who join the 
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rebel fighters [in Syria] are Wahhabis, veterans and members of paramilitary 
organisations”.98 According to media reports, at least some of those that have 
gone to Syria have been identified as former members of the NLA who 
participated in the 2001 war.99 Some analysts have pointed out that the NLA Imre 
Elezi Brigade consisted of foreign and local Islamists.100 Babamovski has 
claimed that “there are 3,000 Wahhabis, mainly among the ethnic Albanian 
minority and Bosniaks in the region of Skopje, Tetovo, Struga and Kumanovo” 
funded by donations from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Iran.101 
 
Many Albanians in Macedonia also see the presence of foreign Islamic 
influences as a threat to their own traditional version of Balkan or Ottoman 
Islam. For their part, Suleyman Rexhepi and the IRC have strongly and publicly 
denounced Muslims from Macedonia fighting in foreign wars. They have called 
on their followers to support the IRC, its traditional form of Islam, and interfaith 
tolerance. Arben Xhaferi, former leader of the Democratic Party of Albanians 
(DPA), considers the influences of foreign Islamists as an attempt to ‘Arabise’ 
the faith of the Albanians: 
It is absurd that Wahhabis should come here and demand, in the name of 
Islam, that we live and dress like them…Albanians will not allow 
foreigners of any kind to tell us our customs must be abandoned and our 
behaviour determined by Islamic totalitarians. We have our own history, 
our own culture, and our own Albanian model of Islam”.102 
 
Those with clear Middle Eastern influences are seen as strange, improper, and 
even dangerous by many within the local Muslim community.103 In particular, 
the beards grown by the men and the burqas worn by the women are seen as 
challenges to the local Islamic traditions and have “become a subject of critique 
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among [some local] Muslims, who see it as a symbol of backwardness and 
intolerance, or subject it to jokes, even calling the black-covered women 
ninjas”.104 
 
Even though they are still in their infancy in Macedonia, religious doctrines 
coming from the Arab world are certainly challenging the former monopoly of 
the Hanafi School as well as the religious legitimacy of the practices of Balkan 
Islam.105 Reports of a generational divide among Albanians exist whereby young 
Islamists who have studied in various the Arab world tend to depict the older 
leaders of Macedonia’s Islamic community as ‘communists’ who do not 
understand Islam correctly due to their indoctrination by the former Yugoslav 
authorities.106 Zadrożna concurs with this assessment and provides examples of 
young imams, who have returned after studying in Saudi Arabia, criticising the 
older locally trained imams on their doctrinal understanding and even the 
methods of prayer.107 The new generation of foreign trained imams plays an 
increasingly important role in local religious life through their preaching in 
mosques and the teaching they provide in the madrasas funded by Gulf States.108 
 
While there are doctrinal divisions across the Muslim communities, these are 
never publicly debated and little effort is invested by the IRC to counter the 
claims of radical Islamists. Neither is the Macedonian Government interested in 
supporting the local Islamic community in contending with the increasing 
influence from the Middle East. For the most part, the Macedonian political elites 
see it as an Albanian problem and something that the IRC needs to deal with. 
They are seemingly content to arrest radicalised Muslims as events transpire but 
not to deal with the causes of radicalisation in the first place. 
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Ethno-Religious Social Distance and Conflict 
Ethnonational and religious polarisation is a defining feature of contemporary 
Macedonia. Macedonians and Albanians are separated by language, religion, 
employment patterns, and traditions, which are cultural and economic fault lines 
that affect all spheres of socio-economic life and political interaction.1 
Segregation between Macedonians and Albanians is particularly visible in mixed 
municipalities such as Struga and Skopje. Generally, Macedonians and Albanians 
live in separate villages or neighbourhoods within municipalities and towns, 
attend separate schools (or separate class shifts within the same schools, see 
Chapter Five), largely work in workplaces that are ethnically homogeneous 
(though there are greater levels of heterogeneity within the public sector), 
frequent separate nightclubs, cafes, restaurants, and shops (and even 
beach/holiday resorts along lake Ohrid), rarely intermarry (95 per cent of 
Macedonians and 96 per cent of Albanians marry within their own ethnic 
group),2 and seldom develop close personal relationships between themselves. 
While Albanians generally learn Macedonian (though this is changing, see 
Chapter Eight), learning Albanian is seen as unnecessary at best and treasonous 
at worst among Macedonians. 
 
Brunnbauer has identified even more considerable distance between the two 
groups based on place of residence (rural versus urban), occupation (state-
employed versus self-employed), political allegiances (state-centred versus 
ethnic-centred), and social values (traditional versus modern).3 He has argued 
that “these differences are politicised and expressed mainly in cultural terms 
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because ethnicity has proved to be a powerful tool for mass mobilisation and 
creating emotional bonds between members of the concerned ethnic group”.4 
Brunnbauer has noted that many social and economic policies have ethnically 
divisive effects because even though they are not directly concerned with issues 
of identity they become ethnicised due to the different social and economic 
circumstances and interests of both groups.5 For example, a lack of state 
investment in rural areas affects Albanians more than Macedonians and rather 
than becoming a rural-urban divide, it becomes an Albanian-Macedonian divide.6 
 
There are some examples of inter-ethnic solidarity, though they have usually 
arisen from tragedy. One of these includes the 2011 murder of a young Albanian, 
Muhamed Ali Jashari, who died while defending his Macedonian friend during a 
violent clash among students at the Zdravko Cvetkovski High School in Skopje. 
According to police reports, Jashari (Albanian) rushed to help his friend Darko 
Jančev (Macedonian) who was being attacked in the school yard by three other 
Macedonians.7 The attackers knocked both Jashari and Jančev unconscious and 
Jashari later died in hospital.8 In a rare moment of inter-ethnic solidarity, the 
media emphasised the heroism of the pupil rather than stressing the fact that an 
Albanian was killed by a Macedonian.9 Both Macedonians and Albanians later 
petitioned the government demanding a memorial be built in remembrance of 
Muhamed Ali Jashari.10 
First Decade of Independence 
Within months of independence, on 11 January 1992, Albanian leaders organised 
a referendum with the intention of declaring an autonomous Republic of Ilirida.11 
Of the 92 per cent of eligible voters that reportedly participated, 74 per cent 
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voted in favour of autonomy.12 Using the referendum as a basis, Albanian leaders 
appealed to the United Nations (UN), the Conference for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the Council of Europe to withhold 
recognition of Macedonia’s independence until Albanian demands for 
constitutional change were met.13 The Macedonian Government responded by 
declaring the referendum illegal and sentenced five Albanian members of the 
ruling coalition to prison for conspiring to create a secessionist state as a base for 
a greater Albania. 
 
During the 1990s Albanian leaders continued to resist the establishment of 
Macedonia as a Macedonian nation-state. This contributed to Macedonian 
suspicions about Albanian loyalties and the view that any constitutional changes 
in favour of minority rights for the Albanians was as a zero-sum game. The 
referendum noted above and the events listed below persist in shaping 
Macedonian perceptions of Albanian intentions: 
 boycotting the Macedonian referendum on independence; 
 demanding the Albanian community be recognised as an equal co-
constitutive nation of the state and voting against the new (1991) 
constitution; 
 boycotting the 1992 census; and 
 establishing a paramilitary group known as the All Albanian Army (AAA) 
with the involvement of Albanian ministers in the Macedonian 
Government. 
 
Marko has argued that actions such as these have fuelled suspicion that the 
Albanian community “wanted more: namely the breakup of Macedonia and the 
formation of a Greater Albania. Thus Albanian Macedonians were seen as a 
permanent threat for the stability or even territorial integrity of the country”.14 
                                              
12 Roudometof, Collective Memory, National Identity and Ethnic Conflict, p. 172. 
13 International Crisis Group, The Albanian Question in Macedonia: Implications of the Kosovo Conflict 
for Inter-Ethnic Relations in Macedonia, 1998, p. 3,  www.crisisgroup.org (accessed 15 September 2011). 
14 J. Marko, “The Referendum on Decentralization in Macedonia in 2004: A Litmus Test for Macedonia’s 
Interethnic Relations”, European Yearbook for Minority Issues, Vol. 4, Iss. 1, 2004, pp. 695-721. 
108 
 
Equally, Macedonian elites never undertook a genuine attempt to integrate the 
Albanian community into the existing social, political, and economic structures.  
 
There have also been high levels of activism and violence at the grassroots level 
in Macedonia. One definitive moment (particularly for the Albanian community) 
were the flag protests in July 1997 where the newly elected Mayor of Gostivar, 
Rufi Osmani, ordered that the Albanian and Turkish flags be raised over the town 
hall alongside the state flag. The matter was taken to the Constitutional Court, 
which ruled that the Albanian flag could be raised over public buildings only on 
holidays and only alongside the state flag.15 Osmani ignored the ruling and 
continued his standoff with the Macedonian Government. As the issue dragged 
on without resolution, both communities became increasingly radicalised. On the 
night of 8 July 1997 thousands of Albanians gathered in front of Gostivar’s town 
hall to prevent police from entering the building in response to Osmani’s call to 
“protect their flag with their blood”.16 Macedonian special police removed the 
flag by force, while demonstrators clashed with riot police resulting in three 
protesters being killed and more than 400 injured.17 Osmani was arrested and 
sentenced to 13 years and eight months (later reduced to seven years) in prison.18 
Large crowds gathered in Skopje, Gostivar, Tetovo, and Debar when Osmani 
began serving his sentence in April 1998 resulting in further violent clashes. 
However, Osmani was amnestied in 1999 after serving nearly two years in 
prison. 
The 2001 War 
The 2001 war was fought between Macedonian Government security forces, 
supported by at least one paramilitary formation (plus a number of others outside 
of state control), and the National Liberation Army (NLA) – an Albanian 
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paramilitary force claiming to represent the Albanian community.19 At first the 
NLA was unable to articulate any clear demands with a variety of objectives 
being announced by various local commanders, including ‘liberating Albanian 
lands’, union with Kosovo, and the establishment of a greater Albania. It was 
only months after the war began and lines of communication with the then two 
key Albanian political parties (Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) and Party 
for Democratic Prosperity (PDP)) were opened that the NLA focused its 
objectives and cited a number of constitutional, political, and cultural demands 
that eventually found their way into the Framework Agreement. 
 
During the first few months of the war both Albanian political parties denounced 
the NLA and rejected violence as a means to political ends.20 In fact, DPA and 
PDP released a joint declaration condemning the use of violence for political 
purposes and appealed to the NLA to disarm.21 However, the NLA grew in 
popularity among the Albanian public, particularly with its victories against the 
ill-trained and ill-equipped Macedonian army and police. Albanians began to see 
the NLA as heroes and DPA and PDP politicians as corrupt collaborators who 
had vested interests in the status quo. To regain public support both DPA and 
PDP aligned themselves with the NLA, even though they had formed a 
government of national unity with VMRO-DPMNE and the Social Democratic 
Union of Macedonia (SDSM). Albanian political parties began calling on 
Macedonian political parties to open up negotiations with the NLA and resolve 
the conflict peacefully. The Macedonians refused to negotiate with what they 
considered to be terrorists and the war continued until the Battle of Aračinovo at 
the end of June 2001 when the US and the EU pressured Macedonia into 
withdrawing its forces and allowing American soldiers to escort up to 500 NLA 
fighters (along with their weapons) to NLA controlled territory.22 This was a 
turning point in the war after which the negotiations on the Framework 
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Agreement began and concluded within the space of six weeks (though 
significant battles took place during the negotiations in an attempt to shore up 
bargaining strength). 
 
The 2001 war itself began on 22 January 2001, when a group of armed Albanians 
claiming to be NLA fighters attacked the police station in the village of Tearce 
(near Tetovo) killing a police officer and injuring three others. The war ended 
after eight months when the Framework Agreement was signed in August 2001. 
Up to 250 combatants and 70 civilians were killed and a further 186,000 civilians 
were displaced or forced to leave their homes. During the war NLA rebels were 
able to gain control over large amounts of Albanian-populated territory in 
northern and north-western Macedonia, particularly in villages around Tetovo, 
Skopje, and Kumanovo. Some estimate that around 120 villages (or 17 per cent 
of the entire territory of Macedonia) fell to the NLA.23 While the war was 
relatively brief, it caused considerable damage to property, the economy, and the 
relationship between Macedonians and Albanians. In fact, there are still many 
internally displaced refugees who are yet to return to their villages. Most of these 
are Macedonians who fled from Albanian-dominated villages such as Aračinovo, 
Matejče, and Raduša.24 The key reason residents are reluctant to return is fear for 
their safety. Witnesses have testified that when they attempted to return and 
rebuild their homes local Albanian residents continued to cause damage, and 
harassed and threatened them until they left.25 Reintegration of these internally 
displaced refugees will be virtually impossible, particularly in Albanian-
dominated villages, as their security cannot be guaranteed. 
 
In addition, the war resulted in a number of serious war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and terrorist acts. It is alleged that the NLA was responsible for many 
of these. The most serious of these include four cases for which the NLA is 
suspected of being responsible caught the attention of the International Criminal 
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Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). These included the NLA Leadership 
case, the Lipkovo Water Reserve case, the Mavrovo Road Workers case, and the 
Neprošteno case. At least 56 suspects were under investigation by Macedonian 
authorities in relation to these four cases. These suspects include a number of 
Albanian political leaders, including current members of the government and 
parliament. 
 
In the NLA leadership case it is alleged that 10 senior leaders of the NLA, 
including Ali Ahmeti, were responsible for abduction, inhumane and degrading 
treatment of civilians in Matejče and Lipkovo, destruction of religious and 
historic monuments, and murder as a war crime. The Lipkovo Water Reserve 
case concerns an individual who is suspected of having twice ordered the 
blocking of the water supply from Lake Lipkovo resulting in 100,000 residents of 
the Kumanovo region being left without drinking water for several weeks. The 
Mavrovo Road Workers case involves 23 suspects who allegedly abducted five 
road workers near the village of Grupčin and then detained them in the 
surrounding forest beating and torturing them for several hours.  The torture 
involved the use of knives to carve letters into the victim’s backs. The 
Neprošteno case involves a mass grave of 12 Macedonian civilians located near 
the village of Neprošteno. This is by far the most serious case of the four.26  
 
While Macedonian authorities undertook the initial investigations into these 
cases, in 2002 the ICTY requested that these four cases be deferred to its 
jurisdiction. Macedonian authorities agreed to this request along with the 
Ljuboten case, which involved Ljube Boškovski and Johan Tarčulovski. 
However, by 2008 little progress had been made and due to time constraints the 
ICTY referred the four NLA cases back to Macedonia for prosecution. In 2009 
Macedonian authorities reported that an indictment was issued in one of the four 
returned cases, one case was in the investigative stage, and the other two were at 
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the preliminary stage of criminal investigation.27 Since then, however, these 
cases have progressed little and in July 2011 the Macedonian Parliament adopted 
a decision stipulating that the Amnesty Law (2002) applies to all cases relating to 
the 2001 conflict, including the four returned to Macedonia by the ICTY.28 In 
October 2012 the Constitutional Court rejected a challenge to the 
constitutionality of the parliamentary decision.29 
 
Since the Parliament’s decision to amnesty these four cases the Government has 
come under strong pressure from the families of the victims, non-government 
organisations, and the Council of Europe. In September 2011 Amnesty 
International criticised the parliamentary decision as inconsistent with 
international law and accused it of leaving the victims and their families without 
access to justice, creating a climate of impunity for persons suspected of 
violations of international humanitarian law.30 The Council of Europe also 
criticised Macedonian authorities for the continued lack of accountability in 
relation to these serious human rights violations.31 The Council of Europe noted 
that amnestying the four cases was a serious impediment to the process of 
achieving justice and lasting reconciliation between the two communities.32 It 
further urged Macedonian authorities to implement the Committee of Ministers 
Guidelines on eradicating impunity for serious human rights violations, which 
state that amnesties should not be applied to gross human rights violations.33 
 
Considering that numerous high-profile Albanian leaders have been implicated in 
these four cases it is unlikely that the Macedonian Government will reverse its 
decision to amnesty them. Leaked cables from the US Embassy in Skopje 
suggest that Prime Minister Gruevski was under considerable pressure from his 
coalition partners in the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) and DPA to end 
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all legal proceedings.34 Albanian opposition to prosecuting these cases was so 
strong that both Menduh Thaçi and Ali Ahmeti were quoted as willing to ignore 
the cases of the six Albanians still missing from the 2001 conflict so as to not 
“increase problems and open Pandora’s Box” and ensure amnesty for the four 
cases returned from the ICTY.35 
 
In these cables, US Ambassador Philip Reeker details that the Macedonian Chief 
Prosecutor was of the view that the Amnesty Law (2002) was not applicable to 
these four cases and that he intended to prosecute them.36 However, Reeker notes 
that the Chief Prosecutor admitted that he was obligated to report to the Prime 
Minister before taking any action “in order to avoid ethnic destabilisation”.37 
According to the leaked cables, the Chief Prosecutor admitted to Reeker that his 
office was intentionally stalling its investigation of the Neprošteno case in order 
to avoid ethnic tensions but did not indicate whether this was due to instructions 
from Gruevski.38 These cables also report the Chief Prosecutor as claiming that 
in many instances there is insufficient evidence to prosecute,39 though this is very 
likely due to the fact that little investigation has actually been undertaken. 
 
Macedonian authorities were accused of murdering 10 Albanian civilians and 
beating and torturing more than 100 others during a two-day operation on 
10-12 August 2001 in the village of Ljuboten, north of Skopje near the border 
with Kosovo. The then Macedonian Interior Minister, Ljube Boškovski, and 
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Johan Tarčulovski, a presidential security officer who led the special police unit 
of approximately 100 men during the Ljuboten operation, were tried at the ICTY. 
According to the Macedonian Government, there was an NLA presence in the 
village; however, the ICTY found no evidence to support this claim. Boškovski 
was acquitted, while Tarčulovski was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment. Many 
Macedonians, regardless of the evidence, believe Tarčulovski was unjustly 
imprisoned and that it was a conspiracy on the part of the international 
community, which is perceived to be allied to the Albanians. Many Macedonians 
are also incensed by the fact that only Macedonians were indicted by the ICTY 
and Albanian perpetrators of war crimes have never been brought to justice. In 
fact, the fate of 20 missing civilians (13 Macedonians, six Albanians and one 
Bulgarian citizen) remains unknown. 
 
Numerous religious sites were also intentionally damaged during the war; 
however, the perpetrators of most of the actions still remain unknown. For 
example, the 13th century monastery of St. Athanasius in the village of Lešok, 
near Tetovo, was bombed and largely destroyed. The Macedonian side blamed 
the NLA, while local NLA commanders placed the blame on Macedonian 
Special Forces claiming it was an attempt to derail the peace talks that were 
ongoing at the time. On the other hand, Macedonian forces destroyed a mosque 
in the village of Neprošteno. Up to 46 mosques were demolished during the 
war,40 mostly by angry mobs. Other religious sites that were attacked include the 
monastery at Matejče, near Kumanovo, and the church of St. Hodegetria, which 
was vandalised by NLA insurgents who spray-painted and carved anti-Christian 
and Albanian-nationalist symbols into the church's 14th century frescoes.  
 
Ethnic cleansing and what could be considered as pogroms were also carried out 
during the war. Reports noted that up to 30,000 Macedonians had been forced 
from their homes by the NLA primarily from Tetovo and its surrounding 
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villages.41 Most of these people were forced out of the Polog region (along the 
Macedonian-Kosovo border) and the villages along the Tetovo-Jažnice highway 
(R1203). Lešok, on the R1203 highway, was bitterly fought over between NLA 
units and armed Macedonian militias, who had been abandoned by Macedonian 
security forces.42 Once the Lešok militia had exhausted its supplies, it was forced 
to flee to Skopje.43 
 
Considerable anger was also directed towards the government, particularly by 
those forced from their homes. Macedonians forced out of Aračinovo (an 
Albanian-dominated village outside Skopje) organised a protest outside of 
Parliament in Skopje on the night of 25 June 2001, which escalated into a mass 
revolt after they were joined by members of the security forces, paramilitaries, 
and thousands of residents. Protesters included hundreds of special police and 
army personnel that took part in the infamous Battle of Aračinovo over the 
preceding number of days, where the Macedonian Government ordered security 
forces to stand aside while NLA rebels were escorted out of Aračinovo, fully 
armed, by a convoy of American soldiers. Servicemen came armed and 
demanded an answer to why the operations were halted and the insurgents 
allowed to be evacuated.44  
 
The protesters forced their way into Parliament, smashed windows and doors, 
damaged the interior of the building, and beat the then Interior Minister Ljube 
Boškovski.45 Protesters demanded to talk to the then President, the late Boris 
Trajkovski, and the then Prime Minister, Ljubčo Georgievski, deriding their 
decision to allow the rebels not only to be evacuated but to take their weapons as 
they retreated.46 This was perhaps the closest that Macedonians had come to 
overthrowing their government, which was a possibility during a number of 
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incidents throughout the war. Rioting also erupted in other towns such as Bitola, 
Prilep, and Veles. These towns have relatively small Albanian populations and 
had not experienced any direct conflict. However, because a large number of the 
soldiers that had been killed originated from those towns violent protests erupted 
on numerous occasions. Macedonians destroyed Albanian homes and businesses 
and set fire to mosques demanding the government destroy the NLA and avenge 
the deaths of Macedonian soldiers.47 It was reported that after the April 2001 
Bitola riots up to 10,000 Albanians left the city.48  
 
The Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC) and the Islamic Religious Community 
(IRC) also became involved. While both organisations had initially attempted to 
calm tensions, they eventually entered the public debate on the side of their 
respective ethno-religious communities. In an open letter, Archbishop Stefan 
(head of the MOC) wrote that “when the freedom and defence of our people 
cannot be achieved with other means then we should get rid of those who 
endanger our lives and who are trying to split our homeland”, referring to the 
NLA.49 Only a week earlier the MOC and IRC had signed a joint declaration 
stating that the “common elements in different religions should serve as a basis 
for understanding and joint actions for peace”.50 Disagreements over the 
constitutional status of the MOC and the IRC were partially responsible for the 
divisions. Ultimately, both institutions function as an outgrowth of their 
respective communities and it was inevitable that they would defend the interests 
of their own people. 
 
The roles played by both Church and Mosque during the war extended beyond 
assisting refugees. In some cases, both religious institutions were responsible for 
inciting violence. Many Macedonian protest leaders during the war rallied 
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crowds through the Church. One particular protest called for the MOC leadership 
to take a strong stand: "we have no strong leaders...only the Church will enforce 
justice in Macedonia”.51 During the war, many mosques and churches registered 
sharply increased attendance and both priests and imams openly encouraged their 
congregations to take up arms.52 While the NLA claimed not to have any special 
affinity for Islam, it often held positions, headquarters, and snipers' nests in 
village mosques.53 This would not have been possible without the support of 
local villagers and their imams. At the funeral of six soldiers from Bitola, Bishop 
Petar called for revenge against Muslims. This led to one of the riots discussed 
above and resulted in the destruction of up to 100 Muslim homes and shops 
across Bitola and the burning down of a 14th  century mosque in Prilep.54 
Ironically, both Bitola and Prilep have relatively few Albanian inhabitants and 
the victims of the attacks were mainly Macedonian-speaking Muslims. 
Ongoing Conflict 
Relations between the two communities since the 2001 war have experienced a 
high level of tension and sporadic outbreaks of violence. At the elite level this is 
evidenced through ongoing political tensions and regular parliamentary boycotts 
by Albanian opposition parties. At the grassroots violence is commonplace and 
includes:  violent protests and clashes between civilians; terrorist actions such as 
politically motivated bombings; attacks on police and military patrols (which are 
now ethnically mixed); politically and religiously motivated kidnappings; the 
ethnicisation and politicisation of criminal matters; and random acts of inter-
community violence (Appendix Four).  
 
Ethno-religious tension and violence have increased significantly, particularly 
since the Wahhabi infiltration of the IRC leadership in 2010. In 2011 the 
Macedonian Government announced that it was building a museum in the 
architectural style of an Orthodox Church within the grounds of the Kale fortress 
in Skopje. The museum was to be built on the foundations of a 13th century 
                                              






church. Albanians opposed the construction of the structure claiming it was 
going to be a place of worship and not a museum. If it was to proceed they 
demanded that a mosque be built as well. Macedonian archaeologists opposed 
the idea of a mosque arguing that there was never a mosque at the fortress. A 
group of 100 Albanians led by two DUI government ministers clashed with 
Macedonian construction workers in their attempt to demolish the structure once 
construction began.55 Over the next few days hundreds of Macedonians and 
Albanians (mostly football ultras) clashed violently across the fortress. Albanians 
attempted to destroy the structure and Macedonians tried to protect it. A 
compromise was later reached where both church and mosque Museums would 
be built and would serve to display archaeological finds from the fortress.56 
 
This was soon followed by confrontations in Struga. On the eve of the Orthodox 
Christian New Year (13 January 2012) the Macedonian-populated village of 
Vevčani celebrated with its traditional Vasilica carnival. As part of the carnival 
residents normally dress up and satirise political and social events that have 
occurred during the past year. During the 2012 celebrations a group of 
Macedonian men dressed as burqa-clad women and reportedly performed 
simulated sex acts. This caused outrage amongst the local Muslim community, 
particularly in the neighbouring municipality of Struga. Albanian and 
Macedonian-speaking Muslims in Struga reacted by organising protests (where 
they chanted ‘death to Christians’), attacked a number of buses carrying 
Macedonians, and raised a green flag representing Islam in front of the municipal 
building (though some reports suggested that it was actually a Saudi flag).57 This 
was followed by a number of attacks on local Churches, two of which were 
burned down. 
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Muslim leaders across the country called for restraint from their followers but 
they also accused the national government of promoting ‘Islamophobia’ because 
it traditionally funds the Vevčani carnival.58 Albanian religious and political 
leaders also called for an official apology from the Mayor of Vevčani and 
demanded that criminal charges be brought against those involved.59 
 
Sporadic violence has persisted, including an off-duty ethnic Macedonian police 
officer killing two ethnic Albanians who were part of a group that threatened him 
and his daughter in the majority Albanian-populated town of Gostivar. Other 
violence has involved armed gangs of youth (mainly football ultras linked to 
various paramilitaries and political parties) from the two communities in open 
street battles across the capital Skopje and the April 2012 (during Orthodox 
Easter) execution of five Macedonian fishermen on Lake Smilkovci (Skopje). 
While little information is publicly available about the murders, many 
Macedonians blame Albanian militants and consider these murders as part of the 
continuing violence that began in Vevčani and possibly as retribution for the 
police officer’s killing of the two Albanians in Gostivar. 
 
In response, thousands of Macedonians held protests against the government for 
not protecting them and stamping out Albanian extremism. At the time, the 
authorities arrested a dozen suspects claiming they were a part of a radical 
Islamist cell whose aim was to ultimately spark another war between the 
Macedonian and Albanian communities and spread their own brand of extremism 
in the ensuing chaos. Thousands of Albanians protested in the streets of Skopje 
chanting a mixture of Islamist and nationalist slogans (waving Albanian flags and 
so-called ‘black flags of jihad’ with the shahada) and clashed with police in 
support of those arrested.60 After six months of investigations charges were 
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finally laid against seven men in October 2012.61 In mid-2014 six of the accused 
were given life sentences (two were convicted in absentia as they are serving 
prison sentences in Kosovo) and one was acquitted. However, reports indicate 
that evidence was lacking and the case against the accused remained weak.62 In 
response to the guilty verdicts, thousands of Albanians returned to the streets of 
Skopje demanding a retrial clashing with police (up to 20 police officers were 
injured) and throwing stones and bricks at the Criminal Court building.63 
 
It is suspected that the protests were organised by Islamist groups who urged 
people to gather in front of the Yaya Pasha Mosque in Skopje’s Albanian-
dominated municipality of Čair (one of the mosques in the hands of Wahhabi 
groups).64 Numerous protests have been organised through the Yaya Pasha 
Mosque and undoubtedly it is used to pursue potential converts are enticed 
through the use of seemingly nationalist causes. At first DUI supported the 
convicted men, as did the War Veterans Association of Kosovo, which 
threatened to help its ‘brothers’ in Macedonia and end ‘Macedonian oppression 
once and for all’.65 Suleyman Rexhepi was cautious in his response to both the 
convictions and the riots that followed and focused his attack on Islamist 
participants, stating that he would prefer to “beat the manipulators who waved 
Arab and Islamic flags”.66 
 
The 2012 Smilkovci executions and the violent protests that they provoked were 
followed by the Talat Xhaferi incidents a few months later (Chapter Six). Talat 
Xhaferi, a former commander of the NLA, was appointed as the new 
Macedonian Defence Minister on 18 February 2013. Violent protests erupted in 
Skopje soon after the announcement of Xhaferi’s appointment. Macedonians 
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clashed with riot police, while Albanians responded with counter-protests the 
following day also clashing with riot police, damaging police cars and private 
vehicles, and burning buses. Sporadic clashes between Macedonians and 
Albanians ensued throughout the city for weeks with 22 people injured 
(including 13 police officers) and 19 arrested. 
 
The large number of new mosques being built in Albanian-populated 
municipalities and the construction of churches and the erection of large crosses 
in Macedonian-populated areas is also important to note. Although they have 
genuine religious significance, they also send a strong political message – ‘this 
town belongs to us’. Macedonia now boasts approximately 1,950 Orthodox 
churches and 580 mosques. This would equate to one church for every 671 
Orthodox Christians and one mosque for every 1,162 Muslims. It has been 
reported, for example, that since the year 2000 over 300 new mosques have been 
built in the country at a cost of €600 million, largely funded by foreign donors.67 
Church construction has experienced similar proportions.  
 
Both the MOC and the IRC insist that the number of religious facilities is not 
enough to meet their needs, while accusing each other of aggression and 
disrespect for the laws surrounding the construction of religious buildings.68 This 
is disputed by survey results that show 74 per cent of Orthodox Christian 
respondents believe there are enough churches in the country and a further 20 per 
cent stating there are too many.69 Among the Muslims surveyed 45 per cent 
believed there are enough mosques, while a further 43 per cent believed there are 
too many.70 An example is that of Aerodrom municipality (Skopje) where eight 
churches are now located in the central district of the municipality, most built 
within the past five years. Locals attest that only one of them, St. Elijah, is visited 
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regularly and that the rest remain permanently locked.71 Regardless, a new 
church is now being built with finance from the Russian businessman, Sergei 
Samsonenko (who has also purchased HC Vardar, a handball team, and has 
financed the construction of the new Jane Sandanski Sports Complex and Hotel 
Russia, both within the vicinity of the new church). 
 
Professor Cane Mojanoski, former Chairman of the Commission for Relations 
with Religious Communities and Religious Groups, contends that there are too 
many churches and mosques in the country for the real number of believers who 
attend them regularly.72 In effect, the MOC admits that churches are markers of 
territory. Father Boban Mitevski, Professor at the Theological Faculty and Chief 
of Staff to the head of the MOC, sees the construction of churches as a way of 
repelling the “invading tendencies of the Muslims”: 
Muslims conquer territory and mark it with religious objects even when in 
reality there are no people or believers living on that territory. In 
response, we build churches, place crosses and defend our territory from 
invaders.73 
 
Todor Petrov, President of the World Macedonian Congress (WMC), placed his 
support behind Aerodrom municipal council which decided to erect a 51 metre 
cross next to the Cevahir Towers, a mixed-use development consisting of four 
high-rise towers (40 floors each) with luxury residential apartments and a high-
end retail shopping mall, built by a Turkish company (rumours abounded that the 
apartments were being offered mainly to Albanians) and explained his reasons 
as: 
Macedonians, Christians, recognise their ethnic space and need to mark it 
with a symbol in which they believe. The cross is an identification of 
Macedonians and they are entitled to mark their ethnic territory with it.74 
 







While largely symbolic in the ethno-religious struggle between Macedonians and 
Albanians, these religious objects have at times led to actual conflict. A typical 
example are the events of September 2013 in the village of Oktisi, with a 
population of 4,500 (predominantly Macedonian-speaking Muslims) located in 
Struga Municipality. This particular incident involved a dilapidated church (St. 
Nicholas) in the centre of the village, for which the MOC had obtained municipal 
approval to demolish and rebuild. Work had been progressing for a number of 
months without any controversy until rumours began to circulate the day before 
Bishop Timotej was due to bless the new church’s foundations that Albanians 
and Macedonian-speaking Muslims were planning to disrupt the event.75 
Macedonians from the region organised fairly quickly through social media, 
kinship networks, and the local chapter of the United Macedonian Forces (MOS). 
The next day an estimated 400 Macedonians from Mislešo, Moroišta, and 
Vevčani marched into Oktisi with the Bishop. They were met by close to 800 
Albanians and local Macedonian-speaking Muslims who had already surrounded 
the church to block the Macedonian procession. Reports suggested that the 
majority of Muslim demonstrators were Albanians who had also been bussed in 
from surrounding villages,76 though the imam called from the minaret of a nearby 
mosque for local Muslims to come and assist during the confrontation. 
 
Police managed to push back the Macedonian group, while allowing the 
Albanians to block access to the construction site; however, the tense standoff 
lasted several hours. Many protesters from both sides were clearly armed with 
pistols and batons, while some had brought automatic rifles (though these were 
kept in vehicles away from the main confrontation). The situation could have 
easily escalated into a violent clash but the Bishop convinced the Macedonian 
procession to withdraw and engage in discussions on resuming construction at a 
future date. Currently, there are no signs that construction will restart in the near 
future with Albanians and Macedonian-speaking Muslims firmly opposed. Some 
speculated that the sudden opposition to renewing the church after months of 
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work was the result of radical Islamists who are known to have influence and 
followers both within Oktisi and the neighbouring villages of Labuništa and 
Podgorci.77 While extremists may have influenced this particular confrontation, 
the general trend is certainly leading to more of these incidents between Christian 
Macedonians and Muslim Albanians. 
 
It should be noted, however, that the MOC and the IRC do at times cooperate in 
areas they believe will benefit their own interests. For example, both institutions 
support religious curriculum in public schools and have jointly lobbied the 
government over this issue. They were successful in having religious classes 
established for children whose parents want their children to attend from the 5th 
grade.78 Students are now taught by theology professors from the country’s main 
religions.79 In addition, both were successful in placing their religious secondary 
schools (Orthodox theological high schools and Islamic high schools) under the 
jurisdiction of the public education system. Students from these theological 
secondary schools now have the option of enrolling in secular courses at 
university rather than just the theological faculties.80 Part of the reasoning from 
the IRC was that state regulation would make it easier to control which teachers 
are used in the madrassas and ensure radical elements do not infiltrate them.81 On 
the other hand, conflict has arisen between the two religious institutions when the 
IRC has lobbied for its followers to have access to prayer rooms in military 
barracks, hospitals, and prisons or when Suleyman Rexhepi called for Muslims to 
have more children in order to increase their proportion of the population.82 
 
In early 2014 further violent protests and riots exploded in Skopje when it was 
reported that an Albanian had murdered a Macedonian. The Albanian had stolen 
a bicycle from the victim and was later confronted by him. During the 
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confrontation the Albanian stabbed the victim to death. Macedonians marched to 
the victim’s home to pay homage and then attempted to move into the mainly 
Albanian suburb of Saraj (rumours circulated that the accused resided there) but 
were intercepted by riot police.83 Macedonian protesters then damaged and set 
alight a number of Albanian-owned stores and restaurants.84 
 
Tensions between the two communities are also known to assume non-violent 
forms where disagreements are managed through the judicial system or other 
non-violent methods. For example, in 2012 the Albanian-dominated Čair 
municipality (run by DUI) renamed four schools. Cvetan Dimov became Hasan 
Prishtina, Rajko Žinzifov became Ismail Kemali, Nikola Vapčarov became Imri 
Elezi, and Jane Sandanski became Jashar Bey.85 Macedonian residents lodged 
complaints and the Ministry of Education refused to authorise the renaming of 
the schools in question. The State Inspectorate for Local Government annulled 
the renaming but the municipality lodged a successful appeal to the Ministry of 
Local Government, which was run by a DUI Minister at the time.86 A motion has 
since been filed with the Constitutional Court, which is currently deliberating on 
the matter.87 While both communities will see any outcome as a zero-sum result 
and tensions will continue to exist over the matter, it is encouraging that the 
situation has not turned violent nor have boycotts been implemented as has been 
the case in many similar circumstances across the country. 
 
The most recent large-scale armed violence occurred on the weekend of 
9-10 May 2015 in the Kumanovo district of Diva Naselba. A two-day battle 
erupted between Macedonian anti-terror police and Albanian militants 
numbering between 40 and 50 men. This ended with eight dead and 37 injured 
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policemen, and 10 dead militants.88 The fighting began when Macedonian special 
police units entered the neighbourhood and launched a counter-terrorist raid. 
Prime Minister Gruevski claimed that the militants were preparing for terrorist 
attacks on government and civilian targets in order to ‘destabilise’ the country 
and that some of the militants had previously fought in other conflicts (in the 
Middle East), while police spokesman Ivo Kotevski noted that the groups’ 
founders were former NLA members.89  
 
Inter-ethnic tensions have continued unabated and with the current political crisis 
Albanians and Macedonians have firmed their respective nationalist positions 
(Chapter Ten). It is noteworthy that a 2015 national survey found that 61 per cent 
of participants believed that the political situation in Macedonia was ‘intense and 
uncertain’ and 58 per cent thought that it was less stable than the previous year.90 
 
*   *   * 
 
Since the establishment of the Macedonian republic within the Yugoslav 
framework in 1944, and even more so since Macedonian independence in 1991, 
successive Macedonian Governments have never seriously attempted to integrate 
their ethnic and religious minorities. Rather, their focus was on consolidating 
Macedonian ethnonational identity and Macedonia as a nation-state of the 
Macedonian people. This led to minority groups, particularly the Albanians, 
strengthening their own ethnonational identity independently of the state and in 
competition with a national civic identity. The result has been the consolidation 
of competing ethnonationalist identities and loyalties (Albanian loyalty to the 
ethnic group and Macedonian loyalty to the ethnic group and the ethnic nation-
state).  
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Religious differences between Macedonians and Albanians have created more 
spheres of difference and potential for conflict than cooperation. While there are 
similarities in the moral teachings contained in the Bible and the Qur’an, there 
are also fundamental theological differences. These differences are reflected in 
the worldviews of Orthodox Christian Macedonians and Sunni Muslim 
Albanians. Religion has also become politicised and both communities have 
incorporated their respective faiths into their ethnonational identities. Religion 
has been used to mobilise their communities for political action and violence. It 
has become embedded in the Macedonian-Albanian conflict as a cause, a means 
and an end in and of itself. Radical Islamism is not widespread across Macedonia 
but its adherents have demonstrated that they are persistent and patient. While 
political and religious elites within the Muslim communities dismiss radical 
Islamist theology and practices as foreign and unacceptable to local Muslims, a 
generational divide has already appeared with younger Muslims more accepting 
of influences from the Middle East and radical interpretations of the Qur’an. 
Radical Islamists have gained followers from both the Albanian and 
Macedonian-speaking Muslim communities; however, it remains to be seen how 
influential they will ultimately become. Nevertheless, their presence is dangerous 
and their influence has already caused conflict within the Muslim community and 
between the Macedonian and Albanian communities. 
 
All of these underlying beliefs form the basis of incompatible worldviews. This 
is the foundation on which both communities see their place in the world, the 
place of the ‘other’, and how they are mobilised into action. Since the collapse of 
Yugoslavia and Macedonian independence sporadic violence has been persistent. 
While much of it is low-level and generally remains unreported in western 
media, it is a daily reality for Macedonian citizens. The two communities live 
parallel lives with interaction being rare and tense. Segregation has been 
culturally and socially embedded and it has now also become institutionalised 
through the implementation of the Framework Agreement (Part II). The 
competing rights claims of the Macedonians and Albanians that the Framework 
Agreement attempted to accommodate stem principally from their ethno-
128 
 
religious views – different perceptions of contemporary problems and visions for 






Competing Rights Claims: 




Part II contends that conflict between Macedonians and Albanians is partially 
explained by competing rights claims. In essence it is a struggle to assert 
dominance over the state by the Macedonians and exercise greater self-
governance through joint control of the state by the Albanians. These competing 
claims over rights, in large part, stem from the incompatible worldviews of the 
two communities. Their competing ethnonationalist narratives and diverse 
religious experiences inform their views of the world. Their worldviews frame 
and underpin their understanding of the past, their perception of the present, and 
their vision for the future. It is these conflicting perceptions that result in conflict 
and competition between the two groups rather than cooperation. When rights are 
identified they are based on their divergent worldviews and what each group 
perceives as necessary to protect and further its own interests. Unsurprisingly, 
each groups claimed rights conflict with those of the other. 
 
This thesis identifies the following five competing rights claims through which 
the overarching claims of Albanian self-determination and Macedonian power 
are being fought: constitutive national status; local self-government; proportional 
employment in state entities; parliamentary veto powers; and minority languages.  
 
Albanians maintain that they have a right to self-determination, or in other words 
a right to govern their own affairs. While some see self-determination as 
something which can only be exercised through an independent state, many 
maintain that it can be achieved through ethnic autonomy (territorial and 
institutional) within the existing state at both national and local levels. The 
position that is supported by the majority of the Albanian elite is that the 
Albanian people should be a co-constitutive nation of the Macedonian state, 
making it a bi-national state of two peoples who would control it through group-
based consensual decision-making. For example, the Democratic Union for 
Integration (DUI) supports the Framework Agreement that has made the 
Albanians a co-constitutive nation (along with others), while the Democratic 
Party of Albanians (DPA) is calling for a new political agreement in which 
Macedonia would be re-constituted as a bi-national state of Macedonians and 
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Albanians only. Under the Framework Agreement Macedonia has been 
reconstituted as a ‘multi-national’ state in which numerous nations, plus the 
undefined ‘other’ nations, are listed as co-constitutive. However, in practice only 
the Macedonians and Albanians hold real political power and Macedonia is 
effectively governed as a bi-national state through an informal consociationalist 
system comprising of the two ethnic groups. 
 
While individual freedom as a political idea within the Albanian community is 
important, the idea that the individual (as the smallest autonomous unit) is the 
foundation of democratic governance is secondary to group affiliation with 
regards to political participation and the distribution of political power and state 
resources. In particular, the leadership of DUI and DPA are of the view that the 
constitutional structure of Macedonia and the distribution of political power 
should be (ethnic) group-based. This is certainly how Macedonia was 
reconstituted through the Framework Agreement. Most Albanian political elites 
agree, including leaders of smaller Albanian parties such as Rufi Osmani. These 
leaders take a nationalist view, similar to the type described by Anthony Smith, 
in that individuals can only truly participate in and contribute to society, and 
experience personal freedom, through the prism of the nation – in this case an 
ethnonational group.1 For example, Adamson and Jović observed that during the 
early years of independence from Yugoslavia the Albanians feared that “free 
elections and the introduction of liberal concepts would inevitably lead to 
‘majoritisation’, a term they [Albanians] used to describe permanent domination 
of the numerically larger group”.2 Arben Xhaferi, former leader of DPA (and 
informally considered one of the ‘fathers’ of the Albanian movement in 
Macedonia), went as far as to claim that liberal democratic principles such as 
individual equality were nothing more than ‘tools of oppression’: 
The ‘one man, one vote’ concept was used to impose the will of one 
people over another during the secession and also in the course of 
                                              
1 Smith, The Nation in History. 
2 Adamson and Jović, “The Macedonian-Albanian political frontier”, p. 301. 
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establishing parliamentary procedures and the creation of the Constitution 
and the laws that define national rights.3 
 
For many Albanians the importance of the group is a priority over classical 
liberal ideas of individual freedom and individual rights. For example, Albanian 
elites regularly appeal to human rights mechanisms such as the UN Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. 
However, these rights are conceived of as group rights and not individual rights. 
Even when allegations of human rights abuses are raised they are generally 
articulated as an infringement on the rights of the group and not specific 
individuals. According to Adamson and Jović, Albanian discourse argues that 
majority rule was established by the Macedonians in order to dominate the state 
and maintain the political, social, and economic subordination of the Albanians.4 
The Albanian elites therefore constructed a link between the lack of an 
appropriate collective status, and subordination and discrimination.5 
 
Macedonians, on the other hand, consider the state as their nation-state in which 
they are the sole constitutive nation. They assert that they can protect their 
identity, culture, rights, and freedoms only through the ownership of their own 
state. Their view is that the state should be an ethnonational Macedonian state, it 
should maintain absolute sovereignty over the entire territory of the state, and 
that minorities should be afforded their full individual human and civil rights 
within this framework. It is argued that under such a political community 
Macedonia would resemble other Western democracies such as Australia, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States where individuals would: have their 
rights and liberties respected; fulfil civic duties; and learn the dominant language 
and culture (Macedonian), which would form the basis of public life and act as 
unifying elements for society as a whole. 
 
                                              
3 A. Xhaferi, “Challenges to Democracy in Multiethnic States”, Albanian American Civic League, 1998, 
p. 5, http://blog.aacl.com (accessed 15 January 2012).  




Constitutional law Professor Karakamiševa-Jovanovska argues that the 
implementation of the Framework Agreement caused tectonic changes to the 
1991 Constitution, as well as some fundamental challenges to human rights 
norms.6 She contends that Macedonia has become an “experimental country in 
which the members of the ethnic communities win the majority of their rights not 
by being citizens, but by being numbers, i.e., [a] percentage…(at least 20 per 
cent of the total population), which made Macedonia the only country in 
constitutional practice where collective rights are realised based on a 
mathematical model, and not on civil grounds”.7 
 
No community is directly linked to any of the group rights provided for under the 
Framework Agreement; rather these rights are linked to fulfilling numerical 
criteria. For example, the Albanian language has not been explicitly named 
within the Constitution. The Framework Agreement, and the Constitution, 
establish Macedonian as the official language and provide for the official use of 
any other language spoken by at least 20 per cent of the population. The 
parliamentary veto, or double majority voting system, has not been explicitly 
linked to any community either. Rather, applicable laws are required to be passed 
by a qualified majority of two-thirds of all votes, within which there must be a 
majority of the votes of representatives from minority communities as a whole.  
 
These formulations were largely a concession to the Macedonian side that did not 
want explicitly to assure these provisions to the Albanian community. A number 
of Albanians have argued that if their proportion of the population were to drop 
below 20 per cent they would automatically lose their powers under the 
Framework Agreement. They have called on the government to amend the 
constitution so that it explicitly links the Albanian people and the Albanian 
language to these provisions.  
 
                                              
6 T. Karakamiševa-Jovanovska, “Macedonian Constitutional Identity: Lost in Translation or Lost in 
Transition?”, IXth World Congress – Constitutional Challenges: Global and Local, The International 




Karakamiševa-Jovanovska makes another interesting observation. She notes that 
the generally accepted terminology for non-majority groups is “national 
minority”.8 In some cases similar derivatives that include the term minority are 
used. The Framework Agreement and the Constitution use a convoluted 
formulation that generally reads along the lines of: “members who belong to 
communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia”.9 This was a 
concession to the Albanian community. Many Albanians oppose being 
categorised as a minority because of: 1) their claim that they constitute a larger 
proportion of the population than successive censuses reveal; and 2) their 
demand for co-constitutive nation status. In the Albanian reckoning being 
classified as a minority undermines their ‘rightful’ place within the state. 
Albanian elites have disputed official census results (Part I) as part of their claim 
to constitute a plurality. In this narrative neither the Macedonians nor Albanians 
constitute a majority but are simply the two largest ethnic groups in the country.  
This is one of the justifications for which they claim to be a co-constitutive 
nation and should therefore establish a bi-national state in which they would 
exercise equal (to the Macedonians) power and control.10 
 
Both communities seek to define the state according to their own ideas and both 
see the inherent benefits for themselves in their respective views. For example, 
Macedonians prefer a political community in which one vote is accorded to each 
individual citizen and that this is replicated in Parliament (majority rule through 
one representative, one vote, and without any special veto powers conferred to 
any group). While they are much more in favour of liberal democratic values, as 
the majority in conflict with a large minority the fact that this type of political 
system ensures their continued dominance does not escape them. Albanians, on 
the other hand, see such arrangements as a tyranny of the majority and therefore 
seek a political community in which one vote is accorded to each ethnic group 
                                              
8 ibid. 
9 ibid. 
10 Victor Friedman provides a good discussion on this issue as it relates to language policy, see 
V. Friedman, “Language in Macedonia as an Identity Construction Site”, in B. Joseph et al (eds.), When 
Languages Collide: Perspectives on Language Conflict, Language Competition, and Language 
Coexistence, The Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 2003, pp. 273-274. 
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and decisions are made through group-based consensus in which either group can 
veto the other. This type of political system would project their power beyond 
their numbers. It may be likely that Albanian social and religious norms, which 







Constitutional Status: The Preamble 
The development of the 1991 Constitution was undertaken relatively quickly. 
The Macedonian Government conducted a referendum on independence on 
8 September 1991 and parliament enacted the Declaration of Independence on 
17 September 1991.1 Under orders from President Kiro Gligorov, constitutional 
drafting had already begun as early as May 1991.2 A draft was accepted by the 
Parliament on 23 August 1991 and then went out to public debate until 
15 September 1991.3 This version of the Constitution was enacted on 
17 November 1991.4 Biljana Vankovska notes some concerns in relation to both 
the Constitution and the process that was undertaken: 
The Albanians objected that they were not represented in the expert team. 
The period for crafting as well as for deliberation was too short. The 
drafts were of dubious quality: the first one, put together by the appointed 
experts, was a good starting point despite some shortcomings; the second 
draft, discussed by a wider audience that included a few constitutionalists, 
had some improvements, but during the process of political bargaining 
many solutions remained half-resolved. The constitutionalists agreed that 
the proposal promoted a majoritarian model while the Albanians insisted 
on consensual democracy. Not many of the proposals raised during the 
public debate were accepted.5 
 
Regardless of the issues noted above, in 1992 the Arbitration Commission of the 
Conference on Yugoslavia (Badinter Commission), led by Robert Badinter, 
found in its opinion (no. 6) on the recognition of Macedonia by the European 
Community (EC) and its member states that the Macedonian Constitution 
                                              
1 The turnout was 76 per cent of eligible voters, of whom 95 per cent voted affirmatively (or 72 per cent) 
of the entire electorate, see B. Vankovska, “Constitutional Engineering and Institution-Building in the 
Republic of Macedonia (1991-2011) in S. Ramet, O. Listhaug and A. Simkus, Civic and Uncivic Values 







embodied the “democratic structures and the guarantees for human rights which 
are in operation in Europe”.6 Consequently, the Badinter Commission formed the 
view that “Macedonia satisfies the tests in the Guidelines on the Recognition of 
New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union and the Declaration on 
Yugoslavia adopted by the Council of the European Communities on 16 
December 1991”.7 
 
Nevertheless, Albanian political parties contested the legitimacy of the 
Macedonian state from the very beginning. The Albanian community largely 
boycotted the referendum on independence in September 1991. This was the 
result of elite dissatisfaction with the proposed Constitution and their inability to 
attain the status of an equal constitutive nation alongside the Macedonians. 
Although the body of the Constitution was relatively civic in its language and 
intent, Albanian political leaders claimed that the Preamble established 
Macedonia as an ethnic Macedonian nation-state and relegated the Albanians to 
‘second-class’ status. In addition, they argued that the Constitution should 
guarantee higher education in the Albanian language and the use of the Albanian 
language in parliament before they could provide their support. Nevertheless, the 
fact that the boycott of the independence referendum was successful 
demonstrates that Albanian political leaders at the time were able to convince 
their constituents that the newly established state was fundamentally anti-
Albanian. 
 
Koinova has argued that conflict in Macedonia is partially a result of “relative 
changes in minority rights compared to the communist period, rather than the 
absolute scope of minority rights granted by the new constitution”.8 She has 
further argued that the decrease of ethnic status is of particular importance for the 
escalation of violence.9 But the loss of symbolic status or concrete minority 
rights is not necessarily the case with regard to the Albanian community in 
                                              
6 M. Ragazzi, “Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising from 
the Dissolution of Yugoslavia”, International Legal Materials, Vol. 31, Iss. 6, 1992, p. 1,510. 
7 ibid, p. 1,511. 
8 Koinova, “Why do Ethnonational Conflicts Reach Different Degrees of Violence?”, p. 84. 
9 ibid, p. 90. 
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Macedonia, even though a number of researchers have made this claim.10 Under 
the 1974 Constitution Macedonia was considered the “national state of the 
Macedonian people [narod] and a state of the Albanian and Turkish nationalities 
[narodnost] residing within her”.11 It explicitly stated that the Macedonian nation 
was equal with the Albanian and Turkish nationalities.12 
 
Under the Yugoslav constitutional model the term narod (literally translated as 
people) equated with the concept of nation and in particular a titular/constitutive 
nation of one of the republics within the former Yugoslav federation (such as the 
Macedonians or the Croats). The term narodnost meant nationality and 
specifically a larger ethnic group that had a kin or home state outside of the then 
Yugoslavia but not a constituent republic within the federation (such as the 
Hungarians). A third category, etnička zaednica (ethnic community), was 
reserved for small ethnic groups such as the Roma.13 Albanians fell into the 
category of ‘narodnost’ because they had an external kin state (Albania) but not a 
constitutive republic within Yugoslavia. 
 
Under the 1991 Macedonian Constitution there was no relative loss of status. 
Macedonia was still considered a nation-state of the Macedonian people (narod) 
and the Albanians an ‘equal’ and ‘co-existent’ nationality (nacionalnost).14 The 
only change that had occurred was a change in lexicon from narodnost to 
nacionalnost. The concept of nationality was retained and the Albanians were 
still considered as such (a minority with a kin/home state elsewhere), though now 
they not only shared that status with the Turks but with a host of other minorities 
mentioned in the Preamble. Even so, it would be accurate to state that many 
Albanians perceived the Preamble as giving preferential status to the Macedonian 
community and relegating the Albanian community to some form of lower 
                                              
10 See also Marko, “The Referendum on Decentralization in Macedonia in 2004”, pp. 695-721. 
11 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia 1974. 
12 ibid. 
13 For a discussion of the Yugoslav concept of nation, nationalities, and ethnic communities, see 
Adamson and Jović, “The Macedonian-Albanian political frontier”, pp. 295-296.  
14 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia 1991. 
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status.15 In support of their allegations, Albanians note that the 1991 Constitution 
legally codified only Macedonian as an official language and acknowledged only 
the Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC). Albanians claim this supports their 
view that the Constitution relegated them to ‘second-class’ status. While it is true 
that Macedonian was the only official language at the national level, even the 
1991 Constitution provided for the use of minority languages at the municipal 
level.16 In addition, although the 1991 Constitution explicitly acknowledged only 
the MOC it also indirectly acknowledged “other religious communities and 
groups” and guaranteed them equal treatment under law.17 
 
The circumstances in which the Albanians found themselves after Macedonian 
independence may also partially explain this perception of a loss of status. 
During the 1980s Albanians began a movement seeking recognition as a narod 
within Yugoslavia. Recognition as a narod implied creation of a separate 
Albanian republic (Kosovo) within the federation where they would be the titular 
nation. With the breakup of Yugoslavia the idea of a separate Albanian republic 
became unachievable and Albanians in Macedonia found themselves in a state 
undertaking a nation-building project hostile to their own ethnonationalist 
demands. 
 
During the 1990s Albanian elite thinking coalesced within two diverging models. 
One sought a federated Macedonia consisting of two constituent republics – one 
Macedonian and the other Albanian (for example, Nevzat Halili). The other 
sought a bi-national state with both Macedonians and Albanians comprising 
equal co-constitutive nations whereby decision-making would be made on a 
consensual basis (for example, Abdurahman Aliti). The latter dominates 
Albanian political thought today. 
 
                                              
15 L. Lesnikovski, “Macedonia’s Ontological Insecurity and the Challenges of Stabilizing Inter-Ethnic 
Relations”, Eurasia Border Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 1, 2011, p. 66. A 1993 poll found that 86 per cent of 
Albanian respondents considered themselves ‘second class’ citizens, see A. Reka, “The Ohrid Agreement: 
The Travails of Inter-ethnic Relations in Macedonia”, Human Rights Review,  No. 9, 2008, p. 58. 
16 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia 1991, art. 7. 
17 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia 1991, art. 19. Further, the 1991 Constitution explicitly 
guarantees freedom of religion, see Article 19, Sections 1 and 2. 
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The idea of the Albanian community being an equal co-constitutive nation 
alongside the Macedonians is a significant one. It is more than just a matter of 
symbolic status because through it Albanian elites seek practical benefits for their 
community. These include an equal level of power, equal distribution of state 
resources, the elevation of the Albanian language as an official language of 
administration, and the right to use the flag of Albania as an official symbol of 
the Albanian community, among other demands.18 
 
These proposals are unacceptable to most Macedonians. Macedonians generally 
consider Macedonia as their own nation-state and themselves as indigenous to 
that territory. Many argue that they have no other homeland and that 
neighbouring states persecute their own Macedonian minorities. Therefore, 
Macedonia must remain a Macedonian state as it is the only home in which they 
are able to determine their own affairs and protect their inalienable rights (the 
implication is that minorities such as the Albanians and Turks are able to ‘return’ 
to their ‘home states’). Macedonians also point out that what the Albanians seek 
(equal political power and access to state resources) is undemocratic and absurd 
because a minority group constituting 25 per cent should not wield political 
power equivalent to the remaining 75 per cent of the population or have access to 
50 per cent of the state’s resources. In addition, recognising the Albanian 
community as a constituent people “would be a tacit agreement to give them the 
option to secede in the future, providing fuel for further nationalistic 
disruptions”.19 
 
Valadez has noted that majority groups or host nations will in most instances 
seek to “preserve the state in its existing form, with its territorial boundaries in 
tact”.20 The rationale is that “this is their land, the land they have cultivated and 
defended...[and that] living in this land should be done on their terms and in a 
way that respects their cultural traditions and way of life. Any group living 
                                              
18 Marko, “The Referendum on Decentralization in Macedonia in 2004”, pp. 695-721. 
19 C. Monteux, “Decentralisation: The New Delusion of Ethnic Conflict Resolutions?”, International 
Journal on Multicultural Societies, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2006, p. 173. 
20 Valadez, Deliberative Democracy, p. 216. 
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within the territorial boundaries of their country should take whatever steps are 
necessary for them to adapt to living in their political community”.21 
 
Nevertheless, the Framework Agreement radically redefined the Macedonian 
state. Originally the Agreement called for a purely civic state without mention of 
any ethnic groups. Under the agreed Preamble there was to be no reference to 
any ethnic groups, rather “the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia” were to be 
the sole constitutive group.22 This was too controversial with both the 
Macedonian and Albanian publics and, after short parliamentary debate, all the 
key ethnonational groups residing in Macedonia were included in the Preamble 
as equal co-constitutive nations, including the infamous open-ended reference to 
‘others’. The Preamble now reads: 
The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, the Macedonian people, along 
with the citizens who live within her borders and are a part of the 
Albanian people, Turkish people, Vlach people, Serbian people, Romany 
people, Bosnian people and others...have decided to establish the 
Republic of Macedonia as an independent, sovereign state… 23 
 
Although some may argue that the Macedonian community has received a ‘place 
of prominence’ because it has been listed apart from the others, it is clear from 
both the wording and the intent of the amended Preamble that it is an equal co-
founder of what has disparagingly become known as the multinational Ramkovna 
Država (Framework State) among Macedonian intellectuals and diaspora 
communities.24 The previous terminology dividing narod (people or nation) and 
nacionalnost (nationality) is no longer used and now all communities are 
considered narodi (nations). According to Marko, both “citizens and ethnic 
                                              
21 ibid, pp. 216-217. 
22 Framework Agreement, annex A. 
23 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia 1991, Amendment IV. Note that the use of ‘people’ here 
equates to ‘nation’ or in Macedonian, ‘narod’. 
24 All the peoples listed in the Preamble are listed as nations and as equals. The specific terminology used 
to equate them includes, ‘along with’, ‘their fatherland’, ‘their forefathers’, ‘equal in rights and 
responsibilities towards the common good’,  jointly ‘determined to establish the Republic of Macedonia’, 
and to ‘secure peace and co-existence’. In addition, many Macedonian intellectuals sarcastically refer to 
the Macedonian state as the ‘Ramkovna Država’ due to its infinite number of co-constitutive nations, 
beginning with those that are listed and continuing with ‘others’. See Constitution of the Republic of 
Macedonia 1991, Amendment IV. 
142 
 
groups, all of them called peoples, are declared ‘constituent’ forces in the process 
of state formation...first, all members of all the peoples are (equal) citizens, and 
secondly, all ethnic groups including the majority population are recognised as 
(equal) communities by designating them as peoples”.25 Further, the statement in 
the 1991 Preamble that declared “Macedonia is established as a national state of 
the Macedonian people” has been removed.26 
 
The terminology used to include non-Macedonian communities in the Preamble 
deserves mention. The text states that “citizens who live within her borders and 
are a part of the Albanian people” has dual implications in the Macedonian 
wording. Firstly, they are a constitutive narod (people, but in this context a 
nation). Secondly, they are not merely a nation for the purposes of 
constitutionally defining the Macedonian state – the language used implies that 
those groups are a part of a wider nation extending beyond the borders of 
Macedonia.  
 
The motivations and original intent behind this are difficult to determine; 
however, some observations can be made. Firstly, the Albanians see themselves 
as part of the wider Albanian nation whose members span Albania, Kosovo, and 
western Macedonia. They perceive themselves (and are perceived to be by the 
Macedonians) as a separate nation to the Macedonians but partnered with them in 
the formation of the state. This conceptualisation underpins their demands for a 
bi-national state, governed under a system of group consensus. Secondly, the 
Macedonians themselves are uninterested in the idea of a civic nation in which 
nationhood is determined by citizenship, regardless of ethnicity, religion, or 
language. Their primary mode of identification is ethnonational and therefore the 
Macedonian nation is an ethnic nation consisting of ethnic Macedonians. The 
wording in the Constitution helps delineate between the various narodi (peoples, 
nations). For many Macedonians, it would be preferred if the ‘others’ (Albanians, 
Turks, Serbs etc.) were simply minority groups as in the case of the 1991 
                                              
25 Marko, “The Referendum on Decentralization in Macedonia in 2004”, pp. 695-721. 
26 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia 1991, Preamble. 
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Constitution; however, their status as co-constitutive nations is currently a 
constitutional fact.  
 
In spite of this, Albanian parties such as the Democratic Party of Albanians 
(DPA) and the National Democratic Revival (NDR) have called for a new 
political agreement between the Macedonians and Albanians. DPA, for example, 
put forward a party platform in 2011 and 2014 calling for a “new agreement that 
would [re]define the rights and obligations between the Albanians and 
Macedonians”.27 In essence, DPA calls for a bi-national state of Macedonians 
and Albanians in which both would enjoy equal power and resources, while 
governing the state on a consensual basis despite the fact that Macedonians 
outnumber Albanians two to one.  From the available DPA documents, it seems 
that any new constitutional arrangement would exclude other minorities as 
constitutive nations and either relegate them to some form of ‘lower status’ or 
ignore them altogether. 
 
In practice, Macedonia already functions as a bi-national state. In the majority of 
instances, the governing Macedonian political party consults with its Albanian 
coalition partner. In circumstances where it does not, and the issues are 
contentious, a crisis of government normally ensues. These lead to parliamentary 
boycotts, increased inter-ethnic tensions and inevitably European Union (EU) 
intervention. 
 
While Macedonian politicians argue that the Framework Agreement is a final 
settlement, there is a growing number of Macedonians that also want to revise 
the current constitutional arrangements in their own favour seeking to reduce 
what they see as undue political power for the Albanians. The argument is that 
the provisions of the Framework Agreement are more akin to special privileges 
than legitimate group rights. The other argument, noted above, is that organising 
political power along ethnic group lines disenfranchises the 75 per cent of the 
                                              




population that are not Albanians and infringes their right to individual equality 





Monteux has noted that most arguments in favour of decentralisation in 
ethnically mixed states “centre on the ability to find a mechanism to distribute 
political power among the different segments of the society in an equal manner 
that is perceived as legitimate and just by the various factions”.1 The 
justifications for decentralisation include arguments that it limits the central 
authority through the redistribution of formal power, aims to enhance minority 
group participation through enhancing their weight in the decision-making 
process to protect them from a so-called ‘dictatorship of the majority’, and allows 
groups to deal with local issues at the local level.2  
 
Monteux has also countered these claims by arguing that decentralisation on an 
ethnic basis “reinforces and legitimises ethnic divisions instead of limiting 
conflicting antagonisms between groups”.3 Any new territorial divisions resulting 
from decentralisation will “inevitably create new numerical minorities which in 
turn will generate dissatisfaction towards the new political settlement”.4 Further, 
Monteux has argued that the devolution of too many powers from the central 
government to ethnically homogeneous localities could increase demands for 
succession.5 
 
Lyon has agreed that decentralisation in ethnically divided societies can 
inadvertently exacerbate the causes of conflict. She has contended that the 
creation of newly defined sub-national units together with the entrenchment of 
ethnicity locally could lead to the creation of ‘local tyrannies’ and shift ethnic 
conflict from the national to the local level, while also causing conflict to become 
                                              
1 Monteux, “Decentralisation”, p. 164. 
2 ibid. 





more intense.6 Lyon has agreed with Monteux that decentralisation creates new 
‘minorities within minorities’ that will inevitably become subject to domination 
by local elites who may resent having to share power with other minorities, 
having just obtained greater autonomy from the central government,7 particularly 
if the new local minority is a part of the national majority. Lyon has also argued 
that where corruption and clientelism already exist in politics, devolving political 
power and resources to local governments may simply shift the locus of 
corruption and clientelism from the national centre to the local periphery.8 
 
While decentralisation is currently advocated by a number of international 
agencies (the United Nations Development Programme, the World Bank, the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Council of Europe) 
as a mechanism through which to improve local democratic governance and 
economic development, this was only a secondary consideration in Macedonia. 
Most Macedonian citizens (regardless of ethnicity) agree that local self-
government is an important reform and that their needs are not being met by the 
national government. However, the imperative for the fast-tracked 
decentralisation and revision of municipal boundaries was largely to provide 
increased levels of local self-government and linguistic/cultural concessions to 
the Albanian community, as agreed under the Framework Agreement. For the 
provisions of the Framework Agreement to take effect at the local level, 
Albanians would need to constitute at least 20 per cent of the municipal 
population. Negotiations to revise boundaries attempted to re-zone as many 
Albanians as possible into Albanian dominated municipalities so that more of 
them could exercise the provisions under the Framework Agreement. This meant 
that factors such as economic sustainability, local government administrative 
capacity, and traditional ties between town and village (along with clan ties) were 
ignored. 
                                              
6 A. Lyon, “Political decentralization and the strengthening of consensual, participatory local democracy 
in the Republic of Macedonia”, Democratization, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2015, pp. 159-160. 
7 ibid, p. 160. 
8 ibid, p. 160. 
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Local Self-government and Municipal Boundaries 
Under Yugoslav rule, local governments in Macedonia had a relatively broad 
range of powers, considerable fiscal autonomy, and somewhat free local 
elections.9 Some have argued that the level of autonomy available to local 
governments during this period went too far because the majority of the 
municipalities did not have the capacity to manage their responsibilities 
effectively.10 The situation was reversed under the 1991 Constitution. After 
independence, municipalities were largely stripped of their powers, finances, and 
responsibilities. This was mainly due to their inefficiency and corruption. In 
addition, rising Albanian ethnonationalism saw the central government 
interfering in the composition of elected municipal councils. It began removing 
elected municipal officials that it deemed dangerous for state security. For 
example, the central government could dissolve an entire council if the council 
adopted an act which “endangered the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
country”.11 As there were no objective criteria provided to define such acts, the 
central government held fairly broad powers. While the Macedonian Government 
began to gradually devolve some powers back to the local municipalities, 
particularly fiscal control, in the latter half of the 1990s, this trend significantly 
accelerated after the implementation of the Framework Agreement, of which 
local self-government was a key component. 
 
Local self-government under the Framework Agreement involved two concurrent 
processes. Firstly, decision-making power and budgetary responsibilities were 
devolved to municipal councils. Secondly, the existing boundaries of municipal 
councils were revised. However, no rationale was provided for the revision of the 
municipal boundaries within the Framework Agreement and the only stipulation 
surrounding their revision was that it was to take place within one year of a new 
census being undertaken. 
 
                                              
9 A. Rockel, “The Efficacy of Decentralisation in the Republic of Macedonia”, University of Cincinnati, 
2008, pp. 21-22, www.mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de (accessed 23 March 2016). 
10 ibid, p. 22. 




A revised Law on Local Self-Government will be adopted that reinforces the 
powers of elected local officials and enlarges substantially their competencies in 
conformity with the Constitution (as amended in accordance with Annex A) and 
the European Charter on Local Self-Government, and reflecting the principle of 
subsidiarity in effect in the European Union. Enhanced competencies will relate 
principally to the areas of public services, urban and rural planning, 
environmental protection, local economic development, culture, local finances, 
education, social welfare, and health care. A law on financing of local self-
government will be adopted to ensure an adequate system of financing to enable 
local governments to fulfil all of their responsibilities. 
 
Boundaries of municipalities will be revised within one year of the completion of 
a new census, which will be conducted under international supervision by the end 
of 2001. The revision of the municipal boundaries will be effectuated by the local 
and national authorities with international participation. 
Framework Agreement, Articles 3.1 and 3.2. 
 
Increased decentralisation and the related revision of municipal boundaries has 
perhaps been one of the most controversial elements of the Framework 
Agreement, particularly within the Macedonian community. The basis on which 
the revision of municipal boundaries was implemented fuelled suspicion against 
Albanian intentions and anger towards the Macedonian political elite for what 
was essentially seen as treason. The reason that the revision of municipal 
boundaries was received so harshly by the Macedonian community was because 
many of them saw it as an exercise in carving out territory for the Albanians. The 
perception was that it would create an autonomous territorial unit, much like 
Kosovo, which would then be used to call for further self-rule, if not outright 
secession. Roeder has suggested that calls for secession based on pre-existing 
autonomy is not uncommon.12 Roeder and Rothschild argue that “territorial 
                                              
12 P. Roeder, Where Nation States Come from: Institutional Change in the Age of Nationalism, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 2007, cited in C. Koneska, “Vetoes, Ethnic Bidding, Decentralisation: Post-
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autonomy and the decentralisation of decision-making powers gives ethno-
politicians the ‘institutional weapons’ to mobilise the local population and 
demand more political power from the centre, which will inevitably lead to 
tension between the majority and the minority elites.13 
 




Both processes and their outcomes have been highly contested. Rather than 
promote economically sustainable municipalities (regardless of their 
ethnonational and religious composition),14 Macedonian and Albanian political 
elites conspicuously drew up new boundaries based solely along ethnic and 
religious lines (consolidating their own power bases in the process), and further 
segregating the two communities politically, economically, and socially. The 
                                                                                                                                    
Conflict Education in Macedonia”, Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, Vol. 11, 
No. 4, 2012, pp. 33-34. 
13 P. Roeder and D. Rothschild, Dilemmas of State-Building in Divided Societies, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, 2005, cited in C. Koneska, “Vetoes, Ethnic Bidding, Decentralisation”, p. 34. 




entire process lacked adherence to basic principles of transparency and 
accountability, and involved only a handful of politicians from the ruling 
Macedonian and Albanian parties.15 Even the larger opposition parties were 
ignored. A senior official from the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), 
which was part of the ruling coalition at the time, interviewed by the 
International Crisis Group explained that: 
We want to maximise the number of municipalities where Albanians 
make up 20 per cent of the population (and thereby make Albanian an 
official language) and we want to bring Albanians in connection with the 
urban centre; the Macedonians want the opposite – to preserve 
Macedonian urban control, keeping Albanians in rural areas and 
minimising the number of 20 per cent Albanian municipalities.16 
 
In 2004 a Macedonian member of the Government confirmed suspicions that the 
revision of municipal boundaries was completed along ethnic lines. During the 
‘Mavrovo Process’,17 this anonymous parliamentarian commented that: 
The rules concerning Skopje were agreed upon as part of a major 
compromise...Struga and Kichevo were also parts of that package. By the 
end of the negotiations [Framework Agreement], all the parties had 
agreed that the best solution would be to change the boundaries of Struga 
and Kichevo, while leaving the capital intact. Before this bargain was 
made, all three municipalities were predominantly ethnic Macedonian. 
Afterwards, the municipal boundaries of Struga and Kichevo were 
modified and the municipalities became predominantly ethnic Albanian. 
In this way, the ethnic Macedonian parties recognized the legitimacy of 
the interests, fears and concerns of their Albanian counterparts and made 
a serious concession, while the Albanians demonstrated an understanding 
of the position of the Macedonians and agreed to preserve the status of 
Skopje unmodified. This compromise certainly helped the Macedonian 
                                              
15 K. Dimitrova, “Municipal Decisions on the Border of Collapse: Macedonian Decentralisation and the 
Challenges of Post-Ohrid Democracy”, Southeast European Politics, Vol. 5, No. 2-3, 2004, p. 174. 
16 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: No Room for Complacency, 2003, p. 20, www.crisisgroup.org 
(accessed 20 July 2011). 
17 The ‘Mavrovo Process’ was a series of roundtables hosted by the Project on Ethnic Relations and the 
Swiss Embassy in Macedonia, which provided a neutral and anonymous setting to open discussions 
between the key political parties in the Macedonian Parliament after the 2001 war.  
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politicians explain to citizens that the deal benefits all the parties 
concerned.18 
 
With regards to Skopje, the participant was referring to the proposal to merge the 
rural municipality of Saraj (Albanian-dominated) with the City of Skopje for the 
sole purpose of making the Albanian population greater than 20 per cent and 
ensuring that the capital became bi-lingual. This proposal was eventually 
accepted, causing further anger among the Macedonian community who saw it as 
yet another capitulation. 
 
Dimitrova has argued that the decision to enlarge Skopje and Struga ran contrary 
to expert advice on municipal organisation, which contended that attaching 
villages to large cities stifles the development of the village.19 Ragaru has also 
bluntly asserted that ethnonationalism played a key role in determining municipal 
boundaries: 
In 2004, both sides knew what they were doing when the SDSM tried to 
guarantee that the road to the international airport located 7km east of 
Struga near the lake shore would remain in an ethnic Macedonian 
municipality or when they negotiated the delimitation of Skopje districts 
so as to guarantee that the Cyril and Methodius University, although on 
the side of the Vardar [river] where Albanians now tend to predominate, 
would remain in Centar municipality, where ethnic Macedonians prevail. 
Similarly the Albanian DUI was fully aware of the impact of drawing 
some Albanian villages and the city of Struga together. By giving ethnic 
Albanians a relative majority, they guaranteed that the next mayor would 
be an Albanian.20 
 
                                              
18 Project on Ethnic Relations, Macedonia’s Interethnic Coalition: Solidifying Gains, 2004, p. 6, 
www.per-usa.org (accessed 15 May 2014). 
19 Dimitrova, “Municipal Decisions on the Border of Collapse”, p. 177. 
20 Ragaru, Macedonia, p. 26. 
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At one stage Albanian political parties advocated that municipalities have the 
constitutional authority to merge and create larger Albanian-populated entities.21 
This was promptly rejected by Macedonian elites who perceived it as a strategy 
for the creation of a single Albanian territorial unit that would eventually seek 
greater autonomy.22 However, the final version of the Law on Local 
Self-Government (2002) does allow municipalities to share resources, and 
establish joint public agencies and administrative bodies. Whether that provides 
municipalities with the power for the de facto creation of a ‘super’ municipality 
is up for debate. It may very well provide for legitimate inter-municipal 
collaboration and work to redress many of the problems created by fiscally 
unsustainable municipalities established by the re-demarcation process in the first 
place. 
 
The fact that the revision of municipal boundaries failed to take into account 
local government efficiency and economic sustainability is demonstrated in a 
number of studies. For example, nearly one-third of respondents to a United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) survey stated that they believe their 
local mayor and municipal council is inefficient.23 In relation to the failures of 
the mayor, 34 per cent believe they are a result of residents’ interests not being a 
priority.24 Further, half of all respondents stated that they are never informed of 
opportunities for direct participation in the governance of their municipality,25 
while an equal number of respondents also felt that municipal council corruption 
existed.26 Another UNDP report notes that local governments are marred by a 
                                              
21 F. Bieber, “Partial Implementation, Partial Success: The Case of Macedonia” in D. Russell and 
I. O’Flynn (eds.), Power Sharing: New Challenges for Divided Societies, Pluto Press, London, 2005, 
pp. 107-122. 
22 ibid. 
23 D. Eftimoski et al, “National Human Development Report 2004 – Macedonia: Decentralization for 
Human Development”, United Nations Development Program, 2004, p. 103, http://hdr.undp.org 
(accessed 15 July 2014). 
24 ibid. 
25 ibid. 
26 L. Dalipi et al., “Decentralisation Survey 2009”, OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje, 2009, p. 15, 
www.osce.org (accessed 13 June 2013). 
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series of deficiencies relating to administrative capacity, transparency, and 
corruption.27  
 
While the World Bank supported decentralisation, it warned against the revision 
of boundaries arguing that it could “set off demands for ethnically homogenous 
municipalities, resulting in...[the institutionalisation of] ethnic separation”.28 
Kreci and Ymeri have noted that there was an increase in the number of 
municipalities that are dominated by a single ethnic group.29 For example, 93 per 
cent of all Macedonians in the country now live in a municipality where they 
constitute a majority.30 Similarly, 79 per cent of all Albanians now live in a 
municipality where they constitute a majority.31 In the case of the Albanians, this 
is an increase of 10 percentage points compared with the previous municipal 
boundaries.32 
 
Table 5. Ethnic Composition of Selected Municipalities 
Municipality 
Pre-2004 Post-2004 
Macedonians Albanians Macedonians Albanians 
Debar 13.9 63.3 20.0 58.1 
Gostivar 26.5 59.0 19.6 66.7 
Kičevo* 53.6 30.5 35.7 54.5 
Kumanovo 59.6 26.4 60.4 25.9 
Skopje 71.2 15.3 66.7 20.5 
Struga 47.9 41.5 32.1 56.8 
Tetovo 28.2 64.0 23.2 70.3 
Source: State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia, Census of Population, 
Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia, Book XIII, 2002, www.stat.gov.mk 
(accessed 20 July 2016). 
* Note: The creation of the new Kičevo municipality was delayed twice because of threats of 
violence. It was finally established in 2012. 
 
The Law on Local Self-Government (2002) and the Law on the Territorial 
Boundaries of Local Self-Government Units (2004) were strongly contested by 
                                              
27 A. Dabo et al., “Local Governance, peace building and state building in post-conflict settings”, United 
Nations Development Program, 2010, p. 13, www.uncdf.org (accessed 18 August 2015). 
28 W. Dillinger, “Macedonia: Decentralization Status Report”, World Bank, 2003, p. 16, 
www.worldbank.org (accessed 15 July 2010). 
29 V. Kreci and B. Ymeri, “The Impact of Territorial Re-Organisational Policy Interventions in the 
Republic of Macedonia”, Local Government Studies, Vol. 36, Iss. 2, 2010, pp. 275-276. 





the overwhelming majority of Macedonians.33 A total of 41 local referendums 
took place in relation to the revision of municipal boundaries and all had rejected 
the new demarcations. However, the coalition government, consisting of the 
Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) and DUI, declared these local 
democratic plebiscites unbinding.34 A national referendum on the revision of the 
boundaries was organised by the then opposition VMRO-DPMNE and the World 
Macedonian Congress (WMC) and held in November 2004. VMRO-DPMNE 
and WMC utilised Article 73 of the Constitution, which obliges the government 
to hold a referendum if one is supported by at least 150,000 voters.35 However, 
the referendum failed owing to low voter turnout (it did not meet the required 
participation rate of 50 per cent). Of those that did vote, 94 per cent rejected the 
revised municipal boundaries.36 There are suggestions that the low voter turnout 
was a result of state pressure on citizens not to vote, including threats, 
intimidation, and abuse.37 
 
In addition, there was an element of international manipulation. The United 
States and the European Union (EU) are the key international supporters of the 
peace process and the Framework Agreement and both viewed the referendum as 
a threat to the peace accord. However, the referendum question brought neither 
the Framework Agreement nor decentralisation into dispute; it merely opposed 
the specific laws (for decentralisation and the revision of boundaries) that had 
been enacted by the governing coalition. The referendum question asked: 
Are you in favour of organising units of local self-government 
(municipalities and the City of Skopje) as per the Law for the Territorial 
Division of the Republic of Macedonia, which also defines the scope of 
local government (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 
                                              
33 Z. Ilievski and D. Taleski, “Was the EU’s Role in Conflict Management in Macedonia a Success?”, 
Ethnopolitics, Vol. 8, Iss. 3-4, 2009, p. 361. 
34 The decision to disregard the local referendums was in contravention of Article 5 of the European 
Charter of Local Self-Government, which states that “changes in local authority boundaries shall not be 
made without prior consultation of the local communities concerned, possibly by means of a referendum 
where this is permitted by statute”, see European Charter of Local Self-Government, art. 5. 
35 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia 1991, art. 73. 
36 Ilievski and Taleski, “Was the EU’s Role in Conflict Management in Macedonia a Success?”, p. 362. 
37 It should be noted that polls leading up to the referendum consistently indicated high voter turnout with 
strong opposition to the new municipal boundaries, see Karajkov, “Macedonia’s 2001 ethnic war”, p. 483. 
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49/96), and the Law for the City of Skopje (Official Gazette of the 
Republic of Macedonia No. 49/96)?38 
 
Nevertheless, the EU threatened that the country could return to war if the 
provisions of the Framework Agreement were not implemented. On the contrary, 
the EU argued, allowing the referendum to fail and implementing the plan for 
decentralisation and the revision of municipal boundaries would assist 
Macedonia with its EU membership aspirations. The United States supported the 
EU’s position and undertook practical measures to dissuade Macedonians from 
voting against the laws in question. This included the official recognition of 
Macedonia’s state name three days prior to the referendum as an inducement for 
Macedonians not to participate in the vote. The Americans accurately judged that 
if they provided name recognition the Macedonians would feel they had gained a 
significant nationalist victory (in relation to Greece) in return for their 
appeasement of Albanian demands. 
 
The issue of boundary revisions also caused violent clashes within the 
Macedonian community. In July 2004 the then Defence Minister, Vlado 
Bučkovski, and SDSM Secretary-General Nikola Ḱurčiev were attacked by a 
large Macedonian crowd in Struga while attempting to explain the new boundary 
adjustments. Bučkovski and Ḱurčiev were escorted by police to the local SDSM 
party headquarters and then needed to be evacuated by special police after a large 
group of armed Macedonians besieged them for two hours with gun fire and 
Molotov cocktails. Approximately 40 people were injured, Albanian-owned 
stores were stoned, and vehicles owned by the government coalition and the EU 
were torched.39 The implementation of the Framework Agreement, including the 
revision of municipal boundaries, was politically devastating for SDSM. It lost 
the following election in 2006 and is yet to recover in the polls. 
 
                                              
38 Decision to Hold a Referendum, Služben Vesnik na Republika Makedonija, No. 59/2004. 
39 Ragaru, Macedonia, p. 18 and Anonymous, “Riots in Macedonia, Minister Evacuated”, Hurriyet Daily 
News, 24 July 2004, www.hurriyetdailynews.com (accessed 13 November 2012). 
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A significant fear among Macedonians with regard to decentralisation was that 
they would be marginalised in Albanian-dominated municipalities, becoming 
“foreigners in their own country”.40 Fear of being denied access to public 
resources and employment is widespread.41 Some report that it is expected that 
the party representing the majority within the municipality will naturally provide 
employment for their “own” and “funding for projects that benefit villages 
inhabited by their own ethnic group”, regardless of whether those in power are 
Macedonian or Albanian.42 Even Albanians in Tetovo concede that Macedonians 
are underrepresented in the municipal council, with 47 per cent stating that 
decentralisation has not brought about better representation.43 
 
Many Macedonians in Struga assert that since the implementation of the new 
municipal boundaries they are being marginalised and are migrating from the 
city.44 Many even accuse the Albanians of undertaking a silent process of ethnic 
cleansing as part of a broader agenda to secure “ethnically clean territories”.45 
Numerous informants have spoken about how they fear living in ethnically-
mixed neighbourhoods and ethnic ghettos have been increasingly becoming the 
norm in towns like Tetovo where Macedonians are moving into ethnically 
homogeneous neighbourhoods.46 In addition, many of these people claim that 
they are too afraid to even venture into neighbourhoods dominated by the other 
ethnicity or patronise their businesses.47 Sixty-seven per cent of respondents in a 
2006 survey believed that reforms related to decentralisation brought about a 
deterioration of inter-community relations in their municipality.48 Further, large 
                                              
40 A. Lyon, “Municipal Decentralisation in the Republic of Macedonian: Preserving a Multi-Ethnic 
State?”, Federal Governance, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2011, p. 33.  
41 This is in part fuelled by historical experience such as the events of 1991 where Albanians gained local 
power in Tetovo and replaced all Macedonians in charge of public enterprises, see ibid. 
42 Conversations with Macedonians, July and August 2013. 
43 M. Lessenski, A. Habova and V. Shopov, The Process of Decentralisation in Macedonia: Prospects for 
Ethnic Conflict Mitigation, Enhanced Representation, Institutional Efficiency and Accountability, 
Institute for Regional and International Studies, Sofia-Skopje, 2006, p. 13. 
44 ibid, p. 13. The claim that residents are migrating from municipalities in which they were once in a 
majority but are now a minority community after the revision of municipal boundaries is also supported 
by testimony from local residents and anecdotal evidence in the media. 
45 ibid, p. 13 
46 R. Riẑevski, “Etnička gentrifikacija: tivkata borba za eden Makedonski grad”, EtnoAntropoZum, 
No. 14, 2015, p. 26. 
47 ibid, pp. 26-27. 
48 Lessenski, Habova and Shopov, The Process of Decentralisation in Macedonia, p. 13 
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proportions of respondents believed that the ethnification of politics would 
increase, particularly in Tetovo (60 per cent), Struga (47 per cent), Skopje (43 
per cent), and Kičevo (40 per cent).49 
 
There is some misapprehension about decentralisation even among the Albanian 
community. One survey conducted in the Albanian-majority town of Tetovo 
found that 33 per cent of Albanian respondents did not accept the 
decentralisation process at the time of implementation 50 Initially, a widespread 
belief within the Albanian community was that the Macedonian Government 
would not allow real decentralisation and that it would cripple the autonomous 
functioning of local governments in order to maintain central control.51 The 
revision of municipal boundaries reinforced such views by establishing 
unsustainable and financially non-viable entities.52 Since decentralisation a new 
opinion has emerged: that fiscal decentralisation will go too far and only because 
the central government wants to cease funding under-developed rural Albanian 
municipalities.53 However, the Albanian community has generally been much 
more supportive of both decentralisation and the new municipal boundaries than 
the Macedonian community. 
Segregation: Governance and Political Participation 
Direct political participation and inter-ethnic political interaction at the local 
level are undermined by both apathy and outright hostility. The Commissions for 
Inter-Community Relations are a key example. These Commissions are required 
to be established where at least 20 per cent of the population belongs to a local 
minority (this includes Macedonians where they are a local minority).54 Their 
role is to consider issues that impact on inter-community relations and make 
recommendations to the municipal council, which under law is required to 
consider these recommendations in its decision-making.55 
                                              
49 ibid. 
50 ibid, p. 12. 
51 ibid. 
52 ibid. 
53 Ragaru, Macedonia, p. 23. 





In practice, evidence suggests that the majority of these Commissions barely 
function. Research conducted by the Community Development Institute (CDI), a 
Macedonian non-government organisation, found that the majority of 
Commission members were elected by municipal councils and residents 
remained generally unaware of the existence of the Commissions.56 Lyon cites a 
representative of the CDI who indicated that “Commission membership remains 
highly politicised, members have limited understanding of their role and the 
frequency with which municipal councils fail to consider the recommendations 
of the Commissions is high”.57 A report by the UN Programme to Enhance Inter-
Ethnic Dialogue and Collaboration found that the Commissions generally 
convene for the sake of demonstrating that they have done so and rarely provide 
advisory, preventative, or reactive recommendations.58 
 
Participation in political parties and elections is another example of the lack of 
inter-ethnic interaction. Since independence in 1991 political parties are highly 
ethnicised. The largest Macedonian parties are generally made up of Macedonian 
members. Some members do come from other ethnic communities such as Turks, 
Roma, and Vlachs. This is the same for the main Albanian political parties. In 
addition, the recently formed Party for European Integration (the first ‘Muslim’ 
party) caters for a group of Macedonian-speaking Muslims who have over the 
past few decades begun to identify solely as Muslims, shedding their ethnic 
Macedonian identity. 
 
Albanian and Macedonian political parties compete for the votes of their 
respective communities and cases of cross-community voting in both the 
municipal and national legislative elections are extremely rare. The only 
exception is the presidential elections where the non-Macedonian communities 
                                              
56 S. Koceski, Committees for Inter-Community Relations: Establishment, Mandate and Existing 
Experiences, Community Development Institute, Tetovo, 2007, p. 9.  
57 Lyon, “Municipal Decentralisation in the Republic of Macedonia”, p. 36. 
58 Connor, G., “Results of a Participatory Assessment: National and Local Capacities for Strengthening 
Inter-Ethnic Dialogue and Collaboration”, United Nations Development Programme, 2010, p. 5, 
www.mdgfund.org (accessed 23 August 2011). 
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are too small to have a candidate of their own elected. In all other instances, an 
unspoken agreement of non-interference seems to apply.59 As Ragaru points out: 
The moment one community comprises above 50 per cent of the total 
population in any given unit of government, that unit becomes ‘hers’. The 
mayor will come from the majority community and he will be expected 
(by members of all communities) to defend the interests of his ethnic 
group in the first place. Minority rights might be respected, yet 
community preference will be the rule rather than the exception.60 
 
For example, the boundaries of Kičevo (a municipality in western Macedonia) 
were agreed during the re-demarcation process but changes were delayed until 
2012 due to threats of violence. The Albanian community is now the majority 
within the new expanded municipality. For the 2013 local government elections 
three key Albanian political parties agreed to support one joint candidate to 
ensure that an Albanian mayor was elected. The same was attempted by two key 
Macedonian parties in Struga and Kičevo, who mirrored the strategy 
unsuccessfully. The defeat of the Macedonian candidates was expected because 
the demographic structure of the revised municipalities has ensured that Albanian 
candidates will win local elections. It seems that the Macedonian parties forged 
pre-election coalitions only to promote a façade of nationalist unity because the 
Macedonian community holds both responsible for the re-demarcations and their 
present inability to elect a municipal mayor. 
 
It is important to note that there is a degree of informal political interaction 
between the two communities at the local level. Most interview participants 
stated that while formal structures are either non-existent or ineffective, informal 
networks based on friendship, business ties, or employment allow influential 
members of both communities to meet on an ad hoc basis and discuss or defuse 
tensions in times of crisis.61 An example are the tensions that arose in the village 
                                              
59 Ragaru, Macedonia, p. 25. 
60 ibid. 
61 Local Committee Leader and Former Police Commander, Interview with Author, 20 July 2013, 
VMRO-DPMNE Official, Interview with Author, 21 July 2013, SDSM Official, Interview with Author, 
20 August 2013, and NGO Activist, Interview with Author, Gostivar, 11 August 2013. 
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of Mislešo (Struga municipality), which is Macedonian-populated and within 
walking distance of the town of Struga. The Mislešo local committee, with the 
support of residents, raised a 30 metre flag pole at the entrance of the village 
where it converges with the town of Struga. Their intention was to counter the 
large number of Albanian flags throughout the municipality and mark out the 
village as Macedonian territory.62 The Mayor of Struga immediately ordered 
municipal workers to remove the flag and flag pole.  
 
Following two tense standoffs between local armed Macedonians and municipal 
workers at the site (including some MOS paramilitary members) the Mayor sent 
a close associate, who was also friends with the leader of the Mislešo local 
committee, to discuss the situation.63 This informal meeting led to a de-escalation 
of tensions, at least temporarily, and a retreat on the Mayor’s part. The President 
of the local committee believes that there will be further attempts to remove the 
flag and flag pole; however, he insists that the residents of Mislešo will never 
allow it and will resort to arms should the municipal authorities try to remove it 
forcibly.64 
Segregation: Education 
Primary and secondary education was among the responsibilities devolved to 
municipal councils under the Framework Agreement. However, the 
decentralisation of school education policy and funding resulted in much greater 
segregation within the education system and this is directly contributing to 
conflict across wider society. Schenker has argued that segregation such as this 
produces prejudices and fear and because of this children are much more 
susceptible to manipulation and misuse for political purposes.65 On the macro 
level segregation of this sort has a “negative effect on the cohesion of the entire 
society and potentially of the state, since it undoubtedly produces centrifugal 
                                              
62 Local Committee Leader and Former Police Commander, Interview with Author, 20 July 2013. 
63 ibid. 
64 ibid. 
65 H. Schenker, “Integrated Education: Emerging Concepts in Macedonia”, Political Thought, No. 33, 
2011, p. 20. 
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effects, including persons who do not interact, do not want to live together, or 
even alongside each other”.66 
 
Ethnic segregation is slowly becoming institutionalised in the education system, 
where many schools in ethnically mixed municipalities hold classes in shifts. 
While ethnic segregation existed prior to the Framework Agreement, it was 
relatively uncommon. Once local governments were provided with control over 
schools, this practice expanded rapidly and is now the norm in many mixed 
municipalities. Koneska has argued that under the Framework Agreement inter-
ethnic integration through education has suffered.67 She has contended that 
instead of exposing children from different ethnic backgrounds to each other 
schools have made Macedonian and Albanian children more encapsulated within 
their own ethnic group.68 
 
Classes for Macedonian and non-Albanian minority students are held separately 
from classes for Albanian students.69 The purpose of separate classes has largely 
been to avoid physical fights between Macedonian and Albanian students,70 
though many parents have also refused to allow their children to study together.71 
According to a 2010 survey cited by the International Crisis Group, 69 per cent 
of Macedonian and 42 per cent of Albanian parents said they would not send 
their children to a school where they are not in the majority.72 The process of 
segregation itself has become relatively simple. In some cases ‘management 
issues’ are invoked without further explanation and this is enough to segregate 
students into separate classes.73 Even in schools where students attend ethnically 
mixed classes, “separation and lack of communication between different ethnic 
                                              
66 ibid. 
67 C. Koneska, After Ethnic Conflict: Policy-making in Post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Macedonia, Routledge, Farnham, 2014, p. 132. 
68 ibid, p. 132. 
69 M. Vetterlein, “The Influence of the Ohrid Framework Agreement on the Educational Policy of the 
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70 ibid. See also Koneska, After Ethnic Conflict, p. 131. 
71 Ragaru, Macedonia, p. 24. 
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groups is the norm during breaks and extracurricular activities”.74 In some cases, 
entire schools have been physically separated along ethnic lines, including the 
school administration, teachers, and parents’ councils.75  
 
A study completed in 2009 by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) on student attitudes towards ethnonational ‘others’ revealed that 
few Macedonian and Albanian students expressed positive feelings towards one 
another. Overall, only 13 per cent of Macedonian respondents felt positively 
towards their Albanian counterparts,76 whereas 33 per cent of Albanian 
respondents felt the same towards Macedonians.77 The report found large 
regional disparities where respondents in ethnically mixed towns such as Struga, 
Gostivar, Tetovo, and Skopje were more likely to have negative feelings for 
ethnonational “others”, while the opposite was true in towns dominated by 
Macedonians.78 According to the report, students of ethnically mixed towns were 
much less likely to have contact with ethnonational “others”, preferring to 
socialise within their own community.79 When students were asked what they 
thought was behind the hostilities at school, 44.2 per cent responded ‘cultural 
differences’, 43.8 per cent responded ‘political party influence’ and 42.9 per cent 
responded ‘student prejudices’.80 Interestingly, 65 per cent of respondents to an 
OSCE survey on decentralisation believe that the influence of politics on 
education has either remained the same or increased since the implementation of 
the Framework Agreement and the new laws on decentralisation.81  
 
Vetterlein notes that the politicisation of the education system is likely to 
increase over time, and notes that soon after municipalities gained significant 
powers over education up to 21 school directors in 7 municipalities were 
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dismissed without any clear grounds.82 Koneska believes that autonomy within 
education for the Albanian community has resulted in the creation of two 
separate and ethnically exclusive education systems in Macedonia.83 She argues 
that reintegrating students into the same classes and schools will be virtually 
impossible because of ethnic divisions and the institutionalisation of ethnic-based 
schools through the decentralisation process.84 In addition, she maintains that the 
veto powers (Chapter Seven) prevent any challenges to the status quo by the 
Macedonian majority.85  
 
                                              
82 Vetterlein, “The Influence of the Ohrid Framework Agreement on the Educational Policy of the 
Republic of Macedonia”, p. 15. 
83 Koneska, After Ethnic Conflict, p. 132. 





Proportional Employment in Public Entities 
Yusuf Bangura has argued that “inequalities among groups often constitute a 
more potent source for violent conflict than inequalities among individuals. 
When inequalities in incomes, wealth and access to services or political power 
coincide with group differences, ethnicity may assume importance in shaping 
choices and mobilising individuals for collective action [emphasis added]”.1 
Atanasova has noted similar views in that competition for resources is a strong 
motivator of ethnic conflict and the struggle for control of resources is usually 
“fiercer in less developed states where the economic pie is small and resources 
scarce…unequal economic opportunities, unequal access to resources such as 
land, capital and property rights, to jobs, government contracts and allocations, to 
developmental inputs and social services…within this context politics matters 
because the state controls access to scarce resources, and groups that possess 
political power can gain privileged access to resources”.2 Resource competition 
is also highlighted by a number of other authors,3 who maintain that competition 
for resources, such as land, capital, property rights, state employment, state 
contracts and grants, and social services all lead to political tension and conflict 
between groups that feel they are being treated unequally, based on their ethno-
religious identity. 
 
This is certainly the case in Macedonia where Macedonians have dominated the 
public sector for decades, and in doing so, have controlled the development of 
public policy and the allocation of public resources. In the Macedonian context, 
proportional representation in state bodies not only suggests proportional 
                                              
1 Y. Bangura, “Ethnic Inequalities in the Public Sector: A Comparative Analysis”, Development and 
Change, Vol. 32, Iss. 2, p. 299. 
2 Atanasova, “Transborder ethnic minorities and their impact on the security of Southeastern Europe”, 
p. 383. 
3 See ibid, pp. 382-384, J. Dettmer, “Al-Qaeda’s links in the Balkans”, Insight on the News, Vol. 18, 
Iss. 26, 2002, pp. 22-23, and P. Kolstø, “Nationalism, ethnic conflict and job competition: non-Russian 




employment within the public sector, but also institutional control which is at 
least correspondent to the size of the particular ethnic group in question. 
Institutional control is seen as a means of influencing public policy and laws, and 
ensuring an ‘equitable’ share of public resources. This section will deal with 
proportional employment in the public sector and, where relevant, institutional 
control and resource competition.  
Macedonian Economic Conditions: 1945-2001 
At the end of the Second World War, Macedonia was a rural country and the 
least industrialised republics of Yugoslavia. The new communist regime 
immediately instituted a program of industrialisation and within a decade the 
number of industrial workers tripled.4 Nevertheless, the majority of workers 
continued to work in agriculture until the 1960s and the majority of people 
continued to live in rural areas until the 1970s.5 
 
Table 6. Rural/Urban Population and Agricultural Employment 
Year Rural (%) Urban (%) Agricultural (%) 
1921 72.8 27.2 - 
1948 73.2 26.8 71.6 
1953 71.0 29.0 63.0 
1961 64.4 35.6 51.3 
1971 51.2 48.8 39.9 
1981 44.8 55.2 21.7 
1991 42.0 58.0 14.7 
1994 40.2 59.8 11.6 
2015 42.9 57.1 2.1 
Source: U. Brunnbauer, “Fertility, families and ethnic conflict: Macedonians and Albanians in 
the Republic of Macedonia, 1944-2002”, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2004, p. 580 and 
the State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia, www.stat.gov.mk.  
 
The collectivisation of agriculture was an important element of the Yugoslav 
strategy to industrialise because it was seen as a means for both socialist 
accumulation and as a method to fight the hostile wealthier peasantry in the 
countryside.6 It was also hoped that the collectivisation of agriculture would free 
                                              
4 The number of industrial workers rose from 10,405 in 1945 to 31,932 in 1955, see Brunnbauer, 





up labour for industry. The forced collectivisation of agriculture began in 1948 
and ended in 1952 during which time approximately half of the total cultivated 
area in Macedonia was nationalised.7 Collectivisation made rural life extremely 
difficult as the state tried to extract as much as possible from agriculture in order 
to support its industrialisation efforts, leading to widespread resistance.8 By 
1953, the Yugoslav authorities reversed their collectivisation policies and 
allowed for the re-privatisation of family-owned farms, which accounted for 75 
per cent of the cultivated land by the late 1960s.9 However, rural conditions were 
extremely harsh and the liberalisation reforms of 1953 lifted the residency 
restrictions which led to a rural exodus to the towns.10 These people largely 
found work in the new factories and administrative apparatus. 
 
The policy of collectivisation and the rural-to-urban migration largely affected 
Macedonians. Only some five per cent of all Albanian households joined 
collective farms, compared to 41 per cent of Macedonian households.11 Ačkoska 
has attributed the failure to collectivise Albanian farms to the strong resistance 
among the Albanian community and the inability of the communist authorities to 
enforce the policy in Albanian-populated areas.12 She explains their resistance 
not only by their desire to defend their property, but also by their ‘religious 
fanaticism’ and their opposition to include women in the workforce, which was a 
feature of collective farms.13 
 
Ulf Brunnbauer argues that the ethnic division of labour was established early on 
under communism, whereby many Macedonians left rural areas and were 
employed in industrial or administrative jobs, while Albanians largely remained 
in subsistence farming.14 Macedonians were more likely to be included in the 
industrial and administrative workforce for two reasons. First, education 
                                              
7 ibid, pp. 580-581. 




12 V. Ačkoska, “Migracijata selo-grad kako posledica na agrarnata politika 1945-1953 godina”, Glasnik 
na institutot za nacionalna istorija, Vol. 38, No. 1-2, 1994, pp. 70-71. 
13 ibid. 
14 Brunnbauer, “Fertility, families and ethnic conflict”, p. 582. 
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achievements were much higher among the Macedonian community, and the 
Macedonian language was the official language of administration.15 Secondly, 
Macedonia was established as a Macedonian nation-state and no one was under 
any illusion that Macedonians would not dominate its political and institutional 
life, and use the administration and state-owned industries as a source of 
employment. Albanians viewed the socialist republic in a very different light. 
They felt increasingly alienated from the state because of its anti-religious 
ideology, its Macedonian dominance, and its attempts to change the role of 
women in society.16 In addition, they regarded urbanisation and industrialisation 
as threats to their cultural traditions and saw their moral values threatened by the 
ruling ideology.17 Brunnbauer has argued that these are some of the reasons why 
so many Albanians declared themselves to be Turks and migrated from 
Macedonia to Turkey during the 1950s under a migration agreement signed in 
1953.18 It is also accurate that many Albanians did not seek state employment 
because they feared being ostracised by their own community as ‘collaborators’ 
in the Macedonian-owned system. 
 
In contrast to Macedonian families who depended on state jobs, Albanian 
households learned to exploit different opportunities, particularly seasonal 
migration to Western Europe (Germany, Austria, and Switzerland).19 Workers in 
Western Europe sent remittances back home and these funds were largely 
invested in the purchase of more agricultural land and machinery.20 This enabled 
many Albanians to maintain agriculture as the core of their subsistence, while 
using non-agricultural income to supplement it, and by doing this they were able 
to maintain their distance from Macedonian socialist development both 
economically and culturally.21 
 
                                              
15 ibid. 
16 ibid, p. 583. 
17 ibid. 
18 ibid.  
19 ibid, p. 584.  
20 ibid, p. 585.  
21 ibid.  
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The Albanian household-based economy proved to be very beneficial during the 
transition from socialism to the free market beginning in 1990 because they were 
less exposed to the economic shocks of unemployment and the collapse of the 
welfare state. The combination of remittances, household-based subsistence 
agriculture and entry into private business enabled Albanian families to transition 
much easier than Macedonian families. It should be noted, however, that 
although Albanian households (in general) were and continue to be relatively 
wealthier than Macedonian households, both are facing harsh economic 
conditions.  
 
On the other hand, many Macedonians were severely impacted when the 
Yugoslav system collapsed in 1990. For the previous 45 years, the majority had 
relied on the state for financial survival. They had worked in loss-making 
factories that were ultimately subsidised by transfers from the wealthier republics 
and Belgrade’s ability to obtain foreign loans and assistance. When they exited 
Yugoslavia, and the onset of transition from a socialist to a market-based 
economy began, most factories and other state companies were either closed or 
privatised, creating serious economic problems ranging from large-scale 
unemployment to rampant inflation.22 Loss of their largest markets within the 
Yugoslav federation and regional events further devastated the Macedonian 
economy. United Nations sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro from 1992 
until 1995 disrupted trade with its main trading partner, even though the 
sanctions were not always enforced. In addition, Greece’s punitive economic 
measures against Macedonia from 1991-95 and its 19-month economic blockade 
during 1994-95 further crippled Macedonia’s economy. The Kosovo War and the 
nearly 350,000 refugees resulted in another economic shock, followed again by 
the 2001 War in Macedonia. 
 
Macedonian GDP per capita had crashed from $8,115 in 1991 to $1,202 in 1992 
(Figure 5), stalled until 2002, and is yet to recover its pre-independence levels 
                                              




($6,655 in 2016). These conditions made the Macedonian community even less 
inclined to share what little had been left from socialist economic development,23 
and continue to influence its desire to maintain control over national economic 
resources, which they view as essential for their own survival.  
 
Figure 2. Macedonian GDP Per Capita ($US Current Prices), 1991-2016 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, [website], www.worldbank.org (accessed 
15 August 2016). 
 
The transition from a centrally planned to a free market economy is yet to be 
completed. The process of transition itself was highly corrupt and largely 
mismanaged. Sections of the old communist elite both obstructed the reform 
process and grossly benefited from the privatisation of state companies by buying 
under-priced state assets through newly formed companies or selling them to 
family members and close associates.24 These same elites are closely linked to 
organised crime and many are accused of being directly involved in (or indirectly 
profiting from) drug, tobacco, and arms smuggling, prostitution, and money 
laundering.25 Unemployment is high within both Macedonian and Albanian 
communities, inflation is rampant, the welfare system is insufficient to 
                                              
23 Brunnbauer, “The Implementation of the Ohrid Agreement”, p. 14. 




































































































































compensate for poverty or other risk factors such as old age, illness or disability, 
and healthcare resembles third world conditions.26 The country continues to lack 
basic infrastructure (reliable communications, modern roads, clean running 
water, and a stable supply of electricity), technology and general skills (let alone 
a labour force with high-end specialist skills or knowledge).27 Foreign investment 
is minimal (Macedonia is ranked 128th out of 216 jurisdictions having 
accumulated only $5.5 billion between 1994 and 2015) and is usually stifled 
through bureaucracy and mired in corruption.28  
 
These structural problems, combined with a corrupt and clientelist elite, have 
impoverished a large proportion of the population (22 per cent),29 which (seeing 
its situation through an ethnic lens) further consolidates around its own 
community with the conviction that its capacity for survival lies in its ability to 
obtain resources at the expense of the ethnic ‘other’. While these circumstances 
have produced deep divisions along ethnic lines, they have also caused 
grievances within ethnic communities where those not aligned with the party in 
power are left disenfranchised. The relative difference in the economic 
circumstances of the Macedonians and Albanians has further coloured pre-
existing ethnic stereotypes.  Many Macedonians feel disadvantaged by having to 
bear the brunt of the transition to privatised industry, and regard Albanians as 
‘wealthy’.30 Relatively affluent Albanians are automatically associated with 
organised crime by ordinary Macedonians, who either cannot understand that 
market-based entrepreneurship is necessary in their post-socialist reality or are 
simply rationalising Albanian financial success as impossible without illicit 
activity. Many Albanians, on the other hand, see Macedonians as “lacking 
initiative and unwilling to work, wedded to white collar jobs and patronage 
                                              
26 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2012 – Macedonia Country Report, Gutersloh, 2012, pp. 22-23, 
www.bti-project.org (accessed 20 September 2016). 
27 ibid. 
28 International Monetary Fund, [website], www.worldbank.org (accessed 15 August 2016). 
29 The World Bank, [website], 2014, www.data.worldbank.org (accessed 5 September 2016). 




networks”.31 They further see Macedonians as greedy and unwilling to share state 
resources with fellow citizens purely based on their ethnicity. 
Ethnonationalisation of the Public Sector 
Under the Framework Agreement, Macedonian politicians agreed to achieve 
proportional employment of minority communities in all national and municipal 
public entities and at all levels of employment within such entities.32 In 
particular, the police force was signalled out as an area of priority, based on 
Albanian arguments that they could no longer trust the institution – particularly 
after the 2001 war and the numerous violent confrontations during the 1980s and 
1990s – unless they themselves were equitably represented within its ranks.33 
More broadly, Albanians wanted control of local police in the municipalities 
where they were a majority; however, this was strongly opposed by Macedonians 
who saw it as a means to creating separate Albanian security forces through 
legitimate state structures. 
 
Proportional Representation in State Bodies 
Laws regulating employment in public administration will include measures to 
assure equitable representation of communities in all central and local public 
bodies and at all levels of employment within such bodies, while respecting the 
rules concerning competence and integrity that govern public administration. The 
authorities will take action to correct present imbalances in the composition of 
the public administration, in particular through the recruitment of members of 
under-represented communities. Particular attention will be given to ensuring as 
rapidly as possible that the police services will generally reflect the composition 
and distribution of the population of Macedonia. 
Framework Agreement, Article 4.2. 
 
                                              
31 Cox, M., Ahmeti’s Village: The Political Economy of Interethnic Relations in Macedonia, European 
Stability Initiative, Skopje, 2002, p. 6, www.esiweb.org (accessed 11 May 2012). 
32 Framework Agreement, s4.2. The Framework Agreement states “equitable representation”. However, 
“equitable” was never defined and in practice the Macedonian Government is recruiting state employees 
on a proportional system based on the percentage that each minority groups represents of the total 
population. 
33 Framework Agreement, s4.2. 
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Since the implementation of the Framework Agreement the Albanian demand for 
proportional representation in public entities, is tied to the belief that it has a 
right to its share of resources (state employment and budget allocations to 
Albanian dominated municipalities) and power (control or influence over state 
institutions and state-level decision-making), reflecting its new status as a co-
constitutive nation. As with many other issues, Macedonians see this as a zero-
sum game and perceive any gain of power and resources by the Albanian 
community as a loss for their own. For many Macedonians this is just another 
component of a broader campaign for the Albanianisation of the state. 
Macedonians also argue that employing more Albanians in the public sector is a 
waste of public funds by unnecessarily bloating public sector bodies. Given that 
they have historically relied on state employment and considered it a birth right, 
by virtue of being a member of the titular nation, this is a hypocritical position. 
Interestingly, a study conducted in 2015 found that 73 per cent of respondents 
believed that the state is responsible for providing employment to its citizens.34 
 
One theory on proportional representation is that passive representation – the 
public sector should match the demographic make-up of the general population – 
will lead to active representation, which is the formulation of policies that will 
benefit the interests of diverse groups,35 creating legitimacy for, and commitment 
to, state institutions and the state itself. The link between passive and active 
representation is premised on research showing that people from similar 
backgrounds – ethnicity for example – will have similar values and beliefs.36 
However, Pitt has argued that for active representation to occur, and for 
proportional representation to make sense, public sector employees (and 
particularly bureaucrats) must be afforded discretion in their jobs with regard to 
policy making and/or implementation, and the policy issue must be relevant to 
the specific group being represented.37 In practice, outside of senior positions, 
                                              
34 J. Bliznakovski and M. Popovich, “Conflict of Interest and Corruption at the Local Level”, Institute for 
Democracy: Societas Civilis, 2015, p. 12, www.idscs.org.mk (accessed 15 March 2016). 
35 D. Pitts, “Diversity, Representation, and Performance: Evidence about Race and Ethnicity in Public 
Organizations”, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2005, pp. 616-
617. 




few bureaucrats are provided the opportunity to meaningfully contribute to 
policy direction and the parameters for its implementation. This is particularly 
the case in Macedonia. In addition, many bureaucrats are merely awarded 
positions through clientelist practices, are unqualified, and have little interest in 
policy development. 
 
At the time of signing the Framework Agreement many commentators noted that 
proportional employment in the public sector would need to be undertaken over a 
generation in order for it to be achieved in an efficient and transparent manner, 
warning that any rapid changes could turn the reform into a zero-sum game over 
state employment. Since then there have been numerous reports of serious 
deficiencies in the competence of employees and the mechanisms of 
employment. These include new public employees (mainly from the Albanian 
community): 
 failing to meet the selection criteria;38 
 being employed through party affiliation;39 
 being requested to remain at home on full salary because of a lack of work 
and/or office space;40 and 
 being unable to speak the Macedonian language, making it impossible for 
them to undertake their normal duties.41 
 
In implementing the Framework Agreement, the Macedonian Government was 
pressured by both the Albanian community and the European Union to make 
rapid changes to the public sector. As a result, advice for the development of 
affordable and sustainable recruitment targets and planning to ensure their 
gradual fulfilment was largely ignored. Rather, a non-transparent and clientelist 
approach to recruiting high numbers of public servants (particularly Albanians) 
irrespective of the needs of the public sector or the competency of those 
                                              
38 European Commission, Macedonia: 2010 Progress Report, p. 22. 
39 European Commission, Macedonia: 2008 Progress Report, 2009, http://ec.europa.eu (accessed 
24 January 2011). 
40 K. Čangova, “Koj gi odobruva ramkovnite vrabotuvan̂a?”, Utrinski Vesnik, 2 February 2010, 
www.utrinski.com.mk (accessed 24 January 2011). 
41 T. Angelovski, “Na “Ramkovnite” im trepaat preveduvači”, Vreme, 14 August 2009, p. 3. 
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employed continues to be undertaken.42 Recruitment is also politicised in that to 
obtain state employment individuals generally need to be members of a ruling 
political party, related to a party member, or be a close associate of a party 
member. Members and supporters of opposition parties rarely obtain state 
employment and are largely disenfranchised until there is a change of 
government. Every change of government has resulted in the replacement of 
large numbers of public sector workers with the incoming government’s own 
party supporters. There have been occasions in changes of government when 
rather than retrenching employees, loyalists from the previous government are 
simply asked not to come to work or given meaningless positions while still 
getting paid. 
 
Local-level recruitment and retrenchment is felt much more acutely. For 
example, in 2002 the European Stability Initiative (ESI) noted that there were 
around 870 public sector positions in the town of Kičevo.43 Given their 
proportion of the population of  Kičevo (54.5 per cent), the Albanians could 
claim over 400 of these positions, which would be more than three times the 
number they held at the time.44 The ESI report noted that to rebalance the 
ethnonational mix, the authorities would need to reduce the number of 
Macedonian employees by a third to make room for so many Albanians. 
Alternatively, more people could be employed but at significant public cost. In 
Kičevo the decision was made to increase the number of Albanian staff by 
employing more people and not retrenching anyone.45 In other instances, such as 
in Čair, Albanian staff numbers were increased by retrenching Macedonians and 
employing large numbers of Albanians.46 Even at the local level, party-based 
patronage is the norm in terms of securing public sector employment. For 
example, a survey completed in 2015 found that 64 per cent of respondents 
believed that recruitment processes at the municipal level were only open and 
                                              
42 European Commission, Macedonia: 2010 Progress Report, 2011, http://ec.europa.eu (accessed 
14 June 2011). 
43 This excludes the education sector that already had proportional representation due to language 
requirements, see Cox, Ahmeti’s Village, p. 28. 
44 ibid. 




accessible to individuals who were close to the governing party within the 
municipality.47 
 
Macedonian ‘concerns’ for public expenditure on unnecessary state employees 
have more to do with their own job security than fiscal mismanagement. The 
Macedonian political elite have further contributed to the problem by using it to 
reward political clienteles and assist friends and family. Even now one of the 
most serious problems in public sector recruitment practices is the increasing 
politicisation of the sector. The International Crisis Group (ICG) has pointed out 
that the public administration is over-staffed, professional employees are 
increasingly being set aside (while still being paid), and new party loyalists are 
being appointed to high-level positions with control over decision-making.48 
These practices are common both at the national and local levels, and by the 
governing Macedonian and Albanian parties.49 It has also enabled political elites 
to distribute patronage and by doing so entrench their hold on power. At the same 
time, elite bargaining on the number of state jobs available and how many each 
community receives causes financial insecurity and ethnic tensions between 
ordinary Macedonians and Albanians. 
 
These practices have only incited further tensions between Macedonians who 
consider them as highly corrupt and a waste of public funds (particularly when 
state bodies are under pressure from international agencies such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to down-size and loss-making public 
enterprises are being restructured, privatised, or closed) and Albanians who now 
consider state employment as a right under the Framework Agreement.50  The 
                                              
47 Bliznakovski and Popovich, Conflict of Interest and Corruption at the Local Level, p. 8. 
48 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: Ten Years After the Conflict, Europe Report No. 2012, 11 
August 2011, p. 10. 
49 For example, a senior Albanian official noted that DUI had “failed to deliver on quality personnel in 
public administration and the judiciary...[focusing instead] on hiring party militants in administration, 
finance and other positions where there is more money”. Some observers note that DUI has equally 
disenfranchised Albanians who are not its members by excluding them from public sector employment, 
see International Crisis Group, Macedonia: Ten Years After the Conflict, p. 10. 
50 According to the standby agreement with the IMF (April 2003), employment in the public 
administration should be reduced by approximately four per cent annually, see H. Willemsen, “Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Persisting Structural Constraints to Democratic Consolidation”, 
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 6, Iss. 1, 2006, p. 94. 
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European Union, which is the key international driver behind the implementation 
of the Framework Agreement through Macedonia’s candidature for membership, 
certainly has not helped the situation. It initially criticised the Macedonian 
Government for not progressing this reform quickly enough and continually 
demanded that sanctions be established for public bodies failing to reach 
recruitment targets. In return, the EU would promise favourable progress reports 
relating to membership. This has contributed to the unaccountable practices 
relating to ethnic quotas that are widespread throughout the country at both the 
national and local levels. Ironically, the EU has reversed its criticism and is now 
reprimanding Macedonia for these issues.51  
 
Sašo Georgievski has argued that Macedonia functions like a ‘party state’, 
known in Macedonia as Partizacija, rather than a Rechtsstaat (i.e., one with the 
rule of law and the provision of justice) in that public officials are selected by the 
spoils system (in which the ruling party provides public jobs to its supporters, 
friends and relatives) and work as party officials rather than state officials.52 
Georgievski has noted that political parties in Macedonia are highly centralised 
and generally under the personal control of their party leader and a close group of 
party members loyal to the leader.53 Georgievski has contended that this style of 
governance tends towards autocratic control over state institutions to the point 
where it is difficult to determine where the state ends and the party begins.54  He 
has argued that “given the rather primitive and authoritarian political culture 
among Macedonian [and Albanian] political elites…party leaders often arrange 
major public and administrative appointments and negotiate access to public 
wealth”.55 Interviews corroborate this analysis and maintain that control by party 
leaders is preserved through patronage and the corrupt distribution of state 
resources and favours.56 More accurately, Macedonia’s political system that 
                                              
51 See the European Commission Progress Reports for Macedonia for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 at 
http://ec.europa.eu (accessed 24 January 2011). 
52 Georgievski, “Separation of Powers in the Republic of Macedonia”, p. 932. 
53 ibid. 
54 ibid, p. 929. 
55 ibid, p. 932. 
56 SDSM Official, Interview with Author, 20 August 2013 and VMRO-DPMNE Official, Interview with 
Author, 21 July 2013. 
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mixes some democratic processes with authoritarian rule could be described as 
anocratic (Part III). 
 
Examples of patronage and politicisation of the public administration are rife. In 
2011 investigative journalists from A1 television exposed documents 
demonstrating that the current ruling party, VMRO-DPMNE, was rewarding 
party members with public sector jobs if they could provide a list of 15 or more 
people who would guarantee that they would vote for the party in the upcoming 
elections.57 Politicisation at the local level is much the same. Rufi Osmani, the 
former Mayor of Gostivar, was accused of demoting 15 employees because of 
their “disloyalty to his newly established party”.58 The Democratic Union for 
Integration (DUI), as the governing Albanian coalition partner since 2008, has 
been largely employing only party members and supporters in the public 
administration.59 There are claims that there is an intra-party agreement within 
DUI that one in three of those employed must be a former National Liberation 
Army (NLA) fighter or a member of their family, under the rationale that they 
are supporting those who risked their lives for the Albanian cause and 
maximising electoral support because of the social prestige that former NLA 
fighters enjoy within their local communities.60 In 2011 DUI even attempted to 
formalise the allocation of the state budget along ethnic lines, claiming that the 
concept was in accordance with the Framework Agreement, particularly the 
requirement for decentralisation.61 DUI Members of Parliament insisted that the 
Albanian community should receive one quarter of the budget (€750 million in 
2012), which would have been approximate to their proportion of the 
population.62 Regardless, in a country with scarce resources and high 
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unemployment (officially at 24.5 per cent),63 state employment can make the 
difference between living in poverty and supporting an extended family. Because 
of these realities, many citizens who complain about corruption, clientelism, and 
politicisation in principle ignore it in practice, particularly when they can 
personally benefit from its existence. 
 
It should also be noted that the employment of minority groups is uneven across 
the public sector. In particular, state bodies with Albanian ministers or heads of 
ministries have been disproportionately staffed by Albanians. For example, in 
2014 (the latest year for which figures are available) Albanian employees were 
overrepresented in the Ministry of Local Government (58 per cent), Health (45 
per cent), Culture (34 per cent), Economy (34 per cent), Justice (31 per cent) and 
Environment (31 per cent).64 On the other hand, Macedonians clearly continued 
to dominate in the Judiciary (both at the administrative and judicial levels), 
public enterprises, smaller government agencies and Ministries such as Finance 
(85 per cent), Information Society (84 per cent), Defence (79 per cent), Transport 
and Communications (79 per cent), Agriculture, Forestry and Water (78 per cent) 
and Internal Affairs (77 per cent).65 Ministries such as Foreign Affairs, Labour 
and Social Policy, and Education and Science are approximate to the overall 
ethnonational composition of the population.66 For the 2011 reporting period the 
Ombudsman reported that of a total of 972 institutions which submitted data, 495 
(51 per cent) did not employ any Albanians and 32 (three per cent) did not 
employ any Macedonians.67 Other communities fared much worse. 
 
                                              
63 State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia, Indicators, 2016. 
64 Ombudsman of the Republic of Macedonia, Annual Report 2014, 2015, pp. 80-84, 
www.ombudsman.mk (accessed 12 December 2015). 
65 ibid. 
66 ibid. 
67 ibid, p. 40. 
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Table 7. Ethnic Composition of Public Sector Employees 





% % % % 
Macedonians 64.2 83.3 77.4 76.3 73.9 
Albanians 25.2 11.7 17.4 17.2 19.4 
Turks 3.9 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.9 
Roma 2.7 0.5 0.6 1.3 1.4 
Serbs 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 
Vlachs 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 
Bosnians 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Others 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.00 100.0 100.0 
Source: Figures for 2011 and 2014 are from the Ombudsman of the Republic of Macedonia, 
Annual Report 2011 [and 2014], www.ombudsman.mk (accessed 12 December 2015). Figures 
for 2002 and 2006 are from Ministry of Finance, [website], 2015, www.finance.gov.mk 
(accessed 12 December 2015). 
 
The table above provides statistics on the ethnonational composition of the public 
sector in Macedonia. The public sector has grown over the past decade,68 and 
much of this growth has been due to the employment of staff from minority 
communities, while the number of Macedonian employees has been reduced in 
both real terms (until 2006) and as a proportion of the total workforce – 
particularly at the local level.69 Once VMRO-DPMNE returned to power in 2006, 
however, it began a clientelist recruitment drive and Macedonian public 
employees increased in real terms, though their numbers continued to decline 
proportionally because Albanian employees continued to grow exponentially.  
 
Nevertheless, Macedonian resentment towards Albanians who they consider are 
‘taking their jobs’ runs high,70 and this is supported by recent employment trends 
and attitudes. For example, findings from the United Nations Development 
Programme’s (UNDP) People-Centred Analysis report suggest that more 
Macedonians (approximately 35 per cent) are looking for work than Albanians 
(approximately 30 per cent).71 In addition, 45 per cent of Macedonian 
respondents believed that they were likely to lose their job within the following 
                                              
68 S. Marušić, “Size of Macedonian Bureaucracy Stays Mystery”, Balkan Insight, 18 November 2011, 
www.balkaninsight.com (accessed 18 November 2011). 
69 Cox, Ahmeti’s Village, p. 28. 
70 Ragaru, Macedonia, 14. 
71 W. Bartlett, “People-Centred Analysis: Quality of Social Services”, United Nations Development 
Programme, Skopje, 2010, p. 61. 
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six months compared to 25 per cent of Albanian respondents.72 Macedonians 
were also more likely to report that their lives had become worse (34 per cent) 
than Albanians (20 per cent) in the previous 12 months and were more likely to 
perceive their household’s financial situation as being below average (41 per 
cent) compared to Albanians (23 per cent).73 This indicates much more economic 
insecurity amongst Macedonians and the blame seems to be directed towards the 
Albanian community and the Framework Agreement.  
The Police and Military 
As noted above, the ethnonational composition of the Macedonian Police Force 
was singled out for rapid restructuring to ensure more Albanians were employed. 
Although most Macedonians distrust the police and have endured repression and 
brutality from the police and various state security services, it is fair to say that 
the Albanians were particularly targeted. 
 
Ethnic Representation in the Police Force 
The parties commit themselves to ensuring that the police services will by 2004 
generally reflect the composition and distribution of the population of 
Macedonia. As initial steps toward this end, the parties commit to ensuring that 
500 new police officers from communities not in the majority in the population 
of Macedonia will be hired and trained by July 2002, and that these officers will 
be deployed to the areas where such communities live. The parties further 
commit that 500 additional such officers will be hired and trained by July 2003, 
and that these officers will be deployed on a priority basis to the areas throughout 
Macedonia where such communities live. 
Framework Agreement, Article 5.2 and Annex C. 
 
Albanian demands for greater representation in the police force were met in 2001 
through the Framework Agreement. Over 1,100 new cadets were trained, of 
which 67 per cent were Albanians and 17 per cent Macedonians, along with 
                                              
72 ibid, p. 62. 
73 ibid, pp. 62-63. 
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smaller numbers of members of other communities.74 In 2004 the Organisation 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) assisted the Macedonian police 
in training an additional 325 cadets in order to increase the number of minority 
police officers. According to the OSCE, in 2001 Albanians accounted for only 
3.8 per cent of the police force, while the presence of other minorities was 
negligible. By September 2005 Albanians made up just over 15 per cent, while 
other minorities accounted for nearly 4.5 per cent.75 
 
This was a rapid expansion of the police force and these quotas were achieved at 
the expense of quality and effectiveness. The then Interior Minister, Hari Kostov, 
complained about incompetence, use of intimidation, and periodic cooperation 
with criminal elements in relation to the newly recruited Albanian police 
officers.76 The OSCE admitted that some unqualified recruits had been employed 
simply to fulfil quotas.77 In particular, research undertaken by the UNDP 
suggests that there are questions about the professional competence of newly 
recruited Albanian police officers who have not gone through the same 
professional training as others.78 One interviewee, a former Police Commander, 
noted that many new Albanian recruits under his command during that period 
were clearly unqualified and politically connected to DUI.79 
 
Some observers also criticised the OSCE emphasis on promoting Albanian 
community acceptance of the police, or community policing strategies, rather 
than preparing officers for the reality that they will need to use force when 
necessary. The OSCE has defended this strategy claiming that community 
policing increases citizens’ confidence in the police and improves mutual co-
operation.  While this may be the case, a large number of high-profile criminals 
(Macedonian and Albanian) have remained at large so as not to disrupt local 
                                              
74 Ministry of Interior, [website], 2016, www.mvr.gov.mk (accessed 15 July 2016). 
75 OSCE, OSCE Annual Report 2005, 2006, p. 66, www.osce.org (accessed 4 April 2010). 
76 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: No Room for Complacency, 2003, p. 4, www.crisisgroup.org 
(accessed 20 July 2011). 
77 ibid. 
78 A. Ivanov (ed.), “People-Centred Analysis”, United Nations Development Programme, 2008, p. 59, 
www.seeu.edu.mk (accessed 15 November 2011). 
79 Former Police Commander and Local Committee Leader, Interview with Author, 20 July 2013. 
182 
 
community relations.80 While this practice may appease those connected to these 
criminals, it is breaking confidence among the rest of the community and sending 
the message that those willing or able to cause unrest will be dealt with leniently, 
or not at all. 
 
A further ongoing issue has been the inclusion of former members of 
paramilitary groups into the police and military. While the Macedonian 
Government has never officially provided confirmation, party officials have 
reportedly suggested that up to 3,000 former Albanian NLA combatants were 
recruited into the police and military after the 2001 war.81 Former Macedonian 
soldiers (many of whom fought in the war) and many Macedonian citizens in 
general have strongly criticized the integration of former Albanian fighters. They 
argue that the state cannot rely on those who actively fought against it and have 
shown loyalty to NLA commanders that called for the destruction of Macedonia 
and unity with Kosovo and Albania. Even more controversial is the fact that 
many former NLA fighters, who are now being recruited into the police and 
army or have obtained political office, originally deserted the security forces in 
2001 to join the NLA.82 
 
One example is that of Talat Xhaferi. Xhaferi, a former commander with the 
NLA, was appointed as the Macedonian Defence Minister on 18 February 2013. 
Xhaferi was an officer in the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) from 1985 to 1991, 
and then became an officer in the Army of the Republic of Macedonia (ARM) 
from 1992 to 2001.83 When the 2001 war began Xhaferi deserted the army and 
joined the NLA. Few details are available about Xhaferi’s actual role during the 
                                              
80 For example, the infamous Dilaver “Leku” Bojku from Velešta, an Albanian populated village in the 
Struga municipality. Leku was a high profile criminal who had the backing of key elements within the 
local Albanian community and was considered untouchable for years. The reasoning was that any attempt 
to arrest him or disturb his operations would ‘provoke’ the Albanian community. The reality was that 
most Albanians wanted to see Leku behind bars. Leku was eventually convicted for trafficking women 
and forcing them into prostitution, but even in prison he was provided with extraordinary privileges and 
approved leave at regular intervals. 
81 T. Stojčevski, “Macedonia: Lions Menace Ends”, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 
6 September 2005, www.iwpr.net (accessed 7 December 2012). 
82 Koneska, C. and Kotevska, B., Context Analysis of the Security Sector Reform in Macedonia 1991-
2008, Analytica, Skopje, 2011, p. 22. 
83 Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia, [website], www.sobranie.mk (accessed 27 February 2013). 
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war but it is understood that he was the commanding officer of the NLA’s 116th 
Brigade, which was stationed in the mountains surrounding Gostivar. Few, if 
any, actual clashes took place in this region and reports suggest that as little as 50 
NLA combatants were present in the area.84 It is unlikely that Xhaferi or the 
116th Brigade actually engaged in combat, and claims from Xhaferi to the 
contrary are most likely political posturing aimed at his constituency. However, 
Xhaferi has also been accused of some serious offences. In 2008 the Minister of 
Interior (and police), Gordana Jankulovska, claimed Xhaferi “threatened police 
officers and the deputy commander of the police station in Grupčin with 
liquidation”.85 None of this seems to have been followed up, most likely because 
Xhaferi’s position within the governing coalition and political expediency 
persuaded the ruling VMRO-DPMNE to overlook its own allegations (at that 
time VMRO-DPMNE needed DUI’s support to maintain a majority in 
Parliament).86 
 
Even so, violent protests erupted in Skopje soon after the announcement of his 
appointment. Macedonians clashed with riot police and accused the government 
of treason for appointing an ‘enemy of the state’ to the position of Defence 
Minister. Albanians responded with counter-protests, also clashing with riot 
police, damaging police cars and private vehicles, and burning buses in defence 
of Xhaferi. Sporadic clashes between Macedonians and Albanians ensued 
throughout the city for weeks, with 22 people injured (including 13 police 
officers) and 18 arrested.87 While it caused outrage within the Macedonian 
community, particularly amongst police and army veterans of the 2001 war, the 
appointment itself was not a surprise. Talat Xhaferi was previously a member of 
                                              
84 Petrovski, Svedoštva, p. 231. 
85 ibid.  
86 Further controversy was also sparked by the discovery that Xhaferi has a criminal record due to an 
incident that occurred in 2008 in Tetovo. Xhaferi was convicted of obstructing a policeman on 
14 October 2010 and received a six month suspended sentence, conditional on not committing another 
offence within the next two years. Xhaferi appealed this sentence only to have the Court of Appeals in 
Gostivar dismiss his plea and confirm the original verdict, see S. Dimovski, “Macedonian Defence 
Minister Has Criminal Record”, Balkan Transitional Justice, 7 March 2013, www.balkaninsight.com 
(accessed 12 March 2013). 
87 Anonymous, “22 hurt in Macedonia ethnic protest”, Times of Malta, 3 March 2013, 
www.timesofmalta.com (accessed 5 March 2013). 
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the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Security, and Deputy Minister for 
Defence from 2004 to 2006 under former Prime Minister Vlado Bučkovski.88 
 
Stojanče Angelov, leader of Dostoinstvo (a political party and civil society 
association representing police and military veterans from 2001), was 
particularly incensed at the appointment of Xhaferi, denouncing it as a 
‘humiliating act’ and a ‘national catastrophe’.89 He argued that because Xhaferi 
deserted the Macedonian army and fought against it, he is unfit to lead the 
Ministry of Defence. Further, it was Xhaferi that led Albanian opposition to a 
draft law before the Macedonian Parliament that sought to provide state benefits 
for police and military veterans of the 2001 war. Xhaferi made a mockery of the 
process by submitting over 15,000 amendments and either remaining silent or 
reciting poetry and other irrelevant material for hours during Parliamentary 
debates.90  
 
Some of the concerns within the Macedonian community are not unwarranted. It 
was the NLA that instigated an armed conflict in pursuit of a number of extremist 
goals.  Further, key figures within the NLA (some of which are now senior DUI 
officials, including party leader Ali Ahmeti) are suspected of committing acts of 
terrorism and war crimes during the conflict. Four cases, including one against 
Ali Ahmeti and other leaders of the NLA, were brought forward by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). These cases 
were deemed as suitable for prosecution by the Macedonian authorities. 
However, in 2011 the Macedonian Government with DUI as a junior coalition 
partner provided amnesty to all the accused without any cases going to trial. In 
addition, some of DUI’s Parliamentary representatives, such as Xhevat Ademi, 
continue to be listed on the United States’ Specially Designated Nationals List 
(SDN) which includes individuals who are guilty or suspected of involvement in 
                                              
88Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia. 
89 S. Marušić, “New Defence Minister Outrages Macedonian Veterans”, Balkan Transitional Justice, 
20 February 2013, www.balkaninsight.com (accessed 13 March 2014). 
90 S. Marušićć, “Macedonia Albanians Hurl Amendments at Army Bill”, Balkan Transitional Justice, 
30 October 2012, www.balkaninsight.com (accessed 17 November 2012). 
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terrorism and war crimes.91 None have been prosecuted as they all received 
amnesty from the Macedonian Government (of which DUI was a coalition 
partner at the time of its enactment). The SDN also includes Menduh Thaçi, the 
current leader of the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA).92 
 
On the other hand, 630 members of a Macedonian paramilitary group known as 
the Lions have been employed as police officers (430) or military personnel 
(200).93 The Lions were formed in 2001 by the then Interior Minister, Lube 
Boškovski (VMRO-DPMNE), and consisted solely of Macedonians. Their 
purpose was to assist a Special Police Unit, known as the Tigers, in fighting the 
NLA. However, there is doubt as to the legality of the Lions, particularly given 
that its command and control structure rested outside of the police force and 
Interior Ministry and within the governing VMRO-DPMNE party hierarchy. For 
all intents and purposes, the Lions were a paramilitary unit and were not a 
lawfully constituted part of the state security forces. A further issue was the 
inclusion of a large criminal element within the Lions. There are claims that 
members of the Lions were involved in more than 70 criminal acts between 2002 
and 2005 (they claimed to have disbanded in 2005), including weapons offences, 
pub brawls, murders, and assaults on civilians.94 Suggestions have been made 
that many former members with criminal backgrounds were included in the 630 
personnel that were transferred to the police and military.95 Albanians, as well as 
some Macedonians, have expressed their opposition to the continued 
employment of former Lions members within the current police and army 
structures. Regardless, many of the dismissed personnel have gone on to join 
other paramilitary groups and private security firms (Chapter Nine). 
 
                                              
91 United States Department of the Treasury, Specially Designated Nationals List, [website], 
www.treasury.gov (accessed 6 September 2016). Xhevat Ademi is reported to have been head of the 
KLA’s ‘secret police’ in Macedonia, head of the ‘Albanian National Army (ANA)’, and a key organiser 
of financial assistance for the NLA. 
92 ibid. 
93 Macedonian Government, Ministry of Interior, Novite policiski regruti, [Press Release], 9 February 
2004, www.mvr.gov.mk (accessed 11 December 2012). 
94 Stojčevski, Macedonia: Lions Menace Ends. 
95 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: No Room for Complacency, p. 7. 
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In 2012 Albanians represented 19 per cent of the army and other minorities 
accounted for a further eight per cent.96 After strong increases in representation 
from 2001 these figures have plateaued since 2008. Considering the 
extraordinary measures the military has undertaken to recruit Albanians and 
other minorities,97 minority representation may have reached its peak. However, 
this plateau may also be a result of continued distrust of the military among 
minority communities in general and Albanians in particular. 
 


















Macedonians 81.4 77.6 75.1 73.6 73.3 73.6 74.1 73.7 
Albanians 12.2 15.5 17.9 18.9 18.8 18.6 18.4 18.7 
Turks 1.0 1.4 1.7 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 
Roma 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
Serbs 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 
Bosnians 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Vlachs 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Other 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Ministry of Defence, White Paper on Defence, 2012, www.morm.gov.mk (accessed 
13 September 2013). 
 
Research indicates that approximately 65 per cent of Albanians do not have 
confidence in the military, while nearly 70 per cent do not have confidence in the 
police.98 These findings are supported by more recent surveys which suggest that 
only 37 per cent of Albanians are satisfied with the police force.99 This is an 
interesting finding when it comes to confidence in the police force on the part of 
the Albanian community, particularly given that there has been extensive 
recruitment of Albanian police officers and these officers are stationed in 
Albanian-dominated municipalities. Possible explanations may include many 
suspect recruits from both the Macedonian and Albanian community being 
                                              
96 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011: Macedonia, United States Department of State, 
[website], www.state.gov (accessed 5 November 2012). 
97 This includes members of minority groups being recruited into the Macedonian army through a 
different set of criteria, see Ivanov, “People-Centred Analysis”, p. 59. 
98 ibid, p. 73 
99 Anonymous, “MVR go poprava imidzot vo ocite na graganite”, Dnevnik, 9 December 2012, 
www.dnevnik.com.mk (accessed 11 December 2012). 
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employed in the police and military, and the high level of corruption among 
public employees, including the security forces. 
 
Significant trust issues have also been reported between Macedonian and 
Albanian members of both the police force and the military. One Non-
Commissioned Officer (NCO) in the Macedonian Army noted that while 
Macedonian and Albanian personnel work together in a professional manner on a 
day-to-day basis and some have formed lasting friendships, many are highly 
suspicious of the ‘other’.100 He noted that it is generally understood by military 
personnel from both communities that sooner or later they will “look upon each 
other through their gun sights”.101 The NCO suggested that for many of his 
colleagues military service was seen as a way to obtain weapons and training for 
the next inevitable war.102 
 
Similar accounts were provided by a former Police Commander. He noted that 
while on the whole police officers from both communities were able to work 
together professionally, there was still a great deal of mistrust between officers 
and that mixed patrols were still tense.103 Although it was rare for an officer to 
actively side with a suspect of the same community against his colleague, there 
were many instances where passive support was provided to suspects of the same 
community while in the field.104 An example witnessed by the interviewee was 
that of two officers, one Macedonian and the other Albanian, in an ethnically 
mixed town. They were confronted by an aggressive ethnic Albanian woman 
who was pulled over for a minor traffic violation. The woman became hysterical, 
claiming that she was being assaulted. Almost immediately an Albanian crowd 
gathered and the Albanian police officer stepped aside, leaving his Macedonian 
colleague to deal with the situation alone. A group of Macedonians quickly came 
to assist the Macedonian police officer. Eventually reinforcements arrived and 
                                              
100 Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO), ARM, Interview with Author, 5 August 2013. 
101 ibid. 
102 The NCO noted high levels of pilfering from military depots by both communities. This was also 
corroborated by former draftees spoken to. 




the incident was brought to an end. While physical violence was limited to 
shoving, the situation could have easily escalated because of a lack of support 
from the Albanian officer, which the interviewee believed was an act of passive 





Parliamentary Veto Powers 
Parliamentary Veto Powers 
Although some argue that the provision of veto powers is necessary to protect 
minority rights, and indeed it is an effective method of doing so, it is also a 
power which can be abused to pursue ethnonationalist and party-political 
interests, creating an arena for conflict and competition rather than forming the 
basis for cooperation. Kelleher has argued that if veto powers are not carefully 
designed and used sparingly (as a last resort) they are able to immobilise the 
political decision-making process, reinforce existing ethnic divisions, and have a 
confrontational and destabilising effect within a power-sharing system.1 
 
Veto powers are generally justified on the basis that proportional representation 
and power-sharing alone may not be sufficient to protect the vital interests of a 
minority because it can be outvoted.2 Therefore, veto powers are intended as a 
guarantee to minority groups that they will be able to defend their vital interests 
if these are threatened.3 However, their intended use does not necessary align 
with their practical implementation and Kelleher has identified the following four 
concerns with vetoes: firstly, the identification of an appropriate veto holder can 
be problematic. Veto powers granted collectively to a number of different ethnic 
groups acting as a single veto bloc may fail their essential functions as each 
ethnic group may have its own vital interests that conflict with the others; 
secondly, if vital interests are defined too narrowly, veto powers again may fail 
to perform their basic function; however, if vital interests are defined too widely, 
veto powers may allow the minority to hold the majority to ransom over a wide 
range of legislative issues and ultimately discredit the power-sharing system; 
                                              
1 S. Kelleher, “Minority Veto Rights in Power Sharing Systems: Lessons from Macedonia, Northern 
Ireland and Belgium”, The Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, 2005, p. 1, www.adalah.org 
(accessed 1 March 2014). 
2 ibid, p. 3. 
3 ibid, pp. 3-4. 
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thirdly, the exercise of a veto can cause deadlock or political crisis that is 
damaging to ethnic relations, particularly if there are no mediation mechanisms 
in place to assist the various groups in finding an acceptable solution; and finally, 
the manipulation of veto powers by opponents of the power-sharing system can 
cause a political crisis in which the veto functions as a weapon in an ethnic 
‘showdown’ with clear winners and losers rather than as a tool for minority 
protection.4 Bieber has largely concurred with the four problems identified by 
Kelleher above and broadly notes that the success of veto rights depends on two 
components: the definition of policy areas where veto rights apply and the 
mediation processes that are activated once a veto is invoked.5 
 
Macedonia lacks the critical elements described above to support its veto system. 
While policy areas in which a veto can be used have been identified through the 
Framework Agreement, the Constitution, and legislation, these are contested and 
Albanian political elites continually attempt to redefine the scope of their veto 
power. In addition, there is no mediation mechanism in place. If a veto is used or 
threatened, the leaderships of the governing Macedonian and Albanian parties are 
left to negotiate an outcome. This has rarely worked in practice and in many 
instances international mediation through US and EU ambassadors or special 
envoys is required to resolve disputes. 
 
Marolov has argued that the Albanian veto in Macedonia favours collectivism as 
opposed to individual rights.6 This veto power presupposes that individuals 
belonging to minority groups will automatically support their representatives 
enforcing a veto, just because they belong to the same ethnic group. This 
undervalues the primacy of the individual as a free and equal citizen and 
indirectly violates their freedom of choice to not support a particular point of 
view that may be prominent among their own ethnic group.  
                                              
4 ibid, pp. 3-6. 
5 F. Bieber, Institutionalizing Ethnicity in the Western Balkans: Managing Change in Deeply Divided 
Societies, European Centre for Minority Issues, Flensburg, 2004, p. 21. 
6 D. Marolov, “Understanding the Ohrid Framework Agreement”, in Ramet, Listhaug and Simkus, Civic 
and Uncivic Values in Macedonia, p. 148. 
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The Badinter Principle 
Under the Framework Agreement minority communities were provided with veto 
powers in relation to a number of constitutional provisions and legislative acts. 
This veto power, known as the Badinter Principle, is effected through a double 
majority system: 
 
a) At the central level, certain constitutional amendments cannot be approved 
without a qualified majority of two-thirds of all votes, within which there 
must be a majority of the votes of representatives from minority 
communities.7 This also applies to legislation with regard to local self-
government and national symbols.8 
b) At the central and municipal levels, legislation affecting culture, language, 
education, personal documents, the use of minority symbols, local 
finances, local elections, the City of Skopje, and the boundaries of 
municipalities,9 must receive a majority of votes, within which there must 
be a majority of the votes of representatives from minority groups.10 
 
The Badinter Principle, developed by Robert Badinter who presided over the 
Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia in 1991, was designed 
to redistribute political power between the Macedonian majority and its minority 
groups. In theory the veto power is held collectively by all the minority groups 
represented in Parliament as a counterweight to the Macedonian majority. In 
practice it is a veto mechanism for the Albanian community to protect its 
constitutional and legislative interests. This is because the vast majority of 
minority representatives in Parliament are Albanians (82 per cent of the total 
                                              
7 The Badinter Principle in this case applies to constitutional provisions dealing with the Preamble, 
language, religion, use of minority symbols and national identity, culture, the Public Attorney, the 
Committee for Inter-Community Relations, the Security Council, the Republican Judicial Council, the 
Constitutional Court, local self-government, and the provisions dealing with constitutional amendments 
themselves, see Framework Agreement, s5.1 and Annex A. 
8 Law on the Committee for Inter-Community Relations, Služben Vesnik na Republika Makedonija, 
No. 150/2007, s11. 
9 Framework Agreement, s5.  The Law on the Committee for Inter-Community Relations identifies 44 
specific legislative acts to which the Badinter Principle applies, see Law on the Committee for Inter-
Community Relations, Služben Vesnik na Republika Makedonija, No. 150/2007, s11. These were agreed 
to by the ruling Macedonian and Albanian parties at the time. 
10 Framework Agreement, s5.2. 
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minority representatives in the 2014-18 Parliament) and the vote of other 
minorities is not required to meet the requirements of enacting a veto. However, 
because the Badinter Principal also applies at the municipal level, other 
minorities, along with the Macedonians where they constitute a local minority, 
can take advantage of it at the municipal level.  
 






Macedonian 90 73.2 
Albanian 27 22.0 
Serb 2 1.6 
Bosnian 1 0.8 
Turk 2 1.6 
Roma 1 0.8 
Total 123 100.0 
Total Minority 33 26.8 
Total Minority Excluding Albanians 6 4.9 
Source: Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia, Members of Parliament 2014-18, [website], 
2016, www.sobranie.mk (accessed 23 May 2016). 
 
Since its implementation the policy areas that are covered by the Badinter 
Principle have been contested. Some of these have arisen from genuine 
differences in interpretation of the Framework Agreement and subsequent 
constitutional and legislative amendments. However, others have arisen from 
political elites attempting to either disregard democratic processes or obtain 
greater powers for the Albanian community. 
 
In 2004 the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) attempted to derail 
the referendum on the revision of municipal boundaries by claiming that the 
referendum itself was subject to a double majority. When this reasoning was 
rejected it proposed that legislative issues that are subject to the Badinter 
Principle should be exempt from referendums11. 
 
                                              
11 K. Neškova, “Badenter stana kako kaučuk”, Nova Makedonija, 14 January 2012, 
www.novamakedonija.com.mk (accessed 17 August 2016). 
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Albanian elites have also attempted to broaden the scope of the veto to include: 
 election of the executive branch of government (2006); 
 the national budget (2010); 
 funding allocated to the ministries for education, culture and local self-
government (2011); 
 the Law for Youth and the selection of members for the State Council for 
Youth (2011); 
 decisions for the conferring of state awards (2011); 
 all parliamentary and municipal council votes (2012).12 
 
Macedonian constitutional experts have dismissed all of these proposals as going 
beyond what was agreed in the Framework Agreement and subsequently codified 
within the Constitution and legislative acts.13 Professor Osman Kadriu, an ethnic 
Albanian constitutional layer, has argued that while the broad policy areas that 
require a double majority have been agreed, the details remain ill-defined. He has 
noted that there are many spheres in law that could potentially impact on 
minority rights and that this needs further consideration so as to reduce 
differences in interpretation of the Framework Agreement and the constitutional 
amendments.14 Law Professor Savo Klimovski (and former president of the 
national assembly) has argued that the biggest issue with the Badinter Principle is 
not its parameters but the absence of democratic political culture among the 
political elites: 
We should not be surprised that the Badinter Principle continuously finds 
itself where it does not belong. The problem is that we have a rule that 
makes opinions more important than the Constitution. That is why these 
four leaders [of the two largest Macedonian and two largest Albanian 
parties] act like tribal chieftains who have usurped the right to make 
decisions and then force these solutions onto us.15 
                                              
12 ibid and S. Stojanovska and V. Donev, “Duhot na Badenter vo Pandorinata kutija na Ustavot”, Nova 
Makedonija, 13 March 2010, www.novamakedonija.com.mk (accessed 17 August 2016). 
13 For example, Professor Karakamiševa-Jovanovska, see Neškova, “Badenter stana kako kaučuk”. 
14 G. Trpkovski, “Pred faktite, i Badenter mora da molči”, Nova Makedonija, 19 October 2015, 





The two largest Macedonian parties have at various times argued that Albanian 
domination over the veto power is untenable and unfairly locks out smaller 
minorities. They have attempted to diminish this domination over the veto power 
by proposing guaranteed Parliamentary seats for non-Albanian minorities.16 
Their motivations are not entirely concerned with minority representation. 
Providing guaranteed Parliamentary seats would allow ruling Macedonian 
political parties to more easily gain a double majority and push through 
controversial legislation as non-Albanian minority representatives generally 
support Macedonian political elites over Albanian representatives. This proposal 
has been supported by the smaller communities that have been effectively locked 
out of utilising the Badinter process.17 Although the Democratic Union for 
Integration (DUI) supports guaranteed seats for the smaller communities, it 
vehemently opposes the idea that these representatives should be part of the 
Badinter process, arguing that the Albanian community would lose its control 
over the veto power.18 This in itself acknowledges that the Badinter Principle is 
not meeting its stated intent of protecting the interests of all minority groups. 
 
Regardless of the motivations of both communities, the Badinter Principle has 
already been grossly misused for political party advantage. For example, after the 
2006 elections the victorious Macedonian party (VMRO-DPMNE) formed a 
coalition government with the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA), its 
ideological equivalent from the Albanian political block.  However, DUI found 
that its loss of executive power that it held from 2002-2006 (in coalition with 
SDSM) was unacceptable for them. DUI argued that because it had obtained the 
largest number of votes among the Albanian parties at the 2006 elections it held a 
mandate to govern on behalf of its community and it should form part of the 
governing coalition. Further, DUI argued that constitutional amendments should 
                                              
16 Anonymous, “SDSM: 10 Pratenicki Mesta za Turci, Srbi, Romi, Bosnjaci i Vlasi”, EReporter, 
15 May 2010, www.ereporter.com.mk (accessed 25 January 2011) and Anonymous, “Nema Pratenici za 
Pomalite Bez Viza od Albancite”, Nova Makedonija, 27 May 2010, http://daily.mk (accessed 
25 January 2011). 
17 Anonymous, “Ahmeti ne go dava Badinter”, Večer, 23 December 2010, http://daily.mk (accessed 
26 January 2011). 
18 ibid.  
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be enacted that would oblige the Macedonian party with the most votes to form a 
coalition with the Albanian party with the most votes. This was rejected by all 
politicians and vehemently opposed by DPA. Given its numbers in Parliament, 
DUI alone was able to block all legislation required to be voted on under the 
Badinter Principle and did so, demanding it be invited to join the governing 
coalition. The DPA leadership was infuriated and demanded that its larger 
Macedonian partner refuse to even consider the matter. For its part, VMRO-
DPMNE was adamant that it would not accept a ‘party of terrorists’ into 
government and claimed that no agreement was possible. 
 
While using the Badinter Principle to create obstructions at the central level, DUI 
ignored its observance at the local level where it held control of municipal 
councils.19 Meanwhile, VMRO-DPMNE was under pressure from its elected 
municipal councillors to force DUI to respect the Badinter Principle at the local 
level. However, its rank and file membership pressured the leadership to resist 
DUI’s demands to join the governing coalition in the national parliament. 
Nevertheless, international pressure was applied by the European Union and 
VMRO-DPMNE agreed to negotiate DUI’s entry into the governing coalition. 
DUI unblocked the legislative impasse it created only after it had secured an 
agreement with the new Prime Minister, Nikola Gruevski, on a number of key 
issues that formed a part of its own political platform.20 Having blackmailed its 
way into government, it also managed to anger DPA into leaving the coalition, 
making DUI the sole governing representative of the Albanian community. 
  
The issues surrounding the Badinter Principle at the national level seem minor 
when compared to its implementation at the municipal level. Most municipal 
councils simply ignore their constitutional and legislative obligations to use the 
double majority voting system when it does not suit the interests of the local 
                                              
19 K. Čangova, “Vo Čair namerno ne go pocituvame Badinter, velat od DUI”, Utrinski Vesnik, 
16 October 2006, http://star.utrinski.com.mk (accessed 26 January 2011). 
20 The infamous ‘Skopje Agreement’ contained five key issues that were agreed. Prime Minister Gruevski 
later denied that any such agreement existed, claiming that the document made public by the leader of 
DUI, Ali Ahmeti, was merely ‘minutes of the meeting’. 
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ethnic majority, regardless of whether they are Macedonians or Albanians.21 
Lyon has noted that in most cases “political deals between the major parties 
concerning sensitive local issues are made behind closed doors and long before 
the issue is debated in municipal councils”.22 
 
This is particularly the case when questions arise over the naming of public 
spaces, such as streets and schools, the conferring of awards, and the construction 
of monuments and memorials.23 Xhabir Derala, an Albanian analyst, believes 
that the Badinter Principle has been repeatedly violated since its inception. He 
argues that the whole concept needs to be revisited, including how it can work at 
the local level, and particularly how the remaining minorities can be included 
because they have been locked out of the voting mechanism.24 Others have 
argued that the Badinter Principle has further weakened political institutions 
because sensitive ethnic issues are now discussed through direct talks between 
party leaders outside of Parliament and its working bodies, and the decision-
making process looks more like blackmail and unprincipled trade-off than a 
consensual and meaningful process of reaching agreement.25 
 
Questions over the definitiveness of the Badinter Principle have also been raised 
and have caused significant tensions. Igor Spirovski, a Macedonian 
Constitutional Court Judge, has reported on the view among many Albanian 
political leaders and legal professionals that any law adopted through the 
Badinter Principle should not be challengeable in the Constitutional Court, either 
on procedural or material grounds, while at the same time Constitutional review 
is welcomed if a law should have been adopted through the Badinter Principle 
and was not.26 Spirovski provided the example of the Law on the Use of 
Community Flags (2005), where amendments to it were passed by Parliament 
                                              
21 M. Jovanoski, “Badenteroviot princip da se prekroi po merka na site?!”, Deutsche Welle, 
5 January 2013, www.dw.com (accessed 17 August 2016) and I. Dimovski, “Lokalnata primena na 
Badenter ne e zadovolitelna”, Dnevnik, 20 May 2013, www.dnevnik.com.mk (accessed 17 August 2016). 
22 Lyon, “Political decentralization”, p. 163. 
23 Jovanoski, “Badenteroviot princip da se prekroi po merka na site?!”. 
24 ibid. 
25 Georgievski, “Separation of Powers in the Republic of Macedonia”, p. 934. 
26 I. Spirovski, “Separation of Powers and Consociational Power Sharing in Republic of Macedonia: 
Developments and Perspectives”, Iustinianus Primus Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1, 2012, p. 11. 
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that would allow the majority community within a municipality to raise a larger 
flag than the flags of other communities and the state flag. The Constitutional 
Court overturned these amendments determining that all community flags would 
remain of equal size and that none could symbolically diminish the importance of 
the state flag.27 The decision was followed by a strong reaction from Albanian 
political parties, the resignation of two Albanian judges (one being the President 
of the Court) and a proposal to either exclude the review of the constitutionality 
of laws adopted through the Badinter Principle or that the Court should decide on 
the constitutionality of such laws through its own Badinter Principle 
mechanism.28  
 
Spirovski has noted that the Venice Commission, in its opinion CDL-AD (2005) 
039, strongly opposed such proposals finding that a veto right for judges would 
run counter to European standards by introducing a political element to decision-
making where the law should act as its sole guidance.29 Such reactions and 
proposals are certainly concerning, considering that the neutrality of the courts 
and judges would come into question because ethnonationalist interests permeate 
society and its legal and political institutions. 
 
The Badinter Principle also has the potential to cause serious tensions between 
Macedonians and Albanians in a number of other areas. One of these is the laws 
concerning state symbols, including the flag, national emblem and national 
anthem. In Macedonia these are highly sensitive issues, particularly for the 
Macedonians whose very identity is being attacked and denied by its neighbours. 
For example, in 1995 the then Macedonian Government capitulated to a Greek 
demand that it change its national flag (among other demands), which had been 
freely chosen by the Macedonian people. To this day the event has left deep 
psychological scars for the Macedonian people, in addition to the very real 
violation of their national sovereignty and basic human rights to freedom of 
expression. Bearing this in mind, it is not difficult to see the tensions surrounding 






the national emblem, which has remained unchanged since the end of the Cold 
War, with the exception of the removal of the ‘red star’. For the past two and a 
half decades Macedonians and Albanians have been unable to agree on a new 
coat-of-arms. Although the two largest Macedonian political parties disagree on 
the exact symbol that could replace the current emblem, anecdotal data reveal 
that many Macedonians see the stylized double-tailed gold lion on a red shield as 
the ‘true’ Macedonian coat-of-arms, dating back to at least the 16th century, and 
possibly the 14th century.30 Albanians, on the other hand, argue that it is a 
Macedonian symbol unrepresentative of the Albanian community. Now that any 
new symbol requires passage through the Badinter Principle the replacement of a 
symbol that neither community associates with seems like an impossible task, 
while Macedonia remains one of only two former European eastern-bloc states 
(along with Belarus) that still has its socialist emblem. 
 
There is also criticism that the Badinter Principle places “undue emphasis on 
ethnicity and thereby runs counter to the aim of transforming Macedonia into a 
civil, non-ethnically based society”.31 Jones has identified two conceptions of 
group rights – collective group rights and corporate group rights.32 According to 
him, the collective conception of group rights argues that moral value is only 
ascribed to individuals and that group rights arise when the joint interest of a 
number of individuals justifies the imposition of duties upon others, while the 
corporate conception of group rights ascribes moral value to the group itself, 
conceived as a single, integral entity.33 “Morally, the group might be said to 
constitute a right-bearing ‘individual’. The right is not held jointly be the several 
individuals who make up the group, but by the group as a unitary entity: the right 
is ‘its’ right rather than ‘their’ right”.34 
 
                                              
30 The Fojnica Armorial from 1340 shows this symbol as representing Macedonia; however, its date is 
disputed. A later example is from the Korenić-Neorić Armorial from 1595. 
31 J. Engström, “Multi-ethnicity or Bi-nationalism? The Framework Agreement and the Future of the 
Macedonian State”, Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, Iss. 1, 2002, p. 16. 
32 P. Jones, “Human Rights, Group Rights and Peoples’ Rights”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 1, 
1999, pp. 80-107. 
33 ibid, pp. 84 and 86. 
34 ibid, p. 86. 
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Jones considers these two conceptions of group rights in relation to the right of a 
nation or a people to self-determination. He argues that if this right is a corporate 
right, moral value would be ascribed to the nation conceived as a corporate entity 
and not the individuals who make up the nation.35 If the right is a collective right, 
then it would be held by each individual jointly with his fellow nationals.36 The 
questions that arise are: how can corporate entities be ascribed moral value, 
which is a human characteristic; and how is the ascription of moral value to 
corporate entities reconciled with human rights, democratic governance and the 
liberal notion of the primacy of the individual? 
 
The veto power provided under the Badinter Principle is a corporate right in that 
it is ascribed to the ethnonational community as a corporate entity and is 
exercised on its behalf (regardless of diverging views within the community). 
One could also argue that the corporatist nature of the Badinter Principle itself 
violates individual rights by making the assumption that each individual is 
supportive of the view(s) espoused by the political party that controls the veto 
power. Further, as in the example provided above, the Badinter Principle was 
used in a manner by DUI that was not representative of the Albanian community 
as a whole, particularly those that voted for other Albanian political parties that 
opposed DUI’s use of the veto power.  
 
Many Macedonians see it as fundamentally undemocratic and claim that it is 
xenophobic. They consider the fact that the Albanian community is able to block 
legislation that is of fundamental importance pertaining to their identity and 
culture when they constitute two-thirds of the population as democratically 
indefensible. Many also see xenophobic undertones in the Badinter Principle 
because ultimately one Albanian vote is equal to nearly three Macedonian votes 
simply because of their ethnicity. One final point in relation to the Badinter 
Principle is that the Albanian community, in general, insists that it does not go 
far enough. As noted previously, most Albanian leaders promote a consensus 
                                              




model for Macedonia in which both communities would share power equally, 
implying that either could veto any legislative initiative. DPA and the National 
Democratic Revival (NDR) have consistently called for new constitutional 
amendments to supersede the Framework Agreement and establish a bi-national 








Language in Macedonia is highly politicised and considered as a marker of 
identity and group loyalty rather than a skill that can and should be utilised to 
pursue career and social objectives. There are relatively few occasions where 
language acquisition is upheld as an advantage or virtue; rather it is perceived in 
terms of differentiation and separation.1 Forcing others to learn your language 
can be seen as a weapon used to demonstrate dominance and ownership in a 
particular region. While the view that one should not learn other languages 
spoken within Macedonia is much more prevalent among Macedonians (69 per 
cent), a similar trend is rising among Albanians (11 per cent opposed learning 
another language spoken in Macedonia in 1995, while following the Framework 
Agreement this figure rose to 39 per cent).2 
 
Duncan has noted that languages are inextricably linked to ethnic identities,3 
particularly in Macedonia. Nation-building projects in this part of the world have 
resulted in linguistic nationalism, which often results in the restriction of 
linguistic rights for minorities.4 Duncan has argued that these policies can 
backfire when minority groups defensively counter the nation-building project 
and emphasise the necessity of their own language.5 He has also contended that 
even when language is not the immediate issue in a conflict it takes on a highly 
symbolic role.6  
                                              
1 Reka, “The Ohrid Agreement”, p. 65. Conversations with Macedonians during fieldwork revealed that a 
common perception among Macedonians seems to be that the only ‘virtue’ in learning Albanian is to 
‘understand the enemy’. 
2 Tasevska Remenski, Albancite i Makedoncite, p. 322. 
3 D. Duncan, “Language policy, ethnic conflict, and conflict resolution: Albanian in the former 
Yugoslavia”, Language Policy, Vol. 15, Iss. 4, 2016, p. 455. 
4 ibid, pp. 456-457. 
5 ibid, p. 457. 
6 ibid, p. 455. 
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Albanian as an Official Language of Administration 
Under Yugoslav rule, Macedonia had a largely pluralistic language policy 
embedded in both the federal and republican constitutions of 1974, which offered 
strong legal protections in terms of maintenance and usage for the various 
languages of different ethnic groups in the country.7 However, by 1981 the re-
emergence of nationalist forces and the crisis of the Yugoslav ideology of 
‘brotherhood and unity’ saw a move away from Macedonia’s previously 
pluralistic policies, which in any case were more a creation of Belgrade than 
Skopje. The Macedonian Government was being challenged by Albanian 
demands for greater cultural and language rights, as well as political autonomy in 
the regions where they were in a majority.8 Macedonia’s response was to shift to 
what Petruševska has referred to as ‘centrist’ policies, which she defines as 
aimed at “maintaining the power position of the dominant ethno-linguistic group 
by means of excluding the languages of the others from public domains”.9 This 
was justified as necessary to halt Albanian nationalism and separatism and to 
ensure the territorial unity of the state.10 
 
With independence, Macedonia proclaimed the Macedonian language (along 
with the Macedonian Cyrillic script) as the official language under the 1991 
Constitution. Albanians saw this as a restriction of their cultural and linguistic 
rights and a threat to the future use of Albanian in the country. Throughout the 
1990s, Albanian leaders demanded the Albanian language be recognised as an 
official language of administration, equal to Macedonian. This was in line with 
their view that the Albanian community should be a co-constitutive nation.  
Albanian language demands were far too radical for the Macedonian community 
and its political representatives. They believed that language rights at the local 
level were reasonable and sufficient to enable the Albanian community to 
effectively communicate with the state. On the other hand, Macedonians consider 
the demands around language with suspicion, interpreting them as disloyalty and 
                                              
7 Petruševska, “Language Policy and Nationalism in the Republic of Macedonia”, pp. 59-60. 
8 ibid, p. 60. 
9 ibid, pp. 55 and 61. 
10 ibid, pp. 61-62. 
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an assault on the identity and security of the state. This is largely due to the 
sensitivities around Macedonian identity and the challenge it faces from Greece 
and Bulgaria. Neither the Greek nor Bulgarian governments accept the existence 
of a Macedonian identity. In line with this policy, the Macedonian language is 
not officially recognised in either country. The Bulgarian Government claims 
that it is a Bulgarian dialect, while the Greek Government prohibits its use 
entirely. 
 
Under the 1991 Constitution minority languages were official in municipalities 
where a minority constituted a local majority.11 The same applied to 
municipalities where minorities were not a local majority but constituted a 
significant proportion of the local population, which was never defined and 
varied in practice.12 Further, members of minority groups had a right to education 
in their own language throughout primary and secondary school but were also 
obligated to learn Macedonian.13 Legislation also provided for state-funded 
Albanian-language television and radio programmes, court proceedings and other 
institutional communication in Albanian, and public signs. 
 
Under the Framework Agreement minority group languages are official, in 
addition to the Macedonian language, at both national and municipal level if they 
are spoken by 20 per cent of residents at their respective levels of government.14 
In addition, local authorities may decide to make a minority language official 
even if the 20 per cent threshold is not met. The Framework Agreement also 
stipulates that primary and secondary education will be provided in the students’ 
own language, while state funding will be provided for tertiary education in the 
languages spoken by at least 20 per cent of the national population.  
 
                                              
11 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia 1991, art. 7. 
12 ibid. 
13 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia 1991, art. 48. 
14 Macedonian remains the only official language for international relations and use in the armed forces, 
see Framework Agreement, s6. 
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Belamarić has argued that the Framework Agreement created a three-tiered 
hierarchy of languages: 
1. Macedonian as the official language of administration; 
2. Languages spoken by at least 20 per cent of the population (in practice, 
only Albanian meets this criterion); and 
3. Languages spoken by less than 20 per cent of the population.15 
 
Belamarić argues that the manner in which language rights are recognised under 
the Macedonian Constitution is one of its peculiarities (similar to the arguments 
put forward by Karakamiševa-Jovanovska). Language rights are not based on 
ethnicity or whether it is autochthonous  to any particular area, but rather a crude 
percentage that was specifically chosen to provide greater rights for the Albanian 
community (and no other community) without having to explicitly name the 
Albanians within the Constitution.16 Both the Macedonian and Albanian 
communities view the increased status of the Albanian language (even though it 
is not explicitly named) as further confirmation of the Albanian community’s 
elevated constitutive status,17 and this is another reason it is opposed by many 
Macedonians. 
 
Since 2001, besides Macedonian (which is official in every municipality), a 
number of other community languages are in official use at the local level. These 
include Albanian in 28 municipalities, Turkish in four municipalities, and 
Serbian and Romani in one municipality each.18 Lyon notes that additional 
resources to fund the associated costs of formally recognising other languages at 
the local level (such as the salaries of translators and interpreters) are not 
provided by the Macedonian Government.19 As a result, there is no guarantee that 
a formally recognised community language will become a working language in 
practice.20 
                                              
15 B. Belamarić, “Attempting to Resolve an Ethnic Conflict: The Language of the 2001 Macedonian 
Constitution”, Southeast European Politics, Vol. IV, No. 1, 2003, pp. 34-35. 
16 ibid. 
17 ibid, p. 36. 
18 Ministry for Local Self-Government, [website], 2016, www.mls.gov.mk (accessed 23 August 2016). 





Albanian elites continue to protest that the Albanian language is not becoming as 
pervasive as quickly as it had hoped it would, though this is mostly due to a lack 
of resources, particularly at the municipal level. Further, they claim that the Law 
on the Use of Languages (2008) has limited what was agreed to in the 
Framework Agreement and subsequent constitutional amendments. However, the 
Law on the Use of Languages (2008) has in fact expanded the use of Albanian 
beyond what was agreed to in the Framework Agreement and codified in the 
Constitution. For example, the Framework Agreement and the Constitution 
provide for the use of Albanian in education, parliament, local self-government, 
criminal and civil judicial proceedings, official personal documentation and the 
central government’s communication with individuals.21 In addition, the Law on 
the Use of Languages (2008) also provides language rights at the national level 
such as the right to communicate with state-owned firms in Albanian and strict 
radio and television content quotas in minority languages. At the local level, 
where a community language other than Macedonian is official, the law allows 
for its use in electoral commissions, candidate lists and ballot papers, state 
libraries, governance and financial information of private firms, and the naming 
of local infrastructure such as streets, squares, bridges, and other structures.22 
 
Language has been politicised beyond what could be reasonably expected in 
debates over its use in private and public communication. One example of this is 
the ‘signage wars’. These incidents relate to the language in which public signs 
are written, including road signs, signs in front of public buildings, and municipal 
boundary signs. The language(s) in which these signs are written are hotly 
disputed to the point where the two communities at times cannot even agree on 
the order in which the languages appear. This has led to instances in which signs 
are vandalised and in some cases where the two parties simply agree not to erect 
a sign at all. In one example, the municipality of Vevčani (which is populated 
solely by Macedonians) removed bilingual road signs from its portion of a 
                                              
21 Framework Agreement and Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia 1991, Amendment 5.  
22 Law on the Use of Minority Languages, Služben Vesnik na Republika Makedonija, No. 101/2008. 
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regional road that leads into the majority-Albanian municipality of Struga and 
replaced them with Macedonian-only signs.23 The Albanian Mayor of Struga, 
Ziadin Sela, threatened to knock down the entrance gate to Vevčani and an 
adjoining church on the boundary of the two municipalities in retaliation.24  
 
The conflict over the status of the Albanian language at the national level 
continues, with renewed efforts by the Albanian community to have it recognised 
as an official language of administration in every municipality and at the national 
level (including the police and military). Further, Albanian political 
representatives are demanding that the Constitution be amended to explicitly 
name the Albanian language as a second official language of administration, 
rather than relying on the formula in the Framework Agreement that refers to any 
language spoken by at least 20 per cent of the population. In this way, Albanian 
representatives argue, Albanian will permanently remain an official language 
regardless of any negative demographic changes.25 Some Albanian commentators 
have even suggested that it be mandatory for Macedonian children to learn 
Albanian in order to develop a fully bilingual society.26 Needless to say, these 
ideas are anathema to many Macedonians. 
 
                                              
23 S. Marušić, “Bilingual Signs Cause Ethic Jitters in Macedonia”, Balkan Insight, 25 October 2013, 
www.balkaninsight.com (accessed 27 October 2013). 
24 ibid. Previously Sela, who was a Member of Parliament before becoming the Mayor of Struga, had 
threatened to burn down the national assembly if it failed to stop the passage of a controversial army bill 
that his party (DPA) opposed. 
25 For example, see the proposed amendments to the Law on the Use of Languages (2008) by DPA in 
Macedonian Parliamentary Debates, 13th Continuation of the 16th Session of the Parliament of the 
Republic of Macedonia, 13 January 2012. 
26 For example, see F. Rustemi et al, “Perceptions about the Albanian Language, Culture and Education 
10 Years After of the OFA” in B. Reka (ed.), Ten Years from the Ohrid Framework Agreement, South 
East European University, Tetovo, 2011, p. 212. 
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It is important to specify the current language regulations in Macedonia. 
According to the Law on the Use of Minority Languages (2008), those languages 
that are spoken by at least 20 per cent of the total population will be used in the 
following instances:  
 Macedonian Parliament; 
 Communication between citizens and all central government ministries, 
institutions and the judiciary; 
 Election-related material; 
 Personal/identity documents; 
 In the application of police powers; 
 Broadcasting and infrastructure; 
 Local Government; 
 Taxation and company governance; and 
 Education.27 
  
Many Macedonians argue that towns such as Struga, Kičevo, Gostivar and 
Tetovo are becoming linguistically Albanianised in that municipal councils have 
spent a great deal of resources to ensure that the Albanian language replaces 
Macedonian as the sole official language. For example, prior to the Framework 
Agreement, public signs were generally in Albanian, Macedonian and English, 
while many are now beginning to appear only in Albanian and English. Further, 
municipal communication with Macedonian individuals has slowly shifted from 
being conducted in Macedonian, to numerous documents such as letters and 
invoices being printed in Macedonian and Albanian, and now with reported 
instances of documents being provided in Albanian only.28 This is causing 
tension with Macedonian communities in the west of the country, which 
condemn it as a gradual takeover of the state by the Albanian community and 
view it as a betrayal by their own government which is accused of being 
indifferent to the affairs of what are considered ‘Albanian municipalities’. 
 
                                              
27 Law on the Use of Minority Languages, Služben Vesnik na Republika Makedonija, No. 101/2008. 
28 Conversations with Macedonian residents in Struga and Gostivar, July and August 2013. 
208 
 
Albanian in Education 
As noted above, Macedonian language policy was much more pluralistic under 
Yugoslav rule. During the 1950s, for example, Albanian students studied in 
Albanian and learnt Macedonian only three hours per week from the third to 
eighth grades.29 The 1974 Macedonian Constitution guaranteed minorities 
education in their own languages.30 Legislative Acts ensured the participation of 
ethnic minorities in shaping educational institutions and curriculum. For 
example, teachers in schools and classes that used minority languages had to be 
competent in those languages, school registers were kept in the relevant minority 
languages, and student reports were issued in both Macedonian and the relevant 
minority language.31 Student enrolments in Albanian-language schools increased 
from 28,619 (1950-51) to 85,430 (1980-81).32 
 
The post-war pluralism came to an end by the early 1980s. Laws on secondary 
education restricted the formation of Albanian-language classes in cases where it 
was not possible to obtain a minimum of 30 students and adequately trained 
staff.33 A 1989 revision of the law then allowed all subjects in the higher grades 
of primary education to be taught by teachers not competent in Albanian, despite 
the fact they were teaching in Albanian-language schools and classes.34 These 
legislative changes had the effect of decreasing both the number of classes 
available in Albanian and the number of students enrolled in Albanian-language 
classes.35 Table 10 below shows that the number of students enrolled in 
Albanian-language schools in 2014-15 has returned to 1980-81 levels; however, 
given the growth of the Albanian population over the past 35 years much higher 
enrolment numbers would be expected.  
 
                                              
29 A. Wachtel, Making a nation, breaking a nation: Literature and cultural politics in Yugoslavia, 
Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1998, p. 180. 
30 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia 1974, art. 178-179. 
31 Petruševska, “Language Policy and Nationalism in the Republic of Macedonia”, p. 60. 
32 V. Ortakovski, “Interethnic Relations and Minorities in the Republic of Macedonia”, Southeast 
European Politics, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2001, p. 30. 
33 Petruševska, “Language Policy and Nationalism in the Republic of Macedonia”, p. 62. 
34 ibid. 
35 Ortakovski, “Interethnic Relations and Minorities in the Republic of Macedonia”, p. 30. 
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Table 10. Schools by Language of Instruction, 2014-15 
Language of Instruction Schools Students Teachers 
Macedonian             827           175,574           16,211  
Albanian             325             84,916             7,589  
Turkish               75               7,140                 845  
Serbian               19               2,519                 364  
Total 1,107          270,149           25,009  
Source: State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia, Primary and Secondary Schools 
2014-15, 2016, www.stat.gov.mk (accessed 15 June 2016). 
Note: The total number of the schools according to the language of instruction does not 
correspond with the total number of schools in the final row because where a school offers 
bilingual or trilingual instruction it is counted under each language. 
 
Under the current arrangements Albanian school children are not required to 
learn Macedonian until the fourth grade. In January 2010 the Macedonian 
Government proposed reforms in which Albanian children would begin learning 
Macedonian from the first grade. The Albanian reaction was aggressive, with 
threats from the major Albanian political parties and the association representing 
former veterans of the National Liberation Army (NLA).36 Teuta Arifi, Vice-
President of the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), claimed that the 
government simply wanted to “demonstrate power, to show which language is 
first and which is second or third”.37 She also claimed that a policy of making 
Albanian children learn Macedonian from the first grade would lead to 
disintegration and not integration,38 a nonsensical but often repeated claim. 
Nevertheless, her comments are characteristic of Albanian views and their 
growing aversion to learning the Macedonian language. A report by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) disagrees with Arifi’s position, 
noting that: 
Teaching in the mother-tongue is generally recognised as a good approach 
for the inclusion of minorities in the educational system…however 
minority language as language of instruction can have its 
challenges…minority-language teaching also carries a risk of enclosure of 
                                              
36 For example, Fazli Veliu (President of the NLA Veteran’s Association, Parliamentary Member for 
DUI, and uncle of the DUI President, Ali Ahmeti) warned the Macedonian Prime Minister that he would 
suffer the same fate as the late President of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, see Anonymous, “Veliu: 
Gruevski ke završi kako Milošević”, Večer, 26 January 2010, http://daily.mk (accessed 30 January 2011). 
37 S. Jovanovska, “Macedonia Wrestles with School Language Dispute”, EU Observer, 3 February 2010, 




the ethnic minority within its own cultural codes and values if perceived 
as an alternative to proficiency in the majority language. This is why if it 
is to be indeed beneficial for the children, teaching in the minority 
language should be an intrinsic part of a system of bilingual education [so 
that] the minority ethnic group can pursue options for education that 
allows it to protect its cultural heritage, while preparing it to participate in 
the broader society… Minority-language teaching therefore cannot be an 
alternative but should be complementary to majority-language 
proficiency. 
 
There is in fact a growing body of Albanian school pupils not learning the 
Macedonian language and even resenting having to study the language of the 
‘other’, which is perceived as “an act of weakness of surrendering to the 
‘stronger’ group and yielding to the imposition of its will and culture”.39 It is 
likely that this trend is also influenced by the newly acquired municipal powers 
under the Framework Agreement where local authorities have more flexibility in 
developing their own curriculum. For example, Vetterlein has reported that some 
Albanian teachers speak only between one and four hours per week in 
Macedonian to their students,40 hardly enough for students to gain proficiency. 
This is corroborated by a USAID fact finding mission, which found that schools 
dominated by minority students study Macedonian only for up to three hours per 
week.41 The USAID report notes that during the 1990s Macedonians would 
deliver Macedonian language instruction in minority schools, however, the 
government later changed policy and allowed minority teachers to provide 
instruction in Macedonian. As a result, the team found that there is a sub-
standard proficiency in Macedonian among many Albanians,42 most likely due to 
the unwillingness of teachers and local authorities to use Macedonian as a 
language of instruction. 
 
                                              
39 M. Najcevska, “Bilingualism in a Kumanovo Kindergarten” in N. Dimitrijevic, Managing Multiethnic 
Local Communities in the Countries of Former Yugoslavia, LGI Books, Budapest, 2000, p. 95. 
40 Vetterlein, “The Influence of the Ohrid Framework Agreement on the Educational Policy of the 
Republic of Macedonia”, fn. 55. 
41 J. Van Fleet et al, “Macedonia: Assistance to Higher, Minority and Bilingual Education”, US Agency 




Most external actors such as the EU, OSCE, and the US have stressed that 
instruction in Macedonian in non-majority community areas should start as early 
as  possible with the goal that all citizens speak Macedonian fluently upon 
completion of their studies.43 While Macedonians agree with this point, they are 
opposed to suggestions from the same international organisations that 
Macedonian students should learn Albanian – at least in areas where Albanians 
are a majority. It is interesting to note that while most Macedonians dislike the 
idea of learning Albanian, many have expressed regret for not doing so when 
presented with the opportunity while they were younger.44 However, these 
sentiments were more tactical in nature than a willingness to embrace 
bilingualism. The expressed purpose for knowing Albanian was to understand the 
‘enemy’ and not be caught off guard in crisis situations. 
 
The lack of local resources and capabilities to deliver Albanian-language 
education has also contributed to increased tensions. There have been instances 
of Albanian parents complaining that their children either do not have access to 
education in Albanian or do not have as much access as they would like.45 Some 
of these issues have arisen because of a lack of resources at the local level and 
Koneska has argued that instances such as these often poison ethnic relations.46 
 
Tertiary education is also a point of contention. Under the former Yugoslavia, the 
Albanian community was able to access higher education in their own language 
through Kosovo’s Prishtina University. When Prishtina University was closed 
down by the Milošević regime in 1991 the Albanian community in Macedonia 
had access only to primary and secondary education in Albanian. The demand for 
tertiary education in Albanian ran high during the early years of independence 
and grew into a significant nationalist cause. In 1994 a number of Albanian 
academics established the Tetovo University in north-western Macedonia. The 
Macedonian Government reacted by declaring the university illegal and ordered 
                                              
43 Jovanovska, “Macedonia Wrestles with School Language Dispute”. 
44 These views were expressed in conversations with the author during fieldwork. 
45 C. Koneska, “Vetoes, Ethnic Bidding, Decentralisation: Post-Conflict Education in Macedonia”, 




police to raid the institution, destroy the building, confiscate its equipment and 
arrest several of its administrators. One Albanian died in the clashes that 
followed between Albanian protesters and police.47 The key fear of an Albanian-
language university was that it would act as the basis of a parallel system similar 
to the role played by Prishtina University and something that was later supported 
by some Albanian leaders.  
 
In order to reintegrate Albanian students into existing tertiary institutions the 
government reintroduced (after previously prohibiting) Albanian-language 
classes into the Pedagogy Department at Skopje University and established 
ethnic quotas for the then two state universities in Skopje and Bitola. While 
Albanians saw this as tokenistic, international organisations report that access to 
higher education for Albanians and other minorities was more than fair and that 
actual practices on admissions provided substantial advantages to them.48 
Opposition to this move was strong amongst Macedonian students and 
academics.49 In early 1997 Macedonian students demonstrated in Skopje daily 
for two months and expressed general anti-Albanian and anti-government 
sentiments. These protests are well-remembered for their taunting and extremist 
slogans such as ‘Albanians to the Gas Chambers’.50 The tensions led to sporadic 
and random acts of violence against Albanians, including violent confrontations 
between Macedonians and Albanians at public events, and particularly between 
football ultras. 
 
The Tetovo University very quickly became a symbol of Albanian resistance to 
the Macedonian state and a hotbed of Albanian ethnonationalism. The then 
President of the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA), Arben Xhaferi, 
advocated a parallel system similar to that in Kosovo to break central control and 
believed that the related political causes of the Tetovo University and the 
Albanian language where the instruments through which to achieve this.51 
                                              
47 International Crisis Group, The Albanian Question in Macedonia, p. 5. 
48 Van Fleet et al, Macedonia, p. 12. 
49 Reka, “The Ohrid Agreement”, p. 63. 
50 International Crisis Group, Macedonia Report: The Politics of Ethnicity and Conflict, p. 11. 
51 International Crisis Group, The Albanian Question in Macedonia, p. 5. 
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Macedonians largely saw Tetovo University and the call for tertiary education in 
Albanian as further evidence of the separatist aspirations of the Albanian 
community.  
 
Despite its best efforts, the Macedonian Government was unable to stop Tetovo 
University from functioning and eventually chose to ignore it.52 However, 
without external recognition qualifications awarded by the university were 
useless. Their quality was highly questionable and even among Albanians Tetovo 
University was perceived as being of low quality.53 Many of the Albanians that 
studied there did so to demonstrate their nationalist credentials within the 
community. A degree from Tetovo University demonstrated separateness from 
Macedonian society and functioned as a form of resistance to the state. It was 
also a convincing demonstration of personal sacrifice to the Albanian cause 
because any qualifications awarded by Tetovo University were useless within 
Macedonia and one’s employment prospects would be unpromising. 
 
In 1998, the governing coalition (VMRO-DPMNE and DPA) reached a 
compromise with the assistance of the High Commissioner of the Organisation 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Max van der Stoel, whereby a 
new private university, the Southeast European University (SEEU), would be 
established in Tetovo with classes in English, Macedonian, and Albanian. The 
university was to be funded by the international community and tuition fees. 
While the Albanian community at first argued that they were still treated as 
second class citizens because the state paid for tertiary tuition in Macedonian-
language universities,54 the Framework Agreement ensured that the SEEU was 
provided with state funding from 2004 (while remaining a private institution).55 
Although stringently opposed by VMRO-DPMNE (which was then in 
opposition), Tetovo University was later reconstituted as a public university by 
an Act of Parliament and renamed the State University of Tetovo (SUT). 
                                              
52 International Crisis Group, Macedonia’s Ethnic Albanians, p. 19. 
53 Van Fleet et al, p. 12. 




Vetterlein has argued that SUT was legalised not because demand was high 
enough for a second Albanian-language university, but because the SEEU was 
established by the governing coalition of which DPA was a part. The new 
Albanian governing coalition partner, DUI, also considered that it needed a win 
on the education front as the university issue was a core, long-running demand.56 
The SEEU is considered to be politically aligned to DPA, which uses the 
university to reward its loyal followers and from which it draws its recruits.57 
DUI uses the SUT largely for the same purposes.58 
 
The two communities essentially attend rival universities, where the vast 
majority of Albanians study at the private SEEU (Tetovo) or the State University 
of Tetovo and Macedonians generally attend various other state and private 
universities, including the University of Saints Cyril and Methodius (Skopje), St. 
Clement of Ohrid University (Bitola) and Goce Delčev University (Štip). There 
are some smaller private universities such as the International University of 
Struga and FON University where the student body has a greater ethnonational 
mix. Segregation along linguistic lines, which began in primary and secondary 
education, has found its way into the tertiary system and the views of the wider 
community have only become further polarised. For example, research conducted 
by Tasevska Remenski shows that the vast majority of Macedonians and 
Albanians are diametrically opposed on the question of whether there should 
even be an Albanian-language university.59  
 
*   *   * 
 
The constitutional status of the Albanian community is unlikely to have reached 
a final settlement. The current state reached through the Framework Agreement, 
and successive constitutional and legislative amendments, has placated relatively 
                                              
56 Vetterlein, The Influence of the Ohrid Framework Agreement on the Educational Policy of the Republic 
of Macedonia, p. 13. 
57 ibid, p. 14. 
58 ibid. 
59 Eighty-one per cent of Macedonians are opposed to the idea, while 96 per cent of Albanians are in 
favour, see Tasevska Remenski, Albancite i Makedoncite, p. 315. 
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few across the two communities. Outside of a narrow circle of politicians, 
ideologues, and academics the Macedonian and Albanian communities have been 
calling for change since the new Preamble’s inception. Both communities are 
seeking opposing solutions, while the Albanians have been more assertive in 
their demands. 
 
The results of decentralisation and the revision of municipal boundaries over the 
past 12 years have been viewed by Macedonians, in general, as an exercise in 
carving out territory where Albanians would comprise a majority.60 This is 
largely seen among Macedonians as a betrayal by their own political elite that 
will eventually lead to a Kosovo-style scenario where Albanians will have a 
defined territorial unit with administrative and institutional structures that they 
can use to secede from the Macedonian state.61  
 
On the other hand, some Albanians hold the view that the decentralisation 
process did not go far enough and that further power needs to be devolved to the 
local level.62 It seems that even though the Framework Agreement explicitly 
rejected territorial solutions for ethnic conflict as one of its basic principles, 
decentralisation has effectively accomplished just that. Municipal boundaries 
were revised to allow the greatest number of Albanians possible to take 
advantage of the new powers obtained through the Framework Agreement. 
However, this resulted in municipalities becoming more ethnically homogeneous 
and Macedonians and Albanians more segregated along ethnic lines. Under the 
Framework Agreement decentralisation has become a zero-sum game between 
the two communities who compete for local political power and control over 
local resources. But even more than that, it has become a struggle over the ethno-
religious identity of the municipalities themselves – are they Macedonian or 
Albanian? Christian or Islamic? Finally, the practice among Macedonian and 
                                              
60 Ilievski and Taleski, “Was the EU’s Role in Conflict Management in Macedonia a Success?”, p. 361-
62. 
61 According to Brunnbauer, many Macedonians fear that the Albanians, “once in control of local 
governments with more powers, [will] start to sever the links to the central government, eventually 
pulling away from the Macedonian state”, see Brunnbauer, “The Implementation of the Ohrid 
Agreement”, p. 17. 
62 Engström, “Multi-ethnicity or Bi-nationalism?”, p. 17. 
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Albanian national elites of not interfering in each other’s municipalities where 
they constitute a local majority ensures that Macedonia functions as two separate 
political and administrative units.   
 
The People-Centred Analysis report highlights the tension that proportional 
employment has created, stating that “it is very dangerous when minorities are 
discontented, but it is even more dangerous when the majority is discontented”.63 
The report notes that dissatisfaction among Macedonians stems from several 
sources, including the loss of privileged status in the public sector, reforms 
within the public sector where many Macedonians continue to work (28 per 
cent), and the economic crisis in Europe.64 In addition, the retrenchment of many 
Macedonians from the public sector to make room for members of minority 
communities is another source of frustration.65 In implementing proportional 
employment in public entities through a non-transparent and fiscally 
unsustainable manner, Macedonian and Albanian political elites have introduced 
another element of zero-sum game, and because livelihoods are at stake the issue 
has become personal in addition to being a matter of ethnic solidarity. The 
People-Centred Analysis report concludes that given such a high level of 
dissatisfaction the Macedonian community can easily become radicalised.66 
 
The Badinter Principle has divided the Macedonian and Albanian communities 
on a number of levels. Albanians see it as a partial equaliser to the Macedonian 
community not only helping to ensure that their interests are protected but 
increasing their power and influence over the state. The misuse of the veto 
power, however, has also caused intra-Albanian conflict between the supporters 
of the major Albanian parties, DUI and DPA. The power struggle over which of 
the two is the legitimate representative of the Albanian community often turns 
violent with beatings, damage to private property, and shootings. 
                                              
63 Bartlett, People-Centred Analysis, p. 63. 
64 ibid. 
65 For example, in July 2003 600 retrenched public sector employees clashed with police in front of 
Parliament, angered in part by the suggestion of an Albanian parliamentarian that the retrenchments were 
positive because they would leave Albanians as a higher proportion of the public sector, see International 
Crisis Group, Macedonia: No Room for Complacency, p. 11. 




On the other side, Macedonians see the Badinter Principle as an undemocratic 
mechanism designed to undermine the Macedonian nation and its proper position 
within the state. The fact that it has not only been used to block legislation 
related to fundamental cultural issues for Macedonians but also to force through 
legislation which is largely seen as anti-Macedonian has many Macedonians, 
rightly or wrongly, comparing it to apartheid rule. At the local level the 
Macedonian experience has been mixed. There are cases in which Macedonians 
(as a local minority) have successfully used the veto power to protect their 
interests. However, there are many more instances where the Badinter Principle 
has been ignored by Albanian-dominated municipal councils. The Badinter 
Principle will continue to act as a conduit for conflict in the future because there 
is a substantial legislative backlog, which has been deferred due to the difficulties 
in navigating the veto power.  
 
Language in Macedonia has become highly politicised with many refusing to 
learn the language of the ‘other’ and language itself is being used as a political 
tool to dominate or demonstrate power. Macedonians generally feel that they 
have been excessively generous with their provision of language rights to the 
Albanian community. Albanians, on the other hand, are continuing to push for 
full equality for Albanian. This is seen by many Macedonians as an attempt to 
‘Albanianise’ the state. Albanians, given their co-constitutive nation status, 
consider it as a natural extension of their newly acquired position and status 
within the state. With the establishment of two Albanian-language universities, 
the segregation within primary and secondary schools is now endemic to tertiary 
education. Macedonians and Albanians are now capable of maturing into 
adulthood without ever having spent any substantial amount of time with 
members of the other community. The effect this will have on integration for the 
Albanian community into wider society will be disastrous. 
 
Macedonians and Albanians hold opposing views in relation to claimed rights. 
Compounding this is the sheer number of rights claims over which the two 
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communities oppose each other. In light of this, it is difficult to foresee a 
sustainable resolution to these disputes as there are multiple junctures that could 










Nominally, Macedonia is in transition from a totalitarian regime under Tito’s 
Yugoslavia towards a liberal democratic political system. However, while there 
was considerable liberalisation (at least in terms of political plurality) during the 
first few years of independence, its new institutions remain weak and ineffective, 
and are largely controlled by political elites through corruption, patronage, and 
nepotism. In practice, Macedonia is an anocracy – with characteristics of both 
democratic electoral competition, and autocratic governance and institutional 
control. 
 
Regardless of which party is in government, democracy in Macedonia has come 
to denote elections (whether they are free or fair is of no consequence) once 
every four years and absolute rule in between by the successful party elites. Civic 
participation, public consultation, and open debate over laws and government 
policies are alien concepts to most Macedonian citizens, and ignored and 
discouraged by Macedonia’s political elite. In Macedonia it is normative practice 
for a small circle within the ruling party to determine public policy and 
legislation. They will necessarily consult with their Albanian coalition partners 
and occasionally have policy rubber-stamped by parliament into law. Once 
decisions have been made, they are announced to the public. The public is then 
expected to submit to the ruling elite, which it generally does, believing that this 
is the full extent of the democratic ideal. 
 
The most recent US State Department Human Rights Report provides a bleak, 
though accurate, picture of the situation in Macedonia: 
The most significant human rights problems stemmed from high levels of 
corruption and from the government’s failure to respect fully the rule of 
law, including by continuing efforts to restrict media freedom, interfere in 
the judiciary, and selectively prosecute offenders. Political interference, 
inefficiency, cronyism and nepotism, prolonged processes, violations of 
the right to public trial, and corruption characterized the judicial system. 
During the year the release of unauthorized intercepted communications 
recorded by the government’s intelligence services allegedly revealed 
evidence of political interference in public administration and the media 
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as well as high-level corruption. Other human rights problems reported 
during the year included physical mistreatment of detainees and prisoners 
by police and prison guards; delayed access to legal counsel by detainees 
and defendants; restrictions on the ability of Roma to leave the country; 
restrictions on access to asylum; discrimination against persons with 
disabilities; discrimination against ethnic minorities, including Roma and 
ethnic Albanians.1 
 
Interestingly, a survey on political culture in Macedonia found that only 42 per 
cent of respondents agreed that democratic systems were better equipped to solve 
social problems, whereas 28 per cent would favour a ‘strong leader’ and 25 per 
cent would prefer an unelected technocratic government of experts.2 The same 
survey found that the ideal politician would deal with issues by using their 
‘knowledge and expertise’ and ‘strong will’ (71 per cent).3 
 
While Macedonia functions as an anocratic state, control by the central 
authorities is haphazard at best. There are three distinguishing features to this. 
Firstly, Macedonian political elites generally do not interfere with majority 
Albanian-populated municipalities and Albanian political elites generally do not 
interfere with majority Macedonian-populated municipalities. Most national-
level elite disagreements occur over mixed municipalities that constitute 
dangerous inter-ethnic flash points (Appendix Six). Regions such as the Struga 
Valley and Skopska Crna Gora are ethno-religiously mixed and local control is 
highly contested by Macedonians and Albanians. Secondly, central government 
control is weak, particularly outside of Skopje. National institutions are staffed 
by party loyalists, but they work within a patronage system and the realm of local 
kinship ties, and are therefore unreliable for central control.4 Most locally-based 
state employees (administrative and police) are closely linked with the governing 
party, and most have received their positions as a reward for their support. 
                                              
1 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015: Macedonia, United States Department of State, 
[website], www.state.gov (accessed 2 September 2016). 
2 Marković et al, Survey on Political Culture in Macedonia, p. 10. 
3 ibid. 




However, their support is contingent on continued patronage, and is further 
weakened when kinship or clan ties conflict with the interests of the political 
elite. As a result, there is a lack of central control and an absence of the rule of 
law. Finally, local municipal councils have their own governance structures and 
local institutions, which are staffed through local patronage and kinship networks 
(and are personal and much more trustworthy) and act as a strong counter to 
central national control. 
 
A clear example is the hesitance of police (who are local residents and have 
extensive kinship ties across the community) to get involved in anything except 
for the most serious of criminal matters, and only when significant pressure is 
applied. An example that occurred in Struga was the hit and run of a cyclist by a 
car. The cyclist was seriously injured and taken to hospital. His bicycle was 
found damaged on the side of the road with the registration plate of the 
offender’s car caught by its back wheel. Even so, the police claimed that they 
could not identify the owner of the vehicle and witness testimony was 
disregarded; the matter went unresolved.5 These are not isolated incidences. 
Corruption, nepotism, incompetence and negligence plague the state 
administration and its institutions. 
 
In some instances, particularly in some of the more remote Albanian-populated 
villages of the Polog region (northwest Macedonia), Skopska Crna Gora 
(northern Macedonia) and the Struga Valley (southwest Macedonia), police are 
unable to even enter certain localities. The state is completely absent in some of 
these cases and the villages are run as independent fiefdoms, with clan networks 
providing governance and security. One interesting case is that of Kondovo 
where a small Albanian paramilitary (with local support) declared (on two 
separate occasions) that the village was off-limits to the Macedonian state (and 
Kondovo is only 10km from the centre of Skopje). This is not unlike Aračinovo 
(15km from the centre of Skopje) and similar villages, which were occupied by 
                                              
5 The author was undertaking fieldwork in Struga at the time. 
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the National Liberation Army (NLA) for virtually the entire duration of the 2001 
war. 
 
This also occurs in some Macedonian towns and villages where locals govern 
them quite autonomously from the central government. A key example is the 
village of Vevčani with a population of 2,400 residents. In 2004 the Macedonian 
government wanted to subsume the municipality of Vevčani into Struga 
municipality (given its location in the centre of the Struga valley). Vevčani’s 
residents threated an insurrection, and their message was clear: “You will either 
leave us as an autonomous municipality or we will secede. We will be the 
Andorra of the Balkans”.6 Perhaps given the village’s historical resistance to 
authority and its self-sufficiency, the Macedonian government conceded and re-
constituted the Vevčani municipality with the village of Vevčani as its sole 
settlement.7 
 
Finally, the role of the European Union and the United States has not helped the 
institutional inertia in Macedonia. Engström notes that: 
The Macedonian state today is dangerously weak, lacking any 
consolidated political capacity, and public confidence in the politicians, 
on both sides of the ethnic divide, is extremely tenuous. International 
diplomatic intervention in Macedonia – charactarized to a large extent by 
the setting of a seemingly endless number of conditions for Macedonia, 
some of which amount to sheer blackmail – has further undermined the 
capacity and authority of the state and its political leaders.8 
 
                                              
6 V. Mitanoski, “Zošto Vevčani i vevčanci se tolku često interesni za mediumite”, Servis za proverka na 
fakti od mediumite, 8 October 2014, www.proverkanafakti.mk (accessed 1 September 2016).  
7 The Vevčani clans have previously resisted both the Macedonian republican and the Yugoslav federal 
authorities on at least two occasions. The first in 1968 when local officials from Struga attempted to 
appropriate modern medical equipment from the village’s self-funded hospital and again from 1987-89 
over water rights to its natural springs. The 1987 confrontations were the result of a project by 
Macedonian authorities to redirect water from Vevčani’s natural springs into Struga’s drinking supply. 
The residents of Vevčani blocked construction workers and police were dispatched to the village. Violent 
resistance ensued and dozens of residents and police were injured. The incidents turned into a major 
political clash and by 1989 both the Minister and the Deputy Minister for Internal Affairs were forced to 
resign. The local leadership in Struga who had overseen the project were pressured to publish critical 
accounts of their role in the affair, see K. Brown, “Order, Reputation and Narrative: Forms of State 
Violence in Late Socialist Macedonia”, European History Quarterly, Vol. 45, Iss. 2, 2015, pp. 295-314. 
8 Engström, “Multi-ethnicity or Bi-nationalism?”, p. 344. 
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Ongoing international intervention in Macedonian politics has only increased the 
perception among the citizenry (lest they needed any further evidence) that the 
central authorities are incompetent and unable to provide even the most basic 






The problems of credible commitments can arise in newly independent states that 
contain one dominant group and at least one powerful minority group, and in 
particular anocratic states that are transitioning from autocratic regimes to 
democracy. Generally, the state (controlled by the dominant group) is unable to 
provide convincing guarantees for the protection of the rights and property of the 
minority group(s). It is argued that minority groups have an incentive to establish 
their own self-governing state, or to obtain significant autonomy within the 
existing state, rather than rely on the dominant group to honour their 
commitments. Further, settlement of any violent conflict which may have taken 
place is also difficult as neither side trusts the other to disarm or comply with 
peace agreements. Weingast maintains that armed conflict can emerge from 
commitment problems even if only vague suggestions of repression exist, as 
individuals who are convinced by their group leaders that they are targets of 
repression, extermination or forced removal would rationally take up arms even 
if their leaders’ assessment is not credible.1 In Macedonia problems of credible 
commitment also exist in the fact that the Macedonian majority does not believe 
that the Albanian minority is committed to peaceful coexistence within the 
framework of the Macedonian state. An additional problem in Macedonia is the 
weak control of state institutions and the complete lack of control of non-state 
actors such as nationalist paramilitaries and local militias. 
 
Ethnic distrust in Macedonia is high. Research conducted by the Macedonian 
Centre for International Cooperation (MCIC) in 2011 found that 43 per cent of 
Albanian participants did not personally trust Macedonians, while 45 per cent of 
Macedonian participants did not personally trust Albanians.2 Grassroots views 
                                              
1 Weingast, “Constructing Trust”, p. 179. 
2 C. Klekovski, Meǵuetnički odnosi vo Makedonija, Macedonian Centre for International Cooperation, 
Skopje, 2011, p. 7. 
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such as these have a considerable impact at the societal level and serious 
implications in terms of credible commitments between the two communities. 
The same study also found that 37 per cent of Albanian participants viewed the 
Macedonian community as a nation of discriminators and 32 per cent viewed the 
state as an instigator of the violation of their rights.3 
 
In Macedonia the lack of credible commitments is evident through three ongoing 
issues: political elites who incite violence and seek the revision of international 
borders; widespread grassroots opposition to the Framework Agreement; and the 
existence of armed militias and nationalist paramilitary groups within both 
communities. 
Threats of War and Appeals for Partition 
Since independence there have been sporadic calls for the revision of 
Macedonia’s international borders. Many Macedonians have often called for the 
reunification of ethno-historic Macedonia – namely, the incorporation of Aegean 
Macedonia (Greece), Pirin (Bulgaria), Mala Prespa (Albania) and Prohor Pčinski 
(Serbia) into the independent republic (Appendix Seven). There have also been 
various Serb and Bulgarian proposals to partition the Macedonian republic. 
Official Serb proposals ended with the collapse of the Milošević regime,4 while 
unofficial Bulgarian proposals continue to occasionally appear in the Bulgarian 
media. 
 
During the first years of independence a number of ideas to either expand the 
borders of the Macedonian republic or partition it among its neighbours were 
floated but were then quickly superseded by the Balkan wars in Croatia and 
Bosnia, American and European intervention in Greek and Bulgarian foreign 
policy, and the explosive Macedonian-Albanian relationship. Instead, new ideas 
began circulating with regards to the Albanian minority and possible territorial 
solutions to the internal Macedonian-Albanian conflict. 
 
                                              
3 ibid, p. 18. 
4 See Phillips, Macedonia, pp. 55-56 and Shea, Macedonia and Greece, pp. 325-356. 
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The earliest of these surfaced in July 1992 when a former diplomat, Saško 
Todorovski, put forward his idea in the Macedonian weekly Puls.5 According to 
Todorovski, Macedonia required a shared space, shared consciousness and 
shared authority in order to function as a civic state.6 In Todorovski’s 
assessment, due to the Albanian community’s irredentism Macedonia possessed 
none of these attributes, and as a result, he proposed an exchange of territory and 
a voluntary exchange of population with Albania.7 Todorovski never specified 
which territories should be exchanged other than arguing that Macedonia should 
request a 40km-wide strip of territory extending from Lakes Ohrid and Prespa to 
Albania’s coast on the Strait of Otranto.8 In relation to the exchange of 
populations, Todorovski argued that it should be voluntary and based on civic 
loyalty rather than ethnicity.9 
 
The next proposal to come to light was secretly discussed by the new coalition 
government (VMRO-DPMNE and the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA)) 
shortly after it came to power in 1998. In a June 2005 interview, Arben Xhaferi 
(DPA leader), admitted to holding discussions with the then Prime Minister 
(Ljubčo Georgievski) and other high ranking officials from neighbouring 
countries such as the Serbian Prime Minister (Zoran Đinđić) on various scenarios 
that involved Macedonia’s partition.10 Xhaferi claimed that he and Georgievski 
had plans “to carry out a peaceful separation of Macedonians and Albanians 
because [they] did not believe in a multiethnic state”.11 Xhaferi also claimed that 
they had Đinđić’s support not only for a partition of Macedonia but for the 
partition of Kosovo as well, however, the war in Kosovo prevented the 
                                              





10 E. Friedman, “The Ethnopolitics of Territorial Division in the Republic of Macedonia”, Ethnopolitics, 
Vol. 8, No. 2, 2009, p. 212. 
11 E. Azemi, “Albanians, How They Can Defend Macedonia From Partition by Macedonians”, Fakti, 
9 February 2009, www.faktinews.com (accessed 10 July 2013). 
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realisation of these plans.12 Georgievski confirmed these claims in a 2012 
interview on Croatian television.13 
 
Partition was raised again during the 2001 war, this time by the Chairman of the 
Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Ǵeorǵi Evremov. Evremov’s 
proposal was for the exchange of population designed to: 
Make western Macedonia into a homogeneously ethnic Albanian enclave 
for eventual cession to Albania. In return, Albania was expected to yield to 
Macedonia a small area of land populated primarily by ethnic 
Macedonians.14 
 
The proposal was perceived as a serious attempt to partition Macedonia as a 
solution to the Macedonian-Albanian conflict. Three factors contributed to this: 
1) the proposal was leaked during the war; 2) Prime Minister Georgievski 
refused to denounce it; and 3) Efremov was a senior official within a respected 
institution. However, it was met with strong opposition from the public. 
Macedonians were in no mood to concede territory to what they saw as a 
disparate group of terrorists, particularly given they had already lost lives in 
defence of it. Additionally, the two largest Albanian political parties (including 
Xhaferi’s DPA), the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), and even 
the National Liberation Army (NLA) rejected it outright.15 
 
Two years later (April 2003), after losing government to SDSM, former Prime 
Minster Georgievski published his own proposal for partition titled, Thesis for 
the survival of the Macedonian nation and state. Georgievski, a signatory to the 
Framework Agreement, argued that the agreement had marked the end of 
Macedonia as a Macedonian nation-state and that the Macedonians should now 
attempt to save the towns of Kumanovo, Skopje, Kičevo and Struga as ethnically 
                                              
12 ibid. 
13 Dnevnik 3, “Interview with Ljubčo Georgievski”, HRT, 13 July 2012, www.hrt.hr (accessed 
15 June 2013). 




Macedonian in a newly reconstituted Macedonian nation-state.16 Georgievski 
proposed that Albanians living in these towns should be assisted to relocate 
(without specifying where but presumably to Tetovo, Gostivar, and Debar – 
towns he would later nominate as areas that should be ceded to a future ‘greater 
Albania’), and that a new Macedonian state be established as a nation-state of the 
Macedonian people with the broadest possible rights for the remaining 
minorities.17 If the Albanian political parties would not agree to such a plan, 
Georgievski proposed that the Macedonian Government act unilaterally and 
follow the Israeli example by building a concrete wall to physically separate the 
two communities.18 Georgievski’s ideas were rejected by the governing coalition 
consisting of SDSM and the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), along with 
the ambassadors of the EU, NATO, OSCE and the US.19 DPA agreed with 
Georgievski’s assessment of Macedonia’s situation and reiterated its position that 
it no longer had any hopes for the successful implementation of a multiethnic 
political and social model in Macedonia.20 
 
In 2007 Georgievski reiterated his views on his 2003 proposal and further 
proposed “that the US, EU and Russia organise a ‘new Balkan conference’ with 
the explicit purpose of creating a Greater Albania”.21 According to Georgievski, 
Macedonia would need to cede Debar, Gostivar, and Tetovo as the only means of 
salvation and survival.22 However, with the political circumstances having 
changed significantly and his own descent into obscurity, Georgievski was 
largely ignored outside of his own small circle of influence.23 Since 2007 
Georgievski has argued in favour of partition numerous times, though most 
Macedonian citizens view him as a largely discredited politician. 
                                              
16 L. Georgievski, “Thesis for the survival of the Macedonian nation and state”, Dnevnik, 18 April 2003, 
www.dnevnik.com.mk (accessed 25 September 2014). 
17 ibid. 
18 ibid. 




23 After Nikola Gruevski’s ascent to the leadership of VMRO-DPMNE Ljubčo Georgievski established a 
new party (VMRO-NP) and maintains a small following, most of which he drew from VMRO-DPMNE. 
He has also been plagued with accusations of pro-Bulgarianism stemming from numerous articles on 
history and politics that he has written since losing the Prime Ministership. In addition, he later obtained 




It is ironic that while the Macedonians have consistently accused the Albanians 
of disloyalty and secretly harbouring aspirations to secede and create a ‘Greater 
Albania’ or a ‘Greater Kosovo’, most concrete public proposals for partition have 
come from high ranking members within their own community – a diplomat, 
various scholars, and a Prime Minister.  
 
For their part, representatives of the Albanian community have made many 
explicit and implicit references to secessionism. Arben Xhaferi’s admission that 
such discussions were undertaken within the Macedonian coalition government 
and with neighbouring states is one example. However, many speeches and 
interviews given by Xhaferi, Ali Ahmeti, Menduh Thaçi, Nevzat Halili and 
others over the years have demonstrated that independence from the Macedonian 
state remains an option should the Albanian community remain unsatisfied with 
the status quo. 
 
The example of Nevzat Halili is possibly the most overt among the Albanian 
community. Halili was founder and first President of the Party for Democratic 
Prosperity (PDP) and was elected to the Macedonian Parliament in 1990 through 
the first democratic elections. During 1991, with the formation of an independent 
Macedonian state and the codification of a new constitution and national laws, 
Halili was at the forefront of pushing for either a bi-national state or autonomy 
for Albanian-populated regions within a federal structure that would consist of 
two republics – Macedonia and ‘Ilirida’.24 By 1992 Halili had organised a 
referendum on autonomy among the Albanian community. Of the 92 per cent of 
eligible voters that reportedly participated, 74 per cent voted in favour of 
autonomy.25 Following the referendum several local leaders within Albanian-
populated municipalities declared their regions part of a ‘Republic of Ilirida’ and 
called for the federalisation of Macedonia in which Ilirida would cover half of 
                                              
24 J. Bugajski, Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe: A Guide to Nationality Policies, Organizations and 
Parties, M. E. Sharpe, Armonk, 1995, p. 116. 
25 Roudometof, Collective Memory, National Identity and Ethnic Conflict, p. 172. 
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the republic’s territory.26 The Macedonian Government declared the referendum 
illegal and sentenced five Albanian members of the ruling coalition to prison, 
convicting them of conspiring to create a secessionist state. Meanwhile, Halili 
managed to distance himself from the Ilirida project, avoiding prison. 
 
As the PDP’s political support fell among the Albanians, Halili slowly faded into 
obscurity until the 2001 war. While his role during the conflict is somewhat 
vague, in July 2002 the United States blocked his assets (along with Gafur Adili 
and Kastriot Hazhirezha) for providing leadership or material support to armed 
insurgents in the Western Balkans.27 Halili remains on the United States’ Office 
of Foreign Assets Control list of designated nationals and blocked persons,28 
which is most likely linked to his paramilitary associations and continued efforts 
to destabilise the country. 
 
In 2004 Halili established a group known as the Albanian National Movement of 
Ilirida (ANDI) of which he is still president.29 ANDI reportedly operates a 
parallel government which has promulgated a constitution for the so-called 
Republic of Ilirida and drawn detailed maps of its internal borders within 
Macedonia.30 ANDI is also reported to have an armed wing known as the 
Albanian Republican Army (ARA).31 
 
Halili, as a representative of ANDI, has regularly made public demands for a 
separate Albanian republic (Ilirida) within a federalised Macedonia. He envisions 
a federal state named ‘Ilirida and Macedonia’, modelled on the previous union 
between Serbia and Montenegro.32 Through various public pronouncements 
Halili has called on Albanian representatives in the Macedonian Parliament to 
                                              
26 Bugajski, Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe, p. 116. 
27 P. Fluri et al, The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in South East Europe: Continuing Democratic 
Reform and Adapting to the Needs of Fighting Terrorism, Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg, 2005, p. 20. 
28 United States Department of the Treasury, Specially Designated Nationals List.  
29 Anonymous, “Ilirida and Macedonia’s federalization brought up again”, VMacedonia, 
6 September 2007, www.vmacedonianews.com (accessed 15 May 2012). 
30 ibid. 
31 M. Trajkovska, Nekogaš poznati radikalni, sega marginalci: vremeto gi zgazi Halili, Šakiri i Hod̂a, 
28 October 2013, www.dnevnik.mk (accessed 25 July 2014). 
32 The details of the model change with each subsequent demand. At times a federation is called for, 
while other times looser confederate models are nominated. 
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resign their positions and establish a parliament of Ilirida in Tetovo, while also 
urging Albanians employed in the state administration to leave their positions 
and return to their ‘parent republic’.33 Halili bases his claims for an autonomous 
Albanian republic on the 1992 referendum that he organised.34 Most recently 
(September 2014), Halili gathered a few dozen Albanians in Skanderbeg Square 
in Skopje to proclaim the establishment of the Republic of Ilirida.35 Halili 
provided a map of the republic to media outlets and demanded an urgent meeting 
with the Prime Minister in order to “call for a referendum on the internal 
territorial division of Macedonia” (Appendix Eight).36 
 
Although Halili claims widespread support from the general population and some 
Albanian MPs from DUI, he is a relatively marginal figure within Macedonian 
politics. Though, this does not ensure his inability to destabilise the country. It is 
believed that he commands some Albanian fighters attached to ANDI. The 
example of Ali Ahmeti is a valuable lesson here. In 2001 Ahmeti began his 
Macedonian campaign with only a few hundred supporters. Yet he was able to 
inspire the Albanian community into providing thousands of recruits for the 
NLA, defeat the Macedonian security forces, and bring about significant 
constitutional amendments through the Framework Agreement. A key difference 
between the two that may disadvantage Halili is that he is considered a part of the 
corrupt and discredited political scene made up of PDP and DPA (PDP has lost 
its electoral support since 2001), whereas Ahmeti at the time of the 2001 war was 
perceived as a hero of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and free from those 
that many in the Albanian community were beginning to view as corrupt 
collaborators. 
 
Politicians who incite violence seem to be one of the few constants of 
Macedonian politics since independence. While they have come from both 
                                              
33 Anonymous, “Ilirida and Macedonia’s federalization brought up again”. 
34 Anonymous, “Samoproglasenata Republika Ilirida bara Makedonija da stane konfederacija”, Daily 
Macedonia, 18 April 2012, www.daily.mk (accessed 16 August 2014). 
35 S. Marušić, “Albanians Declare ‘Republic’ in Macedonia”, Balkan Transitional Justice, 




communities, most threats of war have originated among Albanian politicians 
and activists. It is difficult to ascertain their significance because such 
pronouncements are frequently in the public domain. Some threats have preceded 
violence and popular unrest (including the 2001 war), while others seem to have 
been merely posturing and an exercise in ethnic outbidding (particularly during 
election campaigns). 
 
In recent times Menduh Thaçi (DPA) has warned that the war between 
Macedonians and Albanians is not over. In February 2010 and again in 
September 2013 Thaçi warned that war would be inevitable if the Gruevski 
Government did not begin to respect the Albanian community.37 His demands 
were the replacement of the Framework Agreement with a new “political 
contract” as outlined in DPA’s policy platform.38 This new contract would 
reconstitute Macedonia into a bi-national state belonging to two constituent 
nations (the Macedonians and the Albanians), establish Albanian as an official 
language of administration, and institute a bicameral parliament.39 Thaçi and 
DPA have long argued that the Framework Agreement is dead and a new 
strategic settlement between the two peoples is necessary. Thaçi has criticised 
former leader Arben Xhaferi, stating that he had made a critical mistake on 
behalf of the Albanian community when he signed the Framework Agreement.40 
He boasted that the Macedonians would not only agree to the demands set out in 
his “political contract”, but that they would ask whether anything further was 
necessary – otherwise he threatened that Macedonia and the Macedonians would 
no longer exist.41 
 
                                              
37 Anonymous, “Menduh Tači – Samo mrtov Makedonec e dobar Makedonec!?”, Ohridon, 
9 February 2010, www.ohridon.com (accessed 21 August 2012) and Anonymous, “Izjava na Tači za 
vesnikot “Zeri” – vojnata megu Makedoncite i Albancite ne e zavrsena”, Grid, 16 September 2013, 
www.grid.mk (accessed 20 September 2013). 
38 Democratic Party of Albanians, The Political Contract, 2009, www.pdsh.info (accessed 
12 November 2015).  
39 Anonymous, “Menduh Tači – Samo mrtov Makedonec e dobar Makedonec!?”. 
40 Anonymous, “Preku Tači, Albancite im se zakanija so nova vojna na Makedoncite ako ne bide po 
nivo”, Večer, 9 February 2010, www.vecer.com.mk (accessed 12 March 2011). 
41 Anonymous, “Menduh Tači – Samo mrtov Makedonec e dobar Makedonec!?”. 
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Whether DPA has the capacity or the will to resort to armed conflict is 
questionable. During the 2001 war, under the leadership of Arben Xhaferi, DPA 
sought to play a political role and denounced violence for the purpose of 
obtaining political change as extremism. However, it is noteworthy that it 
maintained close contact with the political representatives of the NLA. Since 
then the leaders of the NLA, under the banner of DUI, have enjoyed firm 
electoral support and established themselves as the most popular Albanian 
political party. DUI politicians have used what has become a form of ‘hero’ 
status from the war to achieve electoral success, while DPA is part of the older 
political scene perceived by many as corrupt and collaborative with Macedonian 
oppressors.42 Further, the Framework Agreement is seen as the achievement of 
the NLA, which risked the lives of its fighters while DPA and PDP functionaries 
negotiated in the comfort of the Presidential villas. Some of the pronouncements 
from DPA, such as threats of war, need to be seen within this context and in part 
as a response to DUI’s continued electoral success. 
Opposition to the Framework Agreement 
Regardless of its problems, the Framework Agreement is still supported by some 
within both communities. Support is greater within the Albanian community, and 
particularly among supporters of DUI. Among Macedonians, support for the 
Framework Agreement generally lies within the political class and academia. 
Research undertaken in south-western Macedonia during 2011 found that 42 per 
cent of participants did not believe that the Framework Agreement had a positive 
influence on Macedonian-Albanian relations.43 Of the Macedonian participants, 
49 per cent agreed that the Framework Agreement did not have a positive 
influence on inter-community relations, while 48 per cent of Albanian 
participants believed that it did have a positive influence.44 According to the 
2003 United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Early Warning Report, 
69 per cent of Macedonian respondents found the constitutional changes adopted 
as a result of the Framework Agreement as undesirable, of which 33 percentage 
                                              
42 NGO Activist, Interview with Author, Gostivar, 11 August 2013. 
43 M. Pechijareski, The role of inter-ethnic conflicts on the integration of Macedonian society, MA 
Thesis, Central European University, 2011, p. 49. 
44 ibid, pp. 49-50. 
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points were of the view that they were completely unacceptable and justified 
armed confrontation with the Albanian community.45 In terms of the Framework 
Agreement itself, 55 per cent of Macedonian respondents did not support it, 
while 92 per cent of Albanian respondents did.46 
 
Research conducted in 2007 (outlined in the table below) suggests that views of 
the Framework Agreement had solidified along ethnic lines. Taševska Remenski 
found that 91 per cent of Albanian participants either fully or partially accepted 
the Framework Agreement, whereas only 23 per cent of Macedonian participants 
partially accepted it.47 Similarly, she found that 82 per cent of Albanian 
participants believed that the Framework Agreement could establish equality 
between the two communities, while 83 per cent of Macedonian participants 
rejected that notion.48 Finally, 79 per cent of Albanians claimed that the 
Framework Agreement could secure long-term peace within Macedonia, while 
93 per cent of Macedonians did not believe it could.49 
 






View on Framework 
Agreement 








Yes 17.3 82.0 
No 82.7 18.0 
Will the Framework 
Agreement Secure Long-
term Peace 
Yes 7.2 79.4 
No 92.8 20.6 
Source: F. Tasevska Remenski, Albancite i Makedoncite: Etnickata interakcija vo Republika 
Makedonija, Pred i Po Konfliktot od 2001 Godina, 2-ri Avgust S, Skopje, 2007, pp. 240-241. 
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Another key difference among Macedonian and Albanian supporters is that while 
Albanians consider that a number of provisions still require implementation, 
Macedonians consider the agreement as fully implemented and the matter closed. 
 
On the Albanian side, DUI is a staunch supporter of the Framework Agreement, 
given that it was born out of an armed rebellion that DUI (then as the NLA) 
instigated against the existing constitutional order. The Framework Agreement is 
a key aspect of DUI’s mythology and status among the Albanian community as 
freedom fighters. It is also the basis of DUI’s claim to be the only Albanian 
political organisation capable of advancing the Albanian cause in Macedonia. Ali 
Ahmeti, for example, has promoted the Framework Agreement as a historic 
“document that regulates the relations between the two largest ethnic groups in 
Macedonia [and that] Macedonia is on the right track, having a much brighter 
future” for having implemented it.50 Ahmeti maintains that while the Framework 
Agreement is a positive development for Macedonia, there remain disagreements 
over some of the more vague provisions, primarily the issue of language usage.51 
According to DUI, Albanian should be a second official language of 
administration, while Macedonian politicians argue that the Framework 
Agreement was referring only to municipalities with a significant Albanian 
population. The wording in the Agreement is sufficiently ambiguous to cause 
legitimate differences in opinion and some have contended that this was 
purposely done by international mediators to obtain agreement from both sides.52 
Nevertheless, even Ahmeti remains cautious and warns that: 
The Albanians need to be the owners of their own house, Albanians do 
not want to be tenants in their own homes, I have stated this a number of 
times. The Albanians want to be loyal towards the state, however, loyalty 
towards the state is dependent on the loyalty of the state towards its 
citizens.53 
                                              
50 A. Ahmeti, “Progresot kon multietnička država e vo dobra nasoka i treba da se vrednuva” in Klekovski, 
S. (ed.), Ohridski Ramkoven Dogovor: Intervjua, Makedonski Centar za Meǵunarodna Sorabotka, Skopje, 
2011, p. 18. 
51 ibid, p. 21. 
52 A. Aliti, “Duhot e poinakva multikulturna filizofija na živeenje vo Makedonija” in Klekovski, Ohridski 
Ramkoven Dogovor, pp. 64-67. 




The late Abdurahman Aliti (former leader of PDP) generally agreed with 
Ahmeti. He has argued that the Framework Agreement is a good foundation for 
Macedonia and believed that it should be understood as a way of life or a 
philosophy of living.54 However, he did not rule out possible changes in the 
future to clarify what he believed were some ambiguous clauses in the agreement 
but neither did he specify which clauses needed clarification.55 
 
Macedonian supporters mostly stem from SDSM or are affiliated with it. For 
example, former Prime Minister Vlado Bučkovski calls post-Framework 
Agreement Macedonia a “model for multiethnic and multi-confessional 
societies”.56 Yet at the same time he admits that in his view the greatest threat 
facing Macedonia is religious intolerance.57 Denko Maleski, a member of the 
first Macedonian government post-independence and now an SDSM-affiliated 
political commentator, is also a strong supporter of the Framework Agreement. 
Maleski has argued that the Framework Agreement “positioned the Macedonian 
state on the right track towards a multiethnic state…[which has] created a 
positive climate for further economic and political development”.58 
 
Others, while they may not see it as an ideal agreement, argue that it was 
necessary to end the 2001 war. Former Prime Minister and President (and a 
signatory to the Framework Agreement) Branko Crvenkovski argues that while 
its “contents were not ideal, and the method through which it was brought about 
unacceptable, it provided a foundation for a functioning multi-ethnic 
democracy”.59 Many supporters of the Framework Agreement, both Macedonians 
and Albanians, argue that without it Macedonia would not be able to join the 
European Union and NATO, and that not doing so would inevitably lead to civil 
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war.60 However, it appears that even with the Framework Agreement Macedonia 
is unable to obtain membership of these two organisations, largely due to its 
dispute with Greece, but also its inability to meet key reforms. Nor is 
membership any guarantor that inter-ethnic tensions will not continue with 
sporadic outbreaks of violence and possibly a future general war. 
 
Opposition to the Framework Agreement, on the other hand, is quite strong. 
Though it varies from specific provisions to the entire agreement in general, and 
the circumstances under which it was negotiated and implemented. Opposition is 
mostly from the Macedonian community, which sees it as a severe loss of both 
security (particularly in relation to their identity) and sovereignty over what they 
consider to be their state. However, opposition also comes from within the 
Albanian community who see it as having failed to meet their aspirations. 
 
Brunnbauer has argued that Macedonian public opinion is largely hostile to the 
Framework Agreement, considering it a threat to its identity, and that the 
strongest opposition was reserved for provisions dealing with the identity of the 
state that had more symbolic characteristics.61 Legislative changes in these areas, 
argued Brunnbauer, were “directly related to the way Macedonians view 
themselves and the character of the state”.62 In 2001 the Macedonian-language 
media viewed the Framework Agreement negatively and reported on it as the end 
of the Macedonian nation-state, calling it a great injustice and likening it to past 
injustices. For example, various editorials in leading newspapers called it a fatal 
indulgence to terrorism and argued that the Framework Agreement “would put 
the country’s future existence under threat because the real aims of the extremist 
Albanians were not the acquisition of rights but of territories”.63 
 
Many ordinary Macedonians saw the Framework Agreement in the light of 
previous unjust settlements, particularly the Treaty of Bucharest (1913), which 
                                              
60 For example, see Mitevski, 2001, p. 260. 
61 Brunnbauer, “The Implementation of the Ohrid Agreement”, p. 7. 
62 ibid. 
63 ibid. 
63 ibid, p. 8. 
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partitioned ethno-historic Macedonia among its neighbours. This feeds into 
Macedonian security concerns and the perception that its neighbours still harbour 
territorial designs. The loss of Macedonia as a nation-state is viewed as another 
threat to the Macedonian identity, which is contested by Greece, Bulgaria, and 
Serbia to varying degrees. Slaveski et al have agreed with this assessment noting 
that Macedonians were opposed to provisions in the Framework Agreement that 
dealt with the identity of the state, particularly in the Preamble, for which they 
had fought so hard.64 Given such circumstances, some have accurately noted that 
“Macedonian nationalism grows not so much from pride, but from desperation to 
survive”.65 
 
Vankovska has been particularly critical of the Framework Agreement. She has 
referred to both the agreement and post-conflict peace as a false peace promoted 
as a success story by the international community and local elites: 
The official propaganda on the “magnificent success of the Ohrid 
Agreement” resembles the post-WWII paradigm of “Brotherhood and 
Unity”…Nowadays Macedonia is mostly praised as a new ‘miracle’ 
thanks to this document that allegedly miraculously averted civil 
war…However, instead of rushing into another miracle what the 
country’s citizens really need is an honest reality-check…[the Framework 
Agreement] is an example of how not to carry out conflict prevention, and 
even more – on how not to rush into claiming a fantastic success story in 
post-conflict resolution.66 
 
Vankovska has cited a number of problems with the Framework Agreement, 
concluding that she has no doubts as to the fact that it is only a transitional 
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solution.67 Among these problems, she observes that the agreement itself was 
negotiated under international pressure from the United States and the European 
Union that were not seen as neutral or unbiased facilitators, particularly by the 
Macedonian community.68 In addition, domestic political leaders suffered from a 
“catastrophic lack of legitimacy among their own constituencies”,69 made worse 
by their total disregard for public debate while rubber-stamping the relevant 
constitutional changes. Deliberations around the implementation of the 
Framework Agreement were largely limited to the governing coalition, 
deceitfully justified by the necessity to stabilise the political situation as quickly 
as possible.70 The fact that the Albanian community obtained the concessions that 
it did through an armed rebellion is criticised by Vankovska as well. She argues 
that this has reinforced the lesson learned in Kosovo – that violence can be a 
viable means of political change and that it has all but been legitimised in 
Macedonia as a political tactic, citing the lawlessness in parts of western 
Macedonia and the use of paramilitary groups at key political junctions for 
tactical gain.71 While Vasilev has generally been supportive of the Framework 
Agreement, he has stated that the means through which the accord was brought 
about has been the target of much criticism from within the Macedonian 
community: 
Much of this criticism has predictably come from the Macedonian 
majority, which has felt bitter and humiliated at having to extend minority 
rights against the threat of Albanian violence.72 
 
Some Albanian politicians suggest that the same gains could have been made if 
the Albanian community continued to follow a political path. Menduh Thaçi, for 
example, has repeatedly asserted that his party would have achieved the same 
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concessions for Albanians in a coalition government with VMRO-DPMNE 
without the war inflicted by the NLA.73 DUI and many within the Albanian 
community, on the other hand, argue that the insurgency was a last resort of what 
had become a futile endeavour.74 
 
Slaveski et al have argued that the Framework Agreement has only reinforced 
and increased the democracy deficit in Macedonia. They contended that 
implementation of the agreement has been relegated to the elite level, and it has 
become a “habit of political actors to resort to extra-institutional means and to 
undermine institutions to address inter-ethnic relations”.75 They argued that 
rather than blindly implementing the Framework Agreement Macedonia needs to 
address its fledging democratic system and only then can it hope to stabilise 
relations between the two communities.76 Slaveski et al have previously agreed 
with Vankovska in relation to the finality (or lack of) of the agreement, calling it 
naïve to assume that it could resolve the disputes between the two communities.77 
 
The fact that the Framework Agreement failed in its key goal of building a civic 
political culture and identity among Macedonian citizens has been heavily 
criticised. The Framework Agreement’s “group-specific measures mark a 
significant departure from a civic ideal of coexistence, because they cultivate an 
institutional environment where people participate not as citizens but as ethnic 
members”.78 This raises concerns about the kind of loyalties the state promotes – 
in this case loyalties tied to mutually exclusive ethnic groups rather than an all-
encompassing civic nation.79 Popstefanov argues that the Framework Agreement 
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has only reinforced the fact that two separate nations exist in a single state 
competing for power against each other.80 
 
Former Prime Minister Ljubčo Georgievski has been one of the most vocal 
opponents of the Framework Agreement within the political establishment, to the 
point of proposing territorial divisions and a new international border between 
the two communities. Georgievski repeatedly sought to distance himself from the 
terms of the agreement. Prior to signing it Georgievski told the media that this 
was a “shameful capitulation and a shameful agreement under pressure from 
Albanian terrorist paramilitaries”.81 At the signing ceremony on 13 August 2001 
he was outraged that Arben Xhaferi addressed the press in Albanian.82 For 
months afterwards Georgievski also threatened to put the Framework Agreement 
to a referendum, knowing that it would most likely be voted down by the 
Macedonian community, but refrained from doing so under international 
pressure.83 However, the inability of the Macedonian public to vote on such 
fundamental and substantive constitutional changes continues to aggrieve many 
within the Macedonian community. In his address to parliament on 3 September 
2001 Georgievski argued that approving the Framework Agreement would send 
a message that terrorism pays.84 He continued to publicly denounce the 
agreement as “blackmail from the West who supported the ‘Taliban of Europe’ 
in its genocide against the Macedonians”.85 
 
In his Thesis for the survival of the Macedonian nation and state, Georgievski 
explicitly outlined his view of how disastrous he believed the Framework 
Agreement was for Macedonia and the Macedonian people. In it he stated that 
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the agreement marked the end of Macedonia and the ideals for which 
Macedonian patriots had given their lives.86 He argued that: the Albanians had 
not fought for human rights but for fundamental changes to the character of the 
Macedonian state; that Macedonia was no longer a sovereign state (rather it was 
now an international protectorate); that Macedonia was no longer a unitary state; 
and that it was no longer a Macedonian state (rather it was a bi-national state 
shared with the Albanians).87 Georgievski has also lamented that the Framework 
Agreement has turned Macedonia into a de facto federal state with a Macedonian 
and Albanian component and that such federalisation will eventually result in a 
final territorial and political division between the two communities.88  
 
There is little doubt that for the most part the Macedonian community views the 
Framework Agreement as a Macedonian loss and an Albanian gain in what is a 
zero-sum game.89 A 2013 survey showed that only three per cent of participants 
(Albanians and Macedonians) thought that the Framework Agreement benefited 
Macedonians, while 47 per cent thought it benefited Albanians.90 
 
Some Albanian academics (such as Blerim Reka, Professor at the South East 
European University (SEEU)) have put forward proposals that seek significant 
constitutional changes far beyond the Framework Agreement. Reka has 
promoted his vision of the Macedonian state based on the principles of the 
Memorandum of the Forum of Albanian Intellectuals in Macedonia (which were 
submitted to President Gligorov in 1991).  
 
Reka argues that constitutional reform should include: 
 Equal constitutive status for the Macedonians and Albanians, which 
should be codified in the Preamble and the body of the Constitution; 
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  The equality of the Albanian language; 
 Consensual democracy in decision-making on crucial issues of national 
and state importance. Both constitutive nations should approve decisions 
through a two-chamber Parliament (a Chamber of Citizens and a Chamber 
of Municipalities). The approval of laws by both constitutive nations 
would only be required for laws that applied to: the territorial integrity of 
the state; security and defence; entrance into international institutions, 
organisations or alliances; national and state symbols; the national budget 
and economic policy; and language and education at the tertiary level; 
 A rotational two-year presidency to be elected by popular vote among the 
two constitutive nations; and 
 The establishment of a special international status for Skopje.91 
 
Menduh Thaçi has consistently called the Framework Agreement a ‘dead 
document’ and has suggested that there is no hope for a multi-ethnic society in 
Macedonia.92 Since 2009 he has called for a new agreement between the 
Macedonians and Albanians, seeking a non-territorial federalisation of the 
country, a bicameral legislature, and substantial veto rights in the lower house for 
Albanians.93 DPA incorporated many of Thaçi’s ideas for a new agreement into 
its policy platform. These include: 
 Consensus-based decision-making between the two communities in which 
both can veto the other; 
 Equal budgetary allocations between the two communities; 
 Albanian as an official language of administration; 
 One of the three key state positions (President, Prime Minister or 
Chairman of the Parliament) to be held by an Albanian representative; 
 New municipal divisions and further decentralisation; 
 Establishment of institutions for the development of Albanian culture; 
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 The removal of ethnic motifs from all state symbols; 
 A commitment from the Macedonian Government to integrate into NATO 
and the European Union; and 
 Punitive measures for the violation of the new agreement.94 
 
These proposals have been rejected outright by the Macedonian community at 
large and DUI, which has largely tied its political fortunes to the success or 
failure of the Framework Agreement. However, smaller Albanian parties have 
supported the idea of a new agreement with their own specific proposals. Rufi 
Osmani, leader of the National Democratic Revival (NDR), has also argued that 
the problem between the Macedonian and Albanian communities was not 
resolved with the Framework Agreement,95 because it was essentially a short-
term compromise to end the 2001 war.96 In particular, Osmani argues that the 
fact that the Albanian people and their language are referred to as those ‘over 20 
per cent of the total population’ is offensive to the Albanians and unacceptable.97 
 
Osmani would like to see what he refers to as a new ‘peace’ agreement in which 
the Albanian community would pledge not to seek self-determination by 
seceding from Macedonia (thereby guaranteeing its territorial unity) in exchange 
for new rights, including co-constitutive status for the Albanian community 
which he claims was not achieved with the Framework Agreement.98 Osmani’s 
vision of a new agreement would more closely resemble a bi-national state of the 
Macedonians and Albanians (as opposed to the multi-national state it has become 
under the Framework Agreement).99 He envisions a maximalist approach to 
decentralisation, while decision-making at the national level would be strictly 
consensus-based between the representatives of both communities.100 
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The newly established Albanian Besa (Oath) movement has also strongly come 
out against the Framework Agreement. In its political platform it has called for a 
complete redefinition of the entire political and legal system of Macedonia, 
seeking to establish a state based on a Macedonian-Albanian consensus system 
without the possibility of majoritisation.101 Besa also calls for a historic 
reconciliation between the Macedonians and Albanians, recognition of the 
autochthonous status of the Albanians in Macedonia and their contribution to the 
formation of the state, and consideration of the consequences of not undertaking 
these actions.102 
 
During 2015 the Secretariat for the Implementation of the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement (SIOFA), with the assistance of the European Institute of Peace and 
the OSCE, undertook an analysis of the Framework Agreement and its 
implementation. SIOFA made a number of controversial recommendations to 
amend the Framework Agreement. These included: 
 amending the Preamble to the Constitution in line with the original civic 
model agreed to under the Framework Agreement (Appendix Five); 
 establishing Albanian as an official language administration, equal to the 
Macedonian language; 
 adopting the national and municipal budgets through the Badinter 
Principle (double majority vote); 
 establishing a new ministry for the ‘political system and inter-ethnic 
relations’ responsible for oversight and implementation of the Framework 
Agreement; 
 criminalising hate crimes and hate speech; and 
 agreeing to some form of social security for the veterans of the 2001 war, 
and the families of those who died.103 
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The report recommends that a new law be enacted to determine the meaning of 
the Amendment 5 to the Constitution. According to the report, this determination 
should specify that the Albanian language be pronounced an official language of 
administration, equal to the Macedonian language.104 In addition, it recommends 
that knowledge of the Albania-language, or another minority language, should be 
a prerequisite for state employment and promotion, particularly to senior levels. 
This would no doubt have a negative effect on Macedonians and their 
opportunities for employment in the state sector – at least in the short to medium 
term. It’s also likely to further aggravate inter-ethnic tensions related to issues 
discussed above such as competition over state resources, ownership of the state, 
and the use of minority languages. 
 
Karakamiševa-Jovanovska has argued that the Framework Agreement has 
opened new disputes without having solved any of the causes of conflict between 
the two communities. She has contended that the Framework Agreement has 
three key problems: firstly, the model of power-sharing it instituted; secondly, it 
was not an adequate response to the 2001 war and it has increased tensions rather 
than decreasing them; and thirdly, it is likely that the Agreement created a bi-
national state where political conflict has been reduced to a Macedonian-
Albanian conflict to the detriment of other issues and other ethnic groups.105 
Karakamiševa-Jovanovska has asserted that the Framework Agreement not only 
failed to overcome the strong ethnic divisions within Macedonian society, it 
actually increased the divisions.106  
 
Rosulek summed up the general view among the majority of Albanians arguing 
that they are not satisfied with the Framework Agreement and do not consider it 
to be a final ‘grand’ agreement with the Macedonians, but only as the first gain 
[emphasis in original], enabling them to formulate further demands at the 
expense of the Macedonians.107 This is not lost on the Macedonians and hence 
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the desire among many of them to annul the Framework Agreement and repeal 
all constitutional and legislative changes that stemmed from it. In addition, the 
ideas of group rights and consensual decision-making are targeted as anti-
democratic and a form of apartheid. 
Paramilitaries and Militias 
In a highly fragmented society like Macedonia where the state has only weak 
control over its territory (virtually none in some areas), the rule of law is 
essentially non-existent with corruption permeating dysfunctional police and 
military forces, and where sporadic violence is common place, security is a 
critical issue. Through both necessity and traditional social organisation, local 
communities across the country (but in western Macedonia in particular) have 
developed their own security arrangements. 
 
Irregular paramilitary forces and militias have a long history in Macedonia within 
both the Macedonian and Albanian communities. Clan or communal village 
defence was a necessary part of life under Ottoman rule, continuing into the 20th 
century – particularly during the Balkan wars, the lawlessness of Vančo 
Mihailov’s Vrhovist interwar period and both world wars. Under Yugoslav rule a 
formalised doctrine of locality-based peoples’ defence was implemented (largely 
underpinned by the traditional clan networks). In 1969 Yugoslavia adopted 
a military doctrine named Total People's Defence (TPD).108 Each constituent 
republic established a Territorial Defence Force (TDF) as an integral part of the 
Yugoslav defence doctrine. The TDF consisted of able-bodied males and females 
between the ages of 15 and 65 and numbered up to 3 million people (across the 
federation) who would fight as irregular or guerrilla forces in wartime. The TDF 
concept focused on small, lightly armed infantry units fighting defensive actions 
on familiar local terrain. A typical unit was a company-sized detachment. More 
than 2,000 villages (clan-based), factories, and other enterprises organised such 
units to fight in their home areas.109 This official local defence system was 
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relegated back to the extrajudicial sphere after the collapse of Yugoslavia and the 
onset of the Balkan wars. Since independence, and due to the threat of interstate 
and ongoing intrastate conflict, new nationalist paramilitary formations have also 
been established alongside, and sometimes as an extension of, the traditional clan 
or village-based militias. 
 
Here a paramilitary unit refers to a militarised group whose organisational 
structure, command hierarchy, training, and function are similar to those of a 
professional military, but which is outside of state control, even though it may at 
times cooperate with the state and its formal armed forces. Militias, in this 
context, are loosely organised armed groups based on clan and/or village social 
structures, and exist for the purpose of local security and defence. 
 
Many of these paramilitaries and militias have fluid links with the state through 
personnel that are either members or material supporters of a non-state group and 
are simultaneously employed by the state, and particularly the security 
services.110 These links exist between Albanian and Macedonian 
paramilitary/militia groups and the state. They generally serve to obtain favours 
and information (both ways), and training and weapons from the state by non-
state groups.111 Training is usually obtained by members of non-state groups by 
formally enlisting in the military or police where weapons and other equipment 
are generally obtained informally through pilfering of state supplies. 
 
It is difficult to give precise numbers of weapons in the country; however, 
weapons are readily available and relatively cheap.112 There has been a large 
influx of small arms from around the former Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria and 
other former eastern bloc countries, particularly since 2001. Firearm ownership 
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across the country is the norm, especially in western Macedonia. Celebratory 
fire, normally during the summer months when most weddings are held, is a 
regular occurrence.113  Many Macedonians and Albanians ‘return fire’ (into the 
air) when they hear celebratory shooting from members of the other community. 
This is to signify that ‘we’re ready for you’. 
 
Illegal arms in Macedonia are mostly smuggled through the western and north-
western borders. The capacity of the Macedonian authorities is fairly limited and 
difficult terrain, due to mountainous and forested areas, makes it hard to maintain 
security.114 Corridors for illegal trafficking into Macedonia are found along the 
entire length of the border with Albania and Kosovo, including: 
 both sides of Lake Ohrid, near the official border crossing of Ḱafasan; 
 numerous mountain passes along the border with Albania, especially the 
region to the north and south of Debar; 
 the numerous crossings on the Šar Mountain range into Kosovo; 
 the northern part of the Skopje valley; and 
 the Kumanovo-Lipkovo region. 115 
 
Another key transport route into Macedonia is its eastern border with Bulgaria. 
Here the weaponry is primarily of Soviet/Russian origin. One international 
observer noted, “I cannot tell you how many arms are around, but I have a firm 
belief that arms can easily be found if a need arises”.116 Large caches of weapons 
are hidden in bunkers across the country and in particular across Albanian-
populated areas with strong support for the various paramilitary groups. In 
November 2007, for example, the Macedonian police seized a large cache hidden 
in a bunker in the village of Prvce (Tearce municipality) in the remote Šar 
Mountain range on the Kosovo border.117 This was the third major confiscation 
in the area in two months and these weapons were reportedly brought in from 
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Albania on horseback.118 Another example of arms smuggling was the police 
capture in October 2007 of 15 coffins on horseback full of munitions, clothing, 
Kalashnikovs, bombs and guidelines for military training in the Albanian 
language.119 
 
A note on extended family groups, which will be referred to as clans here, is 
necessary at this juncture. While little contemporary literature is available in the 
Macedonian (or wider Balkan) context, there are studies from which some 
general insights can be obtained, particularly in relation to former eastern bloc 
countries. A clan is typically defined as a group of people who are related, or 
believe to be related, through a common ancestor.120 Writing on Soviet Central 
Asia, Collins argues that collectivisation, rather than destroying clan ties, pushed 
clan members together into the same state-run farms, committees and 
government structures.121 These new elites maintained the well-being of their 
own kinsmen by providing them with political, social and economic 
opportunities, and in return counted on their kinsmen’s personal loyalty to 
maintain their own status and positions.122 The situation across Yugoslavia was 
similar since its collapse, and mostly because of the economic and political chaos 
that has ensued, this continues to be the case across the Balkans more generally, 
and in Macedonia specifically. 
 
Macedonians have a very rich and complex kinship structure. Kinship relations 
are traditionally patrilineal, meaning an individual's descent is established by 
tracing it exclusively through males from a founding male ancestor. However, 
scholars such as Schubert argue that kinship networks among Macedonians are 
much more complex, and while patrilineality is upheld for the purposes of 
inheritance of property, names and post-marital residence patterns, relationships 
with family are really bilateral in which relatives from both the mothers and 
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fathers side are equally important.123 For example, the Macedonian language has 
an elaborate kinship (rodninstvo) system, which includes commonly used words 
for relations up to five generations removed (great-great-grandparents and great-
great-grandchildren). 
 
In addition, Macedonians have two other types of important kinship relations – 
in-laws (svat) and godparents (kumstvo). Both are important kinships and can be 
considered as an extension of the clan. Marriage forms new bonds not only 
between the families of the couple, but their entire clans. All members of the 
other clan become svatovi (in-laws), not just the parents and siblings of the 
marriage partner. This bond turns into a kinship relationship and reciprocal 
favours, socio-economic assistance and (in some cases) political allegiances are 
formed. Each patriline is also related to another patriline through kumstvo. Inter-
marriage is permitted only if kumstvo is dissolved, which is relatively rare. 
Kumstvo is inherited by the male members of the group and like the svatovi, it 
opens a network of people from whom a reciprocal system of important favours, 
socio-economic assistance and political alliances can be obtained.  
 
The traditional structure of the Macedonian family is an extended family group 
known as a joint family structure (reminiscent of the historical zadruga units),124 
and this continues to be the norm. Macedonian households, particularly outside 
of the capital Skopje, still survive in this form with 3-4 generations typically 
living in the same household. This would normally include an older grandparent, 
parents, their married sons and their grandchildren. In many rural communities, 
family homes may be extended or compounds (single properties with multiple 
dwellings) are developed to accommodate additional family members and in 
many cases multiple brothers will build joint structures with separate living 
quarters for their own nuclear families and their parents. Family continues to 
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underpin political and socio-economic relations, and constitutes an economic 
survival strategy. The importance and reliance on the clan network has only 
strengthened since independence. 
 
Much like the Macedonian community, Albanians also have a rich and complex 
clan system, and their social organisation is perhaps even more dependent on 
kinship networks than that of the Macedonians. Albanian familial structures are 
based on the exogamous patrilineal clan, with a closely knit social, political and 
economic system occupying a demarcated territory.125 Albanian households are 
complex and much larger than typical Macedonian households. In rural areas 
particularly, Albanian households have preserved the patriarchal system, where 
the oldest male member holds authority.126 Boys and girls are segregated at a 
young age, and men always hold authority over women.127 
 
Outside of Skopje and a handful of smaller towns, Macedonia is largely rural 
with small villages littered across the country.128 A typical village usually has a 
few hundred residents, though some number up to a few thousand.129 These 
residents usually belong to half a dozen families, with many consisting of a 
single clan. Even in relatively larger villages, it is common for clans to co-locate 
in their own sectors within the village due to the pattern of ancestral property 
inheritance. The general breakdown in law and order, combined with socio-
geographic settlement patterns among Macedonians and Albanians, have led to 
security arrangements based on either clan or village formations where most 
adult males either own or have access to firearms and other military equipment in 
times of crisis. This is particularly prominent in western Macedonia with the 
additional threat of inter-ethnic conflict. These militias are difficult to assess and 
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quantify in either community. They are loosely organised, and their strength and 
capacity vary over time. Most households own firearms of various types and 
quality.130 
Macedonian Paramilitaries and Militias 
Macedonian clan/village formations played a significant role in 2001, both within 
the war zone and on the effect they had in relation to the states’ ability to provide 
an adequate defence of its territory. Their primary purpose is local defence and it 
could be argued that their existence undermined the government’s war effort 
against the NLA. For example, during 2001 the Macedonian government ordered 
a general mobilisation, which in theory should have fielded up to 86,000 men.131 
The vast majority of Albanian reservists ignored their mobilisation orders (while 
some joined the ranks of the NLA).132 
 
However, many Macedonian reservists also disobeyed their orders to mobilise. 
It’s estimated that only 50 per cent responded to their mobilisation orders,133 and 
there were cases of entire battalions refusing to mobilise.134 Examples include the 
Berovo and Demir Hisar battalions who turned up to their barracks, collected 
their arms and uniforms, and then (refusing to move to the front) returned 
home.135 An army reservist officer, who served in defensive positions in the 
Struga Valley during 2001, noted that: 
When the mobilisation was ordered, most of us only sent one man from 
each family, the rest stayed back to protect our homes. We couldn’t trust 
the government…they’re incompetent and if the Albanians attacked our 
villages, our homes would have been destroyed and our families turned 
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Balance, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 101, Iss. 1, 2001, p. 94. 
132 Arsovski, Kuzev and Damjanovski, Vojnata vo Makedonija vo 2001 Godina, pp. 116-122. 
133 ibid, p. 119. 
134 A battalion consists of 500 soldiers. 
135 ibid, pp. 121-122. The Macedonian army has undertaken significant reforms since 2001. Until then its 
organisation was locality-based, much like the former TDF. As a result, members of battalions were 
largely from the same towns and their surrounds. The men involved in the Berovo and Demir Hisar 
battalions most likely lived in close proximity to each other (and most were probably related to some 
degree) and had the opportunity to agree on their actions prior to mobilising.  
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into refugees…even if the government sent in the army they’d all turn up 
drunk.136 
 
The same interviewee noted that he was out in the field for three months with a 
few hundred other reservists, stationed in the Jablanica mountain range 
overlooking the Struga Valley. Their orders were to shell Albanian villages 
(harbouring NLA fighters) surrounding Struga if the war spread to that district. 
According to him, these men were mostly Macedonians, with a handful of 
Vlachs. The importance of local defence was foremost in his mind: 
We were there to punish the Albanians if they started anything, but most 
of the time we were too busy pilfering the new weapons that were brought 
in from the Ukrainians, Serbs and Bulgarians, and passing them on to our 
relatives and selling them to friends…for the first time since Yugoslavia 
the armoury was full and everyone from the top down was taking 
advantage of it.137 
 
Similar accounts on local security structures were provided by others. One retired 
army Colonel noted that: 
The Albanians cannot be trusted, even in peacetime they stir up trouble. 
Just look at all the attacks they have launched since 2001 – Kondovo, 
Brodec, bombing police stations - and those poor kids executed in 
Smilkovci. We need to be able to protect ourselves. We need to be 
organised and armed. Our ability to protect our territory has declined 
since independence, our security forces have no discipline, no equipment, 
no training. They’re nothing but a bunch of drunken kids. And the 
government does not care – they’ve allowed our military to decline. 
That’s why we rely on ourselves and our neighbours. Each town and 
village needs to make its own arrangements – the Albanians have. If we 
don’t, they’ll destroy us.138 
                                              
136 Reservist Officer, ARM, Interviews with Author, July-August 2013. 
137 ibid. Corroboration of the widespread pilfering of police and military supplies can be found in 
numerous sources, for example, Arsovski, Kuzev and Damjanovski, Vojnata vo Makedonija vo 2001 
Godina, p. 121. 
138 Retired Colonel, ARM, Interview with Author, 22 July 2013. For a detailed discussion on the state’s 




The village of Radožda, with approximately 800 residents and located 10 km 
south of Struga on Lake Ohrid, is a Macedonian-populated village surrounded by 
the Albanian border to the south and west, and Albanian-populated villages to the 
north (Appendix Nine). Residents of Radožda have always expressed a sense of 
isolation from their Macedonian kin, resulting in a perception of insecurity. This 
sense of isolation and insecurity has also been borne out of their experience 
during the Second World War when Radožda and its residents were looted 
numerous times, and many massacred by the Albanian Balli Kombëtar forces 
operating in the Struga Valley.139 A resident of Radožda notes: 
The Government has always left us to our own devices. We’re a small 
isolated village wedged between the Jablanica range on the one side and 
the lake on the other. We’re completely surrounded by Albanians – 
Kališta, Radolišta, Frangovo, Šum, even Struga. We saw what they did to 
us in the Second World War…I lost family in those massacres. The only 
thing stopping them from annihilating us then and now is our ability to 
fight. We’ll never give that up – we can’t.140 
 
The experience of the Second World War, the Balkan wars of the 1990s and the 
2001 war in Macedonia reinforces the idea among many Macedonians, 
particularly in western regions, that organised local defence forces independent 
of government are indispensable.  In 2001, for example, the village of Lešok was 
abandoned by the Macedonian Government. The government had ordered 
security forces to retreat under the terms of the July 2001 general ceasefire 
agreement.141 The NLA took this opportunity to take control of the village – one 
of the few Macedonian villages in the Šar region that had not been ethnically 
cleansed. However, prior to leaving the police defied the authorities and ensured 
that the village militia (200-strong) was well armed.142 A number of police 
reservists originating from Lešok defied their orders and remained in the village 
                                              
139 J. Trifunoski, Ohridsko-Struška Oblast, Srpska Akademija za Nauki i Umetnosti, Belgrade, 1992, 
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140 Radožda Resident, Interview with Author, 23 and 25 July 2013. 
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to fight the NLA.143 While the battle for Lešok lasted two weeks, Macedonian 
authorities refused to allow the police and army to engage in the fighting.144 
During the attack Lešok was isolated and surrounded by NLA forces in the 
neighbouring villages of Varvara, Brezno, Slatino and Neprošteno. One local 
recalls: 
At first our goal was to defend the village to the last man – we didn’t want 
to leave our homes, everything we owned, to the Albanians. We tried to 
evacuate as much of our families as we could before the terrorists 
attacked us – some made it out, others didn’t. We fought as hard as we 
could…in the end we were being overrun and because we still had women 
and children with us we finally decided to leave…when we returned after 
the war everything had been destroyed…they had ransacked everything. 
We would never have been forced out if those traitors on Vodno had let 
the army and police back in.145 
 
After a brief hiatus during Yugoslav rule Macedonian nationalist paramilitaries 
began re-establishing themselves in the newly independent republic as early as 
1992. The first was VMRO-DPMNE’s Macedonian National Guard, formed 
during the negotiations between the Macedonian leadership and the Yugoslav 
People’s Army (JNA) in relation to the latter’s withdrawal from Macedonia.146 
Its stated aim was to resist the JNA if it refused to withdraw from the republic.147 
With the establishment of the Macedonian armed forces, the Macedonian 
National Guard was disbanded. 
 
The 2001 war saw an upsurge in both paramilitary groups and volunteers. There 
was a mixture of motivations behind these forces, ranging from patriotic, party-
political, and criminal factors. Many of these groups attracted police and army 
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reservists (mostly conscripts) who either viewed the state as weak and their 
government as treasonous, or sought additional income that was available 
through the paramilitaries (particularly those attached to organised crime and 
political parties). 
 
Paramilitaries such as Paramilitary 2000, United Macedonian Forces (MOS), 
Todor Aleksandrov, the Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (MRO) and the 
Blue Birds were formed by nationalists seeking to protect the homeland from 
what they considered a terrorist/secessionist movement. Some of these groups 
were partially armed by the state.148 While there was some cooperation with the 
state in terms of training and supply, and coordination with the armed forces on 
the battle field, command and control of these groups fell outside of the states’ 
influence. This was most apparent when the government was nearly overthrown 
by thousands of angry protesters, many of which were paramilitaries who had 
just returned from Aračinovo having witnessed the government allow US forces 
to extract NLA fighters from the village. 
 
Paramilitary 2000 especially frustrated the Macedonian Government’s attempts 
to win diplomatic support in early July 2001 by engineering a mass cleansing of 
Albanians from the Macedonian capital. The paramilitary group delivered 
pamphlets to Albanian shopkeepers across Skopje, warning them to leave or be 
killed and threatening retaliation against Macedonians who continued to do 
business with Albanians. Within 10 days most store owners had closed down and 
up to 30,000 more Albanians had left Skopje for Kosovo.149 It was also reported 
that during that time up to 50 Albanian journalists, intellectuals and business 
owners had disappeared.150 Others, like the Vipers, saw no action on the 
                                              
148 The then Interior Minister, Ljube Boškovski, reportedly supplied arms for up to 15,000 paramilitaries 
through unofficial sources, see P. Sherwell, “Ministers arm paramilitaries in Macedonia”, The Telegraph, 
1 July 2001, www.telegraph.co.uk (accessed 5 October 2010), Anonymous, “Europe: How many groups, 
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149 C. Barry, “Paramilitary threat emerges in conflict in Macedonia”, Associated Press, 3 July 2001, 
www.dailynews.yahoo.com (accessed 1 July 2005). 
150 International Crisis Group, Macedonia: Still Sliding, 2001, p. 3, www.crisisgroup.org (accessed 
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frontlines and engaged largely in racketeering activities such as collecting 
‘patriotic taxes’ from local businessmen across central Macedonia.151 
 
The most notorious of all the paramilitaries were perhaps the Lions. The Lions 
were originally conceived of by the government as a highly-trained rapid reaction 
unit to undertake anti-terror operations. It was to consist of mainly military and 
some police personnel and be jointly controlled by the army and police. 
However, after the order was given to form the new unit the General Staff of the 
Army informed the President that all their soldiers were already in combat 
positions or securing the state’s borders.152 At the same time they insisted that it 
should be comprised of professional soldiers and not reservists. Prime Minister 
Georgievski and Interior Minister Boškovski refused to cooperate with the 
President’s initiative for an army unit and by claiming that the military was 
incapable of timely action, they organised their own police unit to fill the role.153 
 
While Boškovski obtained government sanction to form the new police unit, he 
created its command and control structure outside of the Interior Ministry and 
through the VMRO-DPMNE party.154 Although the unit ultimately answered to 
Boškovski as Interior Minister, it was a political party paramilitary. Its members, 
all Macedonians, numbered 7,000 at its height, and were primarily drawn from 
police and army reservists (who were transferred to the Interior Ministry). Many 
also reportedly had substantial criminal records and were VMRO-DPMNE party 
members,155 though large numbers of civilian volunteers were also recruited and 
organised in units based on their place of origin.156 
 
                                              
151 Anonymous, “The Macedonian Paramilitaries – More Apparent Than Real?”, Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, 21 September 2001, www.rferl.org (accessed 22 March 2016). 
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Research Centre, 2004, p. 23, http://isndemo.atlasproject.eu (accessed 24 July 2010). 
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154 For example, see Ordanoski, “Lions and Tigers”, Phillips, Macedonia, pp. 157-160, and E. Rubin, “A 
simple NATO mission faces bad faith and Lions”, The Christian Science Monitor, 11 September 2001, 
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156 Former Lions Member, Interview with Author, 12 August 2013. 
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The Lions have been implicated in numerous kidnappings and intimidation of 
both Albanians and Macedonians. For example, on 11 October 2002 (over a year 
after the war ended) approximately 30 members of the Lions entered the 
Albanian-populated village of Presil (Kruševo municipality) at around 5:40am.157 
The paramilitaries allegedly opened fire randomly on homes across the village 
and this continued for 30 minutes.158 Before leaving they also allegedly stopped 
in front of the local mosque and fired at it, causing significant damage.159  
 
However, paramilitary forces such as the Lions (alongside local militias), 
reversed the tide of the war in 2001. Their brazenness was not lost on the NLA or 
the general public. A Tetovo-based journalist was quoted as stating, "when you 
see these guys fight, you can only ask: where were they hired? In Idrizovo or 
Demir Hisar?" (referring to the notorious jail in Idrizovo and the Demir Hisar 
Psychiatric Hospital).160 Nevertheless, their cooperation and loyalty to the 
government were transient. Even the Lions who were led by Boškovski and the 
ruling VMRO-DPMNE felt it their duty to disobey their superiors when they 
thought the nation was at stake. While the army and regular police forces 
suffered continuous defeats, and the government withdrew regular forces from 
the frontline to abide by ceasefires, it was the local militias and paramilitaries 
that defended frontline villages and stopped the advance of the NLA in the 
Northwest during its July 2001 offensive. 
 
Zoran Dalevski, a commander in the Lions and a VMRO-DPMNE activist, noted 
that during the July NLA offensive the Lions were protecting the Prime Minister 
and the Parliament building from attack by thousands of Macedonians enraged 
with the government. Dalevski recalled: 
They [the protesters] provoked us and said, 'Go protect Macedonians,' and 
they were right. So we pressured our commanders. Either send us, or we 
                                              
157 Amnesty International, The lions beat tonight: alleged ill-treatment of Macedonian citizens by 
paramilitary police, 2002, www.amnesty.org (accessed 8 February 2014). 
158 ibid. 
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160 S. Ordanoski, “Reading Between the Lions”, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 
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go on our own…for 17 days we fought with no reinforcements just 50 
meters away from the NLA. When we asked the Army for help, nobody 
came. We weren't well trained, but a lot of us are a little 'gone,' and we 
held out.161 
 
In essence, most of the volunteers in these paramilitaries – even in the Lions – 
were nationalists seeking to protect their ethnic kin and homeland first and 
foremost. The paramilitaries, much like the local militias, did not trust the 
government and considered politicians as corrupt and treasonous. Their entire 
raison d’etre was to defend the republic because they saw the state and the 
regular police and military as incapable of doing so. When they saw a 
government or military decision which they believed was not in the interest of 
Macedonia’s national defence, they acted independently. One former member of 
the Lions was forthright in his condemnation of the Macedonian Government: 
These people in the government are clowns. They’re incompetent and 
corrupt. They don’t care about this country. They have enough money to 
leave if it all comes apart. But where will I go? Where will I take my 
family? No one wants us; this is all we have left. We’ve been sold out 
enough. If we didn’t take action in 2001 and left it to those fools, we 
wouldn’t even have this. Their answer to Albanian bullets was duck and 
cover or just retreat. That’s not how you fight battles.162 
 
By their nature, it is difficult to determine whether some of these paramilitaries 
still exist or whether those that do are fully functional and have the capacity to 
deploy a large number of men quickly. However, it is quite certain that in a crisis 
situation some of the paramilitaries would be able to mobilise and enter the 
conflict relatively quickly. While there are varying views on them, two 
Macedonian groups have the potential to quickly organise – United Macedonian 
Forces (MOS) and Dostoinstvo. MOS, led by Ljubiša Nastevski, regularly 
provides communiques through sympathetic media outlets and is frequently seen 
in public at various rallies, protests and confrontations with the Albanian 
                                              
161 Rubin, “A simple NATO mission faces bad faith and Lions”. 
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community. At public rallies and demonstrations, its members are usually 
dressed in their distinct black uniforms and have on occasion appeared in full 
battle dress, armed with Kalashnikov rifles and holstered pistols. The group also 
keeps a fairly visible social media presence and appears to function in a largely 
decentralised manner with dozens of local chapters across the country. MOS is 
loosely affiliated with various right-wing political organisations and sees people 
like Johan Tarčulovski as national heroes. MOS also claims to have many former 
members of the Lions and veterans from 2001 among its ranks. Its rallying cry 
can be seen posted across the country and is included in all of its official 
communiques: 
We, the Macedonian crusaders, are prepared to defend our fatherland, our 
faith and our people with our lives.163 
 
Dostoinstvo, the other paramilitary group is a peculiar case. Dostoinstvo does not 
claim to be a paramilitary group, rather an association of veterans from 2001 that 
also welcomes as members all active, reserve, and past police and armed forces 
personnel. Dostoinstvo was established shortly after the war by former General-
Major Stojanče Angelov, commander of the Police’s Special Operations Unit, 
known as the Tigers. Angelov quickly gained a strong following among veterans 
and serving military and police officers, particularly because of his political 
activities around obtaining better conditions and pensions for veterans. 
Originally, Dostoinstvo was aligned to VMRO-DPMNE; however, as it became 
clear to its leadership that VMRO-DPMNE was both unwilling to consider its 
concerns and politically aligned with DUI, its former enemies (NLA) on the 
battlefield, Dostoinstvo broke ties with the party. Eventually Dostoinstvo formed 
its own political wing by the same name that was registered as a political party in 
2011 with Angelov as its President. 
 
Dostoinstvo, the veteran’s association, claims that it has up to 14,000 
members.164 Its many public rallies certainly support this figure – thousands of 
                                              
163 For example, see Anonymous, “Komu li mu odgovara tenzijata što se pumpa poslednive nedeli? 
Sigurno ne na Makedoncite i na Albancite!”, MKD.MK, 10 July 2014, www.mkd.mk (accessed 
12 July 2014). 
263 
 
Dostoinstvo members regularly turn up to political rallies and peaceful protests in 
support of Angelov and his various political causes, marching in military 
formation (though dressed in civilian clothing). Over the past 15 years, Angelov 
has regularly appeared on national television and in print media (in addition to 
Dostoinstvo’s and his own personal social media accounts) speaking on a variety 
of subjects including government corruption, democracy, the rule of law, and 
primarily the welfare of veterans and their families, bringing former NLA war 
criminals to justice and annulling the Framework Agreement. With thousands of 
well-trained (and undoubtedly well-armed) men behind it, Dostoinstvo has 
repeatedly warned Albanian elites and paramilitaries, and the Macedonian 
Government that it will defend the republic, its constitutional order and the 
Macedonian people, with or without the support of its corrupt officials. For 
example, in 2014 Angelov responded to renewed threats by Albanian 
paramilitaries that they were here [in Macedonia] and ready for another war with 
the following: 
You might be here, but so are we. We are the Macedonian guardians from 
2001! We are dissatisfied, angry and rabid, but always prepared to defend 
our Macedonian state and our Macedonian people. This time it won’t be 
like 2001, this time we will clean out our own ranks first and then you 
will feel the Macedonian wrath!165 
 
                                                                                                                                    
164 Central Committee Member, Dostoinstvo, Interview with Author, Skopje, 15 July 2013. This figure 
was corroborated with other members of the association during separate conversations with the author. 
165 M. Peposka and G. Spiroski, “General Angelov im odgovori na UČK: Ako treba tuka ste – ama i nie 
sme tuka, branitelite od 2001”, MK News, 8 July 2014, www.mkd-news.com (accessed 3 May 2016). 
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Albanian Paramilitaries and Militias 
Much like the Kosovo Albanian clans, Albanian clans in Macedonia traditionally 
have small armed units for the protection of their villages and compounds.166 
Albanians living in the isolated mountainous regions of western Macedonia are 
left outside of the reach of the state. Albanian villagers rarely encounter police, 
children are often not sent to school, and very few pay taxes.167 An Albanian 
interviewee from an isolated village in the Gostivar region discussed the self-
sufficiency of his small community: 
We’ve lived outside of the state system for centuries and we probably 
always will. It’s clear that the Macedonians do not want to share the state 
with us anyway…and to be honest, we cannot trust them. I think given the 
chance, they would be worse than Milošević, worse than Hitler even. We 
                                              
166 Tsekov, “Sons of the Eagle”, p. 8. 
167 R. Hislope, “Crime and Honor in a Weak State: Paramilitary Forces and Violence in Macedonia”, 
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have to be able to protect ourselves and control our territory…this is why 
we are armed…it comes down to self-defence.168 
 
An ethnic Albanian officer in the Macedonian army held a slightly different view 
on working within the system: 
More and more Albanians are joining the police and army. Before it was 
not an option – the Macedonians did not want us and we did not want to 
serve a regime that oppressed us. But now after Ohrid [the Framework 
Agreement] they have to accept us in the military…and we have realised 
that we can use the state for military supplies and training, just like they 
do [Macedonians]. Why should they benefit and take everything when we 
can take our share as well? We can use the state for our own interests 
too.169 
 
The first Albanian paramilitary organisation to come to light after independence 
was the All-Albanian Army (AAA) in 1993. It was believed to have existed since 
1991 and some of its organisers are believed to have been PDP functionaries, 
including the then Deputy Minister of Defence, Hussein Huskaj, and the PDP 
Secretary-General, Midhat Emini.170 According to the Interior Ministry, the 
group was funded by the Albanian diaspora and the police seized 600,000 DM, 
300 rifles, thousands of rounds of ammunition and a list of 21,000 recruits.171 
Ten organisers were arrested, including the officials noted above of which 
Huskaj was believed to be the leader, and sentenced to prison.172 Stojan Andov, 
who was President of the Parliament at the time, wrote that some of the accused 
claimed that the formation of the paramilitary group was agreed to by the then 
Prime Minister, Nikola Kljušev, and its role was to assist in defending the state 
                                              
168 Local Militia Leader, Interview with Author, 11 August 2013. 
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from possible Yugoslav invasion.173 John Shea corroborates this, claiming that 
President Gligorov had encouraged both Macedonians and Albanians to form 
paramilitary forces prior to the departure of the Yugoslav army and the 
establishment of the Macedonian armed forces.174 Once the Yugoslav army had 
withdrawn, Gligorov apparently retracted his support for these groups and 
ordered the prosecution of its organisers.175 Other sources suggest that it was 
unknown to the Macedonian Government and may have even been clandestinely 
operating within the structures of the newly formed Macedonian army.176 
 
The next known Albanian group was the National Liberation Army (NLA), 
which fought against Macedonian government forces in 2001. It was established 
in 1999 by Ali Ahmeti (its Supreme Commander and political representative), his 
uncle (Fazli Veliu) and Emrush Xhemaili – all three of them Albanians from 
Macedonia. They were all members of the Executive Council of the People’s 
Movement of Kosovo (PMK) which was founded in May 1982 and which later 
created the KLA in 1993 at a meeting in Kičevo, Macedonia (Ahmeti is from 
Zajas, Kičevo municipality).177 This meeting was attended by Ahmeti, Veliu, 
Xhemaili, and Hashim Thaçi who went on to become the leader of the KLA.178 
Ahmeti, Veliu and Xhemaili were all involved in the war in Kosovo, which likely 
led them to conclude that the same strategy could be replicated in Macedonia. 
 
The NLA was estimated to comprise approximately 5,000 to 7,000 men 
(including logistical support) and was organised into six brigades.179 The 
majority of combatants were from Macedonia; however, these were 
supplemented by volunteers from Kosovo and Islamist veterans from the wars in 
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Bosnia and Kosovo.180 A leaked Interior Ministry report also outlined the 
existence of two ‘mujahedeen’ units, one numbering 120 fighters and the other 
250 fighters, which operated outside of the NLA structures in northern 
Macedonia.181 According to this report the majority were Albanians from 
Macedonia and Albania, but also included fighters from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, 
Pakistan, Jordan, and Chechnya.182 
 
Table 13. National Liberation Army (NLA) Structure 
Brigade Region Active Commander(s) 
Chief of General 
Staff 
Macedonia Gzim Ostreni 
111th (Reserve) Crna Gora   
112th Tetovo 
Samedin Xhezairi (Commander 
‘Xoxha’) 
Hamdi Ndrecaj (Commander 
‘Panteri’) 
Daut Redzepi (Commander ‘Leka’) 
113th ‘Ismet Jašari’ Kumanovo 
Daut Haradinaj (Commander ‘Maliki’) 
Sami Shakiri (Commander ‘Sami’) 
114th Skopje 
Fadil Nimani (Commander ‘Tigri’) 
Nazim Bushi (Commander ‘Adaši’) 
115th Raduša (Commander ‘Musi’) 
116th Gostivar Talat Xhaferi (Commander ‘Forina’) 
Source: Author’s Research. 
 
The NLA had claimed responsibility for a number of bomb attacks on police 
stations and other targets across Macedonia during 1999-2000, and it is believed 
that Veliu had organised earlier attacks on police stations in 1998-1999.183 By 
January 2001 the NLA had initiated a systematic campaign of attacks, which 
escalated into a full-scale insurgency after the battle of Tearce (Tetovo 
municipality) on 22 January 2001.184 In the beginning its aims were ill-defined 
and contradictory, with different field commanders issuing varying demands 
ranging from improved constitutional rights to outright secession and unification 
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with Kosovo and/or Albania. By April 2001 the NLA had more clearly aligned 
its political aspirations with those of DPA and PDP, and in May 2001 the Prizren 
Agreement was signed between the three. This agreement later became the basis 
of the DPA and PDP negotiating position for the Framework Agreement. 
 
While the NLA was officially disbanded in October 2001, it’s unlikely that this 
actually happened. Most NLA fighters joined DUI as the core of the new party’s 
membership and many of the NLA’s former commanders became high-ranking 
party officials. The NLA’s core personnel and structure remains. In fact, it has 
been reported that many former NLA commanders now head DUI’s local party 
branches, which are stacked with former NLA fighters.185 It is also evident that it 
maintains some security structures as DUI ‘supporters’ are frequently engaged in 
armed battles with its rival, the Albanian National Army (ANA).186 NATO 
launched a 30 day mission named Operation ‘Essential Harvest’ in August 2001, 
after the Framework Agreement was signed, to collect NLA weapons that were 
voluntarily surrendered. However, this was largely considered a farcical 
operation, receiving approximately 3,900 small arms.187 Estimates suggest that 
the NLA (including the personal weapons of its fighters) could have possessed 
up to 100,000 small arms,188 which would be more in line with the vast amount 
of weaponry available across the country and the Balkan region more generally. 
As a comparison, the Interior Ministry has noted that between 2003 and 2007 it 
had seized over 20,000 weapons (including caches it had found in various 
bunkers across north-western Macedonia).189 NATO also conceded that about 30 
per cent of the weapons collected were not serviceable,190 and many more were 
either of vintage design, including some World War II era firearms, or unusable 
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for combat, such as hunting rifles and shotguns. Even Menduh Thaçi, Ahmeti’s 
key political opponent, during a subsequent disarmament drive in November 
2003 visited villages in Northern Macedonia like Kondovo and Saraj to urge the 
locals to hold on to their arms.191 
 
After the Framework Agreement and the inclusion of the NLA (through DUI) 
into the political system, other groups began to appear. One of these includes the 
Albanian National Army (ANA), which is believed to have been founded in 1999 
and may have taken part in the 2001 war.192 For example, the ANA took 
responsibility for the 8 August 2001 ambush on the Skopje-Tetovo highway that 
resulted in the death of ten soldiers, among a number of other incidents.193 
 
Some sources suggest that the ANA includes many former NLA fighters who felt 
betrayed by the peace process and by Ahmeti opting for a watering down of their 
original aims. The ANA is reportedly seeking to create a greater Albanian state 
across the region – one that would include Albania, Kosovo, north-western 
Macedonia, south-eastern Montenegro, the Preševo Valley in Serbia, and north-
western Greece.194 They view the Framework Agreement as a betrayal of this 
vision and their senior commanders becoming politicians within the corrupt 
Macedonian political system as collaborators and traitors.195 The Albanian 
National Union Front (ANUF), headed by Gafur Adili (Commander Valdet 
Vardari), allegedly commands the ANA. Adili has been quoted as stating: 
From the first moment the Ohrid agreement was signed, ANA publicly 
stated that we do not recognise it and judge it as harmful and 
treacherous…[Ahmeti entered into a] coalition with the Macedonian 
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occupiers of Albanian ethnic land. We have no trust in the occupiers and 
their Albanian collaborators.196 
 
Jane’s Intelligence Review estimates the ANA presence in Macedonia at about 
200, and possibly up to 2,000 in the tri-border zone of Macedonia, Kosovo, and 
southern Serbia.197 The group allegedly fields two Divisions in Macedonia, the 
Skanderbeg Division and the Tahir Sinani Division.198 Some sources suggest that 
a number of Albanian village militias have aligned with the ANA, which could 
significantly boost their numbers.199 Other sources suggest that the ANA includes 
fighters from now disbanded groups such as the KLA and the Liberation Army of 
Preševo, Medvedje and Bujanovač (UCPMB).200 This is a possibility given the 
territory that the ANA operates on. 
 
While it is not believed to have widespread support among the general 
population, the ANA’s activities have been devastating. Between 1999 and 2003 
it is believed that the ANA had instigated up to 6,571 attacks across the region, 
killing up to 1,206 people and injuring up to 1,324 others.201 It has targeted 
Macedonian institutions and the police in numerous attacks across the country, 
including bomb attacks in Skopje, Struga and Kumanovo.202 In a February 2000 
communique the ANA claimed responsibility for an attack on a Macedonian 
police station in Aračinovo that resulted in the death of four police officers a 
month earlier.203 In late 2001 it kidnapped nearly 100 civilians from buses and 
cars along a highway outside of Tetovo and caused the death of three 
policemen.204 Other claimed attacks include a bomb blast on 31 October 2002 
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outside the Parliament building in Skopje,205 the 14 September 2002 
assassination attempt on Interior Minister Boškovski,206 and the 14 February 
2003 bomb outside the Court of Original Jurisdiction in Struga.207 These attacks 
have continued and it is possible that the ANA (or rogue ANA members) was 
responsible for the Kumanovo clashes on 9-10 May 2015; though, the fighters in 
Kumanovo claimed they were NLA members. 
 
The Albanian Republican Army (ARA), also known as Army of the Republic of 
Ilirida, is believed to be the military wing of Nevzat Halili’s Albanian National 
Movement of Ilirida (ANDI). It appears that the ARA was established in 2002, 
two years earlier than its political wing.208 It is currently thought to have about 
200 fighters, many of them ex-NLA members.209 Reports suggest that it had 
close ties with the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), the Kosovo Albanian 
security forces established under NATO auspices out of former KLA,210 and 
ANA members.211 
 
Various smaller groups appear in Macedonia from time to time. One example is 
the Krasniqi group. Agim Krasniqi was a commander in the NLA during the war, 
but remained active after the peace deal with a band of approximately 80 fighters 
based in the village of Kondovo, just outside of Skopje.212 Krasniqi occupied the 
village of Kondovo and declared it off-limits for Macedonian police from July to 
December 2004. One of his stated demands was to be amnestied like the other 
NLA war veterans.213 The government refused to accede to his demands and 
Krasniqi retaliated by threatening to bomb Skopje.214 The situation was finally 
defused by joint DPA/DUI led negotiations. However, Krasniqi again occupied 
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Kondovo from February to August 2005. The then SDSM Government was 
reluctant to move against him as he had the backing of its coalition partner DUI. 
After the second occupation it appears that the Macedonian Government 
negotiated a settlement with Krasniqi, as he agreed to stand down and appear in 
court some time later.215 When he did the judge dismissed all outstanding 
international and domestic warrants against him.216 This caused uproar among 
the Macedonian community; however, Krasniqi disappeared until he was arrested 
in 2008, along with eight others, for violence related to the Parliamentary 
elections and for possession of illegal weapons and narcotics.217 In October 2008 
he was sentenced to prison for six and a half years.218 
 
Ramadan Shiti and Lirim Jakupi are another case in point. These two men led a 
small armed band known as the Jakupi Group, with links to the ANA. Jakupi 
was wanted in Macedonia for launching a rocket at a police station, killing a taxi 
driver, wounding three police officers, placing the village of Volkovo (Skopje 
municipality) under siege, and threatening to bomb Skopje.219 Shiti was a 
Wahhabi extremist and is believed to have been previously involved with 
Wahhabi leaders such as Zenun Berisha and Ramadan Ramadani in their 
attempts to take control of the Islamic community in Macedonia. It is believed 
that various members of the group were veterans from across the region, 
including the wars in Kosovo, the Preševo Valley, and Macedonia.  
 
On 7 November 2007 a day long battle, codenamed Operation Mountain Storm, 
ensued in the villages of Brodec, Vešala and Vejce (Tetovo municipality) near 
the Kosovo border. Shiti and Jakupi fought in the village of Brodec where the 
heaviest fighting took place. Six militants were killed, including Shiti who 
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reportedly died as a suicide bomber during the operation, and 13 were arrested.220 
Large quantities of weapons were seized, which according to police could have 
armed over 600 soldiers.221 The seized weaponry included rifles and ammunition, 
artillery pieces, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and laser-guided anti-aircraft 
missiles; most of the arms were of Chinese, Yugoslav, and Russian origin.222 
Bunkers had been dug into the mountainside above Brodec, stocked with 
sleeping bags, food rations, and weapons.223 The structures also included 
improvised beds and shower cabins.224 The men had been conducting night-time 
uniformed patrols and roadblocks in the weeks leading up to the battle, and were 
clearly preparing for a prolonged armed confrontation. 
 
Another smaller group calling itself the Skopje Liberation Army (SLA) appeared 
in 2014. Some have suggested the possibility that this group is either responsible 
for (or linked to) the execution of five Macedonians in Smilkovci in April 2012. 
This has been suggested because in July 2014 the SLA threatened to start 
attacking police if the men convicted for the executions were not freed.225 While 
this did not eventuate, mass protests and riots took place across the country, with 
the largest in Skopje, demanding that the perpetrators be pardoned and released. 
Little is known about the SLA, its goals, or its capacity to undertake armed 
combat or terrorist actions. However, many small groups have undertaken 
significant actions across the country, which have resulted in substantial damage 
and the loss of lives. 
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In October 2014 a group claiming to be the NLA attacked the Macedonian 
Government building with a rocket-propelled grenade.226 Its communique stated 
that it was dissatisfied with the progress in implementing the Framework 
Agreement and demanded international intervention in Macedonia.227 On 
21 April 2015 a police watchtower at the Macedonia-Kosovo border, in the 
mountain village of Gošince, was attacked by 40 heavily armed men wearing 
uniforms and claiming to be the NLA.228 Following this a two-day battle erupted 
between Macedonian police and Albanian militants (numbering between 40 and 
50 men) in the Kumanovo district of Diva Naselba on the weekend of 9-10 May 
2015. This ended with eight dead and 37 injured policemen, and 10 dead 
militants.229 More than 30 of the remaining militants surrendered to the police, 
though it was reported that some may have later escaped.230 
 
The fighting began when Macedonian police entered the neighbourhood and 
launched a counter-terrorist raid against the group. Prime Minister Gruevski 
claimed that the militants were preparing for terrorist attacks on government and 
civilian targets in order to destabilise the country (and that some of the militants 
had previously fought in other conflicts, including in the Middle East), while 
police spokesman Ivo Kotevski noted that the group’s founders were former 
NLA members.231  
 
Alternative explanations for the incident have arisen; however, they lack 
supporting evidence and are largely inconsistent. For example, Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov suggested that the attack on Kumanovo was orchestrated 
by the West in response to the Gruevski Government’s support for Russia and the 
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Russian-led Turkish Stream gas pipeline project.232 The implication was that the 
West was attempting to stop the Turkish Stream project by preventing its passage 
through Macedonia. However, this is unlikely because the pipeline would first 
need to pass through Turkey and Greece/Bulgaria before it reached Macedonia. 
If the West wanted to prevent its construction, it could have stopped it by 
applying pressure on its NATO allies without needing to orchestrate such an 
incident. 
 
Another was raised by the Macedonian opposition and later claimed by the 
Albanian defendants tried for the incident. This version suggests that the 
Gruevski Government planned and instigated the attack to deflect criticism from 
the wire-tapping crisis.233 However, given the Albanian commanders involved, it 
is difficult to imagine that they would help Gruevski (and Ahmeti) retain power. 
 
Within days of the battle, however, various Albanian media outlets published a 
press statement from a group calling itself the National Liberation Army, 
claiming responsibility for the attack. This may be the same group that has 
claimed responsibility for a number of other attacks over the past few years and 
is believed to be an off-shoot of Ahmeti’s NLA formed by disgruntled former 
commanders.234 Among the group in Kumanovo were also prominent members 
of the former KLA, including Muhamed Krasniqi (Commander Malisheva), 
Mirsad Ndrecaj (Commander NATO), Sami Ukshini (Commander Sokoli), Beg 
Rizaj (Commander Begu) and Deme Shehu (Juniku).235 
 
Later Ali Ahmeti admitted on Alsat-M television that DUI had been in regular 
contact with the leaders of the group for an entire year prior to the clashes in 
                                              
232 Anonymous, “Macedonia terrorist raid may be linked to country’s support of Russia – Lavrov”, RT, 
16 May 2015, www.rt.com (accessed 10 October 2017). 
233 S. Dimovski, “Macedonia Shootout Suspects Want Politicians to Testify”, Balkan Transitional Justice, 
6 October 2016, www.balkaninsight.com (accessed 10 October 2017). 
234 Anonymous, “Ahmeti: Ne mi se jasni motivate za napadot, pricina za nova vojna nema”, MKD.MK, 20 
May 2015, www.mkd.mk (accessed 25 May 2015). 
235 Anonymous, “Macedonia blames Kosovans for deadly Kumanovo clashes”, BBC, 11 May 2015. 
276 
 
May.236 Ahmeti claimed that they tried to convince their former NLA colleagues 
to refrain from undertaking any violent attacks. Ahmeti also claimed that he was 
unaware of how the group ended up in Kumanovo or what their exact aims were. 
Other reports suggest that both the Kosovo and Macedonian governments knew 
of the group’s existence and its intention to commit violent acts.237 Some of these 
alleged planned attacks included targets such as police stations, shopping malls, 
and sports events.238 
 
Within a few days of the Kumanovo clashes an Albanian named Suleyman 
Osman (Sulja) contacted the Albanian news service Almakos claiming to be one 
of the militants from Kumanovo who surrendered to Macedonian police and later 
escaped.239 According to him, his group was in contact with Ahmeti during the 
fighting and had asked him to negotiate a retreat from Kumanovo. He claimed 
that Ahmeti convinced them to surrender, assuring them that the OSCE would 
take them into custody and later release them to Kosovo.240 Osman noted that 
once they had surrendered, they were taken by Macedonian police rather than 
OSCE observers who were not even present and accused Ahmeti of betraying 
them.241 Ahmeti, speaking to Alsat-M, confirmed that the militants had called 
him seeking his intervention and that he persuaded them to surrender.242 
 
Reports suggest that this same group was responsible for the attack on the police 
station in Gošince where they briefly kidnaped a number of policemen and raided 
the armoury (some of these weapons were later found among the Kumanovo 
militants).243 Their stated demand in Gošince was apparently the creation of an 
Albanian state. The captured policemen later reported that the armed group had 
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told them, “[we are] from the NLA…we want our own state".244 The 
International Crisis Group claims that it obtained copies of written statements 
from the captured militants where they claimed that they wanted to reconstitute 
Macedonia as a federation with an Albanian republic.245 This would bring its 
aims into line with Halili’s group (ANDI) in seeking a federal state with two 
republics based on ethnicity. The same group is also possibly linked to earlier 
attacks in late 2014, including the shelling of the Government Building in Skopje 
on 28 October 2014.246 
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Private Security Firms 
Private security firms are another factor contributing to the intense distrust in 
Macedonia between the Macedonian and Albanian communities. The two key 
reasons are: a) most private security firms are mono-ethnic and b) many are 
either aligned to political parties or owned by individual politicians, nationalist 
crime bosses and/or other nationalist benefactors. Private security firms, 
however, also contribute to a lack of trust within ethnic communities. Page et al 
have noted that the private security industry in Macedonia tends to mirror the 
wider society in which it operates, with Albanian firms operating in areas with an 
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Albanian majority and not in those with a Macedonian majority, and vice 
versa.247 
 
There are approximately 145 registered private security firms in the country with 
up to 16,000 armed personnel employed by these firms.248 This means that there 
are twice as many private security personnel as there are police officers (7,600) 
in the country.249 The vast majority of personnel employed by private security 
firms have a police or military background and are either veterans of the 2001 
war, former conscripts, and members of paramilitaries or football ultras. In many 
cases they move fluidly between these organisations, working in multiple roles to 
earn additional income. For example, it has been reported that up to 30 per cent 
of the Macedonian Army’s Special Forces units are working for private security 
firms.250 Page et al have noted that ethnically based groups, formally from the 
security forces, have established their own security firms.251 They argue that this 
is a way of keeping armed paramilitary groups active following the end of a 
conflict and essentially acting as a reserve force should they need to be rapidly 
mobilised, pointing specifically to the Army Special Forces Battalion, the 
Wolves, and the Lions paramilitary group.252 
 
Two key examples in the Macedonian community include OSA Security and 
Kometa No. 1 Security Agency. OSA is owned by Branko Bojčevski, the former 
Director of Public Security within the Ministry of Interior.253 In 2005 it was OSA 
personnel, rather than the police, that arrested a number of VMRO-DPMNE 
                                              
247 M. Page et al., “SALW and Private Security Companies in South Eastern Europe: A Cause or Effect of 
Insecurity?”, South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 
2005, p. 52, www.saferworld.org.uk (accessed 9 September 2016). 
248 O. Bakreski and T. Miloševska, “Links between Private and Public Sectors in the Republic of 
Macedonia”, Varstvoslovje, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2009, p. 288. 
249 Langton (ed.), The Military Balance, p. 118. 
250 Tholens, S. and Strazzari, F., “Privatised Security in the post-war Western Balkans: The (in)visible 
hand on the monopoly of force”, Second Global International Studies Conference, University of 
Ljubljana, Ljubljana, 2008. 
251 Page et al, “SALW and Private Security Companies in South Eastern Europe”, p. 115. 
252 ibid. 
253 Branko Bojčevski simultaneously held his position as Director of OSA Security while Director for 
Public Security under the SDSM Government. Bojčevski’s position and contacts within the government 
ensured him large-scale state contracts and he aligned OSA with SDSM, see Tholens and Strazzari, 
“Privatised Security in the post-war Western Balkans”. 
280 
 
members linked to the Raštanski Lozja trial.254 Earlier in 2002 OSA personnel 
were also reportedly present during incidents that occurred in the process of 
privatising the ‘Kiro Ḱučuk’ factory in Veles where, in spite of a strong police 
presence, OSA personnel opened fire on strikers and protesters, wounding 
four.255 Kometa, owned by Zoran Jovanovski, is politically aligned to VMRO-
DPMNE. During 2001 its personnel worked fluidly between the security firm, 
paramilitaries and police reserve units. A number of its personnel took part in the 
Ljuboten massacre of Albanian civilians. How exactly they came to be a part of 
the force that attacked Ljuboten is uncertain, but when Johan Tarčulovski 
organised the force it was a motley assortment of police reservists, paramilitaries 
and (from the accounts at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia), it appears that Jovanovski aided Tarčulovski by supplying his own 
men.256 
 
Politically aligned security firms have also been accused of a host of electoral 
scandals, including ballot stuffing, extortion, and extra-judicial killings.257 Pavle 
Trajanov, a former Interior Minister, claims that private security firms are 
integral to political party election campaigns – they not only maintain security at 
various events such as political rallies, but they organise them, maintain 
discipline among party members, and cause a large number of irregularities.258 
For example, in 2005 OSA was caught stuffing ballot boxes for SDSM in Ohrid, 
while during the 2006 Parliamentary elections a street fight broke out between 
the employees of Lupus (backed by VMRO-DPMNE) and NIKOB (backed by 
SDSM).259 In a 2000 local election 22 year old Fatmir Jakupi was killed by DPA 
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bodyguards at an electoral booth in Kondovo because he reportedly refused to fill 
ballot boxes with fake ballots.260 
 
The head of the Macedonian Rifle Association, where security personnel are 
trained in firearms use, has claimed that the 30 largest private security firms in 
the country are owned by former high ranking police officers and that several 
local mayors also have their own firms.261 Security firms such as these have 
caused not only distrust between communities, but within communities. They 
largely act as a legalised security force for organised crime, and undertake 
extortion and racketeering activities. For example, the head of a local school in 
Struga was told by the mayor that he would need to hire VIP Security, an 
Albanian-owned firm, to protect the school from terrorism – a service that the 
parents are required to pay for.262 
 
Thales and Strazzari explain that the private security sector in Macedonia is 
sustained by a near feudal clan system comprised of a complex web of ethnic 
paramilitary groups and ex-combatants that have been integrated into party-
affiliated parallel security structures.263 
Football Ultras 
During the Balkan wars of the 1990s football ultras delivered many recruits to 
the paramilitaries in Bosnia and Croatia, of which the most notorious were 
perhaps Želko Ražnatović’s (Arkan) Tigers, a paramilitary formed out of Red 
Star Belgrade’s ultras. Like many other Macedonians, Johan Tarčulovski 
followed a similar path. He was once a leader of the Komiti, the Vardar Skopje 
FC ultras who are linked to the ruling VMRO-DPMNE. He later formed a youth 
wing for VMRO-DPMNE – the Union of Youth Forces (UYF), and in 1993 he 
was selected as President of the UYF for Čair municipality. In 1998 he was 
selected as a personal bodyguard for the then Prime Minister Ljubčo Georgievski 
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and in 1999 as the personal bodyguard for the then President Boris Trajkovski. 
Tarčulovski was officially a police officer acting as an Escort Inspector in the 
President’s Security Unit in the Ministry of Interior.264 However, like many 
others, he had close links with various paramilitaries and continues to openly 
associate with groups such as Todor Aleksandrov and a lesser known group 
called Hristo Uzunov based in Ohrid. 
 
Most outbreaks of violence between football ultras (outside of the stadium) are 
linked to political events. Football ultras have been involved in the mass protests 
and riots across Skopje and other cities over the past few years and in some 
instances were involved in organising them. A case in point is the battle over 
Kale in 2011. Kale is a medieval Skopje Fortress built in the 6th century. 
Archaeological excavations began in 2006, and after the foundations of a 13th 
century church were found within the complex the Cultural Heritage Protection 
Office approved a project to restore it. Its purpose was to function as a museum, 
though its appearance would be that of the original church. Ethnic Albanians, 
supported by DUI, claimed the site also contained an older Illyrian structure and 
that, by virtue of their claimed Illyrian ancestry, the site should be theirs. They 
were also strongly opposed to the church-like structure being re-built. This 
resulted in hundreds of Macedonian and Albanian football ultras fighting each 
other with knives and stones.265A young Albanian from the Šverceri claimed that 
“this is a real war…at the stadium we fight with words, on the street we fight 
with fists. We defend our national identity with our blood”.266 A Macedonian 
ultra from the Komiti posited similar nationalist views with a religious 
undertone, asking “when will they stop dishonouring us? No one destroys a 
church in our Orthodox country!”267 
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Manasiev, a journalist with Balkan Insight’s Investigative Reporting Network, 
notes that the larger political parties all have strong ties with football clubs and 
their ultras, claiming that ultras “regard themselves as the foot soldiers of the 
nationalist causes that dominate politics”.268 Manasiev points out that while 
football hooligans in the West are stigmatised, the ultras in Macedonia generally 
expect their activities to enhance their status.269 One Albanian, leader of the 
Ballisti (Shkendija FC), noted that “the doors of local government, companies 
and political parties are always open to us”.270 Ivan Anastasovski, a former board 
member of the Macedonian Football Federation (MFF), says that political parties 
see the ultras as a potential base for voters and activists during elections, and in 
return for mobilising their members the leaders of the ultras are provided with 
jobs in the public sector, political parties and even the security services.271 Ultras 
from Komiti, for example, also formed part of the cadre of the Lions paramilitary 
and possibly of Paramilitary 2000.272 
 
Table 15. Football Ultras in Macedonia 
Ultras Group Claimed Size City (Club) Ethnicity 
Komiti 900 Skopje (Vardar Skopje FC) Macedonian 
Čkembari 2,000 Bitola (Pelister FC) Macedonian 
Vojvodi 300 Tetovo (Teteks FC) Macedonian 
Majmuni 100 Prilep (Pobeda Prilep FC) Macedonian 
Lozari 800 Kavadarci (Tikveš FC) Macedonian 
Legija V Undetermined Skopje (Rabotnički FC) Macedonian 
Divizija Hanrievo 900 Skopje (Ǵorče Petrov FC) Macedonian 
Ballistët 4,400 Tetovo (Shkëndija FC) Albanian 
Šverceri Undetermined Skopje (Shkupi FC) Albanian 
Source: Author’s Research. 
 
Football ultras are an underrated, but dangerous element within inter-ethnic 
relations. They consist of young and ill-tempered men, highly fluid in their social 
and political circles and linked to paramilitaries, organised crime, and political 
parties. They are both easily mobilised by political elites for their own personal 
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269 A. Manasiev, “Balkans’ political football keeps hooligans close to heart of power”, The Guardian, 
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or party interests, and highly unpredictable and capable of undertaking 
independent action that can spiral out of control. The battle over Kale, violent 
protests, riots, and street fights that have caused significant damage to public and 
private property, along with the deaths and injuries that have resulted from these 
actions, are a testament to the volatility of the ultras. 
 
More broadly, the large number of ethnically motivated men and the groups that 
can mobilise them are a two-edged sword. On the one hand, they provide security 
and protection where it would otherwise not exist. On the other hand, they 
contribute to the lack of trust and commitment between the two ethnic groups, 






Ethnic outbidding, or ethnic competition, theories posit that “politicians create 
platforms and programs to ‘outbid’ their opponents on the anti-minority stance 
adopted”.1 The literature on ethnic outbidding predicts that competition in ethnic-
based party systems like Macedonia’s compels all parties to take up mono-ethnic 
causes because a party of only one ethnic group can rarely win votes from other 
ethnic groups and must instead compete for votes within its own ethnic 
community.2 In these cases, political parties vying for the vote of one ethnic 
group can often only distinguish themselves through radical rhetoric, and this 
dynamic usually advantages nationalist parties.3 Koneska has contended that 
ethnic outbidding becomes a spiralling process of intra-bloc party competition 
where each party claims to be the most effective defender of the bloc’s interests.4 
 
It is argued that ethnic outbidding marginalises minority communities and 
exacerbates tensions leading to minorities losing confidence in state institutions 
and the majority. This would promote reactive nationalism leading to ethnic 
rivalry and conflict. DeVotta, for example, argued that the political structure of a 
state is the most important factor in encouraging, or discouraging, ethnic 
outbidding. He held the view that multi-ethnic political coalitions elicit ethnic 
coexistence, while encouraged competition between ethnic parties engenders 
ethnic outbidding.5 This, however, is not necessarily the case in Macedonia, 
where the ruling Macedonian majority party has always ruled in coalition with an 
Albanian minority party. However, these coalitions have always been formed 
post-election, while elections have been contended along ethnic lines rather than 
                                              
1 DeVotta, “From ethnic outbidding to ethnic conflict”, pp. 141-159. 
2 P. Pickering, “Explaining Support for Non-nationalist Parties in Post-conflict Societies in the Balkans”, 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 61, No. 4, 2009, p. 574. 
3 P. Pickering, “Explaining Support for Non-nationalist Parties in Post-conflict Societies in the Balkans”, 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 61, Iss. 4, 2009, pp. 574-575. 
4 Koneska, “Vetoes, Ethnic Bidding, Decentralisation”, p. 35. 
5 DeVotta, “From ethnic outbidding to ethnic conflict”, pp. 144.  
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through multi-ethnic electoral coalitions. Further, ethnic outbidding is a common 
feature of the Macedonian political scene not only among Macedonian politicians 
but Albanian ones who also need to compete for votes within their own ethnic 
group. 
 
Macedonian anocracy is important to consider as well. As Fareed Zakaria 
pointed out, anocracies (or illiberal democracies as he calls them) have the 
potential to provide for legitimately free and fair democratic elections; however, 
these will not necessarily produce liberal governments.6 He noted that liberalism 
is not about the procedures for selecting government, but rather the philosophy 
and practice of protecting an individual’s autonomy and dignity against coercion, 
whatever the source – state, church, or society.7 Zakaria contended that in 
countries like Macedonia, where ethnic outbidding is a normative practice, 
compromise seems impossible – one can bargain on material issues like housing, 
hospitals, and welfare, “but how does one split the difference on a national 
religion? Political competition that is so divisive can rapidly degenerate into 
violence”.8 
 
Since independence political parties in Macedonia have been highly ethnicised. 
The largest Macedonian parties are generally made up of Macedonian members, 
with limited membership coming from other ethnic groups such as Turks, Roma, 
and Vlachs. This is the same for the main Albanian political parties and those of 
the Turkish, Serb, and Roma communities. In addition, the first religious-based 
party, the Party for a European Future (PEF), caters solely to Macedonian-
speaking Muslims. 
 
                                              





Table 16. Parliamentary Seats, 1990-2014 




38 - 62 33 45 63 56 61 
SDSM 
Coalition 
52 95 27 60 32 27 42 34 
PDP 22 10 14 2 3 - - - 
DPA - 4 10 7 11 11 8 7 
DUI - - - 16 13 18 15 19 
NDR - - - - - - 2 1 
Others 8 11 6 2 16 1 - 1 
Total 120 120 120 120 120 120 123 123 
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, [website], 2016, http://www.ipu.org [accessed 
13 May 2016] 
Note: 
1. The coalition that formed government is highlighted in red in the relevant year. The Albanian 
party that joined the governing coalition is highlighted in green in the relevant year. 
2. Representation in the Macedonian Parliament was increased from 120 members to 123 
members in 2011. The additional electoral districts are: a) Australia and Asia; b) Europe and 
Africa; and c) the Americas. 
 
Albanian and Macedonian political parties compete over the votes of their 
respective communities and cases of cross-community voting in both the 
municipal and national legislative elections are extremely rare. The only 
exceptions are the presidential elections where the non-Macedonian communities 
are too small to have their own candidate elected. In all other instances an 
unspoken agreement of non-interference seems to apply,9 though given the social 
distance between the two communities it is highly unlikely that members of one 
community would vote for the political parties of the other community in any 
significant numbers. 
 
Generally, the two largest Macedonian political parties, VMRO-DPMNE and the 
Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), have followed a strategy of 
attempting to ethnically outbid each other, while co-opting Albanian political 
representation by inviting it into coalition governments. Albanian elites, on the 
other hand, have tried to work within government as this is the easiest way to 
obtain resources for their own group goals, and disrupt it when in opposition.  
                                              
9 Ragaru, Macedonia, p. 25. 
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The First Decade: 1991-2001 
Ethnic outbidding in the Macedonian community occurs mostly between the two 
largest political parties, VMRO-DPMNE and SDSM. However, smaller political 
parties and other political associations also contribute to the phenomenon. The 
practice generally occurs during election campaigns and when tensions are 
heightened between the two communities over a specific political or religious 
issue, or inter-ethnic violence such as the Smilkovci executions. 
 
VMRO-DPMNE was founded prior to independence on 17 June 1990 after the 
political system was liberalised by the former Yugoslav authorities. Ljubčo 
Georgievski, then only 24, was elected leader of the new party. Along with the 
Movement for All-Macedonian Action (MAAK), formed on 4 February 1990, 
VMRO-DPMNE was the only political party in Macedonia calling for 
independence at that time. It claims to be the ideological successor of the anti-
Ottoman Macedonian liberation movement, Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organisation (VMRO), founded in 1893.10 From 1990 to 1995 the party certainly 
held to the principles of what is locally known as Makedonizam (Macedonism), 
the idea that the Macedonian people should constitute a free and sovereign nation 
with their own independent and democratically-governed nation-state. Its stance 
was also staunchly anti-Yugoslav (along with anti-Serb and anti-Greek) and anti-
communist. Most of its members and supporters were from families that opposed 
Yugoslav rule and communism,11 and during the early 1990s VMRO-DPMNE 
had almost universal support from the Macedonian diaspora. 
 
VMRO-DPMNE’s immediate priorities in the first half of the 1990s were to 
remove Yugoslav influences from Macedonia and consolidate its independence, 
and to define the status of the Albanian community within the constitution. The 
party envisaged Macedonia as a nation-state of the Macedonian people with 
room for minorities whose fundamental human rights would be respected. It 
                                              
10 VMRO-DPMNE, [website], www.vmro-dpmne.org.mk (accessed 10 May 2016). 
11 E. Friedman, “Party System, Electoral Systems and Minority Representation in the Republic of 
Macedonia from 1990 to 2002”, in Bloed, A., European Yearbook of Minority Issues, Vol. 2, 2002/3, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2004, p. 233. 
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rejected outright Albanian claims to ethnic or group rights and their demands for 
co-constitutive nation status. VMRO-DPMNE, like most Macedonians, saw the 
Albanian community as untrustworthy at best and secessionists seeking to carve 
out Macedonian territory at worst.12  During the 1990 election campaign, 
Georgievski famously stated that “we will cut the claws off the Albanian eagle”13  
 
While developing the 1991 Constitution SDSM had envisaged that Albanian 
could become a second official language of administration. However, VMRO-
DPMNE attacked them and questioned their commitment to the Macedonian 
people. It was an easy victory as it was impossible for a Macedonian party to 
allow Albanian to become an official language. In addition, it was only two years 
earlier that the SDSM leadership (under the banner of the League of 
Communists) removed legislative rights relating to the public use of the Albanian 
language and a reversal of this policy was politically untenable. During the 
transition to independence VMRO-DPMNE was easily able to outbid SDSM 
among the Macedonian constituency, frequently accusing the former communists 
of being too lenient on Albanian extremist demands. 
 
VMRO-DPMNE was unable to form government even though it had gained the 
largest proportion of votes (31.7 per cent) during the first free parliamentary 
elections in November 1990.14 In order to do so, it needed to enter into a 
coalition with either SDSM or the Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity 
(PDP). VMRO-DPMNE refused to do either as it saw both options in stark 
contradiction to its own principles and ideological outlook, and viewed both 
parties as detrimental to the Macedonian national cause. Further, it boycotted the 
1994 parliamentary elections citing wide-scale fraud undertaken by SDSM in the 
first round.15 This ensured that it remained outside of government until 1998. 
 
                                              
12 Albanian demands for greater collective rights and a constituent Republic of Kosovo (within the former 
Yugoslav federation) had begun during the late 1960s and culminated in violent protests during March 
and April 1981. The Albanians in Macedonia joined their ethnic kin in demanding greater rights within 
Macedonia and the option to be included in a future Kosovo republic. 
13 Shea, Macedonia and Greece, p. 277. 
14 Rossos, Macedonia and the Macedonians, p. 263. 
15 Shea, Macedonia and Greece, pp. 247-254. 
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SDSM is the successor to the League of Communists of Macedonia (LCM), the 
Macedonian branch of the ruling League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). 
The LCM was reconstituted into the League of Communists of Macedonia – 
Party for Democratic Renewal (LCM-PDR) prior to the first free elections in 
1990 and then again into its current form, the Social Democratic Union of 
Macedonia at its 11th Congress on 21 April 1991. It is a social democratic party 
that attracts progressive voters but also many unreformed Leninists and Titoists 
among its membership. It was not until 1998 that SDSM distanced itself from 
orthodox Leninism and the repressive aspects of the previous one-party system.16 
 
SDSM claims to be the ideological heir to the First Conference of Macedonian 
Socialists convened on 3 June 1900 and to Vasil Glavinov’s Macedonian 
Revolutionary Social Democratic Union (that SDSM claims fought for an 
independent Macedonian state),17 but which actually envisaged a Macedonian 
republic within a Balkan Socialist Federation. SDSM also claims roots from 
VMRO and specifically its left-leaning factions led by Goce Delčev and Nikola 
Karev.18 However, its key historical association is to the Anti-Fascist Assembly 
for the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) convened on 2 August 1944 
after the liberation of Macedonia from German occupation.19 This is considered 
by Macedonian socialists and social democrats as the foundation of the modern 
Macedonian state and the realisation of the Macedonian people’s desire for 
freedom (albeit within the Yugoslav framework). 
 
The Social Democrats and their predecessors in the LCM were far from the 
internationalists that they claimed to be. They were still heavily influenced by 
Macedonian nationalism that was encouraged by Yugoslav authorities in 
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contradiction to Yugoslavism and socialist patriotism.20 During the 1980s and the 
1990s the LCM and the SDSM leadership were brutal in their dealings with the 
Albanian community. On the one hand, SDSM under Kiro Gligorov conveyed 
conciliatory messages about inter-ethnic cooperation and minority rights, and 
PDP and the National Democratic Party (NDP) were welcomed into the broad 
governing coalition. Due to his reliance on the Albanian parties to maintain an 
SDSM-led government, Gligorov even agreed to amend the Constitution in 
February 1993 after a year of negotiations. The proposed amendments would 
remove references to the Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC) and the Albanian 
language would have been recognised as an official language alongside 
Macedonian.21 VMRO-DPMNE refused to accept the proposed changes and 
without its votes the necessary two-thirds majority to amend the Constitution was 
unachievable. 22 
 
On the other hand, Albanians were considered a fifth column by SDSM and were 
the constant target of the unreformed secret police. Prior to the October 1994 
elections Gligorov ensured that he would not need to rely on Albanian parties to 
form government by changing electoral voting boundaries, which saw Albanian 
political parties drop from a total of 24 seats to 14 seats in the 120-member 
Parliament.23 VMRO-DPMNE had boycotted the second round of voting citing 
an extraordinary large number of irregularities, which allowed SDSM to win an 
absolute majority in Parliament of 95 seats.24 Now that he was free of the 
Albanian political parties, Gligorov had no intention of amending the 
Constitution. However, SDSM maintained a conciliatory tone and included 
Albanian parties in the governing coalition, along with promoting more 
Albanians into high positions across the judiciary, the army and the diplomatic 
service. Again, this was largely an attempt to co-opt Albanian political elites and, 
                                              
20 Yugoslavism was meant to be a supranational identity for the Balkan nations, underpinned by the 
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21 T. Buck, “Fear and Loathing in Macedonia: Ethnic Nationalism and the Albanian Problem”, Institute 
on East Central Europe, Columbia University, New York, 1996. 
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through them, the wider Albanian community. This was considered unacceptable 
by many Macedonians and resulted in a considerable erosion of SDSM’s popular 
support.25 Even though SDSM won the 1994 election, it was largely due to 
VMRO-DPMNE’s boycott. Voter turnout reached only 54.7 per cent and of those 
that voted, only 53.5 per cent voted for the SDSM-led Alliance for Macedonia.26 
 
The events surrounding the Tetovo University in 1994 (Chapter Eight) showed 
that there were limits even to SDSM’s willingness to meet Albanian demands. 
The then Prime Minister, Branko Crvenkovski (SDSM), called the death of an 
Albanian activist ‘tragic’, but firmly warned that there were consequences for 
working outside the legal framework and going against the Government’s 
decision.27 He described the leaders of the university as ‘self-declared messiahs’ 
with no regard for human life and pledged that “all activities violating the 
Constitution and law” would be punished.28 However, VMRO-DPMNE found an 
opportunity even in this instance to accuse SDSM of pro-Albanian leanings. 
Dosta Dimovska, its then Vice President, claimed that it was a fabricated affair 
between SDSM and its Albanian coalition partners with the purpose of 
intimidating Macedonians in the western part of the country to accept Gligorov’s 
policy of retreat and constant concessions to the Albanian community.29 
Dimovska went on to claim that Gligorov was planning to provide the Albanians 
with independence so that he could then engineer the annexation of the rest of 
Macedonia by Serbia.30 The heightened tensions around the use of the Albanian 
language led to violent confrontations between Macedonians and Albanians on 
the streets of Skopje, and other acts of violence.31 
 
PDP was one of the first two Albanian political parties founded in Macedonia. It 
was established in Skopje on 15 April 1990 by Nevzat Halili. The other was 
                                              
25 Rossos, Macedonia and the Macedonians, p. 274. 
26 State Electoral Commission, [website], www.sec.mk (accessed 12 May 2016). 
27 Shea, Macedonia and Greece, p. 269. 
28 ibid. 
29 ibid. 
30 ibid. VMRO-DPMNE has consistently claimed that SDSM is a pro-Serbian party that would like to see 
Macedonia either absorbed into Serbia or join a renewed Yugoslav federation. 
31 International Crisis Group, Macedonia Report: The Politics of Ethnicity and Conflict, 1997, p. 12, 
www.crisisgroup.org (accessed 20 May 2003). 
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NDP, founded by Ilijaz Halili. NDP was a nationalist alternative to PDP based in 
Tetovo. However, it largely cooperated with PDP until it eventually sided and 
merged with the Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians (PDPA) to form 
the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) in 1997. 
 
PDP was largely considered to be the more moderate of the Albanian parties, 
particularly because it was willing to join the governing coalition with SDSM 
(1992-1998) and work within the Macedonian political system. In actual fact, its 
policy platform and actions, particularly during the early 1990s, were highly 
contentious. It was PDP that organised the Albanian referendum on autonomy, 
boycotted the Macedonian referendum on independence, and is believed to have 
established the All-Albanian Army (AAA) paramilitary group. For the most part, 
its focus was on defending what it saw as Albanian interests and minority 
rights.32 Since 1998, however, PDP’s popular support has been eroded and it 
currently has no elected members of parliament. 
 
DPA grew out of a division with PDP at its February 1994 Congress. Many 
members were dissatisfied with what they saw as slow progress in obtaining 
greater minority rights for the Albanian community, and were opposed to 
working with Macedonian political parties whom they viewed as oppressors.33 
They were also dissatisfied with the party leader, Abdurrahman Aliti, whom they 
accused of being a collaborator with the Macedonian Government.34 This wing of 
the party, led by Arben Xhaferi and Menduh Thaçi, established PDPA. The 
newly established PDPA merged with the NDP on 4 July 1997 to form the 
current DPA. DPA was a nationalist challenge to PDP and eventually surpassed 
it in popular support and joined the VMRO-DPMNE led coalition government 
(1998-2002). Its platform is largely focused on Albanian minority rights and the 
development of a new settlement to replace the Framework Agreement. 
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Abdurahman Aliti, a former PDP leader, dismissed accusations of treason for 
working with the Macedonian government and asserted that PDP’s participation 
in government kept more nationalist Macedonian parties out of power.35 In order 
to maintain a semblance that PDP would defend Albanian interests, Aliti 
regularly warned of ‘grave consequences’ if the Macedonian Government failed 
to satisfy Albanian demands.36 However, the failure to actually achieve anything 
for their constituents, other than build a system of patronage funded through the 
state budget, played into the hands of DPA who called for an end to all 
participation within the Macedonian political system.37 As inter-ethnic relations 
deteriorated during the 1990s, a growing number of Albanians switched their 
support from Aliti to Xhaferi, whom they considered less willing to make 
concessions and likely to do more to satisfy Albanian demands.38 
 
During the mid-1990s Xhaferi “resorted at first to populism in order to build a 
political basis for his party, while the Albanian representatives [PDP] in the 
Macedonian assembly stressed their own achievements for the Albanian cause”.39 
Xhaferi threatened to take the Albanian community underground numerous 
times,40 a reference to the Kosovo Albanians who had created a parallel state in 
their province. As DPA began to capture PDP’s political base, PDP was forced to 
adopt a more confrontational approach with Macedonian officials in the coalition 
government.41 However, the two parties were not at odds with pragmatism. At 
the 1998 parliamentary elections PDP and DPA formed an electoral alliance and 
fielded joint candidates in order to maximise the impact of the Albanian vote.42 
Between them they managed to elect 24 candidates to parliament, including 14 
from PDP and 10 from DPA. The electoral alliance was short-lived and DPA 
joined a coalition government led by VMRO-DPMNE. 
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DPA took the opportunity to attack PDP after Rufi Osmani was sentenced to 
prison for the Albanian flag incidents in Gostivar in July 1997. DPA organised 
5,000 protesters to march in Skopje, in addition to protests in Debar, Gostivar, 
and Tetovo, calling for Osmani’s release and the resignation of PDP ministers 
and parliamentarians. The protesters chanted ‘Free Osmani’, ‘Away with 
Traitors’ and ‘Leave your Chairs’ (in reference to the comfortable leather chairs 
used by Cabinet Ministers and directed at PDP).43 By the 1998 elections PDP 
was forced to distance itself from the governing coalition in an effort to 
strengthen its electoral position, which was being threatened by DPA’s overtly 
nationalist policies. 
 
In 1995 Georgievski had decided that VMRO-DPMNE’s ideological stance 
would never enable them to obtain power. He calculated that the ideological 
divisions among Macedonians, coupled with weak ethnonational identity across a 
large part of the Macedonian community, would not enable him to gain enough 
votes to win government outright. In a reversal of conventional Balkan wisdom 
and in contradiction to the theories of ethnic outbidding, VMRO-DPMNE moved 
away from its founding principles and nationalist ideology. Macedonism was for 
all effective purposes declared dead by the party leadership and a ‘moderate’ 
stance was required to secure government.44 At its May 1995 Congress 
Georgievski announced: 
We were building an image of a party which refused to have anything to 
do with ex-communists or extreme parties of Albanians, but we lost the 
sense of pragmatism and missed a chance to form a government…we are 
aware that, despite the huge support of our party, we cannot come out as 
absolute winners of any elections by ourselves.45 
 
Georgievski did not win universal support within his party for this change of 
direction. Ordinary members were particularly incensed at what they considered 
                                              
43 International Crisis Group, The Albanian Question in Macedonia,  p. 8. 
44 VMRO-DPMNE Official, Interview with Author, 21 July 2013. 
45 Shea, Macedonia and Greece, p. 276. 
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was a centuries-old struggle to establish a Macedonian state, not a state that 
would have to be shared with Albanians or Serbian collaborators (in relation to 
SDSM and other communist ideologues).46 Many within the party saw 
Georgievski’s shift as a calculated move for purely personal political gain by a 
man that had grown impatient with having been locked out of government.47 As a 
result, a number of factions split from the party and formed new political parties 
all claiming to be the true heirs to the original VMRO.48 
 
VMRO-DPMNE toned down its nationalist rhetoric in the lead-up to the 1998 
Parliamentary elections. However, it still maintained a core of its nationalist 
policies that it was not yet prepared to part with. For example, the party platform 
continued to include references to what it saw as an Albanian population 
explosion. It called the Albanian community’s natality rate a characteristic of the 
‘third world’ and promised to adopt an ‘appropriate population policy’, which 
would include reducing high birth rates and preventing migration into the country 
from Albania, Kosovo, and Serbia’s Sandzak region.49 It also advocated 
increasing the amount of instruction in the Macedonian language at all levels of 
education, as well as abolishing quotas in secondary and post-secondary 
education.50 In addition, while it explicitly advocated a civic society, its electoral 
program clearly stated that VMRO-DPMNE considered the Macedonian nation 
as the bearer of Macedonian statehood;51 in other words, the state was founded 
by the Macedonians and for the Macedonians. The party program went on to list 
a number of responsibilities for minorities, including respect for the Constitution 
and the laws of the state, respect for the rights of the majority, especially in areas 
                                              
46 VMRO-DPMNE Official, Interview with Author, 21 July 2013. 
47 ibid. VMRO-DPMNE had formed a pre-election coalition with Vasil Tupurkovski’s left-leaning 
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where it is in a minority, and abstaining from activities which are directed against 
the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of the state.52 
 
While the party leadership had (incorrectly) determined that nationalism was an 
exhausted ideology in Macedonia, its membership viewed the political landscape 
very differently, and so did the broader Macedonian public. SDSM was aware of 
the nationalist current within Macedonian society and it was also well aware of 
the fact that it had been able to form government at both the 1990 and 1994 
elections only because VMRO-DPMNE refused to work with parties that did not 
share its ideological and philosophical purism and boycotted the latter election.53 
By 1998 the Social Democrats had largely lost the little support that they had 
commanded and SDSM “started to harden its position towards the Albanian 
community in an effort to confront the challenge presented by the strengthening 
VMRO-DPMNE”.54 The 1998 election was unsalvageable for SDSM. Nearly a 
decade of corruption, failed democratic reforms and an economic transition that 
had barely begun was enough for the electorate to abandon them, regardless of 
VMRO-DPMNE’s ideological position. 
 
The 1998 election resulted in a VMRO-DPMNE-led government, in coalition 
with two unusual choices – the former communist functionary Vasil 
Tupurkovski’s Democratic Alternative (DA) and the radical nationalist DPA led 
by Arben Xhaferi. Once in government VMRO-DPMNE faced the same 
problems in regards to its Albanian coalition partner as did SDSM before them. 
While SDSM generally refrained from inserting statements into its policy 
documents that could be perceived as anti-Albanian,55 it was now free to take an 
even harder nationalist stance and accused VMRO-DPMNE of being too soft 
with DPA (DPA had argued that the Albanian community should pursue either 
autonomy within a federalised Macedonia or outright independence). In 1999, for 
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example, former Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski accused VMRO-DPMNE 
of participating in an Albanian-Bulgarian conspiracy to dismantle the state: 
Today, Georgievski and [KLA spokesman] Demaci are meeting in 
Skopje, and in Sofia Xhaferi and [Bulgarian Prime Minister] Kostov are 
debating the future of Macedonia, the future of all of us. This is the same 
Demaci who declared that the goal of the KLA is the creation of Greater 
Albania, in the borders of which are also included parts of Macedonia. 
This is the same Xhaferi who asserted that a Macedonian people does not 
exist, that it is the invention of Gligorov and the company around him, 
and that we are a population which steals others’ history, the history of 
neighbouring states.56 
 
By 2000 VMRO-DPMNE was already plagued by accusations from within its 
own membership that it was catering to the Albanian community and that 
excessive concessions had been provided to them.57 In particular, the issue of the 
Tetovo University had been resolved between VMRO-DPMNE and DPA in 
favour of the Albanian community, which was strongly opposed by the 
Macedonians. The newly elected President, Boris Trajkovski (VMRO-DPMNE), 
bore most of the blame as his election relied on the support of the Albanian vote 
and many Macedonians saw the settlement of the university issue as a reward.58 
SDSM took advantage of this mood and began to publicly speculate that there 
was a secret agreement between VMRO-DPMNE and DPA to divide the country 
into ethnic enclaves and that Albanian political leaders were collaborating with 
their colleagues in Kosovo and Albania (the insinuation was that they were 
planning to create a ‘greater Albania’).59 
 
Until 1998 DPA had accused PDP of treason for participating in both the 
Macedonian political system and in a coalition government. After the 1998 
parliamentary elections DPA found itself in the reverse situation. While DPA 
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was forced to moderate some of its rhetoric in government, PDP successfully 
used the same tactics and accusations that were once levelled against it.60 
Ironically, by 2000 many whom had originally left PDP to follow Arben Xhaferi 
were rumoured to be ready either to return to the now more nationalist (as they 
perceived it) PDP or establish a whole new political party.61 They accused 
Xhaferi of having become too soft since joining government.62 Nevertheless, 
Xhaferi’s moderated stance on many issues saw the rise of several smaller 
nationalist parties, including Mevaip Ramadani’s Democratic Alliance of 
Albanians (DAA), which claimed that DPA was unable to achieve any of its 
promises.63 
 
The balance between the two larger parties had completely shifted and DPA was 
now able to fill positions within the state administration and public enterprises 
with its own supporters at the expense of PDP supporters.64 This included the 
replacement of several police chiefs in Albanian-populated municipalities.65 The 
same state budgets and posts that had once driven the PDP party machine now 
enabled Xhaferi to establish his own dominance. Had it not been for the National 
Liberation Army (NLA) and its political successor, the Democratic Union for 
Integration (DUI), to overthrow the political domination of both older parties, it’s 
likely that DPA would have enjoyed further electoral success based on its more 
strident nationalism and newly established patronage networks. 
War and the Implementation of the Framework Agreement 
The 2001 war saw a complete breakdown in inter-party relations between 
VMRO-DPMNE (which held government until the 2002 elections) and SDSM. 
As one observer noted, the two parties seemed to be running a long election 
campaign rather than defending the state in wartime.66 The practice of ethnic 
outbidding reached its height with explicit and open warfare between the two 
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Macedonian parties. At the beginning of the war Branko Crvenkovski (SDSM) 
blamed VMRO-DPMNE for the appearance of the NLA, accusing the 
Georgievski Government of being incompetent and suggesting that it was unable 
to effectively use the military and intelligence services to protect the country.67 
Vlado Bučkovski (SDSM) reiterated the accusations of incompetence: 
This is the government’s final warning that it should not turn a blind eye 
to the establishment of paramilitary formations in Macedonia. Alongside 
a political crisis, of the government’s own making, the state now faces a 
security crisis. 68 
 
In the government’s defence, DPA levelled the accusation that the ‘terrorist 
actions’ of the NLA were in fact coordinated by SDSM with the sole purpose of 
bringing down the government.69 Even after a Government of National Unity was 
formed,70 divisions between the two Macedonian parties on how to deal with the 
war were significant. Prime Minister Georgievski and Interior Minister 
Boškovski insisted that they would not negotiate with terrorists and believed that 
the armed forces could defeat the NLA militarily. Branko Crvenkovski argued 
that ‘reasonable’ force should be used in conjunction with negotiations, but his 
idea of ‘reasonable’ force was to leave large swaths of Macedonian territory at 
risk of NLA attack unprotected and this did not sit well with Macedonians, 
especially those living in the war zone. 
 
In general, Macedonian politicians did not want to be perceived as appeasing the 
Albanian rebels; rather, a demonstration of their willingness to protect the 
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country was necessary to maintain the support of the Macedonian community.71 
Ljubomir Frčkovski argued that: 
Trajkovski played a crucial role for the peaceful solution of conflict, 
because he was the only politician who could take the responsibility to 
take care of negotiations. No other Macedonian politician wanted to lead 
the peace negotiations with Albanian parties because they thought they 
would lose the elections if they did so.72 
 
The 2004 referendum on decentralisation (Chapter Five) saw a strong increase in 
inter-ethnic tensions, which were already high after the previous few years of 
implementing the Framework Agreement. Political leaders on both sides engaged 
in strong rhetoric. Condemnation of the now SDSM-led government (2002-2006) 
was strong, not only from VMRO-DPMNE, but also from many smaller 
Macedonian parties, civil society groups, and the media. Nikola Gruevski, having 
assumed leadership of VMRO-DPMNE in 2003, declared that the leaders of 
SDSM were guilty of high treason against Macedonian national interests for the 
sole purpose of personal political gain.73 He called on the nation to oppose the 
territorial redistribution plan, calling it a historical duty: 
We have a historical duty to oppose this evil treason against the Republic 
of Macedonia. SDSM has agreed to everything demanded by DUI. The 
future of our country is at stake. This treasonous act was undertaken by a 
number of careerists in the government…they did not win a mandate for 
treason. VMRO-DPMNE has nothing against the Albanians and the 
Albanian language. However, there are radical groups with hidden 
agendas that want something different, not integration. Struga and Kičevo 
will become municipalities with a majority Albanian population. Ethnic 
enclaves are being shaped, which will mean Macedonians will emigrate 
from them.74 
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VMRO-DPMNE’s Executive Committee called the plan for territorial 
redistribution a catastrophe and announced that it would be joining the 
referendum campaign organised by the World Macedonian Congress (WMC), 
led by Todor Petrov.75 Blaže Ristevski, from the Macedonian Academy of 
Sciences and Arts, also denounced the SDSM/DUI plan calling it an atrocity and 
claimed that there would be migrations between regions creating mono-ethnic 
enclaves.76 His colleague, Katica Kulavkova, stated that SDSM “devalued the 
needs and vital interests of citizens from all ethnic communities, except the 
Albanians”.77 The SDSM leadership even came under criticism from its own 
party membership. Tito Petkovski, SDSM representative from Struga, denounced 
the leadership for undertaking secret negotiations with DUI on matters that 
brought into question the stability of the country.78 Other than the four members 
that took part in the secret negotiations, it was claimed that the entire Central 
Committee of SDSM was in revolt against the agreement.79 
 
The two opposition Albanian parties, DPA and PDP, did not help the situation 
with their radical pronouncements during the referendum campaign, which 
reinforced the idea among Macedonians that the municipal revisions were part of 
a larger agenda to either federalise Macedonia or carve out Albanian territory, 
and that they would undertake this project regardless of what the result of the 
referendum was. Abdulmenaf Buxheti, leader of PDP, announced that if the 
referendum to annul the new territorial arrangements was successful, his party 
would respect the results of the 1992 Albanian referendum and establish an 
autonomous Ilirida.80 DPA, however, declared that what was happening was 
evidence that the Framework Agreement was ineffective in solving inter-ethnic 
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issues and demanded that it be annulled and a new agreement between the 
Macedonians and Albanians negotiated – and until then all options were open, 
implying support for PDP’s autonomous Ilirida idea.81 Xhaferi later called for an 
international protectorate to be established over Macedonia if the referendum 
succeeded and reiterated his long-held belief that multi-ethnic countries were 
unsustainable and where different ethnic communities could not agree on a 
common existence, they needed to separate.82 
 
The governing coalition led by SDSM (2002-2006) was left with the 
responsibility for implementing the vast majority of the Framework Agreement 
after the war ended. The agreement itself, along with the legal and constitutional 
amendments that it prescribed, was extremely unpopular with the Macedonian 
community. This left SDSM exposed to attacks by VMRO-DPMNE (which 
never annulled any of the measures implemented by SDSM) and other right-
leaning parties, including Ljubčo Georgievski’s newly established party, the 
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – People’s Party (VMRO-NP). 
VMRO-DPMNE was able to use these circumstances to mobilise the 
Macedonian community in opposition to SDSM, painting it as a party of traitors 
who were set on destroying the Macedonian state. However, VMRO-DPMNE 
borrowed tactical lessons from SDSM. In this electoral cycle, it also refrained 
from making statements in its policy documents that could be perceived as 
overtly anti-Albanian. This did not prevent it from making overt accusations 
against SDSM, with the implication that extremist Albanians were using the 
Social Democrats for their own ends and calling their government the ‘fascist-
Ballisti’ coalition after the German-backed Albanian Balli Kombëtar movement, 
which occupied western Macedonia during the Second World War.83 In 
combination with the Albanian factor, VMRO-DPMNE was also able to 
convince the Macedonian public that it would never betray the Macedonian 
identity or abrogate the human rights of Macedonians in respect of Greece’s 
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assault on Macedonia’s name. SDSM was targeted as a party of traitors that were 
not only prepared to capitulate to Albanian extremists, but part with Macedonia’s 
very soul at the behest of Athens. 
VMRO-DPMNE & DUI: A Coalition of Komiti and Kaçaks 
VMRO-DPMNE easily won the 2006 Parliamentary elections, a political defeat 
for SDSM from which it is yet to recover having been defeated at every 
Parliamentary and Presidential election, and the majority of local elections 
since.84 Maleska has argued that while the Macedonian public punished VMRO-
DPMNE at the 2002 elections for not being able to put down the Albanian 
insurgency, it devastated SDSM from 2006 onwards because of its role in 
implementing the Framework Agreement.85 The 2006 election campaign 
involved frequent clashes between the followers of the two major Macedonian 
and Albanian parties and included verbal and physical attacks on campaign 
officials and non-fatal shootings.86 As usual, numerous irregularities involving 
the intimidation of voters by party representatives and employers, vote buying, 
and ballot box stuffing were observed.87 The VMRO-DPMNE-led coalition, For 
a Better Macedonia, still needed the support of one of the Albanian parties in 
order to form government. It was extremely reluctant to ally itself with DUI (as 
former NLA fighters),88 particularly given it had spent the last few years vowing 
it would never work with terrorists and criticising SDSM for doing so.89 Instead, 
it formed government with its previous governing coalition partner, DPA. 
 
DUI was outraged that it was excluded from government and undertook a 
number of measures, including exercising its control of the veto power under the 
Framework Agreement, which eventually led to VMRO-DPMNE accepting them 
into the governing coalition in 2008 (Chapter Seven). The two parties have 
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remained in a governing coalition for the past eight years and are likely to 
continue if they win the 2016 elections. VMRO-DPMNE’s rank and file 
membership saw this move as catastrophic, and as the very treason that they had 
opposed when SDSM was in a coalition with DUI.90 The fallout for VMRO-
DPMNE was humiliating. SDSM frequently took the opportunity to remind 
VMRO-DPMNE’s leadership of its vow never to form a political coalition with 
‘fascists and terrorists’.91 
 
The VMRO-DPMNE/DUI coalition, while long-lasting, has been very volatile 
and inter-party communication has been limited. Cooperation between the two in 
Parliament fluctuates depending on ethnic tensions between Macedonians and 
Albanians, and the specific issues at hand. Threats by DUI to leave the coalition 
or boycott Parliament sittings are not uncommon and are usually undertaken 
when VMRO-DPMNE promotes or undertakes policies or actions that are 
perceived as anti-Albanian. Depending on the final outcomes, DUI’s 
parliamentary boycotts have mixed results for VMRO-DPMNE. These crises in 
the ruling coalition are usually mediated by special envoys representing the 
European Union and/or the United States to find a compromise between the two 
governing partners. Concessions made between the two parties are viewed in 
zero-sum terms and they can be interpreted as victory or defeat for their members 
and constituents.92 More importantly, the two communities view any concessions 
or compromises between the ruling coalition parties as a zero-sum game that 
either strengthen or weaken their respective communities in relation to the other. 
 
There have been sporadic cases of solidarity between VMRO-DPMNE and 
SDSM based purely on ethnic interests. In such situations it would have been 
politically impossible for one to oppose the other and impractical to attempt to 
outbid them. One example includes the VMRO-DPMNE draft law to compensate 
wounded veterans and the families of veterans killed during the 2001 war. The 
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draft law only covered police and military veterans and excluded all members of 
paramilitary organisations, including the NLA.93 While DUI and DPA strongly 
opposed the draft law, SDSM supported VMRO-DPMNE unreservedly and 
dismissed Albanian accusations that the draft law was anti-Albanian.94 
 
Symbolic issues, such as the use of flags, have generated some of the most 
significant tensions both between the two communities and have been 
demonstrated to be a fertile arena for ethnic outbidding. In 2012 VMRO-
DPMNE agreed to DUI’s request for the government to fund the 100th jubilee of 
both Albanian Flag Day and Mehmet Derralla’s appointment as Albania’s first 
Minister of War.95 SDSM demanded that VMRO-DPMNE withdraw its support 
for the public funding of what it argued were national holidays of neighbouring 
countries. Albanian Flag Day commemorates the Albanian declaration of 
independence from the Ottoman Empire on 28 November 1912 and the raising of 
the Albanian flag in Vlora on the same day. Mehmet Derralla was one of the 
signatories of the Albanian Declaration of Independence and a major figure in 
the anti-Ottoman uprisings. SDSM accused VMRO-DPMNE of being pseudo-
patriots willing to sell out Macedonian national interests for personal political 
gain and the unbridled pursuit of power.96 
 
At the same time DUI and DPA undertook their own political manoeuvring. DPA 
accused DUI of backing down to its Macedonian partner and not going far 
enough because DUI did not support DPA’s own proposal to make Albanian 
Flag Day a national public holiday.97 DUI officials called DPA’s proposal 
hypocritical and a simple political stunt, noting that DPA previously rejected 
DUI’s proposal (when DPA was in a coalition government with VMRO-
DPMNE) to make both 28 November (Albanian Flag Day) and 13 August (the 
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signing of the Framework Agreement) national public holidays.98 Given that DUI 
has built its political legitimacy on the Framework Agreement, acknowledging it 
formally would be politically unacceptable for DPA, which sees such a proposal 
as a DUI electioneering stunt and the Framework Agreement as a failed 
settlement between the Macedonian and Albanian communities. Ziyadin Sela, 
then a DPA Member of Parliament (and current Mayor of Struga), condemned 
DUI for even suggesting 13 August as it would effectively endorse the idea that 
the Albanian question in Macedonia had been resolved, that the laws relating to 
language and community symbols are acceptable, and that the status of the NLA 
fighters was finalised.99 During the flag day celebrations, Ali Ahmeti took full 
advantage of the platform provided to him to both appease the Albanian 
community and outmanoeuvre DPA when he declared that “this [Kičevo] is 
Albanian territory…these flags will fly throughout the ages”.100 Albert Musliu, 
an Albanian observer, notes that the pomp surrounding the Flag Day “may be 
interpreted as provocations towards Macedonians” but are primarily fuelled by 
election cycles, further stating that he had concerns about the “approach of both 
the parties [VMRO-DPMNE and DUI] and their pursuit of easy votes by causing 
ethnic tensions”.101  
 
The following year (2013) Ahmeti raised the stakes even further by initiating an 
annual commemoration for NLA fighters who lost their lives in Aračinovo 
during the 2001 war, and a celebration of the NLA victory there.102 Aračinovo’s 
municipal authorities announced that the commemoration was a day of “pride 
and the international recognition of the NLA. On this day, the NLA was 
recognised as an organised army with a clear political platform for the rights of 
Albanians in Macedonia”.103 With silence from the larger Macedonian parties, 
Stojanče Angelov took the opportunity to remind his Albanian counterpart, and 
Gruevski indirectly, that “had it not been for the international community, the 
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members of the NLA would all be dead and today they would not have been 
celebrating, but mourning”.104 
 
The use of the 2001 war as a key nation-building event has opened political rifts 
between DUI (as the successor of the NLA) and the main opposition DPA. As 
DUI has been a part of the governing coalition for the vast majority of time since 
the 2001 war, it has been able to secure funds and undertake various projects 
related to the 2001 war that not only shape Albanian identity but reinforce DUI 
as the legitimate representative of the Albanian community. This has enabled 
DUI to ‘own’ the narrative, as it was DUI (NLA) that went to war, and made it 
difficult for DPA to compete with its own narrative. DPA has no fallen heroes to 
build statues of, or name public spaces and objects after, and no events to 
commemorate. DPA’s response to DUI’s use of the 2001 narrative is to engage 
in ethnic outbidding where it takes a more radical approach to almost all issues 
and goes beyond what was settled in the Framework Agreement in order to 
demonstrate that it has the interests of Albanians at heart.  
 
At one point DPA attempted to mimic DUI’s electoral popularity by trying to 
draw legitimacy from the NLA through the inclusion of former NLA 
commanders (who then opposed Ahmeti) on its list of candidates.105 DPA 
recognised the importance of former NLA fighters, their large family groups, and 
the social prestige through which they attracted a solid voter base. 106 However, 
the strategy failed largely due to the fact that DPA already had a large perception 
problem within the community and was considered as part of the old corrupt 
elite. 
 
An example of DUI’s dominance over the Albanian nationalist narrative is the 
Museum of Freedom, also commonly referred to by the public as the Museum of 
the NLA. The museum was opened under the initiative of DUI and paid for with 
                                              
104 ibid. Macedonian military and paramilitary forces were close to destroying the NLA force in 
Aračinovo when US troops stationed in Kosovo intervened and withdrew the NLA fighters under guard. 




public funds. The building itself, in Čair (Skopje), was built by Yaşar Bey 
Kumbaraci as his house during the 19th century. This was strongly opposed by 
both the Macedonian community and DPA. The museum’s goal is to tell the 
history of the Albanian people in Macedonia from the Prizren League (1878) 
until the 2001 war.107 The artefacts include old weapons, photographs, coins, 
documents, NLA uniforms and flags.108 
 
Given that DUI has so inextricably entwined its political legitimacy and 
nationalist narrative with the Framework Agreement, DPA sees its electoral 
changes in exploiting the growing sentiment that the Framework Agreement is 
not meeting the expectations of the Albanian community, and for some was a 
weak compromise to begin with. The DPA leadership, and in particular Arben 
Xhaferi (who was a signatory to the Agreement), refused to attend the 
Framework Agreement’s anniversary celebrations early on. In addition, when it 
saw public support among the Albanians weakening in relation to the Agreement, 
it announced its alternative plan for a new contract between the Macedonian and 
Albanian nations. 
 
Rufi Osmani explains the divisions between DPA and DUI as completely 
contradictory on important issues such as the 2001, war suggesting that “while 
DUI’s position is that the 2001 war was a historic necessity as a consequence of 
the permanent repressions up to that period by the Macedonian authorities 
towards the Albanians, DPA characterises this war with vocabulary which is 
completely inappropriate – as the largest act of treason towards the 
Albanians”.109 Menduh Thaçi accuses DUI of wanting to obtain power by force, 
while DUI officials claim that DPA is not a political party but rather a private 
enterprise in which Arben Xhaferi and Menduh Thaçi are the President and 
CEO.110 Ragaru argues that power and access to state resources are at the core of 
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inter-party tensions between DUI and DPA (though this could be said of 
Macedonian political parties as well). Ragaru notes: 
Albanian political parties can only deliver (jobs, contracts, public funds) 
when they are in power. The moment they fall out of government, they 
lose most of the resources that allowed them to control political loyalties. 
Traditionally, Albanian parties have therefore tried to survive while in 
opposition through adopting radical national discourses and ethnicising 
day-to-day politics.111 
 
During this period VMRO-DPMNE opened its own museum in Skopje, which is 
the official national museum of Macedonia. Colloquially it is known as the 
Museum of the Macedonian Struggle, though its full name is perhaps the longest 
museum name in the world: The Museum of the Macedonian Struggle for 
Sovereignty and Independence – Museum of VMRO – Museum of the Victims of 
the Communist Regime. The exhibits cover the period from the beginning of the 
resistance movement against Ottoman rule (with the Karpoš Rebellion of 1689) 
until the declaration of independence from Yugoslavia in 1991.112 It consists of 
109 wax figures, 16 large portraits of revolutionaries and intellectuals, 80 
massive portraits of significant events from Macedonian history, and a large 
collection of artefacts including maps, documents, photographs, weapons, and 
clothing.113 The museum’s key function is to tell the Macedonian narrative of 
that period, but more specifically, VMRO-DPMNE’s version of that narrative. 
The exhibits covering the victims of communism, while legitimate, are also a 
condemnation of SDSM and its party and ideological predecessors. 
 
The return of Johan Tarčulovski to Macedonia, after having served an eight-year 
sentence for war crimes, was used by VMRO-DPMNE to display its supposed 
patriotic credentials. Tarčulovski was arrested and handed over to the Hague 
Tribunal in 2005 by the then SDSM Government. Many Macedonians view him 
as a national hero and the role of SDSM in his arrest as yet another betrayal. 
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From the beginning VMRO-DPMNE funded his defence counsel and took every 
opportunity to use the situation for a political attack on SDSM. When 
Tarčulovski was released from prison in 2013 the VMRO-DPMNE Government 
organised an extravagant home-coming celebration. Tarčulovski was welcomed 
as a national war hero, a patriot who had been sacrificed by a treasonous SDSM 
Government at the behest of the ‘West’. The celebrations were attended by the 
VMRO-DPMNE party elite, and Tarčulovski and his family were invited to meet 
President Ivanov at the Presidential Office. 
 
The outbidding strategies of smaller Macedonian political parties have also met 
with substantial success, both in terms of changing VMRO-DPMNE policies and 
growing their own support base. One example is that of Strašo Angelovski, 
former President of the now defunct MAAK-Conservative Party and current 
President of the Macedonian Fatherland Organisation for Radical Renewal – 
Vardar-Egej-Pirin-Prespa (TMORO-VEP). TMORO-VEP was (established in 
2006 and advocates restoring the status of Macedonia as a Macedonian nation-
state and vehemently opposes the Framework Agreement, including the 
constitutional and statutory changes that resulted from it.114 Between the 2006 
parliamentary elections and the 2009 municipal elections its vote increased from 
744 to 15,147.115 Its votes were concentrated in Prilep, Kisela Voda (Skopje) and 
Kumanovo, which enabled it to win substantial representation at the municipal 
level.116 During the 2011 and 2014 parliamentary elections TMORO-VEP 
entered the VMRO-DPMNE led coalition. Similar parties, including Vančo 
Šetanski’s Permanent Macedonian Radical Unification (TMRO) party and Janko 
Bačev’s People’s Movement of Macedonia (NDM), which oppose the 
Framework Agreement and what they see as a continuous stream of capitulations 
from the Macedonian side have also had substantial electoral success by 
outbidding VMRO-DPMNE. While initially running independently of any 
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coalitions, these two parties have also been co-opted by the VMRO-DPMNE 
machinery and recently joined its electoral coalition. 
 
Saveski and Sadiku have argued that the inclusion of these smaller parties in the 
broader VMRO-DPMNE electoral coalition has not extinguished their opposition 
to the Framework Agreement or their nationalist rhetoric. Rather, they argue, 
VMRO-DPMNE has been forced to take on a more overtly nationalist policy 
stance and that nation-building projects such as Skopje 2014 are partly explained 
by the necessity to placate a plethora of smaller, but popular, political parties on 
its right.117 
The ‘Coloured Revolution’ 
Macedonia entered a serious political crisis in early 2015. The crisis was sparked 
by alleged illegal surveillance exposed by Zoran Zaev (leader of SDSM) in early 
2015 through the release of surveillance tapes that he alleges were made by the 
Macedonian Directorate for Security and Counterintelligence (UBK) on the 
orders of its Director, Sašo Mijalkov and Prime Minister Gruevski, who is 
Mijalkov’s cousin. Zaev alleged that up to 20,000 people had been under 
surveillance for at least the past five years, including journalists, academics, 
political opponents, judges, activists, religious leaders, Gruevski’s own cabinet 
ministers and the Macedonian President. If true, this number would surpass the 
estimated 14,000 that came under surveillance during the previous four to five 
decades under Tito’s regime.118 Zaev has stated that the recordings were provided 
to him by a whistle-blower within UBK. Many of the publicly released wire-taps 
indicate widespread corruption at the highest levels, financial crime, electoral 
fraud, executive interference in the judiciary, state control over the media and 
intimidation of the government’s opponents among many other serious breaches 
of the law.  
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As the surveillance tapes were released thousands took to the streets demanding 
the resignation of the government. This included Macedonians and Albanians – 
though they have tended to hold separate protest rallies. These protests became 
known as the Coloured Revolution (Šarena Revolucija). When the protests 
turned violent the European Union brokered an agreement between the 
government and opposition, known as the Pržino Agreement, which set out a 
roadmap for ending the crisis. The key provision was early elections, initially 
scheduled for April 2016. To enable free and fair elections, a transitional 
administration was formed that included the opposition. In addition, Gruevski 
resigned as prime minister and installed Emil Dimitriev, Secretary General of 
VMRO-DPMNE.119 The government also agreed to verify Macedonia’s electoral 
list and provide the opposition with equitable access to the state-owned media. In 
parallel, Macedonia appointed an independent Special Prosecutor to investigate 
the evidence contained in the leaked recordings.120 
 
However, political leaders failed to agree on key issues that could guarantee free 
and fair elections, and as a result missed two scheduled election dates – in April 
and in June 2016.  Further, in June 2016 VMRO-DPMNE and DUI used their 
majority in Parliament to expel opposition ministers from the transitional 
administration and restored their previous coalition government.121 Gruevski’s 
hold on power is now completely reliant on DUI’s continued participation in 
backing his authoritarian rule. This is a high-risk undertaking for DUI, 
particularly if the European Union and the United States decide to introduce 
sanctions on the government and its leadership. However, given the significant 
loss of electoral support it has experienced since the crisis has begun, it may be 
its final opportunity to retain power. Given their pivotal position in keeping 
VMRO-DPMNE in power, some have suggested that DUI may move to demand 
the federalisation of Macedonia, which could help revive its deteriorating 
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popularity.122 This would undoubtedly create another inter-ethnic crisis in the 
country and could re-ignite armed conflict. 
 
Another important issue to note is that Macedonian and Albanian opposition 
groups are yet to establish a united front against the government. The likelihood 
that they will maintain separate protest movements is very high. Macedonians 
and Albanians, both opposed to Gruevski and Ahmeti, have largely organised 
their own separate anti-government protests. Nor are they likely to form a joint 
front in the upcoming elections. While they may be united in their short-term 
goal of ousting the government, their longer-term goals and interests are at odds. 
There have been discussions between SDSM, DPA, and Unity (a new Albanian 
party) on a potential united front at the next election; however, political analyst 
Naser Ziberi maintains that “the two sides are not ready for more serious 
cooperation for now [because] their platforms are in large part based on ethnic 
issues and, on that subject, they have completely opposing views”.123 Given the 
presence of new Albanian political parties (discussed below) and their intention 
of outbidding the established parties, this will be a period of more intense 
nationalist rhetoric as they vie for votes within their own ethnic community. The 
possibility of forming electoral coalitions with Macedonian parties (who will also 
be engaging in increased nationalist rhetoric) is very unlikely. 
 
The question remains, however, how much of the public has engaged in the 
Coloured Revolution. At best, the protests have attracted 20,000 to 40,000 
people, most of whom are SDSM-affiliated, or those organised by newly 
established Albanian opposition groups. Gruevski has managed to organise pro-
government rallies matching the size of the opposition protests.124 While most 
protests have been in Skopje, smaller anti-government protests have been held in 
towns across the country – though these have been intermittent. In large part, the 
‘Coloured Revolution’ has been an elite power struggle supported by their 
                                              
122 ibid. 
123 S. Marušić, “Macedonia Opposition Unlikely to Bridge Ethnic Gap”, Balkan Insight, 5 February 2016, 
www.balkaninsight.com (accessed 31 August 2016). 
124 J. Mironski and J. Matić, “Tens of thousands rally for Macedonia PM as opposition digs in”, Yahoo 
News, 19 May 2015, www.yahoo.com/news (accessed 30 August 2016). 
315 
 
respective party faithful and with regards to Gruevski those whom he influences 
through patronage or threats (such as public employees). The large majority of 
the public seem to be rather apathetic towards the crisis, which they see as just 
another in a long line of political crises over the past 25 years. 
 
Gruevski and his party still command a great deal of support among the 
electorate with committed supporters dismissing all and any accusations of 
wrongdoing as some sort of treasonous, western-backed SDSM plot to discredit 
the regime (conflating the regime with the nation and the state). However, none 
of what has transpired makes those from SDSM any more qualified than their 
counterparts in VMRO-DPMNE. SDSM under Kiro Gligorov and Branko 
Crvenkovski ruled the country in the same authoritarian manner, and were 
perhaps even more brutal in their grip on power. While Zaev’s release of these 
recordings (assuming they are authentic) is justified and may bring about regime 
change, his claim to offer a democratic alternative is preposterous. 
 
As noted above, DUI is increasingly losing its credibility among its own 
constituency.  It is seen by a growing section of the Albanian community as part 
of the corrupt political system that it had originally ousted in the form of DPA 
and PDP.125 Further, its detractors believe that it no longer represents the interests 
of the Albanian community.126 For example, in recent years a number of events 
have forced DUI to support its coalition partner, VMRO-DPMNE, in 
circumstances that has earned it the ire of its constituency. When the suspects in 
the Smilkovci executions were convicted in 2014, large Albanian crowds 
protested the court’s decision. DUI’s senior officials supported the outcome, 
which was seen as treachery resulting from long-term neglect of Albanian 
nationalist interests.127 After the initial wave of protests DUI recanted its original 
position and denounced the trial and its verdict.128 Protesters remained 
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unconvinced of DUI’s changed position and during the next wave of protests 
targeted Ahmeti’s party itself.129 Ahmeti’s abrupt change of policy was seen by 
the Albanian public as tokenistic and deceptive. 
 
A number of new Albanian political parties have emerged over the past few years 
seeking to challenge the established political landscape and in particular DUI. 
Besa (Oath) was established in November 2014 by Zeqirija Ibrahimi, Bilal 
Kasami and Afrim Gashi as an anti-establishment party. Besa’s political platform 
calls for a ‘redefinition’ of Macedonia and an entirely new agreement between 
Macedonians and Albanians, proposing a strong consociational model of 
governance.130 Besa has gained significant support and leads the Opposition 
Council, a grouping of Albanian political parties that are not allied with the 
government. Besa has organised many of the Albanian anti-government protests 
throughout 2015 and 2016, targeting DUI as much as VMRO-DPMNE in 
relation to the ongoing illegal surveillance scandal and the resulting political 
crisis. It has done so position itself as an Albanian alternative and champion of 
democratic reform. Besa accuses Gruevski of authoritarian rule and imposing a 
policy of discrimination against the Albanian community.131 In June 2015 Besa’s 
Chairman, Bilal Kasami, accused both Gruevski and Ahmeti of politicising all 
spheres of society, misusing state institutions, failing to integrate the Albanians, 
and a host of other anti-Albanians policies.132 
 
In May 2016 Besa organised a protest in Skopje that attracted over 20,000 
people.133 Its purpose was to call for an end to the Gruevski-Ahmeti coalition 
government. Protesters denounced what they deemed to be ‘fascism’ in 
Macedonia and demanded the immediate resignation of ‘Ali the Betrayer’ along 
with all DUI representatives.134 One of the protesters was reported as saying, “I 
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came here since I’m discriminated [against] everywhere: in school, by police and 
the state structures. But more than Gruevski I blame Ali Ahmeti who has always 
taken the votes of Albanians [for granted]”.135 DUI’s unpopularity within this 
cohort suggests that new political movements are likely to make an impact on the 
next round of elections. These movements are dismissing DUI’s key 
achievement, the Framework Agreement, as an irrelevant farce that never met 
their demands. Throughout the protests organised by Besa Albanian nationalism 
and the failure of DUI to protect its interests has been the key theme, even 
though their official purpose was democratisation and the resignation of the 
Gruevski-Ahmeti coalition. For example, these protests are opened with the 
Albanian national anthem, draped in Albanian flags, and include chants of 
“Greater Albania” for the entire duration of the events.136 Kim Mehmeti, 
Spokesman for the Opposition Council, made it clear that the new political 
movements are seeking much more than DUI, DPA, or PDP before them 
imagined would be possible within the framework of a Macedonian state: 
We have been waiting for 26 years to have an Albanian paragraph in the 
Macedonian anthem, to have an eagle in the Macedonian flag and to have 
an Albanian President or Prime Minister.137 
 
Zejadin Sela, Mayor of Struga and a longstanding factional leader within DPA, 
established his own political party in July 2015 named Movement for Reforms – 
Democratic Party of Albanians (MR-DPA). As part of his own manoeuvring, 
Sela accused DPA (his main rivals) of only feigning to be in opposition, while 
closely collaborating with Gruevski.138 Sela’s claim seemed to be given 
credibility in July 2015 by one of the leaked surveillance recordings in which a 
person who is believed to be Menduh Thaçi (DPA President) swears allegiance 
‘to the death’ to the former UBK Director, Sašo Mijalkov.139 Some analysts 
believe that Sela’s new party, like Besa, is an attempt to capitalise on the political 
                                              




138 S. Marušić, “Macedonian Albanians Form New Opposition Party”, Balkan Insight, 6 July 2015, 




crisis and supplant the existing Albanian political organisations using the 
dissatisfaction against them to mobilise opposition that may not have been 
possible without the current crisis.140 
 
The formation of a third Albanian party (Unity) was announced in September 
2015. Its founders are dissatisfied high ranking DUI officials, including the Head 
of DUI’s General Assembly, Zuluf Adili, and former DUI Secretary General and 
once NLA Chief of General Staff, Gzim Ostreni. Zuluf Adili claims that the party 
will pursue a civic concept for Macedonia so that it is a country that belongs to 
all of its citizens rather than just one or two ethnicities.141 There had been 
growing rifts within DUI for a number of years with violent incidents among the 
party leadership. For example, in October 2014 five people were wounded in a 
gun fight at the DUI branch in Saraj on the outskirts of Skopje.142 In December of 
the same year a fight between DUI members in Struga left several in hospital, 
while in July 2015 two party members were killed in separate shootouts in the 
towns of Kumanovo and Struga.143 The intra-Albanian rivalries in Macedonia are 
exceptionally violent and “marked by murders, bombings, kidnappings and sheer 
banditry”.144 Electoral violence is particularly vicious, with beatings, shootings 
and assassination attempts on party officials.145 
 
*   *   * 
 
Macedonia is an anocratic state with a highly dysfunctional political culture. The 
central government does not have full control over the country and there are 
some areas that exist entirely beyond the reach of the authorities. Its institutions 
are ineffective and incapable of meeting some of the most basic expectations of 
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its citizens – social services, security and justice – let alone acting as a 
mechanism through which complex ethno-religious disputes can be managed. 
Many basic services that would normally be expected from the state are provided 
for locally through kinship groups, intra-ethnic community ties and household 
self-sufficiency. This creates parallel social institutions among Macedonians and 
Albanians that compete for resources. 
 
Neither the state nor non-state actors within both communities are able to provide 
credible commitments that a long-term rapprochement is possible. Influential 
political elites engage in threatening war and making proposals for the revision 
of international borders. Small non-state actors that cannot be controlled by party 
elites take independent violent action, like the NLA in 2001 or smaller incidents 
such as those in Kondovo and Kumanovo. Widespread grassroots opposition to 
the Framework Agreement continues to grow among members of both ethnic 
groups and new political movements are arising that are challenging the status 
quo and the established political parties.  
 
The electoral strategy among ethnically-based political parties in Macedonia is to 
promote nationalist solutions to ethno-religious problems in order to obtain 
support from within their own ethnic constituencies. Both VMRO-DPMNE and 
SDSM have followed a broad strategy of ethnically outbidding each other on 
issues pertaining to minority rights, while at the same time attempting to co-opt 
Albanian political elites by forming coalition governments with them. Albanian 
elites, on the other hand, have worked within the political system when in 
government as this provides them with resources to pursue Albanian nationalist 
goals and reward their supporters through patronage. However, when in 
opposition, they have tended to try and disrupt the work of government and 




This thesis set out three hypotheses: 
1. Violent and non-violent conflict between Orthodox Christian 
Macedonians and Sunni Muslim Albanians in Macedonia is the result of: 
a) incompatible worldviews (ethnonationalist and religious); b) competing 
rights claims, namely self-determination (Albanians) and state sovereignty 
(Macedonians); and c) an anocratic regime that lacks democratic 
institutions to manage conflict, coupled with a dysfunctional political 
culture; 
2. There was an attempt to resolve some of these issues through significant 
constitutional and legislative amendments under the Framework 
Agreement, which was an outcome of the 2001 war. However, rather than 
addressing these issues, the Framework Agreement has exacerbated the 
causes of conflict noted above, while becoming a contentious issue in and 
of itself; and 
3. There cannot be peaceful cohabitation or successful national integration 
between the two communities under the status quo. 
 
The investigation has found that there are three broad causes of conflict between 
Macedonians and Albanians in Macedonia. Incompatible worldviews, built upon 
opposing ethnonational identity and religious belief systems is a central cause of 
conflict between the two groups. While Macedonians and Albanians in the region 
under investigation have lived in the same state since Ottoman times, they have 
existed in parallel societies and relative isolation from each other, particularly 
since the Second World War. From the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the 
Balkans (1912-13) until the German invasion of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
(1941) the two communities were subjected to similar treatment under Serb rule 
and in many cases had similar interests and cooperated in day-to-day socio-
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economic life. In some cases, they even cooperated in military-political activities 
such as the joint rebellion against Serb rule (1913) in south-western Macedonia.1 
 
However, during the Second World War and the Italian occupation of Albania 
the Albanian quisling government in conjunction with local Albanian fascist 
formations (Balli Kombëtar) in Macedonia sought to carve out a greater Albanian 
state. Macedonian partisan forces came into direct conflict with the Balli 
Kombëtar and both were responsible for atrocities against each other’s civilians. 
The experience of the Second World War brought the conflict between both 
communities into much sharper focus and the subsequent establishment of a 
Macedonian republic (within Yugoslavia) ended any cooperation between 
Macedonians and Albanians as the Macedonian authorities replaced the Serb 
authorities, in the minds of Albanians, as the main antagonists. On the other 
hand, Macedonians viewed the actions of the Balli Kombëtar as a renewed effort 
by Albanian separatists (beginning with the Prizren League) to carve out 
Macedonian territory. 
 
Macedonian elites focused their nation-building efforts on Macedonian 
ethnonational identity and the construction a Macedonian socialist republic 
(1944-1991) as a nation-state for the Macedonian people. While lip service was 
paid to the historical and contemporary importance of its minorities, particularly 
the Albanians, the reality was that they were left largely to their own devices. 
Neither the Macedonian authorities in Skopje nor the Yugoslav federal 
authorities in Belgrade made any real attempt to integrate the Albanians into a 
national civic identity at the republican level or a supranational identity at the 
federal level. Until the Yugoslav-Soviet split, Albanians in Macedonia and 
Kosovo cooperated to a large degree with the authorities in Albania in 
standardising the Albanian language and school textbooks. During the Cold War 
the Albanians in Macedonia faced significant ethnic and religious discrimination 
and became increasingly isolated from the Macedonians. This was compounded 
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by the geographic concentration of the Albanian population in northern and 
western Macedonia, and the relative isolation of many Albanian-populated towns 
and villages. 
 
Since Macedonian independence Macedonian elites made even less of an effort 
to integrate its ethnic and religious minorities. Rather, its focus sharpened even 
more so on consolidating Macedonian ethnonational identity and securing 
Macedonia as their nation-state. This came about because of the extremely 
negative reactions to its independence by Greece and Bulgaria, which refuse 
even to acknowledge the existence of Macedonians as an ethnic group with its 
own culture and language, or its right to use the Macedonian name. With 
independence came a breakdown of law and order, and a significant weakening 
of state institutions. Added to this were the economic embargoes on Serbia to the 
north and Greece’s own economic embargo on Macedonia from the south. This 
chaotic environment allowed the Albanians to effectively run their own affairs 
within the Macedonian state at the local/regional level and enabled them to 
strengthen their own ethnonational identity in competition with a national civic 
identity. The result has been the consolidation of competing ethnonationalist 
identities and loyalties to ethnic groups.  
 
Religious differences between Macedonians and Albanians also created further 
divides and more opportunity for conflict. Having learned the nationalist 
narrative of Ottoman oppression, many Macedonians are deeply suspicious of 
Islam, which they do not completely understand. They view Islam as foreign and 
dangerous, and consider it both an existential threat to the Macedonian nation 
and a civilizational threat to Europe. Albanians, on the other hand, see 
Macedonians as part of a ‘sea’ of Orthodox Christians in the Balkans who, as a 
whole, are an existential threat to the Albanian nation and their Islamic faith. 
They believe that their Islamic religion is a central reason why they are 
discriminated against, but view it also as the means through which they were able 




Religion has also become highly politicised, and both communities have 
integrated their respective faiths as an essential element of their respective 
ethnonational identities. The Orthodox Church and Islam are both used to 
mobilise their communities for political action and violence. At the same time, 
nationalism is also used to mobilise the two communities in support of religious 
goals, such as constructing churches and mosques or establishing religious 
schools. Religion has also become so embedded in the Macedonian-Albanian 
conflict that it is a cause, a means and an end in and of itself. 
 
The issue of radical Islamism is becoming more problematic, particularly since 
the 2001 war. The war brought militant Islamists who had fought in the conflicts 
in Bosnia and Kosovo, and new recruits from the Middle East and Central Asia 
to the ranks of the National Liberation Army. While it is not believed that they 
participated in the war in significant numbers (probably because it did not last 
long enough to drive mobilisation and recruitment), these militants began to see 
Macedonia as a chaotic state with weak central control that they could use as a 
staging ground for action across the Balkans and further into Europe. As noted in 
Chapter Two, numerous radical Islamist training camps have been reported in 
Macedonia and it is possible that some continue to exist in the west and the 
north. Since 2001 Islamists have been recruiting young Muslims (from both the 
Albanian and Macedonian-speaking Muslim communities) to study Islamic 
theology in places like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. These young imams have 
returned to Macedonia and many are believed to be preaching radical 
interpretations of Islam, coming into conflict with the local Islamic institutions 
and local Islamic doctrines and traditions. In addition, some of these radicals 
have been involved in recruiting what is estimated to be hundreds of locals to 
fight for groups like ISIS in Syria. 
 
While radical Islamism does not yet have a substantial following across the 
country, its adherents have demonstrated that they are persistent and patient. Its 
followers are growing in numbers and their ability to organise large-scale protest 
is impressive (for example, the protests against the conviction of the Smilkovci 
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murderers). For now, political and religious elites within the Muslim 
communities dismiss radical Islamist theology and practices as foreign and 
unacceptable to local Muslims; however, a generational divide has already 
appeared with younger Muslims more accepting of influences from the Middle 
East generally, and in some cases radical interpretations of the Qur’an. It remains 
to be seen how influential the radicals will ultimately become. Nevertheless, their 
presence is dangerous and their influence has already caused conflict within the 
Muslim community, and between the Macedonian and Albanian communities. 
 
All of these underlying beliefs form the basis of the incompatible worldviews 
between Macedonians and Albanians. This is not to say that each and every 
individual subscribes to these, nor is it to say that these views do not evolve and 
change. However, they form the basis from which many in both communities 
currently perceive reality. These worldviews determine how people view their 
place in the world, the place of the ‘other’, and how they are mobilised into 
action. The competing rights claims of the Macedonians and Albanians that the 
Framework Agreement attempted to accommodate principally stem from their 
perception of reality, understood through the framework of their respective 
ethno-religious worldviews. 
 
The first time that either of the two groups were in any position (in the modern 
era) to determine their own political system was when the Anti-fascist Assembly 
for the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) was convened in 1944. 
However, the vast majority of the deputies elected to the assembly where 
Macedonians from the Macedonian partisan movement, with only a handful of 
Albanians. The Macedonians (within the limited framework they were provided 
by Yugoslav authorities in Belgrade) shaped the Constitution and legislative 
agenda for the following five and a half decades, until Ali Ahmeti and the 
National Liberation Army (NLA) rebelled in 2001. 
 
Since independence Albanian elites have claimed that the Albanian community 
should be recognised as a state-forming nation within the Constitution, equal to 
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the Macedonians. Macedonia should, in their view, be a bi-national state of the 
Macedonian and Albanian peoples governed by a group-consensus system. 
Under such a system decisions would only be valid if the representatives of both 
communities agreed. This would in effect give both communities a veto over all 
political decisions and legislative acts. With the end of the 2001 war, and the 
signing of the Framework Agreement, the Constitution was amended to 
recognise Albanians and a host of other communities as constituent peoples of 
the Macedonian state – equal to the Macedonian people. The issue of constitutive 
status is important because Albanians argue that as a constituent nation they are 
entitled to certain powers and resources. These include local self-government, 
proportional employment in state entities, parliamentary veto powers, and the 
recognition of the Albanian language as official language of administration. 
 
However, the constitutional status of the Albanian community is unlikely to have 
reached a final settlement. Outside of a narrow circle of politicians, ideologues, 
and academics the Macedonian and Albanian communities have been calling for 
change since the new Preamble’s inception. Both communities are seeking 
opposing solutions; the Albanians want to relegate the smaller minorities to a 
non-constitutive status so that Macedonia is formally a bi-national state as 
described above, while the Macedonians want to reconstitute the state as a 
nation-state for the Macedonian people and relegate all minorities, as well as the 
Albanians, to a non-constitutive status. 
 
The results of the implementation of the Framework Agreement have been 
largely negative. It failed to resolve any issues that it attempted to settle, while at 
the same time it opened new problems between the two communities. 
Decentralisation and the revision of municipal boundaries over the past 15 years 
have enabled the greatest number of Albanians to take advantage of the 
provisions within the Framework Agreement at the municipal level. However, 
this has also led to greater structural segregation where more Macedonians and 
Albanians now live in ethnically homogenous local territorial units. As these 
municipal councils have been granted greater responsibilities, particularly in 
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education, they have also witnessed the institutionalisation of segregation. For 
example, the school system where Macedonian and Albanian children either 
attend separate schools or separate classes within schools so that they can study 
in their own languages and avoid ethnic violence between students.  
 
The criteria used to revise municipal boundaries – ethnic homogenisation - is 
largely seen among Macedonians as a betrayal by their own political elite, which 
will eventually lead to a Kosovo-style scenario where Albanians will have a 
defined territorial unit with administrative and institutional structures that they 
can use to secede from the Macedonian state. On the other hand, many Albanians 
hold the view that the decentralisation process did not go far enough, and that 
further power needs to be devolved to the local level. Some Albanians argue that 
all issues, apart from those that directly affect the national interest and the 
defence of the country, should be determined at the local level, similar to a 
Swiss-style canton political system. 
 
It seems that although the Framework Agreement explicitly rejected territorial 
solutions for ethnic conflict as one of its basic principles, decentralisation has 
effectively accomplished it. Decentralisation has become a zero-sum game 
between the two communities who compete for local political power and control 
over local resources. But even more than that, it has become a struggle over the 
ethno-religious identity of the municipalities themselves – are they Macedonian 
or Albanian? Christian or Islamic? Finally, the practice among Macedonian and 
Albanian national elites of not interfering in each other’s municipalities where 
they constitute a clear local majority ensures that Macedonia de facto, if not de 
jure, functions as two separate political and administrative units. 
 
The issue of proportional public employment for all ethnic groups has been 
particularly divisive. As the bearers of statehood, the Macedonians have 
dominated the public sector and few others were able to obtain state employment. 
The reasons for this vary, including: the fact that knowledge of Macedonian as 
the working language of the administration was necessary; Macedonians had 
327 
 
much higher levels of education; and they viewed state employment as a birth 
right due to their position as the titular nation. The implementation of 
proportional employment has meant that many Macedonians have been 
retrenched to make room for minorities. This has particularly been the case at the 
municipal level where Albanians now dominate local government. Previously 
Albanians were excluded and disenfranchised from public employment, now 
Macedonians face that same problem. The United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) argued that “it is very dangerous when minorities are 
discontented, but it is even more dangerous when the majority is discontented”.2 
It further contends that by implementing proportional employment in public 
entities in a non-transparent and financially unsustainable manner, the 
Macedonian and Albanian political elites have introduced another element of 
zero-sum game, and given the high levels of dissatisfaction, the Macedonian 
community can easily become radicalised.3 
 
The Parliamentary veto powers (Badinter Principle) have created a partial bi-
national system where Albanians are able to veto some constitutional and 
legislative changes, particularly in the cultural, educational, and religious 
spheres. However, the threat of a veto on legislation where it can be applied if 
other legislative acts are unacceptable makes its use much broader. Nevertheless, 
it has divided the Macedonian and Albanians communities on a number of levels. 
Albanians see it as a partial equaliser to Macedonian dominance, not only 
helping to ensure that their interests are protected, but increasing their power and 
influence over the state. The misuse of the veto power, however, has also caused 
intra-Albanian conflict between the supporters of the major Albanian parties 
(DUI and DPA) that have used it for party political interests. 
 
On the other hand, Macedonians see the Badinter Principle as an undemocratic 
mechanism designed to undermine the Macedonian nation and its ownership of 
the state. The fact that it has not only been used to block legislation related to 
                                              
2 Bartlett, People-Centred Analysis, p. 63. 
3 ibid, p. 64. 
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fundamental cultural issues for Macedonians but also to force through legislation 
which is largely seen as anti-Macedonian, has many Macedonians (rightly or 
wrongly) comparing it to apartheid rule. At the local level, some Macedonian 
communities have been able to use it to protect their local interests. However, the 
observance of the Badinter Principle at the municipal level is rarely respected. 
Key disputes relating to the Badinter Principle at the local level involve the 
ethno-religious character of the municipality, particularly in terms of naming 
public places and structures, obtaining approval to build churches and mosques, 
and even obtaining permits to build structures on private property, which at times 
is done simply to frustrate the members of the other ethnic group. 
 
The Badinter Principle is a case in which the Framework Agreement opened a 
new source of conflict, both across ethnic lines and within the Albanian 
community. At the same time, it moved conflict into the local level where 
constitutionally imbedded voting requirements have created a new structural 
conflict. The Badinter Principle will continue to be contentious in the future as 
there is a substantial legislative backlog at the national level which has been 
deferred due to the difficulties in navigating the veto power, and ongoing 
disputes over cultural, educational and religious issues at the local level. 
 
Macedonian language policies under Yugoslav rule were much more liberal and 
allowed for greater use of minority languages, particularly at the local level. This 
changed with independence and the Macedonian Government’s attempt to 
consolidate a Macedonian nation-state, and as a reaction to Greek and Bulgarian 
elites disputing the very existence of the language and its identification as 
Macedonian. For Albanians, use of their own language as an official language of 
administration was of primary concern. Firstly, it was a mechanism with which 
to maintain their own ethnonational identity; secondly, it was a matter of 
expanding their opportunities in education, employment, and participation within 
the political and institutional structures of the country; and thirdly, it was a 
means with which to increase their power and influence in society.  Therefore, 
language became highly politicised with many refusing to learn Macedonian. In 
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addition, language itself began to be used as a political weapon with which to 
conquer public space and dominate or demonstrate power, particularly in local 
municipalities where the use of language in public spaces can construct the 
‘identity’ of that territory. For example, the use of Albanian as the primary 
language on street signs, shop fronts, and other objects works to mark that town 
or village as Albanian. 
 
Many Macedonians feel that they have been excessively generous with their 
provision of language rights to the Albanian community. Albanian demands for 
full equality of the two languages is seen by Macedonians as an attempt to 
‘Albanianise’ the state, and extending the public use of Albanian into 
municipalities with little or no Albanians residents is seen as unacceptable. 
Nevertheless, language differences have led to the segregation of Macedonians 
and Albanians into their parallel worlds. With the institutionalisation of language 
through the creation of separate schools and the establishment of two Albanian-
language universities Macedonians and Albanians are now capable of maturing 
into adulthood without ever having to spend any substantial amount of time with 
members of the other community. The affect this will have on integration for the 
Albanian community into wider society will be disastrous. 
 
Finally, Macedonia is an anocratic state with a highly dysfunctional political 
culture. Nineteen ninety-one saw the beginning of an ambitious project to 
transition from a totalitarian regime that controlled all aspects of social, 
economic and political life to a liberal democratic society that would resemble 
the West in both its nature and its practical function. The problem was 
Macedonian citizens had never experienced a classical liberal or democratic 
political system (as understood in the West). New and old political elites were 
the product of the society in which they lived, and they continued to govern the 
state in the only manner with which they were acquainted. While the political 
elites undertook a substantial amount of formal liberalisation and 
democratisation, including removing government control from most aspects of 
social and economic life and opening politics to a multi-party system, once 
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elected they continue to rule like autocrats. They continue to ignore central tenets 
of democracy such as open public debate, public consultation, and free and fair 
elections. In addition, human rights abuses, patronage, corruption, and nepotism 
are pervasive throughout society, not just at the elite level. 
 
Nevertheless, the central government does not have full control over the country, 
and there are some areas that exist entirely beyond the reach of the authorities. In 
addition, its institutions are weak, ineffective, and incapable of meeting some of 
the most basic expectations of its citizens – social services, security, and justice – 
let alone acting as a mechanism through which complex ethno-religious disputes 
can be managed. Many of the basic services that would normally be expected 
from the state are provided locally through kinship groups, ethnic community 
ties, and household self-sufficiency. This creates both competition for scarce 
state resources and parallel socio-political institutions (some of which should be 
met by government, i.e., security and justice) among Macedonians and 
Albanians. 
 
Neither the state nor non-state actors within both communities are able to provide 
credible commitments that a long-term rapprochement between the two is 
possible. Influential political elites continue to incite violence and propose 
revisions of international borders. In addition, widespread grassroots opposition 
to the Framework Agreement continues to grow among members of both ethnic 
groups, and this has given impetus to new political movements (particularly 
among the Albanian community) to challenge the status quo (in terms of the 
Framework Agreement) and the established political parties. Small non-state 
actors that cannot be controlled by political elites take independent violent 
action, like the NLA during the 2001 war or smaller incidents such as those in 
Kondovo (2004-05), Brodec (2007), and Kumanovo (2015).  
 
The electoral strategy among ethnically-based political parties in Macedonia is to 
take advantage of nationalist sentiment (or create it where necessary) in order to 
maintain support from their own ethnic constituencies. Both VMRO-DPMNE 
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and SDSM have broadly followed a strategy of attempting to ethnically outbid 
each other on issues pertaining to minority rights, while at the same time 
attempting to co-opt Albanian political elites by forming coalition governments 
with them, and offering some peripheral ministerial posts or posts without 
portfolio. Albanian elites, on the other hand, have worked within the political 
system to the extent that it has suited them when in government as this provides 
them with access to resources to pursue Albanian nationalist goals (such as its 
nation-building projects) and to reward their supporters through patronage. 
However, when in opposition, they have tended to try and disrupt the work of 
government accusing it of betraying the interests of the Albanian people, 
boycotting parliamentary sessions, and pursuing a much more radical agenda in 
order to outbid their opponents. 
 
In the final analysis, Jenny Engström argues that: 
The conflict is...not merely over rights for the [Albanians] in a country 
dominated by the [Macedonians] but, more fundamentally, about who 
controls the state and what kind of state Macedonia should be.4 
 
The Macedonian-Albanian conflict is but one of a myriad of chaotic social, 
economic, and political problems with which the country finds itself struggling. 
The fact that Macedonians and Albanians have far-reaching disputes relating to 
issues of fundamental importance is compounded by the sheer number of issues 
over which they disagree. In light of this, it is difficult to foresee a sustainable 
resolution to this conflict. Nor is the status quo going to deliver peaceful 
coexistence between the two communities. Rather, the existing state of affairs is 
on a trajectory of increasing ethno-religious segregation, competition and 
violence. 
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Chronology of Key Events 
May 1876 
Macedonian Razlovci uprising began. 
 
June 1878 
Albanian notables and chieftains created the League of Prizren.  
 
October 1878 
Macedonian Kresna Uprising broke out. 
 
3 November 1893 
The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO) was established 
in Salonica. 
 
2 August 1903 
Ilinden uprising against Ottoman rule led by VMRO declared an independent 
Macedonian state known as the Kruševo Republic. 
 
22 November 1908 
In Bitola, a committee of Albanian political and cultural activists adopt a unified 
alphabet standard. 
 
10 August 1913 
The Treaty of Bucharest ended the Second Balkan War. Macedonia was 
partitioned between Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Albania.  
 
23 September 1913 
Macedonian komiti allied with Albanian Kaçaks rebelled against occupying Serb 
forces in Ohrid, Struga, Debar, and Kičevo. The Serbs suppressed the uprising by 
killing thousands of Macedonians, Albanians, and Turks. The town of Debar was 
razed to the ground. 
 
1918 
Macedonian territory under Serbian occupation became part of the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. 
 
1941 
Germany invaded Yugoslavia. Macedonian territory under Yugoslav occupation 
was then partitioned among Bulgaria and Italian-occupied Albania. A 
Macedonian partisan army was established and fought occupying German, 





The fascist Albanian Balli Kombëtar was established. Its aims were to create a 
greater Albanian state. 
 
March 1944 
The Germans established the Skanderbeg Waffen SS division, composed of 
Albanians. The unit was deployed in Macedonia and Kosovo. 
 
2 August 1944 
The establishment of a Macedonian republic was proclaimed by Antifascist 
Assembly of the People’s Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) at the St. Prohor 
Pčinski monastery. 
 
7 January 1945 
A revolt by Macedonian recruits due to be dispatched to the Srem front in 
northern Serbia was crushed by the Yugoslav partisan army. 
 
29 November 1945 
The establishment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was declared, 
with Macedonia as a constitutive republic.  
 
February 1953 
Yugoslavia signed a trilateral pact with Greece and Turkey. Muslim emigration 
from Kosovo and Macedonia increased. By the mid-1960s, more than 200,000 
Turks and Albanians had left Yugoslavia; approximately half of them were from 
Macedonia. 
 
19 July 1967 
The independence (autocephaly) of the Macedonian Orthodox Church was 
proclaimed after having been dissolved in 1767. 
 
1 February 1990 
Over 2,000 Albanians demonstrated in Tetovo against the treatment of Albanians 
by the Macedonian authorities. The protesters demanded independence for 
regions in western Macedonia where ethnic Albanians constituted a majority. 
 
25 August 1990 
Nevzat Halili was elected chairman of the Albanian Party for Democratic 
Prosperity (PDP). The party's main objectives included the attainment of 
proportional representation in the government of Macedonia for the Albanian 
community, and strengthening their cultural rights. 
 
11 November – 12 December 1990 
The first free multiparty elections were conducted in Macedonia since 1938. In 
the three rounds of elections for the Macedonian Parliament, no clear winner 
emerged. The coalition between the Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity 
(PDP) and the National Democratic Party (NDP) received 25 seats in the 120 seat 
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Parliament. The nationalist VMRO-DPMNE gained 37 seats and the League of 
Communists of Macedonia (LCM) won 31 seats. 
 
29 March 1991 
After months of discussions on political power sharing arrangements, the 
Parliamentary deputies concluded that the country should be led by a politically 
unaffiliated cabinet. VMRO-DPMNE and PDP both voiced displeasure at the 
compromise. 
 
15 September 1991 
Macedonia declared its independence from Yugoslavia. 
 
20 November 1991 
The new Constitution was promulgated at a special session of Parliament, which 
was boycotted by PDP and NDP in protest against the Preamble of the 




The Macedonian National Guard was created by VMRO-DMPNE (then in 
opposition) to protect Macedonia in the event that the Yugoslav National Army 
(JNA) refused to withdraw from the newly independent republic. 
 
11-12 January 1992 
A referendum on autonomy was organised by Albanians throughout Macedonia. 
Albanians overwhelmingly voted in favour of autonomy. The Macedonian 
government refused to recognise the results of the referendum. 
 
31 March 1992 
Approximately 40,000 Albanians protested in the Macedonian capital, Skopje. 
The protesters demanded that the Macedonian state remain unrecognised by the 
international community until it granted Albanians the right to autonomy in 
regions where Albanians constituted the majority. 
 
7 April 1992 
Representatives of the Albanian community declared an “Albanian Autonomous 
Republic of Ilirida”. 
 
June 1992 
In Radolišta, a village in the Struga Valley near the Albanian border, 
Macedonian police found a cache of weapons including pistols, Kalashnikov 
rifles, Skorpio machine guns, explosives, ammunition, and uniforms with the 
Albanian emblem of the black two-headed eagle. The finding further raised fears 
among Macedonians that Albanian separatists had organised paramilitary forces. 
 
September 1992 
Following two months of negotiations, a new government was formed to replace 
the "government of experts" led by Nikola Kl̂ušev. The new government was led 
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by a coalition of parties that included PDP, NDP, Social Democratic Union of 
Macedonia (SDSM), and Reformist Forces of Macedonia-Liberal Party (RFM-
LM). 
 
30 September 1992 
Following a lecture given by Nevzat Halili to an extremist Albanian émigré 
group (Balli Kombëtar) at a Chicago mosque, his departing entourage came 
under gun fire. Halili, PDP chairman, was continually interrupted and 
antagonized during his speech. The audience objected to the cooperation of PDP 
with the Macedonian government. 
 
6 November 1992 
Clashes between Macedonian police and Albanians in the mostly Albanian 
neighbourhood of Bit Pazar in Skopje left four dead, and 36 Albanians and police 
injured. Following the disturbance police detained 87 people. The unrest 
exploded when police arrested and allegedly severely beat an Albanian youth 
charged with illicit dealings of cigarettes. During the unrest over 50 shops were 
ransacked and several police vehicles destroyed. Gunfire was also exchanged 
between the Macedonian police and Albanians. The rumour of the youth's 
beating, which infuriated ethnic Albanians, was apparently false. 
 
8 November 1992 
Following the disturbances that occurred in Skopje, the Interior Ministry 
announced the seizure of 2,000 leaflets calling on Albanians to wage war for the 
right to self-determination. 
 
9 November 1992 
Over 20,000 Albanians participated in the funeral of the three Albanians who 
died during the Bit Pazar riot. The men were buried in the Muslim section of 
Skopje's cemetery as observers waived the Albanian flag.  
 
10 November 1992 
The Parliament approved a new citizenship law which allowed ethnic 
Macedonians from abroad and those born in Macedonia to receive citizenship 
automatically. Those not fitting into these categories were required to have lived 
in Macedonia for 15 years before being eligible for citizenship. Further, the new 
law placed the status of citizenship under the full discretion of the Interior 
Ministry. 
 
11 December 1992 
The UN Security Council decides in Resolution 795 to deploy 700 UN 
peacekeepers to Macedonia. 
 
20-21 February 1993 
Macedonians demonstrated in Skopje against the building of refugee housing for 
displaced Muslims from the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The protestors were 
met by 200 riot police who dispersed the crowd with tear gas. The housing site 
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was originally planned for Macedonians returning from other parts of Yugoslavia 
but the influx of over 50,000 Bosnian refugees made their settlement a priority.  
 
1993 
Vevčani, populated solely by Macedonians, held its own referendum on 
independence after members of the country's Albanian community living nearby 
did the same. Ninety-six per cent voted in favour of independence and the local 
authorities declared the establishment of the Republic of Vevčani. This was 
considered to be a symbolic declaration by the central authorities. 
 
November 1993 
Macedonia's Deputy Defence Minister, Hisen Haskaj, and Deputy Health 
Minister, Imer Imeri, were arrested for alleged involvement in establishing an 
Albanian paramilitary group. The Macedonian police also reportedly arrested 
several more ethnic Albanians in Tetovo and Gostivar for charges pertaining to 
arms trafficking and involvement with ethnic Albanian separatist paramilitary 
organisations. Interior Minister Ljubomir Frčkovski stated that Deputy Defence 
Minister Hisen Haskaj was arrested for spying and collaborating with foreign 
secret services to smuggle arms into Macedonia. He stated that the operation was 
aimed at developing an organization called the All Albanian Army (AAA). The 
Interior Minister also said that AAA lists detailing the names of 20,000 ethnic 
Albanians were seized during the earlier arrests. 
 
4 December 1993 
Disagreements between hard line and moderate factions of the ethnic Albanian 
Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) culminated in the resignation of party 
president Nevzat Halili, General Secretary Mithad Emini, as well as the entire 
party presidium. PDP radicals, led by Menduh Thaçi, complained that the party, 
as part of the ruling coalition, made too many compromises which undermined 
ethnic Albanian interests.  
 
January 1994 
Mithad Emini, the former General Secretary of PDP, was arrested along with 
nine other ethnic Albanian for alleged separatist activities. The group was 
charged with involvement in the AAA plot. 
 
12 February 1994 
At a national congress held by PDP, the party officially splintered into two 
factions. The moderate faction, led by the old leaders, was determined to work 
within the system and achieve ethnic Albanian demands through compromise. 
The radical faction, led by Arben Xhaferi and Menduh Thaçi, criticised the 
government and opposed government policies. The split was preceded by growth 
in ethnic Albanian dissatisfaction with the PDP's involvement in the coalition 
government. 
 
18 June 1994 
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As tensions concerning the July census escalated, Albanians and Macedonians 
clashed in Tetovo. A Macedonian youth was fatally stabbed. Macedonian 
authorities arrested two Albanians as they attempted to leave the country. 
 
2 July 1994 
PDP walked out of the Macedonian parliament in a show of protest against the 
conviction of several ethnic Albanians accused of organising separatist 
paramilitary groups. PDP denounced the convictions as a political manoeuvre 
aimed at weakening PDP and constraining Albanian rights. Among those 
convicted by a Skopje court were two high level PDP members. The General 
Secretary of PDP, Mithad Emini, received an eight year sentence, and the former 
Deputy Defence Minister Hisen Haskaj received a six year sentence. 
 
14 November 1994 
Macedonia's census showed that Albanians accounted for 22.9 per cent of the 
country's population. The Albanians claimed that the census was falsified and 
that they accounted for up to 40 per cent of the population. International 
observers dismissed their objections. 
 
December 1994 
The Macedonian government blocked the opening of an Albanian-language 
university in Tetovo declaring it illegal. They later bulldozed the building which 
was to house the university. 
 
10 February 1995 
Albanian deputies forced Parliament to adjourn over the issue of ID cards that 
were to be printed only in Macedonian. 
 
15 February 1995 
2,000 ethnic Albanians gathered for the opening of Macedonia's first, albeit 
illegal, Albanian-language university. Police closed the university within a day. 
 
17 February 1995 
Violent clashes erupted between Albanians and Macedonian police. One man 
was killed. Deputies from PDP began to boycott parliamentary sessions. 
 
23 February 1995 
About 2,000 Macedonian students protested outside of Parliament demanding the 
closure of the Albanian-language university. 
 
27 February 1995 
All 19 Albanian deputies withdrew from Parliament demanding the right to use 
the Albanian-language in Parliament and the approval of the Albanian-language 
university in Tetovo. 
 
May 1995 





3 May 1995 
The dean of the illegal Albanian-language university was sentenced to two and a 
half years in jail for inciting the 17 February riot outside the university. Others 
were later sentenced to lesser sentences on similar charges. 
 
3 October 1995 
President Gligorov was critically hurt in a car bomb attack. The bomb, which 
targeted his car as he headed to work, cost him an eye and killed his driver and a 
bystander. 
 
4 July 1996 
More than 10,000 Albanians rallied in Tetovo, protesting against the jailing of 
Fadil Suleymani, the Dean of Tetovo University. Demonstrators demanded the 
university’s legalisation and its integration into the official education system. 
 
24 July 1996 
About 3,000 members of the Albanian minority protested in Skopje demanding 
the release of five of their leaders and permission to set up an Albanian language 
university in Tetovo. 
 
22 May 1997 
The Constitutional Court prohibited the use of the Albanian flag. The Parliament 
moved to adopt restrictive legislation. 
 
8 July 1997 
Protests in Tetovo and Gostivar demanding the free use of Albanian national 
symbols ended in violent clashes with security forces. Three local Albanians 
were killed and 500 arrested, including Rufi Osmani (Mayor of Gostivar). Gun 
battles ensued in which several policemen were wounded and 312 protesters 
were arrested. 
 
22 July 1997 
In an effort to defuse tensions in Gostivar and Tetovo, Parliament passed a law 
allowing the Albanian flag to be flown outside the town hall, but only on certain 
Macedonian national holidays. The mayors in both towns rejected the new law. 
 
17 September 1997 
Rufi Osmani is sentenced to 13 years in prison on charges of inciting ethnic 
hatred in the July riots. 
 
30 September 1997 
In his talks with Albanian President Meydani and Prime Minister Fatos Nano, 
Arben Xhaferi asks the Albanian Government to show more commitment to 
Albanians in Macedonia. Xhaferi proposes the establishment of a pan-national 
assembly to draft a pan-national strategy, including the creation of pan-national 




18 April 1998 
Thousands of Albanians protested in Gostivar for Rufi Osmani’s release from 
prison. 
 
22 July 1998 
Three explosions shocked Macedonia. The blasts, one of them in the centre of 
Skopje, caused only minor damage. 
 
20 January 1999 
Members of the governing coalition and Albanian parties in Macedonia backed 
an appeal by Speaker Savo Klimovski to President Kiro Gligorov, asking 
Gligorov to sign the amnesty law passed by Parliament in December. The law 
covered, among others, the Albanian mayors of Gostivar and Tetovo, Rufi 
Osmani and Alaydin Demiri. 
 
4 February 1999 
The Macedonian Parliament overruled a presidential veto and amnestied 8,000 
prisoners, including Rufi Osmani. 
 
15 April 1999 
Albanian political parties were reportedly helping the Prime Minister of 
Kosovo’s provisional government. Recruits from western Macedonia were been 
sent to training centres in northern Albania, where they were trained for combat 
in Kosovo. 
 
17 April 1999 
The Tetovo police rejected media claims that there were centres for the 
recruitment of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) fighters in Tetovo municipality. 
The Skopje daily Dnevnik, reported that a special headquarters existed in the 
Tetovo village of Poroj, which performed the task of accepting Kosovo refugees, 
as well as organising the transfer of Albanian volunteers from Macedonia to the 
KLA. 
 
22 April 1999 
Macedonian Prime Minister Ljubčo Georgievski warned that the influx of 
Albanian refugees from Kosovo was threatening the demographic balance of the 
country. 
 
25 January 2001 
Albanian paramilitaries claimed responsibility for a rocket attack on a police 
station in Macedonia, which left one officer dead and three others wounded. 
 
19 February 2001 
The National Liberation Army clashed with a military patrol in Macedonia.  
 
2 March 2001 
The Macedonian Parliament ratified a border treaty with Serbia. Only the 
opposition PDP voted against ratification on the grounds that authorities in 
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Kosovo were not consulted. NATO issued a last minute appeal to Macedonia not 
to embark on a military offensive against Albanian paramilitaries. Macedonian 
authorities warned NATO that they were losing patience following the 
appearance of about 200 Albanian fighters in the border village of Tanuševci. 
 
4 March 2001 
Macedonia sealed its border with Kosovo after three soldiers were killed in 
heavy fighting with Albanian rebels, led by Ali Ahmeti. 
 
5 March 2001 
The Macedonian army announced a general mobilization. 
 
7 March 2001 
Macedonia’s Defence Ministry claimed that Macedonian positions had been 
attacked with mortar fire, as NATO peacekeepers joined Macedonian units in a 
bid to seal off the rebel-held areas. As he addressed Parliament, the Macedonian 
President made a public promise to root out Albanian terrorism and extremism. 
 
10 March 2001 
Albanian rebels launched separate attacks on Macedonian and Yugoslav forces 
killing two people and wounding another three. Armed Albanians, numbering 
300 to 500 men, with a logistic base in Kosovo were operating in a mountainous 
region in Macedonia bordering Kosovo. Greece and Bulgaria announced they 
were sending military aid to Macedonia to help its struggle against the rebels. 
 
14 March 2001 
The Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) extended its attacks to Tetovo. 
 
20 March 2001 
Security forces began a heavy attack against paramilitary fighters and issued an 
ultimatum that weapons be laid down. 
 
21 March 2001 
The government rejected a rebel cease-fire and proceeded with its military 
offensive. 
 
22 March 2001 
Two Albanians were killed by police at a checkpoint when they appeared to pull 
out grenades. The EU urged Macedonia to show restraint and intensify 
discussions with Albanian militants. 
 
24 March 2001 





25 March 2001 
Macedonian security forces undertook attacks with tanks and helicopters against 
rebels in Tetovo. Prime Minister Georgievski stated that the attack began 
immediately after the termination of the government ultimatum to the terrorists. 
 
2 April 2001 
President Trajkovski expressed readiness to join an all-party dialogue and revise 
sections of the Macedonian Constitution. Macedonians protested against 
anticipated changes. DPA leader Arben Xhaferi threatened to leave the 
government if the demands of the Albanian minority were not met within one 
month. 
 
28 April 2001 
Eight Macedonian soldiers and police were killed by rebels near the Kosovo 
border. This led to Macedonians rioting in Bitola on 1 May where they destroyed 
Albanian shops following the funerals of soldiers killed in the ambush.  
 
3 May 2001 
Troops backed by helicopter gunships began a fresh offensive against Albanian 
rebels after two soldiers were killed and one kidnapped in an ambush. 
 
12 May 2001 
The Parliament approved a national unity government. 
 
15 May 2001 
The new unity government ordered a halt to attacks on Albanian rebels but 
warned them to clear out of northern villages within two days or face full-scale 
assaults. 
 
25 May 2001 
Government troops began a ground assaults against rebels and some 3,000 
civilians fled the area. 
 
1 June 2001 
The government offered amnesty to the Albanian militants if they laid down their 
weapons. 
 
6 June 2001 
Albanian shops and a mosque in the southern town of Bitola were torched in riots 
before the funerals of Macedonian soldiers killed by rebels.  
 
10 June 2001 
Albanian rebel leader Commander Hoxha threatened to take the insurgency into 
the cities unless the government stopped fighting in the north. 
 
13 June 2001 
Police announced that men of fighting age in Skopje were mobilised, following 




15 June 2001 
Rebels declared a unilateral cease-fire as politicians began talks to resolve the 
crisis. 
 
22 June 2001 
Government troops ended an 11-day cease-fire and attacked Albanian rebels with 
tanks and helicopter gunships. 
 
24 June 2001 
Macedonia called off an offensive against Albanian rebels near Skopje after talks 
with European Union officials.  
 
25 June 2001 
Rioting erupted in Skopje after US troops escorted rebels from Aračinovo. 
 
26 June 2001 
Armed protesters besieged the Parliament in Skopje, angry at what they saw as 
leniency towards Albanian rebels. President Boris Trajkosvki made a national 
appeal for peace. 
 
23 July 2001 
Macedonian protesters in Skopje, angered by Western efforts at mediation, 
attacked symbolic targets. 
 
8 August 2001 
Political leaders initialled a peace accord as rebels ambushed an army convoy 
and killed 10 soldiers. 
 
10-12 August 2001 
Two mines hit military trucks near Skopje and seven soldiers were killed. 
Macedonian security forces supported by paramilitaries launched an assault on 
Ljuboten. Macedonian forces killed six Albanian civilians and burned at least 22 
houses in the village. Another three were killed from indiscriminate shelling and 
another died when shot while fleeing. 
 
13 August 2001 
Macedonian and Albanian political parties signed the western-backed 
Framework Agreement, involving greater recognition of Albanian rights in 
exchange for a rebel pledge to hand over weapons to NATO forces. 
 
17 August 2001 
NATO’s 1st advance troops of Operation Essential Harvest arrived in Skopje. 
 
22 August 2001 
NATO members gave formal approval for alliance soldiers to collect weapons 




24 August 2001 
Rebels agreed to hand over some 3,000 weapons. The government had earlier 
estimated that the rebels had up to 100,000 weapons. 
 
26 August 2001 
An explosion at a hotel in Čelopek killed two Macedonians. 
 
27 September 2001 
Albanian rebels declared that they had formally disbanded and were returning to 
civilian life. 
 
4 October 2001 
Macedonian security forces, in opposition to external warnings, took control of 
three Albanian villages but were met with armed resistance from others.  
 
11 October 2001 
Police found a cache of arms in an area held by Albanian rebels. 
 
12 November 2001 
Three policemen were killed in fighting following the seizure of hostages by 
Albanians near Tetovo in response to a police raid. 
 
16 November 2001 
The Parliament adopted constitutional amendments agreed to under the 
Framework Agreement. 
 
2-3 March 2002 
Macedonian police killed seven men who allegedly attempted to ambush them 
near Butel, a suburb of Skopje. Police say the attackers were Pakistanis. Foreign 
officials later discounted these assertions and suspected that they were illegal 
immigrants. A two year investigation into the so-called Raštanski Lozja affair 
revealed that police had staged the killing to demonstrate their support for the US 
led campaign against terrorism and claim that Macedonia too was dealing with 
its own Islamic militants. A bomb blast at the Macedonian consulate in Karachi 
on 5 December 2002 killed three people in apparent retaliation. 
 
29 August 2002 
In western Macedonia police killed two Albanians after gunmen abducted at least 
five people from a bus. The five abducted people were released after two days. 
 
14 September 2002 
An Albanian was killed and two were wounded in a clash with police, as tensions 
soared on the eve of national elections. The Albanian National Army (ANA) 
launched a number of attacks in Kosovo and Macedonia. ANA also claimed 




15 September 2002 
The Social Democrats under Branko Crvenkovski won government. Most 
Albanian voters backed the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), under 
former rebel Ali Ahmeti. 
 
31 October 2002 
ANA claimed responsibility for bomb blast outside of the Parliament building. 
 
August 2003 
Grenades launched by unknown people hit government buildings in Skopje.  
 
7 September 2003 
Macedonian police clashed with Albanian militants in the volatile north and 
reported killing several men in what they said was a major sweep against 
paramilitary groups. 
 
23 January 2004 
The Macedonian Parliament officially recognised the University of Tetovo, 
where the language of instruction is primarily Albanian. 
 
14 February 2004 
ANA claimed responsibility for a bomb blast outside of the Struga courthouse. 
 
26 February 2004 
Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski was killed when his plane crashed in 
southern Bosnia. 
 
28 April 2004 
Macedonians elected Branko Crvenkovski, the then Prime Minister, as President. 
His opponent, Saško Kedev claimed electoral fraud. 
 
23 July 2004 
Thousands of Macedonians protested against proposals to revise municipal 
boundaries and give Albanians more power in certain areas. Macedonian protests 
turned into rioting in Struga. 
 
July to December 2004 
The Krasniqi group occupied the village of Kondovo, outside of Skopje. 
 
7 November 2004 
A referendum against the revision of municipal boundaries and the related 
decentralisation failed. 
 
February to August 2005 




14 March 2005 
The Hague tribunal indicted former Macedonian Interior Minister Ljube 
Boškovski and Johan Tarčulovski for war crimes. 
 
6 July 2006 
Prime Minister Vlado Bučkovski conceded defeat to VMRO-DPMNE in 
Macedonia's parliamentary elections. Nikola Gruevski became Prime Minister. 
 
26 August 2006 
The Democratic Union for Integration and the Party for Democratic Prosperity 
held a protest at which three police officers were injured. 
 
29 November 2006 
The Macedonian Minister of Education received several death threats after 
dismissing the rector and several Albanian professors from the University in 
Tetovo. 
 
16 April 2007 
Former Interior Minister Ljube Boškovski went on trial at the international 
tribunal in The Hague, charged with war crimes during the 2001 war. 
 
March 2007 
Gruevski met with the leader of the Albanian opposition and Ali Ahmeti 
agreeing to start over with the (until then) blocked political dialogue, as well as 




Another grenade attack on government facilities occurred. 
 
7 November 2007 
Police undertook Operation Mountain Storm near the village of Brodec against a 
group of Albanian paramilitaries and Islamists in which eight gunmen were 
killed and large quantities of weapons were found. 
 
1 June 2008 
Macedonia's parliamentary election was marred by violence in Albanian areas 
and suspected fraud, with one person killed and nine wounded, and voting halted 
in one town after a gun battle. Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski won an 
overwhelming election victory but monitors criticised the violence that marred 
the poll. The government promised to repeat voting in 22 polling stations that 
were shut down due to shootings or alleged ballot fraud. 
 
10 July 2008 
Ljube Boškovski was freed by the ICTY in his trial for the Ljuboten massacre. 




5 April 2009 
Ǵorǵe Ivanov won the Presidential elections. 
 
12 May 2010 
Macedonian police stated that a shootout between police and an armed group 
near the country's border with Kosovo left four people dead. Police had 
intercepted them attempting to smuggle weapons across the border from Kosovo. 
 
13 February 2011 
Albanians and Macedonians clashed at the historic Kale Fortress in Skopje over a 
dispute relating to a new structure being built on the foundations of a 13th century 
church. Eight people were injured. 
 
March 2012 
Twenty people were arrested and dozens injured in two weeks of clashes 
between Macedonian and Albanian youths. 
 
8 April 2012 
Five Macedonians were executed on the shores of Lake Smilkovci near Skopje. 
 
May 2012 
Police arrested 20 suspected Islamists over the Lake Smilkovci executions.  
 
1 March 2013 
Macedonians protested in Skopje, angry at the appointment of an Albanian 
Defence Minister, who was an NLA commander during the 2001 war. 
 
2 March 2013 
Violent ethnic riots rattle Macedonia's capital, culminating with hundreds raging 
through the city centre, clashing with police, overturning cars, and attacking a 
bus station. At least 22 people were injured, 13 of them police officers. 
 
20 May 2014 
Macedonian police announced that they had detained 18 people following 
overnight riots in Skopje sparked by the fatal stabbing of a Macedonian teenager 
by an Albanian bicycle thief. Police arrested a 19-year-old suspect for the 
murder. 
 
30 June 2014 
A Macedonian court convicted six Albanians of murdering five Macedonian 
fishermen in Lake Smilkovci on Easter 2012, in an alleged plot to destabilise the 
country and sentenced them to life imprisonment. Two of the defendants were 
tried in absentia because they were serving jail terms in neighbouring Kosovo 




14 July 2014 
Macedonian police fired tear gas and stun grenades in clashes with around 2,000 
Albanians who took to the streets of the capital to protest the jailing of the 
Smilkovci suspects for murder and terrorism. 
 
28 October 2014 
A group calling itself the NLA claimed responsibility for the rocket-propelled 
grenades that were launched at a Macedonian government building in Skopje. 
 
21 April 2015 
Forty militants claiming to be part of the NLA attacked a police watchtower in 
the village of Gošince on the border with Kosovo. 
 
9-10 May 2015 
Clashes in the northern town of Kumanovo left eight police and 14 gunmen dead. 
The government blamed Albanian terrorists from neighbouring Kosovo for the 
gun battle. The militants were linked to the same group that attacked the police 
watchtower in Gošince on 21 April 2015. Opposition parties staged large protests 
calling on Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski to resign over alleged corruption, 








Taking as the points of departure the historical, cultural, spiritual and statehood 
heritage of the Macedonian people and their struggle over centuries for national 
and social freedom as well as for the creation of their own state, and particularly 
the traditions of statehood and legality of the Kruševo Republic and the historic 
decisions of the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the People's Liberation of Macedonia, 
together with the constitutional and legal continuity of the Macedonian state as a 
sovereign republic within Federal Yugoslavia and the freely manifested will of 
the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia in the referendum of September 8th, 
1991, as well as the historical fact that Macedonia is established as a national 
state of the Macedonian people, in which full equality as citizens and permanent 
co-existence with the Macedonian people is provided for Albanians, Turks, 
Vlachs, Romanies and other nationalities living in the Republic of Macedonia, 
and intent on:  
- the establishment of the Republic of Macedonia as a sovereign and 
independent state, as well as a civil and democratic one;  
- the establishment and consolidation of the rule of law as a fundamental 
system of government;  
- the guaranteeing of human rights, citizens, freedoms and ethnic equality;  
- the provision of peace and a common home for the Macedonian people 
with the nationalities living in the Republic of Macedonia; and on  
- the provision of social justice, economic wellbeing and prosperity in the 
life of the individual and the community,  
 
the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia adopts THE CONSTITUTION OF 




Preamble (as agreed in the Framework Agreement) 
The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, taking over responsibility for the 
present and future of their fatherland, aware and grateful to their predecessors for 
their sacrifice and dedication in their endeavours and struggle to create an 
independent and sovereign state of Macedonia, and responsible to future 
generations to preserve and develop everything that is valuable from the rich 
cultural inheritance and coexistence within Macedonia, equal in rights and 
obligations towards the common good – the Republic of Macedonia, in 
accordance with the tradition of the Kruševo Republic and the decisions of the 
Antifascist People’s Liberation Assembly of Macedonia, and the Referendum of 
September 8, 1991, they have decided to establish the Republic of Macedonia as 
an independent, sovereign state, with the intention of establishing and 
consolidating rule of law, guaranteeing human rights and civil liberties, 
providing peace and coexistence, social justice, economic well-being and 
prosperity in the life of the individual and the community, and in this regard 
through their representatives in the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 
elected in free and democratic elections, they adopt THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 
 
Preamble (as amended in 2001) 
The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, the Macedonian people, as well as 
citizens living within its borders who are part of the Albanian people, the Turkish 
people, the Vlach people, the Serbian people, the Romany people, the Bosniak 
people and others taking responsibility for the present and future of their 
fatherland, aware of and grateful to their predecessors for their sacrifice and 
dedication in their endeavours and struggle to create an independent and 
sovereign state of Macedonia, and responsible to future generations to preserve 
and develop everything that is valuable from the rich cultural inheritance and 
coexistence within Macedonia, equal in rights and obligations towards the 
common good - the Republic of Macedonia - in accordance with the tradition of 
the Kruševo Republic and the decisions of the Antifascist People’s Liberation 
Assembly of Macedonia, and the Referendum of September 8, 1991, have 
356 
 
decided to establish the Republic of Macedonia as an independent, sovereign 
state, with the intention of establishing and consolidating the rule of law, 
guaranteeing human rights and civil liberties, providing peace and coexistence, 
social justice, economic well-being and prosperity in the life of the individual 
and the community, and, in this regard, through their representatives in the 
Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, elected in free and democratic 






Key Flash Points 
 
 
Key zones prone to ethno-religious violence include Skopksa Crna Gora, the 























Ethnic Map of Struga Municipality 
 



























Lions (2001), Šar Planina 
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Macedonian Paramilitaries (2001), Tetovo 




Russian volunteers (2001), attached to Macedonian paramilitaries 





Crosses and Mosques 
 
 
Millennium Cross, Mt. Vodno (Skopje) 
















Newly constructed mosque, Struga 





Newly constructed mosque, Tetovo 




























Weapons Cache – Brodec 
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